Y 


OUNG 


THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 


THE    MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

NEW  YORK    •    BOSTON   •    CHICAGO   •    DALLAS 
ATLANTA   •   SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO..  Limited 

LONDON    •    BOMBAY    •    CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA.  Lia. 

TORONTO 


THE   TREND    OF    HISTORY 

Origins  of  Twentieth  Century  Problems 


BY 

WILLIAM  KAY  WALLACE 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1922 

All  rights  reterved 


PRINTED   IN   THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 


Copyright,  1922, 
By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY, 


Set  up  and  printed.    Published  October,  1922, 


Press  of 

J.  J.  Little  &  Ives  Company 

New  York.  U.  S.  A. 


-y-^  LIBRARY 

J^  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 


3^3 


SANTA  BAimAiU 


TO 

W.  D.  W. 

I  GRATEFULLY  DEDICATE 
THIS  BOOK 


PREFACE 

W^  ^re  sfanrlingjnn  the  threshold  of  an  unpolitical  j 
age.  Politics  has  fallen  trom  its  high  estate.  Since  the 
flopdgates  of  political  privilege  have  been  opened,  and 
participation  in  political  affairs  has  been  vouchsafed  to 
all,  we  find  everywhere  a  progressively  increasing  apathy 
in  matters  relating  to  politics.  The  preeminence  of  the 
^tcttf  p^^Hf-inlly  rnnrpi'vpr^,  has  been  called  into  question. 
Its  sovereignty  has  been  shorn  of  many  of  its  mystical 
characteristics.  Other  forms  of  corporate  organisation 
are  pressing  for  recognition.  We  may  in  turn  see  arising 
beforfi^onr  eyps^a  new,  great  social  institution.  Like 
feudalism  it  is  iji  Its  essence  unpolitical.  As  Lord  Bryce 
has  pointed  out  "feudalism  was  a  social  and  legal  system, 
only  indirectly  and  by  consequence  a  political  one."  We 
may  to-day  note  that  "industrialism,"  which  may  serve  to 
denominate  this  new  institution,  is  a  social  and  economic 
system,  only  indirectly^ political.  Siich  would  appear  to  be 
the  trend^i^f  history. 

History  is  the  book  of  life  of  mankind.  Its  function 
is  primarily  interpretative.  Historical  interpretation 
means  the  selection  of  those  relevant  factors  out  of  the 
mass  of  past  events  which  stand  in  significant  relation  to 
the  present  moment.  Every  age  may  thus  be  said  to  have 
historical  ties  which  at  first  sight  seem  Incongruous.  In 
our  own  times  the  Interest  in  guild  organisation,  the  as- 
sertion that  occupation  or  function  rather  than  geograph- 
ical distribution  is  destined  to  become  the  basis  of  more 
adequate  social  organisation,  hark  back  to  the  Middle 

vii 


y 


/ 


viii  PREFACE 

Ages,  and  are  closer  thereto  than  to  the  theories  of 
State  and  the  political  practice  which  were  still  more  or 
less  universally  accepted  before  the  World  War.  Thus 
history  must  ever  be  written  afresh,  for  after  a  few  years 
such  writing  inevitably  becomes  obsolete,  except  as  of 
literary  or  antiquarian  interest.  But  history  itself  is 
never  obsolete.  The  historical  present  is  the  outcome  of 
a  past  which  it  is  the  purpose  of  history  to  trace.  In 
our  own  times  the  transformation  which  is  taking  place  in 
the  theory  of  social  organisation  requires  that  the  method 
of  historical  writing  be  revised. 

Hitherto  history  has  generally  been  conceived  in  an 
exclusively  political  sense  as  a  record  of  the  res  qestae, 
and  of  the  men  who  brought  them  to  pass.  As  long  as 
politics  remained  dominant  it  was  natural  that  history 
should  have  remained  primarily  political  in  character. 
But  we  can  now  perceive  that  political  history  or  any 
other  partial  survey  of  events  in  their  isolation,  such  as 
is  embodied  In  a  biography  or  even  in  a  national  history, 
is  no  longer  adequate.  History  must  henceforth  be  ap- 
proached from  an  institutional,  not  from  an  Individual  or 
national  standpoint.  The  theoretical  background  of 
social  practice  must  be  Inquired  into.  ~Tn  this  brief  survey 
I  would  point  the  way  to  this  new  method  of  histojy.  To 
trace  through  the  tangled  maze  we  call  the  course  of 
events  the  logical  antecedents  and  coefficients  thereof  is  to 
discover  the  trend  of  history,  the  process  of  social  life. 
Such  is  the  purpose  of  this  volume. 

The  chaotic  state  of  mind  which  exists  so  widely 
among  all  manner  and  condition  of  persons  Is  in  a  great 
measure  due  to  the  fact  that  the  relevant  factors  of  his- 
tory, the  connective  tissue  between  the  past  and  the  pres- 
ent, are  obscure.  The  great  obsolete  mass  of  dead  matter 
incorporated  in  the  average  historical  survey  illustrates 


PREFACE  ix 

significantly  the  point  I  wish  to  make.  I  would  not  infer 
that  political  data  have  been  omitted  from  this  book.  On 
the  contrary  as  it  reviews  a  predominantly  political  period, 
in  fact  traces  in  outline  the  rise,  maturity  and  decay  of 
modern  political  practice,  politics  has  found  a  large  place 
therein.  But  I  have  endeavoured  in  so  far  as  possible  to 
present  the  theory  of  the  age  and  illustrate  it  by  the  prac- 
tice of  politics,  and  I  trust  that  I  may  have  succeeded  in  a 
mc'asure  in  pointing  beyond  this  theory  and  practice  to  the 
newer  theory  that  was  being  developed. 

Though  politics  can  no  longer  be  held  to  be  pivotal, 
in  history,  we  cannot  disregard  the  fact  that  the  aim  of 
politics  is  to  arrive  at  some  workable  functioning  of 
what  we  term  social  life.  But  in  this  politics  has  no  ex- 
clusive monopoly.  Religion,  politics  and  economics  are 
the  three  great  regulative  factors  of  human  intercourse 
subsumed  under  the  term — Society.  At  various  epochs 
the  principal  emphasis  has  been  placed  now  on  one,  now 
on  another  of  these  elements,  according  to  a  certain  his- 
torically relevant  relationship  which  may  be  traced.  It  is 
a  one-sided  distortion  of  historical  truth  to  attempt  to 
claim  absolute  preeminence  for  any  one  of  these  factors, 
though  the  dominance  first  of  one  and  then  of  another  is 
confirmed  by  a  perusal  of  history.  As  a  consequence  the 
manner  and  mode  of  the  civilisation  of  a  given  epoch,  the 
cultural  life  of  a  period  is  colored  by  the  dominant  char- 
acteristic of  the  age,  be  it  religious,  political  or  economic. 
In  this  first  volume  I  would  present  for  your  consid- 
eration the  origins  and  background  of  present-day  social 
phenomena.  I  would  trace  in  this  new  historical  spirit  the 
course  of  relevant  events  which  has  led  up  to  those  of 
the  epoch  which  we  may  conveniently  call  our  own.  It  is 
sheer  pedantry  or  an  utter  misunderstanding  of  the  aim 
of  history  to  declare  that  the  events  of  his  own  times  are 


X  PREFACE 

too  vivid,  too  fresh  for  an  historian  to  undertake  to  inter- 
pret them.  In  point  of  fact  the  only  history  that  is  ade- 
^  quate  is  ^'^"t^rrr  ^  ""'T  ^■■"'•'^'•Yi  that  is,  history  that  is 
related  to  the  present.  All  the  research  of  historians, 
all  the  delvings  of  students  into  texts  and  yellowed  parch- 
ments to  eke  out  the  minutiae  of  facts,  which  Macaulay 
nearly  a  century  ago  significantly  termed  the  "mere  dross 
of  history,"  are  in  themselves  worthless  unless  linked 
up  with  the  current  of  events. 

History  reveals  life  in  its  manifoldness  and  com- 
plexity. In  order  to  introduce  some  semblance  of  unity, 
to  take  history  out  of  the  realm  of  chronicles,  to  free  it 
from  a  parity  with  fiction  or  a  disparity  with  romance, 
we  must  assure  ourselves  that  it  is  made  understandable 
in  terms  of  contemporary  interest  and  usage.  History  in 
this  sense  is  not  merely  the  book  of  life,  it  may  if  read 
aright  become  the  book  of  wisdom  of  jnankiad.  I  do  not 
mean  to  imply  that  it  should  be  looked  upon  as  a  collection 
of  recipes  to  be  followed  in  guiding  individual  action,  or 
that  it  can  serve,  as  it  is  so  often  held,  as  the  magjster 
vitae  of  a  person  calling  himself  a  statesman.  But  pre- 
senting those  events  which  are  closely  related  to  our  own 
times  and  showing  the  relationship  that  exists  between  the 
past  and  the  present,  not  only  may  we  hope  to  arrive  at  an 
understanding  of  the  significance  of  the  course  of  events, 
but  we  may  even  discern  a  pattern  of  purpose  in  social  life. 
This  purposive  element  is  in  itself  only  discernible  a  pos- 
teriori and  should  not  be  taken  as  implying  some  rigid  no- 
tion of  historical  causality.  For  history  which  recounts 
the  story  of  the  life  process  in  its  entirety  admits  of  no 
such  notion  as  an  efl^cient  or  final  cause.  It  is  nevertheless 
with  these  causal  factors  that  history  is  primarily  con- 
cerned. It  is  by  weaving  them  into  a  unity,  by  setting 
forth  cogently  whatever  may  serve  to  explain  their  mean- 


PREFACE  xi 

ing,  that  the  course  of  events,   the   trend  of  history  is 
revealed. 

In  selecting  the  historical  data  used  to  illustrate  this 
inquiry,  much  had  perforce  to  be  abridged,  much  omitted 
which  might  possibly  have  found  a  place  in  these  pages. 
Thus,  for  example,  in  discussing  the  rise  of  the  modern 
State,  the  influence  of  the  Counter-Reformation,  and  the 
part  played  by  the  Jesuits  in  joining  hands  with  the  liberal 
movement  in  undermining  the  concept  of  the  divine  right 
of  kings,  and  their  struggle  against  monarchical  absolut- 
ism, some  might  aver,  should  have  been  included.  This 
very  interesting  episode  has  like  others  been  omitted  not 
only  because  of  the  need  of  limiting  the  scope  of  the  nar- 
rative within  reasonable  bounds,  but  also  because  the 
Counter-Reformation  and  the  work  of  its  protagonists 
were  historically  negative.  What  the  Jesuits  sought  was 
the  restoration  of  papal  supremacy  in  matters  temporal, 
and  not  the  positive  progress  of  the  new  and  more  liberal 
political  practice.  Other  omissions  might  be  cited,  but  a 
careful  study  has  led  me  to  conclude  that  in  the  main  their 
influence  was  negative,  and  had  no  preeminently  positive 
influence  on  the  course  of  history. 

W.  K.  Wallace 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Introduction  i 

BOOK  I 

/.  CHAPTER  I 

The  Politico-Theistic  Concept  of  the  State 

MachiavelH — Bodin — The  Precursors  of  the  New  Politico-Juridic 
Movement — Locke — Althusius — Grotius 17 

CHAPTER  II 

The  Genesis  of  Constitutional  Government 

The  Moral  Attributes  of  the  State — The  Role  of  England — The 
Declaration  and  Bill  of  Right — Influence  of  the  Middle  Class — 
Spread   of    Liberalism 25 

CHAPTER  III 

The  Rise  of  Public  Opinion 

France  of  the  Eighteenth  Century — Humanity — Liberty — Progress 
— Montesquieu — Turgot — Condorcet — Rousseau 35 

CHAPTER  IV 

American  Independence 

Causes  and  Aims — Temper  of  the  Colonists — Influence  of  French 
Political  Theory — English  Practice 54 

CHAPTER  V 

The  Middle  Class   Mind 

Free  Humanity — Cosmopolitanism — Economic  Interest — Influence 
of  the  Physiocrats — Adam  Smith — Political  Liberty — Economic  In- 
dependence     65 

xiii 


xiV  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  VI 
The  French   Revolution 

,  PAGE 

Foreign  Influcr.ee — The  New  Spirit— The  Tiers  Etat — The  Rights 
of  Man — The  Constitution  of  1791 73 

CHAPTER  VII 

The  Idea  of  Nationalism 

The  Effects  of  the  Revolution — ^The  New  Concept  of  Liberty — 
National  Self-Consciousness — Napoleon  I — His  Political  Importance 
— His  Historical  Role 80 


CHAPTER  VIII 

The  Restoration 

The  Spread  of  Constitutional  Government — Sicily  (1812) — Spain 
(1812) — France  (1814) — Minor  German  States — The  Destiny  of 
Europe — The  Congress  of  Vienna — The  Holy  Alliance — The  Policy 
of  Legitimacy — Aix-la-Chapelle — Troppau — Laibach — The  Monroe 
Doctrine        88 


CHAPTER  IX 

The  Aftermath 

The  Temper  of  the  Early  Nineteenth  Century — New  Schools  of 
Politics — The  Socialist  Doctrine — St.  Simon — The  Increasing  Im- 
portance   of   Economics 97 


CHAPTER  X 

The  Triumph  of  the  Middle  Class 

Greek  Independence — The  Revolution  of  1830 — Louis  Philippe, 
King  of  the  French — The  Whigs  in  Power — The  Reform  Act  (1832) 
— Belgian  Independence — Economics  and  Politics — The  Competitive 
Ideal — Capitalism  and  Nationalism — The  Business  Man  in  Politics 
— The  Case  of  Algeria — Portents  of  Decay — Chartism    ....     104. 


CONTENTS  XV 

BOOK  II 

CHAPTER  I 

Political  Maturity 

PAGE 

Comparative  Methods — The  Time  Element — Metaphysical  Char- 
acter of  Politics — Physical   Factors — Duration 115 

CHAPTER  II 

,,  The  Spread  of  Nationalism 

Louis  Napoleon — Consolidation  of  Middle  Class  Control  in  France 
— Comte — The  Teachings  of  Positivism — Utilitarianism  in  England 
— The  Situation  in  Germany — The  Zollverein — Fichte — Racial  In- 
fluences     122 

CHAPTER  III 

The  Awakening  of  Germany 

The  Influence  of  Hegel — His  Political  Ideas — Their  Widespread 
Acceptance — Comparison  of  German,  French,  and  English  Theory — 
The  Accession  of  Frederick  Wilhelm  IV — Economic  Development 
— The  New  Nationalism 133 

CHAPTER  IV 

1 830- 1 848 

Louis  Philippe — Economic  Factors — Attitude  of  the  Middle  Class 
— The  Right  to  Vote — The  Extension  of  Suffrage — Revolutionary 
Outbreaks  of  1848 — Causes — Italy — France — Germany — Austria — 
Historical    Motives 143 

CHAPTER  V 

Communism 

The  Manifesto  of  1848 — The  Marxian  Theory — Historical  Ma- 
terialism— The  Influence  of  Hegel — Economic  Interpretation  of 
History — Opposition  to  Democratic  Doctrines — Revolutionary  Tac- 
tics       157 


XVI  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  VI 

The  Nation-State 

PAGE 

The  French  Constitution  of  1852— The  Second  Empire — The  Cen- 
tralisation of  Authority- — Colonial  Expansion — The  British  Empire 
— Industrial  Exhibitions — Prosperity   and   Politics 172 

CHAPTER  VII 

Napoleon  III 

His  Nationalist  Policy — Relations  with  Foreign  Powers — The  Posi- 
tion of  Russia — Pan-Slavic  Movement — The  Crimean  War — The 
Role  of  England — The  Congress  of  Paris — Russophile  Tendencies  .      181 

CHAPTER  VIII 

The  New  Nationalism 

Survey  of  the  International  Situation — Relations  between  States — 
Napoleon  III  and  Italian  Unity — The  War  with  Austria — Villa- 
franca — Effects  of  Union  of  Italy — Poland — Franco-Russian  Ten- 
sion— The  Mexican  Expedition — Bismarck  and  the  War  with  Den- 
mark— Annexation  of  the  Danish  Duchies — Prussia  and  Austria — 
Sadowa — The  Treaty  of  Prague — The  North  German  Confederation 
— The  Collapse  of  the  Mexican  Empire — The  Luxemburg  Incident — 
The  German  Menace — The  War  of  1870 — Sedan — The  Foundation 
of  the   German  Empire 190 

CHAPTER  IX 

Realpolitik 

The  Motives  of  Public  Policy — Neo-Machiavellianism — Morality 
and  Politics — The  Personalised  Nation-State — Definition  of  Realism 
— Philosophic  Background — The  Influence  of  Pessimism — Schopen- 
hauer— Decline  of  the  Politico-Juridic  Theory  of  State — The  State 
as  Power — Volitional   Factors 209 

CHAPTER  X 

The  Politico-Economic  Theory  of  State 

Term  Defined — The  End  of  the  State — Role  of  the  Individual — 
Union  of  the  State  and  Its  Members — Phases  of  Transition — Classi- 
fication of  States — New   Functions  of  the   State — Education — Public 


CONTENTS  xvii 

PAGE 

Welfare — Economic  Enterprise — Motives  of  Public  Policy — The 
New  Absolutism — Survey  of  the  Contribution  of  the  Middle  Class  to 
Political  Theory 223 


BOOK  III 

CHAPTER  I 

The  First  International  Movement 

The  Decline  of  Nationalism — Quantitative  Values — Imperialism 
and  Internationalism — The  Part  of  England — Organisation  of  In- 
t§rnati'onal  Movement — Its  Character — Rapid  Growth — The  Con- 
gress of  Basel — The  Paris  Commune — The  Attitude  of  the  Middle 
Class        


24s 


CHAPTER  II 

Imperialism 

Relation  to  Capitalism — Role  of  the  Proletariat — Megalomania 
of  the  Epoch — Processes  of  Decay — Influence  of  Pessimism    .     .     .     256 

CHAPTER  III 

The  Rise  of  the  Proletariat 

Dualism  in  Politics — Principles  of  Public  Policy — Disraeli — His 
Place  in  History — Leader  of  Imperialist  Movement — His  Affinity 
with  the  Proletariat — Aristocracy,  Middle  Class,  and  Proletariat — 
Interpretation  of  their  Political  and  Social  Theories 263 

CHAPTER  IV 

The  New  Europe 

Relative  Position  of  the  Powers — The  Predominance  of  Germany 
— The  Dreika'tserbund — The  Rapid  Recovery  of  France — The  Crisis 
of  1875 — The  Situation  in  the  Balkans — British  Foreign  VoVicy — 
England  and  Turkey — Plans  for  the  Pacification  of  the  Balkans — 
The  Suez   Canal   Incident 272 

CHAPTER  V 

The  Eastern  Question 

Conflicting  Influences — Reforms  a  la  Turque — The  Programme  of 
the  Three  Emperors — The  Berlin  Memorandum — Firm  Attitude  of 


xviii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

England — War  in  the  Balkans — The  Reichstadt  Agreement — Bul- 
garian Atrocities — Abdul  Hamid — The  Constantinople  Conference 
— The  Porte  Proclaims  a  Constitution — Efforts  to  Keep  the  Peace 
— Russia  Declares  War — British  Threat  of  Intervention  to  Pro- 
tect Constantinople — Austria  and  the  Western  Balkans — Plevna — 
Bismarck  and  German  Interest  in  Balkan  Affairs — Russia  Vic- 
torious— The  Treaty  of  San  Stefano 283 

CHAPTER  VI 

The  Congress  of  Berlin 

Objects  of  the  Congress — Treaty  of  San  Stefano  Revised — Dis- 
tribution of  Territory — Erection  of  Independent  Balkan  States — 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina — Cyprus — The  New  Orientation  in  Foreign 
Affairs — Maturity  of  Nation-States — Plans  of  Expansion — The  Euro- 
pean   Viewpoint 295 

CHAPTER  VII 

The   State  as   Power 

Bismarckian  Doctrines — Relation  to  Marxism — The  Interpretation 
of  Treitschke — Objective  Concept  of  Power — Church  and  State — 
Berlin  and  the  Vatican — The  Significance  of  the  Kulturkampf — So- 
cial Problems — Bismarck's  Programme  of  Social  Welfare — Disraeli's 
Attitude — England  and   Germany 301 

CHAPTER  VIII 

International  Politics 

Results  of  the  Congress  of  Berlin — Crisis  in  Egypt — British  Oc- 
cupation— A  Scientific  Frontier — The  Afghan  War — Russo-German 
Tension — The  Balkans  Again — Austro-German  Alliance — England 
and  the  Alliance — The  Temper  of  the  Times — The  Passing  of 
Pessimism — The  Super-Man  and  the  Super-State — Tunis — Franco- 
Italian  Rivalry — An   Imperialist  Comedy — The   French  in  Tunis   .     314 

CHAPTER  IX 

The  Triple  Alliance 

The  Civilising  Mission  of  the  State — The  New  Basis  of  Competi- 
tion— Tendency  to  Coalition — Position  of  Italy — Foundation  of  the 


CONTENTS  XIX 


PAGE 


Alliance — Its  Historical  Significance — ^The  Role  of  Austria  and  of 
Italy — Economic  Factors — Peaceful  Penetration — Supernationalism — 
Politics  Subservient  to  Economics — Social  Benefits — The  Theory  of 
Exploitation ,23 

CHAPTER  X 

The  Super-State 

The  New  Economic  Basis  of  the  State — Bismarck  as  Minister  of 
Commerce  and  Industry — Protective  Tariffs — Markets — Communi- 
cations— The   Reinsurance   Treaty   of    1884 — Its   Economic   Motives 

— Atmed     Peace — Colonial      Expansion — France — England — Italy 

Germany — Leopold  II  of  Belgium — The  Congo — Berlin  Conference 
— First  Participation  of  the  United  States  in  a  European  Con- 
gress— The  Partition  of  Africa — The  New  Era 330 

CHAPTER  XI 

Salus  Populi 

Estimate  of  Bismarck's  Historical  Mission — The  New  Ethics  of 
Government — The  Justification  of  the  Use  of  Force — Cultural  Su- 
periority          3^2 


THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 


THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

INTRODUCTION 


•Li.. 


IN  periods  of  historical  transition,  the  stress  of  new 
ideas  is  greater  than  can  be  equably  borne.  The  pass- 
ing of  the  old  order  is  attended  by  upheavals  and  disturb- 
ances which  are  in  themselves  manifestations  of  this 
overburdening,  and  must  not  be  confounded  with  the 
positive  progress  of  the  new  tenets.  The  natural  con- 
servative forces,  latent  in  all  living  matter,  render  smooth 
transition  difficult.  Reactionary  principles  remain 
dominant,  relatively  intact,  until  the  crumbling  process 
is  accelerated  and  new  and  more  appropriate  theories 
find  spontaneous  acceptance. 

It  no  longer  suffices  that  the  political  philosopher, 
the  doctrinaire  sociologist,  or  the  ethically-minded 
economist  should  seek  to  discover  and  array  in  his- 
torically accurate,  logically  sound  argument  the  factors 
which  contribute  to  the  ideal  governance  of  society.  It 
no  longer  suffices  that  the  historian,  after  a  minute  in- 
quiry into  the  episodes  and  events  in  the  life  of  a  people, 
should  present  those  relevant  details  which  may  appear 
to  have  led  to  the  rise,  grandeur,  and  fall  of  empires,  so 
that  we  may  profit  by  the  experiences  of  the  civilisations 
which  have  preceded  our  own.  The  time  is  past  when 
the  mission  of  the  historian  is  to  arouse  the  patriotic 
fervor  of  his  compatriots  as  a  spur  to  national  unity  or 


i  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

political  independence,  which  influenced  so  much  of  the 
historical  writing  and  the  so-called  philosophy  of  his- 
tory during  the  19th  century.  Theories  of  the  summum 
boniim,  politically  arrived  at,  or  panaceas  based  on  worn- 
out  political  creeds  into  which  the  historian  would  seek 
to  breathe  a  breath  of  new  life  can  no  longer  be  accepted. 

Western  civilisation,  and  in  its  train  that  of  the  rest 
of  the  world,  has  entered  upon  a  new  historical  epoch. 
If  we  are  to  be  in  a  position  to  interpret  aright  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  course  of  events,  to  understand  the  mean- 
ing of  the  historical  moment  we  call  the  present,  we 
must  be  equipped  to  view  dispassionately  and  without 
prejudice  the  origin  and  growth  of  the  State  as  we  know 
it,  and  trace  the  deray  of  its  present  constitutional  form. 
To  do  this  we  must  inquire  with  greater  precision  into 
the  plan,  investigate  with  clearer  insight  the  principles 
upon  which  the  social  organisation  of  our  epoch  has  been 
built.  A  new  method  of  historical  inquiry,  a  new  his- 
torical viewpoint  is  required. 

When,  after  the  barbarian  Invasions,  the  political  or- 
ganisation of  the  Roman  Empire  was  disrupted,  men 
turned  in  disgust  from  the  secular  world  and  found  what 
solace  they  could  in  the  contemplation  of  the  glories 
of  the  "City  of  God."  In  the  West,  politics  in  its  proper 
sense  disappeared  and  we  have  the  period  known  as 
the  Dark  Ages,  devoid  of  history.  In  the  course  of  these 
centuries,  roughly  from  the  end  of  the  5th  to  the  loth, 
the  Church  entrenched  itself  firmly  and  filled  the  whole 
life  of  the  individual. 

During  the  long  continuance  of  the  domination  of  the 
cultural  life  of  Europe  by  the  Church,  its  control  had 
become  so  absolute  that  in  order  to  emancipate  mankind 
from  what  had  come  to  be  recognised  as  an  intolerable 
servitude,  it  was  felt  that  a  new  theory  of  social  organ- 


INTRODUCTION  3 

isatlon  was  required.  Whereas  religion  may  assure  a 
primitive  stability  to  society  and  make  possible  a  rudi- 
mentary form  of  social  organisation,  with  the  growing 
complexity  of  social  life  secularisation  invariably  ensues, 
which  awakens  a  fresh  interest  in  politics. 

In  contrast  to  the  religious  instinct  common  to  man- 
kind, we  find  among  civilised  peoples  what  we  may  term 
political  consciousness.  Religion  has  to  do  with  the  life 
and  conduct  of  the  individual;  politics  with  the  life  and 
conduct  of  the  State.  Religion  is  primarily  moral;  poli- 
tics primarily  ethical.  Religion  demands  conformity  to 
creed;  politics  conformity  to  law.  Religion  is  static; 
politics  dynamic. 

The  social  order  of  the  Middle  Ages  which  bore  a 
religious  imprint  was  essentially  Immobile.  Society  was 
established  on  a  permanent,  hereditary  basis.  Its  hier- 
archy was  fixed,  apparently  indissoluble.  The  interde- 
pendence of  the  various  social  orders  was  secondary  only 
to  their  independence  as  a  class.  Each  class,  according 
to  the  measure  of  its  strength,  looked  out  for  its  own 
welfare,  endeavored  to  safeguard  Its  own  Interests;  In 
some  Instances  even  maintained  Its  own  armed  force,  and 
provided  and  paid  for  Its  own  representatives  in  the 
Diets.  The  gradual  decay  of  this  social  system.  In  which 
the  dominant  position  of  the  Church  was  everywhere 
recognised,  was  primarily  due  to  the  reawakening  of 
political  consciousness,  and  In  a  far  less  degree  to  the 
abuses  and  corruption  of  the  Church.  To  overthrow 
the  authority  of  the  Church  in  secular  affairs  Involved 
the  displacing  of  religion  as  the  focal  factor  In  society 
and  the  introduction  of  a  new  pivotal  interest.  It  meant 
that  religion  was  to  give  way  to  politics;  that  the  guid- 
ance of  mankind  by  transcendental  revelation  was  to  be 
replaced  by  an  empirical  rationalism. 


4  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

The  substitution  of  the  State  politically  conceived  for 
the  Church,  which  had  in  the  past  performed  the  dual 
function  of  spiritual  and  social  supervision,  meant  not 
only  the  usurpation  by  the  State  of  many  of  the  func- 
tions formerly  performed  as  religious  rites  but,  what 
was  to  prove  more  important,  the  assertion  of  the  pre- 
eminence of  the  secular  world. 

Whereas  the  Church  had  left  a  wide  latitude  to  the 
individual  in  regard  to  his  political  beliefs,  and  had 
loosened  the  bonds  of  his  allegiance  to  the  State,  that 
intolerable  servitude  of  antiquity  the  tradition  of  which 
still  survived,  the  Reformation,  by  wresting  the  con- 
trol of  the  social  order  from  the  hands  of  the  Papacy, 
introduced  the  concept  of  nationality  in  ecclesiastical  af- 
fairs, raised  the  political  status  of  the  individual,  and 
revived  with  renewed  intensity  his  interest  in  his  al- 
legiance to  a  secular  state.  It  must  be  acknowledged 
that  these  were  merely  incidental  consequences  of  the 
process  of  rehabilitation  of  the  Church,  undertaken  by 
the  champions  of  the  Reformation,  and  were  not  con- 
sidered by  them  as  the  objectives  which  they  strove  to 
attain.  One  need  but  call  to  mind  the  inquiring  attitude 
of  Erasmus,  the  shrewd  fearlessness  of  Luther,  the  un- 
compromising severity  of  Calvin,  as  they  surveyed  the 
world  of  their  day.  The  ulcer  of  society  as  they  clearly 
saw  it  was  the  decadence  of  the  Church.  The  longings, 
the  strivings  of  men  were  directed  towards  the  planning 
of  a  new  era,  a  new  relation  of  man  to  his  God  and  in- 
directly of  man  to  man.  The  time  was  ripe  for  a  new 
social  order.  The  sun  of  theism  still  glowed  in  the 
West  with  effulgent  splendor.  The  aim  of  those  who 
were  destined  to  bring  about  its  eclipse  was  not  to  ex- 
tinguish its  beneficent  rays,  but  rather  to  dissipate  the 
clouds   of   superstition,   vice,    and   ignorance   which   ob- 


INTRODUCTION  5 

scured  it.  They  were  in  the  first  instance  solely  con- 
cerned with  the  reform  of  the  Church,  its  purification, 
its  strengthening,  and  its  reaffirmation  as  the  dominant 
force  in  society.  Nevertheless,  the  first  fruit  of  the 
teaching  of  the  Protestant  reformers  not  merely  resulted 
in  undermining  the  doctrine  and  dogma  of  the  Church, 
but  at  the  same  time  awakened  an  unquenchable  in- 
terest in  the  theory  and  practice  of  political  affairs.  The 
disciplined  faith  of  Catholicism,  which  had  bred  a  spirit 
of  obedience  and  orderly  acquiescence  in  the  existing 
social  structure,  was  to  give  way  to  private  judgment, 
based  on  private  conviction  which  was  soon  extended 
from  religious  to  secular  affairs. 


II 

It  Is  in  the  nature  of  human  affairs  that  the  instru- 
ments man  uses  to  attain  his  objects  survive  long  after 
the  objects  themselves  have  been  attained  and  disappear. 
The  ideal  is  the  goal  towards  which  man's  striving  is 
directed.  It  is  usually  held,  and  sincerely  so,  as  a  better- 
ing of  the  existing,  its  improvement,  rather  than  a  sub- 
stitution by  something  radically  different  or  new.  Such 
was  the  case  when  religious  interest  gave  way  to  political 
enthusiasm  at  the  opening  of  the  modern  epoch. 

Historical  inquiry  appears  to  confirm  the  fact  that  as 
religion  was  supplanted  by  politics  as  the  pivotal  Interest 
of  civilised  man,  almost  by  way  of  accident  In  so  far  as 
fixed  motives  were  concerned,  so  politics  will  in  turn 
be  supplanted  by  the  instruments  made  use  of  to  re- 
generate it.  It  is  by  the  clear-visloned  acknowledgment 
of  these  probable  consequences,  by  a  careful  examination 
thereinto,  that  it  will  be  possible  to  discern  with  In- 
creasing accuracy  the  trend  of  historical  development. 


6  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

For  the  tome  of  social  history  must  not  be  conceived,  as 
it  has  been  hitherto,  as  bound  between  its  board  covers, 
complete  in  its  form  and  content^ — however  admirable 
these  may  seem — to  which  a  new  volume  is  added  from 
time  to  time;  but  rather  like  a  loose-leaf  ledger  in  which 
fresh  pages  are  to  be  inserted  as  the  new  is  uncovered, 
as  the  old  is  outworn.  This  does  not  mean  continued 
compromise,  or  work  half  done;  it  does  not  mean  that 
the  negative  will  never  be  inserted  where  the  positive 
held  sway,  owing  to  a  passing  change  of  mood.  It  means 
that  the  course  of  history  need  not  be  held  to  be  in  proc- 
ess of  continuous  disruption;  nor  yet  that  the  growth 
of  the  newer  forms  of  social  organisation  need  be  re- 
tarded by  the  apparent  finality  of  its  existing  form.  It 
means  that  there  is  a  possibility  for  perpetual  renova- 
tion, naturally  and  smoothly  arrived  at;  the  old  no 
longer  encumbering  the  new.  It  is  on  this  economy  that 
the  polity  of  the  future  must  be  built. 

By  an  acceptance  of  this  view  we  can  with  more 
simplicity  reach  an  understanding  of  what  is  meant  by 
that  perplexing  term,  "progress";  we  can  conceive  the 
plausibility  of  perfectibility.  We  can  understand  prog- 
ress in  its  essential  nature,  not  as  an  end  in  itself,  as  it  is 
so  often  held  to  be,  but  merely  as  an  incidental  factor 
l^ln  human  affairs,  to  be  made  use  of  in  the  manner  and 
with  the  ease  with  which  an  outworn  page  can  be  re- 
moved, and  a  new  page  can  be  inserted.  The  elemental 
principles  have  been  determined,  bound  by  the  nature  of 
man,  but  the  Infinite  variations,  progress  and  regress, 
stretch  on  before  us. 

I  have  given  this  brief  outline  in  order  that  it  may  be 
clear  that  when,  after  the  Reformation,  religion  came  to 
be  supplanted  by  politics  as  the  pivotal  factor  In  social 
life,    the    theistic    concept,    long   held    the    fundamental 


INTRODUCTION  7 

tenet  in  Western  Europe,  was  introduced  into  political 

life.      It  need,   therefore,   excite   no  surprise,   as  it  was 

a  logical   development,   that  we   should   find    a   Hobbes    y    (^ 

proclaiming  the  State  the  "Mortal  God."     We  see  here 

the   transference  of  allegiance   from  the  theistic  to  the 

political  Godhead.      Machiavelli   in  Italy  and  Bodin  in 

France  had,  before  Hobbes,  exalted  the   supremacy  of 

the  State,  and  their  political  doctrines  had  found  a  ready 

acceptance   among  the   very  limited  number  of  men  in 

a  position   to   comprehend   the    true   nature   of   politics. 

Looked  at  from  this  standpoint,  it  is  not  difficult  to  trace 

the  growth  of  monarchical  absolutism  in  Europe,  which 

led  to  the  introduction  of  the  concept  of  the  divine  right 

of  kings. 

From  the  i6th  to  the  i8th  century  absolutism  was 
the  commonly  accepted  theory  of  government.  The 
divinity  of  the  will  of  the  monarch,  his  direct  responsi- 
bility to  God,  his  irresponsibility  towards  man,  was  the 
common  creed.  The  King  was  God's  anointed.  To  his 
support  rallied  his  subjects.  Papal  Rome  was  over- 
shadowed by  Paris,  London,  Madrid,  and  a  number  of 
German  centres,  each  of  which  had  set  up  a  political 
Godhead.  Religion  was  relegated  to  the  sphere  of  spec- 
ulation. Politics  became  the  primal  preoccupation,  and 
with  It  rose  the  empirical  mind,  which  tested  and  In- 
vestigated the  tangible.  In  an  ever-widening  circle 
the  field  of  experimentation  was  extended,  and  brought 
within  the  realm  of  the  human  mind  useful  and  prac- 
tical solutions  of  all  manner  of  problems,  which  had 
never  hitherto  been  Investigated.  Civilisation  had  en- 
tered upon  the  path  of  perfectibility  and  progress.  Such 
was  the  work  of  the  Reformation.  Who  shall  say  that 
it  was  consonant  with  the  aims  of  Its  initiators? 

In  a  futile   attempt  to  arrest  the  decay  of  religious 


8  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

ascendancy  the  Papacy  had  sanctioned  a  system  of  per- 
secution of  the  heretical  adherents  of  the  Reformation, 
more  terrible  than  that  suffered  by  the  early  Christians 
at  the  hands  of  the  Romans.  In  the  ferocity  of  the 
methods  used,  and  in  the  number  of  victims  resulting 
therefrom,  it  far  distanced  its  earlier  prototype.  For 
a  century  and  a  half  Europe  was  racked  by  Internecine 
religious  wars  and  persecutions,  which  spared  no  man, 
no  land.  Throughout  the  17th  century  these  convul- 
sions continued.  Civil  wars  in  England,  the  Thirty  Years' 
War  in  Germany,  the  Dragonnades  in  France,  the  In- 
quisition In  Portugal  and  Spain,  the  massacres  in  Hol- 
land— all  had  as  their  apparent  motive  the  suppression 
of  Protestant  heresy.  In  reality  they  were  phases  of 
a  bloody  struggle  for  the  supremacy  of  a  new  ideology. 
The  latent  forces  of  politics  had  pushed  upward.  Politics 
was  about  to  supplant  religion  as  the  motive-force  of 
social  life. 

From  the  positive  worship  of  one  immortal  God  the 
attention  of  men  had  been  diverted.  Religious  worship 
was  not  abolished,  but  it  became  avocational.  The  vo- 
cation of  men  was  henceforth  political.  Their  energy 
was  no  longer  engaged  in  religious  strife.  Finally,  the 
Papacy  Itself  realised  the  irrevocable  character  of  the 
new  trend,  and  sought  to  retain  at  least  a  loose-woven 
spiritual  hegemony.  It  no  longer  excommunicated  and 
fulminated,  no  longer  insisted  on  asserting  its  temporal 
sovereignty  on  the  field  of  battle,  but  associated  itself 
with,  and  lent  the  sanction  of  its  approval  to,  the  rule 
of  temporal  sovereigns  favorable  to  its  religious  creed, 
and  thus  assisted  actively  in  the  creation  of  a  politlco- 
thelstlc  organisation  of  society. 

The  State  as  embodied  in  its  sovereign  had  become 
the  Mortal  God.    But  in  the  eyes  of  the  more  educated 


INTRODUCTION  9 

it  could  not  fail  to  be  a  god  divested  of  many  of  the 
sacred  attributes  which  had  awed  past  generations.  Re- 
ligion implies  implicit  obedience.  Politics  demands  no 
more  than  explicit  allegiance.  Religion  relies  on  the 
utilisation  of  the  primitive  psychic  phenomena,  faith, 
which  readily  accepts  the  prospect  of  infinite  reward  in 
the  future,  in  return  for  the  patient  bearing  of  infinite 
hardship  and  toil  in  the  present,  coupled  with  the  threat 
of  eternal  punishment  in  case  its  tenets  are  violated. 
Politics  attempted  to  refashion  this  doctrine,  in  that  it 
claimed  to  insure  a  more  real  present  worth,  without 
much  regard  for  the  remote  future,  and  exacted  no  se- 
vere accounting  for  omissions.  Furthermore,  politics 
left  as  much  of  the  religious  doctrine  intact  as  did  not 
interfere  with  its  fundamental  requirement  of  allegiance. 
The  Church  remained,  but  it  became  in  theory  the  sub- 
servient tool  of  the  State.  Such,  in  brief,  was  the  basis 
of  the  new  political  ideology. 


Ill 

Two  centuries  had  not  elapsed  since  the  day  when 
Luther  aflixed  his  ninety-five  theses  to  the  gate  of  the 
church  at  Wittenberg  (15 17).  Louis  XIV,  the  ex- 
emplar of  kingly  divinity  who  had  proclaimed  "L'Etat, 
c'est  mot,"  and  had  coupled  it  as  a  maxim  of  govern- 
ment with  that  of  the  divine  right  of  kings,  was  at  the 
end  of  his  long  reign  (17 15).  The  divinity  of  king- 
ship was  already  beginning  to  be  called  into  question. 
Present  worth,  in  its  political  aspects,  was  proving  no 
more  satisfactory,  and  actually  more  oppressive  than 
it  had  under  theistic  overlordship.  The  sovereign  and 
his  court  had  absorbed  all  the  benefits  derived  from 
the  politico-theistic  system   of  statehood.      In  the  new 


lo  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

strongly  compacted  national  states,  such  as  France  and 
Spain,  the  long  arm  of  taxation  reached  out  to  the 
most  remote  confines,  and  drew  to  the  coffers  of  the 
capital  the  funds  needed  for  the  support  of  royal  ex- 
penditure. This  system  was  carried  to  its  greatest  per- 
fection most  rapidly  in  France,  and  served  to  consoli- 
date and  unite  the  various  provinces,  already  bound  by 
linguistic  and  social  bonds.  The  State — the  Mortal  God 
— was  expanding  into  a  system  of  political  polytheism, 
wherein  the  national  spirit  was  aroused,  and  national 
jealousies  were  fostered,  based  no  longer  on  creed,  but 
on  political  allegiance.  The  politico-theistic  system  had 
endowed  the  State  with  a  divinely  anointed  sovereign. 
Now  thoughtful  men  came  to  recognise  for  the  first 
time  that  the  State  is  in  reality  composed  not  merely 
of  the  governing,  but  also  of  the  governed.  Here 
we  have  the  genesis  of  the  social  contract,  which  was 
the  cause  of  fierce  conflict  in  England  between  Parlia- 
ment and  the  Crown  during  the  greater  part  of  the  17th 
century,  and  was  to  be  so  emphatically  emphasised  by 
Rousseau  and  his  disciples  a  century  later.  It  wa-s  this 
struggle  to  secure  the  recognition  of  the  contractual 
relation  between  the  governing  and  the  governed  which 
resulted  in  the  violent  overthrow  of  the  principle  of 
the  divine  essence   of  statehood. 

The  Bill  of  Rights  of  1689,  which  limited  the  power 
of  the  sovereign  in  England,  and  the  Declaration  of 
the  Rights  of  Man  of  1789  are  complementary  docu- 
ments. Divinity  implies  hierarchy  in  governance,  but 
it  also  recognises  the  equality  of  all  before  the  throne 
of  the  Deity.  As  long  as  kingship  was  able  to  identify 
itself  with,  and  mark  off  for  itself,  the  exclusive  control 
of  sovereignty  invested  with  supernatural  attributes,  its 
absolute  authority  was  assured.     But  once  the  State  was 


INTRODUCTION  n 

divested  of  this  theistic  fiction,  once  it  came  to  be  be- 
lieved that  the  State  is  composed,  not  alone  of  the  sov- 
ereign, but  also  of  the  people,  each  individual  sharing 
in  the  greatness,  power,  and  pomp  of  the  State,  the 
sacrosanct,  noli  me  tangere  characteristic  of  kingship  was 
destined  to  vanish. 

The  equality  of  men  before  the  Deity,  which  politico- 
theistic  society  sought  to  imitate  under  monarchical  ab- 
solutism, had  been  warped  by  prejudice  of  caste  and 
privilege.  The  new  political  ideology  of  the  i8th  cen- 
tury proclaimed  the  sovereignty  of  the  people,  as  a  legal 
obligation.  The  relation  of  the  individual  to  the  State 
lost  its  theistic  bias,  and  gained  in  breadth  of  concep- 
tion. Henceforth  it  was  to  be  declared  with  growing 
insistence  that  the  State  is  made  up  of  its  citizens,  who, 
in  theory  at  least,  should  all  have  an  equal  share  of 
rights  and  privileges.  Political  control  was  to  rest  on 
a  juridical  basis.  The  power  to  enact,  or  enforce  arbi- 
trarily, the  sovereign  will  was  to  be  withdrawn  from 
the  monarch.  Parliaments,  representative  of  the  politi- 
cally enlightened  elements  of  the  population,  now  came 
to  be  regarded  as  the  proper  repositories  of  political 
power;  law-making  and  amending  came  to  be  held  their 
principal  function;  the  assent  thereto  the  function  of  the 
sovereign  or  executive.  The  contractual  relation  be- 
tween the  governed  and  the  governing,  partnership  in 
the  government  of  the  State,  was  to  be  established. 

The  smooth  working  of  such  a  system  was  incompati- 
ble with  the  politico-theistic  thesis  of  government.  It 
meant  the  substitution  of  the  juridical  for  the  theistic 
relation.  The  new  ideology  made  steady  progress.  Ra- 
tional inquiry  affirmed  the  absurdity  of  the  older  prin- 
ciples; over-emphasised  the  benefits  to  be  derived  from 
the  new;  adduced  a  priori  an  ideal  social  order  which 


12  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

required,  It  was  alleged,  only  the  sanction  of  the  people 
to  bring  it  into  being.  Peaceful  adjustment  was  no  longer 
possible.  When  the  oppressed  feel  the  hand  of  the 
oppressor  growing  unsteady;  when  the  man  in  the  saddle 
makes  way  for  the  man  on  foot;  when  the  potentially 
strong  gives  way  and  concedes  to  the  apparently  weak, 
social  leavening  is  inevitable. 

The  leavening  of  society  seems  to  follow  certain  fixed 
laws;  relatively  as  fixed  as  those  of  the  physical  world. 
"Leaven,  the  primitive  ferment,  is  simply  a  portion  of 
moistened  flour  or  dough  in  which  the  putrefactive  agen- 
cies have  begun  to  work.  When  brought  in  contact  with 
a  new  portion  of  flour  and  water,  and  incorporated  there- 
with by  kneading,  it  very  quickly  acts  as  a  ferment,  and 
develops  partial  fermentation  in  the  whole.  Hence  it 
is  that  where  leaven  is  used  it  is  customary  to  retain  a 
portion  of  leavened  dough  for  the  next  baking."  So  runs 
the  old  explanation  of  the  use  of  leaven  in  bread-making. 
I  have  reproduced  it  here  for  two  reasons :  one  to  point 
out  that  when  putrefactive  agencies,  which  have  begun  to 
work,  are  brought  in  contact  with  the  healthy  mass  and 
incorporated  therewith  they  act  quickly  as  a  ferment;  the 
other,   that  a  portion  of  this  new,  partially  fermented  jj 

mass,  when  set  aside,  acts  as  the  future  leaven.  It  is  per- 
haps not  unnecessary  to  add  that  fermentation  is  the 
change  which  occurs  in  one  organic  substance  when  in- 
fluenced by  another  in  a  state  of  decay. 

The  social  order  is  fundamentally  organic:  both  physi- 
cally and  psychically  subject  to  change.  It  is  more  than 
mere  metaphor  when  we  speak  of  social  ferment;  its 
processes  are  in  many  respects  analogous  to  the  action 
of  ferments  outlined.  Every  substance  which  putrefies 
becomes  a  ferment,  and  in  this  condition  acquires  the 
properties  of  setting  a-going  the  processes  of  fermenta- 


INTRODUCTION  13 

tion.  What  are  the  forces  of  social  fermentation?  What 
are  the  integral  ingredients  of  social  leavening?  To 
examine  their  characteristic  manifestations,  to  test  their 
dynamic  potency,  to  discover  what  elements  have  been 
kneaded  into  social  life  and  what  elements  have  been 
set  aside  for  future  leavening  will  render  more  intel- 
ligible the  hitherto  occult  processes  of  social  development 
and  historical  evolution. 

The  French  Revolution  eliminated  theism  from  poli- 
tics>''  and  though  politico-theism  survived  in  form  for 
a  prolonged  period,  its  substance  had  been  sapped,  and 
the  "grace  of  God"  was  no  longer  held  to  be  a  vital 
political  asset.  Politics,  clad  in  its  new  juridic  dress, 
shorn  of  its  theistic  elements,  rationalised,  was  to  be- 
come the  bearer  of  a  new  ideology — nationalism. 

We  must  here  pause  to  consider  the  elements  of  this 
politico-juridic  concept  of  the  State.  We  must  trace 
its  course  of  development  and  final  flowering  in  the 
Nation-State. 

I  have  hitherto  sketched  very  briefly,  with  a  few  rough, 
broad  strokes,  the  background  of  the  historical  changes 
which  grew  out  of  the  Reformation.  It  now  becomes 
necessary  to  inquire  more  minutely  into  the  fundamental 
political  principles  which  have  influenced  the  growth 
of  the  new  theories  of  State  and  of  social  organisation. 
We  must  at  times  retrace  our  steps,  and  go  over  the 
ground,  using  historical  data  not  so  much  as  guide  as  for 
illustration;  drawing  our  conclusions  synthetically,  mak- 
ing use  of  theory  and  practice,  which  may  serve  to  il- 
lumine our  inquiry.  It  is  by  following  such  method  that 
we  may  hope  to  arrive  at  a  constructive  under- 
standing of  the  political  history  of  our  own  times; 
neither  confined  to  mere  abstraction,  nor  subjected  to 
too  rigid  and  stilted  empirical  tests;  neither  disregard- 


14  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

Ing  the  ideal  side  of  politics,  nor  exaggerating  its  realist 
manifestations.  Pursuing  our  inquiry  in  a  philosophical 
mood,  without  perverting  history,  or  distorting  theory, 
we  can  reasonably  expect  to  be  in  a  position  to  formu- 
late conclusions  which  will  approach  nearest  to  truth 
as  unfolded  to  us  in  our  era. 

Truth  is  the  keystone  of  the  arch  of  history,  based 
on  the  two  supporting  pillars  of  accuracy  and  veracity. 
Truth  is  composite :  veracity  is  its  ideal,  accuracy  its 
real  element.  To  determine  truthfully  implies  a  harmo- 
nious union  of  the  real  and  the  ideal.  It  Is  by  patient  in- 
quiry, by  slow-moving  processes  of  investigation,  by  the 
refraction  of  the  known  factors  into  their  elements,  as 
light  is  refracted,  and  then  by  presenting  the  fruits  of 
our  research,  as  pictured  objects  seen  through  a  stereo- 
scope possessing  but  two  dimensions  are  seen  not  as 
plane  representations,  but  as  possessing  solidity  and  re- 
lief, that  we  may  hope  to  arrive  at  a  true  understand- 
ing of  the  trend  of  history. 


BOOK  I 


CHAPTER  I 

The  PoUticO'Theistic  Concept  of  the  State 

^MAqjilAVELLI — BODIN THE  PRECURSORS  OF  THE  NEW   POLITICO- 

JURIDIC    MOVEMENT — LOCKE — ALTHUSIUS — GROTIUS 


WHILE  the  spiritual  leaders  of  the  Reformation 
were  engaged  upon  the  work  of  church  reform, 
and  by  their  active  propaganda  had  brought  about  the 
overthrow  of  Papal  supremacy,  theories  of  State  were 
being  evolved  upon  which  to  build  the  new  social  struc- 
ture. The  theory  advanced  by  Machiavelli  early  in  the 
1 6th  century — influenced  as  he  was  by  the  anarchical 
condition  of  Italy  so  abhorrent  to  him,  and  familiar  with 
the  ways  and  means  made  use  of  so  successfully  by  the 
Papacy  to  heighten  the  domination  of  theistic  absolutism 
— vested  in  the  Prince  all  authority  in  the  State.  His 
Prince  was  omnipotent  and  arbitrary,  above  all  law,  civil 
or  canon.  His  State  was  non-moral;  its  head  bound  by 
no  code.  We  see  in  this  project  the  desire  of  its  author 
to  substitute  not  merely  the  authority  of  the  State  for  that 
of  the  Church,  but  the  omnipotence  of  the  Prince  for  that 
of  God. 

It  was  left  for  a  Frenchman,  Jean  Bodin,  to  formulate 
logically  and  legitimatise  the  doctrines  of  Machiavelli. 
In  his  well-known  treatise,  Les  Six  livres  de  la  Republique, 
published  in  1576,  Bodin,  after  discussing  the  theory  and 
essence  of  sovereignty,  postulated  it  as  the  source  of  all 

[17] 


i8  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

authority  in  the  State,  which  he  vested  in  the  Prince,  the 
vitalising  factor  and  only  real  power  in  the  State.     He 

(gave  substance  and  form  to  the  doctrine  of  absolutism, 
based  on  the  admixture  of  political  and  theistic  theories 
which  he  reconciled  in  a  manner  satisfactory  to  his  times. 
It  became  the  accepted  basis  upon  which  the  governments 
of  his  day  were  modelled. 

Though  the  politico-theistic  concept  of  the  State,  as  we 
would  tersely  denote  the  political  theory  underlying 
monarchical  absolutism,  which  sanctioned  the  supreme 
authority  of  the  Prince,  was  outwardly  adhered  to  by 
the  majority  without  question  throughout  the  i6th  and 
17th  centuries,  already  in  the  minds  of  some  this  ill- 
defined  and  irresponsible  basis  of  sovereign  power  ap- 
peared to  be  monstrous.  It  was  soon  perceived  that, 
though  the  King  might  by  analogy  be  endowed  with  the 
attributes  of  divinity,  in  reality  he  was  able  to  enforce 
his  will  towards  his  subjects  only  by  threats  of  punish- 
ment, and  that  in  his  relations  with  other  sovereigns  he 
was  powerless  unless  he  had  recourse  to  the  use  of  armed 
force. 

In  this  dilemma  men  sought  for  another  basis  of 
sovereignty  consistent  with  the  rapid  spread  of  liberal 
views  concerning  the  value  and  dignity  of  man.  It  is  of 
interest  to  note  that  this  new  thesis  was  first  formulated 
by  a  Dutchman  at  a  time  when  the  Dutch  Provinces  were 
still  struggling  for  their  independence  against  Spain,  and 
stoutly  maintained  their  adherence  to  the  religious  tenets 
of  the  Reformation. 

The  theory  of  State  advanced  by  Althusius  in  his 
Politica  issued  in  1603,  for  the  first  time  set  forth  that 
sovereignty  is  an  attribute,  not  merely  of  the  Prince,  but 
of  the  State  as  a  whole,  which  is  held  to  be  an  indivisible 
unit  made  up  of  Prince  and  people.  Furthermore 
Althusius  maintained  that  the  State  is  endowed  with  dis- 


POLITICO-THEISTIC  CONCEPT  OF  THE  STATE    19 

tinct  moral  attributes,  and  subject  to  moral  law.  Grotius, 
his  younger  contemporary,  expanded  this  idea,  and  out- 
lined a  code  which  was  to  regulate  the  intercourse  of 
States,  both  in  peace  and  war,  by  the  enforcement  of 
certain  rules  of  conduct,  which,  he  maintained.  States 
would  willingly  accept  as  binding.  It  was  but  a  step 
forward  when  the  first  professor  of  what  has  since  come 
to  be  known  as  International  Law,  Pufendorf,  taught  at 
the  University  of  Heidelberg,  during  the  closing  years 
of  the  17th  century,  that  the  State  was  possessed  of 
ethical  characteristics,  similar  to  those  of  an  high-minded 
individual  who  recognised  his  moral  responsibility,  and 
that  under  given  circumstances,  the  State  could  be  ex- 
pected to  act,  and  would  act,  just  as  an  honorable  man 
would  act. 

At  about  the  same  time  Locke,  in  his  Treatise  on  Civil 
Government  (1689),  propounded  the  opinion  that  the 
authority  of  the  State  rested  primarily  on  the  consent  of 
the  governed.  The  State,  according  to  Locke,  is  not  the 
arbitrary  creation  of  some  supreme  authority,  but  an 
evolution  ai^sing  oiit-ef  the  social  needs  of  man,  which 
require  not  merely  the  establishment  of  fixed  rules,  but 
that  these  rules  or  laws  should  be  administered  uni- 
formly by  an  authority  which  men  would  willingly  con- 
sent to   recognise. 

The  State  created  in  the  image  of  God,  the  politico- 
theistic  State,  had  led  to  the  abuses  of  absolutism;  the 
State  fashioned  in  the  image  of  man,  the  politico-juridic 
State,  as  the  new  theory  may  be  called,  was  the  doctrine 
which  was  to  gain  authority  and  acceptance. 

We  have  thus  traced  in  brief  outline  the  early  phases 
of  the  transition  from  the  politico-theistic  to  the  politico- 
juridic  concept.  The  close  correlation  between  the  de- 
cay of  the  theistic  concept  of  the  State  and  the  rise  of 


20  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

the  juridic  could  be  emphasised  at  great  length.  It 
suffices,  however,  to  note  that  the  growth  had  been  logi- 
cal, and  followed  the  trend  of  spiritual  speculation,  lag- 
ging behind  the  more  bold  emancipators  of  the  Church, 
but  destined,  when  the  fresh  earnestness  of  the  religious 
reformation  had  so  rapidly  spent  itself,  to  usurp  the  field 
and  make  what  appeared  to  be  unprecedented  progress. 
In  order  to  arrive  at  a  rational  understanding  of  this 
progress,  and  gain  a  proper  Insight  into  political  organi- 
sation in  our  own  times,  it  is  essential  to  point  out  that 
the  thesis  of  the  unity  of  the  national  State,  in  its  ac- 
cepted form,  is  a  result  of  an  analogy,  which  was  drawn 
by  a  few  17th  century  thinkers,  between  the  body  politic 
— the  State — and  that  of  man.  This  analogy,  at  first 
tentatively  presented,  was  seized  upon  a  century  later, 
posited  as  fundamental,  and  led  to  the  rampant  indi- 
vidualism and  its  correlative,  nationalism,  of  the  19th 
century. 


II 

It  is  characteristic  of  the  human  mind  to  seek  to  ex- 

>         plain  by  analogy.     In  order  to  make  an  explanation  lucid 
it  is  the  practice  to  choose  such  subjects  which,  whether 
A  they  fit  exactly  or  not,  can  by  the  consonance  of  sound, 

(^phrase,  and  image,  and  the  skilful  use  of  emphasis,  be 
rendered  acceptable.     An  analogy  In  the   first  Instance 
r*^  Implies  nothing  more   than   partial   agreement  between 

^  things  in  other  respects  different.     But,  as  some  defini- 

►  tlon   is   essential   to   arrive   at  understanding.   It  is  not 

difficult  to  perceive  that  in  endeavoring  to  set  forth  the 
^  characteristics  of  so  intangible  a  concept  as  the  State, 

"~      Hk.       the  most  broad  and  simple  analogy  should  be  pressed 
)  1 — y   into  service. 

r 

s 
*       ra 


POLITICO-THEISTIC  CONCEPT  OF  THE  STATE    21 

In  setting  up  the  theistic  concept  of  the  State  and  es- 
tablishing its  absolutist  principles,  Machiavelli,  Bodin, 
and  Hobbes  had  dealt  with  analogies  altogether  compre- 
hensible at  the  time.  To  understand  clearly  the  coher- 
ence of  the  doctrines  they  set  forth,  a  glance  at  the 
social  organisation  of  the  Middle  Ages  is  necessary. 

During  the  mediaeval  period  the  State  was  looked  upon 
as  an  organisation  of  laymen  altogether  beneath  the 
Church.  "The  basest  and  most  corrupt  clerk,  in  virtue 
of  his  order,  stands  high  above  the  most  eminent  and 
virtuous  layman,  as  gold  is  above  iron,  or  spirit  above 
the  body."  ^  Secular  laws  were  not  binding  on  the  clergy. 
The  priesthood  had  the  right  to  inquire  into  their  validity, 
and  to  determine  in  how  far  they  saw  fit  to  submit  vol- 
untarily to  the  jurisdiction  of  these  laws.  The  ques- 
tion of  the  obedience  of  the  clergy  to  the  legal  restric- 
tions established  by  secular  authority  was  never  raised. 
Whenever  the  interests  of  the  clergy  were  infringed 
upon,  whenever  it  appeared  as  though  the  privileges 
or  immunities  of  the  Church  were  about  to  be  threat- 
ened, the  clergy  categorically  refused  to  recognise  any  su- 
perior authority  and  disregarded,  unmolested,  all  secular 
enactments.  While  refusing  to  submit  to  any  restraints 
imposed  by  lay  authority,  the  Church  claimed  implicit 
obedience  to  its  edicts.  As  a  natural  consequence  canon 
law  was  placed  above  civil  law,  and  the  right  of  secular 
courts  to  Intervene,  even  in  criminal  matters  in  which 
the  interests  of  the  Church  or  its  ministrants  were  con- 
cerned, was  denied.  Paying  no  taxes,  exempt  from  bear- 
ing arms,  the  clergy  insisted  on  levying  heavy  contri- 
butions for  the  support  of  their  establishments,  and  re- 
quired the  secular  authorities  to  lend  armed  assistance 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  prestige,  power,  and  author- 

'J.  K.  Bluntschli,  The  Theory  of  the  State  (authorised  English  trans- 
lation), p.  125. 


22 


THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 


ity  of  the  Church,  which  in  turn  was  accountable  only 
to  God.i 

God,  the  sublime  and  absolute,  was  an  active  partici- 
pant in  the  everyday  life  of  the  times,  whose  indulgences 
were  peddled  from  door  to  door,  whose  penalties  were 
suffered,  and  blessings  praised.  The  omnipotence  and 
omnipresence  of  God  in  secular  as  well  as  spiritual  life 
were  universally  acknowledged.  There  was  a  constant 
intercourse  between  man  and  the  Almighty,  familiar  and 
direct  through  the  medium  of  the  clergy;  though  the 
chasm  which  separated  man  from  his  God,  a  chasm  which 
only  the  clergy  might  bridge,  was  insistently  em- 
phasised. 

But  soon  the  priesthood,  no  longer  content  with  their 
purely  spiritual  dominion,  under  the  pressure  of  Increas- 
ing secular  influence  and  nascent  political  consciousness, 
began  to  take  an  active  part  in  worldly  affairs.  The  Pope 
acquired  the  sovereignty  of  the  territory  immediately 
adjoining  Rome,  and  by  degrees  increased  the  Patrimony 
of  St.  Peter.  By  wars,  alliances,  and  intrigues,  suc- 
cessive Popes  throughout  the  15th  century  and  the  early 
years  of  the  i6th  extended  their  possessions  and  played 
a  chief  role  in  the  countless  struggles  which  racked  Italy. 
In  Germany  ecclesiastical  princes  received  extensive  do- 
mains and  territorial  sovereignty,  and  it  was  not  long 
before  the  clergy  became  a  separate,  privileged  political 
order  in  the  new  politico-social  organisation  throughout 
Western  Europe.    Thus  the  Church  still  combined  spirit- 

^  The  bull  Unam  Sanctam  of  Boniface  VIII  (1302)  sets  this  forth  very 
clearly:  "The  Church  possesses  two  swords,  the  spiritual  and  the  tem- 
poral— one  for  its  own  use,  the  other  to  be  employed  in  its  service  by 
the  kings  and  warriors  of  the  earth.  The  spiritual  power  as  much  sur- 
passes in  dignity  and  nobility  every  terrestrial  power,  as  things  spiritual 
excel  things  temporal ;  the  spiritual  power  has  the  right  to  judge  the 
temporal  power,  but  the  spiritual,  at  least  in  its  highest  expression 
which  is  the  Pope,  can  be  judged  only  by  God." 


POLITICO-THEISTIC  CONCEPT  OF  THE  STATE    23 

ual  and  temporal  authority,  though  now  in  distinctly 
separate  spheres.  We  may  trace  the  close  connection 
between  the  assumption  of  secular  dignities  and  honors 
by  the  clergy  and  the  loss  of  their  mediaeval  Immunities. 
Their  irnj»i«<ign^e  in  secular  affairs  served  to  undermine 
their  spiritual  authority,  and  brought  out  clearly  the 
corrupt  practices  which  were  to  prove  the  outwardly 
manifest  causes  of  the  Reformation. 

As  we  have  seen,  Machiavelli  and  his  followers,  in 
their  eagerness  to  find  a  firm  basis  for  the  authority  of 
the  Prince  in  the  newly  created  State  emancipated  from 
church  control,  laid  hold  upon  so  natural  an  analogy 
as  the  supreme  authority  of  God.  Here  we  have  the 
genesis  of  the  polltico-thelstic  system:  the  State  in  the 
image  of  God — not  the  spiritual  Godhead,  worshipped 
by  millions  of  devout  persons  with  sincerity,  but  the  God 
of  whom  an  Alexander  VI  or  a  Julius  II  were  typical 
representatives. 

It  Is  but  a  further  example  of  this  use  of  analogy 
in  an  effort  to  arrive  at  an  understanding  of  the  true 
nature  of  the  State  that  when,  as  has  already  been  pointed 
out,  the  active  participation  of  God  in  worldly  affairs 
was  no  longer  given  credence,  when  the  Deity  was  rel-  » 
egated  to  a  purely  spiritual  realm,  when  men  came  to 
take  cognisance  of  their  own  strength.  In  their  desire 
to  outline  a  new  and  more  satisfactory  concept  of  the 
State,  they  should  have  looked  to  man.  Man  It  was 
claimed  Is  ruled  by  laws,  is  amenable  to  justice,  has  a 
moral  sense,  has  his  family,  his  relations,  his  friends,  and,  P ^  .  r/ 
above  all,  his  Interests,  his  property.  Man!s_aLhiil£_Jife  Tv^  ^SiJ" 
is  made  up  of  a  series  of  compacts  and  contracts  which  y/  ^ 
to  be  valid  without  continuous  warfare  mustjh^i^  the  ^^4/tJ*^ 
sanction  of  a  legal  code.      Thus  man  in  society  is  a  juridic  / 

animal  bound  by  laws  which  make  possible  the  smooth    ^**' 


24  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

working  of  social  relations  and  prevent  anarchy.  It  ap- 
peared a  very  rational  use  of  analogy  to  present  the  State 
as  patterned  after  the  image  of  man.  It  seemed  so  self- 
evident  that  it  immediately  gained  axiomatic  acceptance 
among  the  more  liberal-minded,  throughout  the  West- 
ern World,  and  became  the  basis  of  all  of  the  new 
theories  of  State.  It  thus  becomes  necessary  for  us  to 
enter  into  a  closer  examination  of  this  analogy;  to  trace 
its  growth,  its  spread,  perversion,  and  decay,  as  a  useful 
theory  of  social  relations. 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Genesis  of  Constitutional  Government 

THE  MORAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  THE  STATE — THE  ROLE  OF  ENGLAND 
ypTHE  DECLARATION  AND  BILL   OF   RIGHT — INFLUENCE 
■^  OF  THE  MIDDLE  CLASS SPREAD  OF  LIBERALISM 


THE  politico-jurldic  concept  of  the  State  which  en- 
dowed it  with  moral  responsibility   was  a  distinct 
cultural  advance.     Under  the  older  politico-theistic  doc- 
trine the  question  of  the  government  of  the  State  was 
rarely  if  ever  broached.     The  State  as  an  entity  inde- 
pendent of  its  sovereign  was  not  conceived  of,  as  the 
complete  fusion  of  these  two  elements  was  the  basis  of 
that  doctrine  of  Statehood.     When,  however,  the  thesis 
was  presented  that  the  State  was  in  reality  to  be  held  the 
projection  of  the  personality  of  the  individual,  and  the 
action  of  the  State  manifestations  of  its  will  as  an  inde- 
pendent moral  organism,  the  question  arose  how  this  will    | 
should  be  controlled;  in  short  how  the  State  was  to  be 
governed. 

The  political  theorists  of  the  17th  century  found  no 
difficulty  in  devising  programmes  of  government  and 
probing  into  the  essence  of  Statehood.  Man  jsjnoral, 
therefore  the  State  created  in  the  image  of  man,  by  man, 
for  men,  must  be_a_miii^l--ofgaiLlsm.  A  compact  is  bind- 
ing, a  contract  valid  between  two  men,  therefore  not 
only  contracts  between  the  governed  and   the  govern- 

f25] 


26  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

ing  must  be  binding,  but  compacts  between  States  must 
be  valid. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  outline  with  any  degree  of  ex- 
actness the  limits  of  the  moral  responsibility  of  the 
State.  Morality  as  such  eludes  precise  definition.  Its 
categories  embrace  all  higher  human  aspirations  or  what 
may  better  be  called  sentiments.  The  transfer  by  analogy 
of  the  moral  attributes  of  civilised  man  to  civ- 
ilised States  raised  questions  which  admitted  of  no  sat- 
isfactory solution.  It  was  an  insufficient  explanation 
i^,  to  declare  that  the  State  was  bound  by  certain  implicit 
p*  obligations  to  limit  its  action,  or  to  assert  that,  as  the 

primary  natural  object  of  the  State  wa?  to  provide  a 
form  of  government  to  enforce  law  and  order,  the  State 
— in  itself  a  component  of  law  and  order — was  func- 
tionally moral.  It  is  difficult  to  perceive  how  such  a 
sophistical  explanation  should  have  been  deemed  ade- 
quate, the  more  so  as  at  the  same  time  it  was  as- 
serted that  the  State,  being  sovereign  and  independent, 
recognising  no  superior  authority,  bending  to  no  law, 
amenable  to  no  court,  was  responsible  only  to  itself. 

There  is  here  a  striking  similarity  of  argument  with 
that  implied  in  the  attitude  of  the  clergy  during  the 
Middle  Ages  to  insure  their  exemption  from  secular  con- 
trol. The  social  chaos  which  eventually  resulted  from 
this  duality  failed  to  serve  as  a  warning  to  the  framers 
of  the  new  theories  of  State. 

It  was  soon  found  that  whereas  the  State,  still  uncon- 
scious of  its  national  strength,  might  in  its  international 
relations  be  left  to  rely  on  a  system  of  moral  responsi- 

Ibilities  in  so  far  as  its  internal  government  was  con- 
cerned, a  labyrinth  had  been  entered  upon  in  the  at- 
tempt to  formulate  a  workable  code  applicable  to  the 


GENESIS  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  GOVERNMENT   27 

growing  complexity  and  vigor  of  political  life.  The 
rationalists  of  the  i8th  century  sought  a  more  satisfac- 
tory formula.  By  glossing  over  the  moral  attributes  of 
the  State,  they  fixed  on  the  analogy  between  government 
and  the  constitution  of  man,  which  met  with  ready 
acceptance. 

Constitutional  government,  the  fine  fruit  of  modern 
political  theory,  the  basic  manifestation  of  the  politlco- 
juridic  organisation  of  the  State,  was  a  tangible  analogy, 
JThe'' constitution  of  man  implies  in  the  first  instance  his 
health,  manly  vigor,  possibilities  of  development.  It 
implies  Inheritance  from  the  past,  source  of  activity  in 
the  present,  promise  of  Increase  in  the  future.  It  implies 
birth,  growth,  vigor,  decay,  carried  on  through  succeed- 
ing generations.  It  is  the  organic  basis  of  mankind. 
So  the  constitution  of  the  State  became  by  analogy  the 
organic  law,  the  fundamental  principle  upon  which  the 
new  political  system  was  built. 

The  establishment  of  constitutional  government^ 
marks  the  enthronement  of  the  politlco-juridic  theory  of 
State.  To  be  sure,  Montesquieu,  who  labored  so  In- 
defatigably  to  define  and  Illustrate  the  jurldic  basis  of 
society  as  expressed  in  constitutional  government,  goes 
so  far  as  to  point  out  that  the  first  beginnings  of  con- 
stitutional monarchy  are  to  be  found  as  reported  by 
Tacitus,    among   the    ancient    German    tribes:     Ce   beau 

^  "The  fundamental  defect  of  the  policy  of  antiquity,"  Mommsen  tells 
us,  "was  that  it  never  fully  advanced  from  the  urban  form  of  constitu- 
tion to  that  of  a  state  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  from  a  system  of 
primary  assemblies  to  a  parliamentary  system.  The  sovereign  assembly 
of  Rome  was  what  Congress  would  be  if,  instead  of  sending  representa- 
tives, all  the  electors  should  meet  in  a  Parliament;  a  body  neither  able 
to  take  a  comprehensive  view  nor  form  a  resolution ;  a  body  which, 
save  in  a  few  cases,  a  couple  of  hundred  or  thousand  individuals  acci- 
dentally picked  up  from  the  streets  of  the  capital,  acted  and  voted  in  the 
name  of  the  burgesses." — History  of  Rome,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  332. 


28  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

systeme  a  etc.  trouvc  dans  Ics  bois}  Bluntschli,  writing 
a  century  later  concerning  the  rise  of  constitutional  mon- 
archy, which  he  held  to  be  the  final  and  perfect  form 
of  government,  declare:  "It  is  the  end  of  a  history 
of  more  than  a  thousand  years,  the  completion  of  the 
Romano-Germanic  political  life,  the  true  political  civi- 
lisation of  Europe."  -  There  is  much  truth  in  both  these 
assertions,  were  we  to  confine  ourselves  to  an  inquiry 
into  the  evolutionary  forms  and  stages  of  constitutional 
government.  Nevertheless,  we  can  with  precision  fix 
on  the  historical  event  which  marks  the  establishment 
of  constitutional  government  as  a  working  political 
principle. 

\.l'^  The  Revolution  of  1688,  which  resulted  in  the  calling 

\^  5^  of  William  and  Mary  to  the  throne  of  England,  was  the 
C.  outcome  of  the  desire  to  put  into  practice  this  constitu- 
v^v)^  tional  principle  which  was  henceforth  to  become  the 
guiding  precept  of  government.  "  The  Declax^iion  and 
Bill  of  Right  was  drawn  up  so  as  to  secure  the  "liberties 
of  Hie^  nation."  It  was  a  man-made  document,  and 
affirmed  that  man  is  the  supreme  arbiter.  It  rejected 
the  concept  of  the  divine  right  of  kings,  patterned  the 
monarchy  on  the  constitutional  basis,  as  sanctioned  by 
man-made  laws,  and  recognised  in  Parliament  the  su- 
preme authority,  the  expression  of  the  ultimate  will  of 
the  people.  Monarchy  was  shorn  of  its  vested^priv- 
X,  jlege^.  The  power  of  suspending,  or  dispensing  with, 
law  by  regal  authority  was  declared  illegal,  as  was  the 
levying  of  money  for  the  use  of  the  Crown  by  preroga- 
tive without  grant  of  Parliament,  and   the  raising  and 

*  De  I'Esprit  des  Lois,  Book  XI,  Chap.  VI.  In  the  next  paragraph 
Montesquieu  pointedly  adds:  "As  all  human  things  have  an  end,  the 
state  we  are  speaking  of  will  lose  its  liberty,  will  perish.  Have  not 
Rome,  Sparta,  and  Carthage  perished?  It  will  perish  when  the  legisla- 
tive power  shall  be  more  corrupt  than  the  executive." 

^Op.  cit.,  Chap.  XIV,  p.   396. 


A 


GENESIS  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  GOVERNMENT   29 

keeping  of  a  standing  army  in  time  of  peace,  except  with 
its  consent.  Parliament  further  asserted  its  right  to 
grant  taxes,  regulate  the  royal  household,  control  the 
executive  authority,  secure  free  speech  and  freedom  of 
the  press.  These  are  the  principal  provisions  of  this 
epoch-making  document.  The  Lords  and  Commons 
thereupon  resolved  that  William  and  Mary  should  be 
King  and  Queen  of  England  for  their  joint  and  separate 
live^. 

We  cannot  fail  to  recognise  the  jubilant  satisfaction 
with  which  this  great  experiment,  the  putting  into  opera- 
tion of  this  new  theory  of  State,  must  have  been  greeted. 
Men  for  the  first  time  had  deliberately  created  the 
State  in  their  own  image.  They  took  fresh  courage  in 
their  achievement.  It  opened  what  appeared  to  be  the 
smooth  path  of  indefinite  development;  it  broadened  and 
made  plausible  the  arguments  of  legality;  it  widened 
and   prepared   the   way   for   the   emancipation   of   man-  r 

kind  from  political  oppression,   and  broke  the  last  re-  g^ 

maining  shackles  which  held__5£ieii££_  enslaved.  Man 
seemed  to  hold  firmly  in  his  hands  the  chart  of  his  destiny.  '*i^^  J^ 
He  dared  examine  it  in  the  light  of  his  own  experience,  '^  \ 
test  his  conclusions  by  practical  experimentation,  satisfy  <^^i/VA 
himself  of  the  tangible  reality  of  his  achievement.  His  j^^  \ 
reason  guiding  his  strength  had  created  the  State,  en-  ^  A^* 
dowed  its  government  with  individuality  and  personality,  vA^ 
stamped  It  as  his  own. 


II 


It  was  particularly  fortunate  that  In  Locke,  England 
should  have  found  a  man  able  to  express  in  lucid  lan- 
guage the  basis  upon  which  this  new  political  ideolosrv 


^A 


THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

was  founded.  According  to  his  doctrine,  government  is 
not  primarily  a  contract  entered  into  between  the  gov- 
erned and  the  governing,  for  the  protection  of  inter- 
N^ests,  but  a  contract  made  for  the  protection  of  right§, 
Man,  according  to  Locke,  is  by  nature  endowed  with 
certain^ rights:  the  right  to  live,  the  right  to  work,  the 
^  right  to  enjoy  in  peace  the  fruits  of  his  labor.  Before 
governments  were  established  each  man  had  to  defend 
these  rights  as  best  he  could,  and  as  so  much  time  was 
taken  up  with  their  defence  little  was  left  to  provide 
a  more  ample  store  than  for  his  immediate  needs.  Con- 
ceiving that,  by  the  establishment  of  some  organisation 
which  would  provide  for  this  defence,  man  would  have 
more  time  to  devote  to  the  useful  tasks  of  production, 
he  promised  to  obey  the  government  established  as  long 
as  this  government  in  return  protected  his  inherent  rights, 
but  no  longer.  Man  in  society  does  not  surrender  any 
of  his  inherent  rights,  but  confers  on  the  government 
the  sanction  of  authority  similar  to  that  which  he  had 
availed  himself  of  in  protecting  his  own  rights.  This 
authority  is  expressed  in  the  constitution,  which  is  the 
\source  of  the  legality  of  government.  When  the  con- 
stitution is  violated,  men  have  the  fundamental  right 
to  overthrow  a  government  which  purports  to  continue 
without  their  sanction,  and  establish  a  new  government 
conforming  to  their  needs.  In  other  words,  the  govern- 
ment of  the  State  rests  on  the  consent  of  the  gov- 
erned. Locke  did  not  have  in  mind  a  written  constitu- 
tion, but  rather  a  verbal  agreement.  The  propositions 
set  forth  in  the  Declaration  of  Right  embody  the  tenets 
upon  which  such  a  constitutional  government  was  to  rest. 
The  Magna  Carta  (1215)  had  sought  to  establish 
the  supremacy  of  the  aristocracy  over  the  King.  The 
Declaration  of  Right  proved  that  the  sanction  of  con- 


GENESIS  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  GOVERNMENT   31 

stituted  authority  was  now  vested  in  the  Middle  (^|ass. 
The  Magna  Carta  had  been  exacted  of  the  sovereign 
by  a  powerful  coterie  of  barons.  The  Declaration  of 
Right  was  the  work  of  the  Commons,  who  conferred 
some  of  the  attributes  of  sovereignty  upon  the  prince 
whom  they  had  selected,  retaining  the  full  power  in  their 
own  hands. 

Constitutional  government  in  England  was  the  crea- 
tioq  of  the  dominantly  puritanical  Middle  Class, ^  which 
had  risen  to  power  in  the  wake  of  a  decaying  aristocracy 
— a  Middle  Class,  whose  character  had  been  hardened 
by  a  long  series  of  civil  wars  and  religious  disturbances. 
It  was  made  up  of  men  who,  in  a  single  generation,  had 
executed  a  king  and  raised  a  commoner  to  sovereign 
power,  and  in  a  reactionary  moment  had  recalled  to  the 
throne  a  dissolute  prince  of  the  dynasty  they  had  so 
dramatically  deposed.  They  had  tolerated  his  excesses, 
and  finally  in  exasperation  at  the  infringements  of  his 
successor,  James  II,  upon  the  established  rights  of  Par- 
liament, had  driven  out  the  latter,  and  called  in  a  prince 
from  the  Low  Countries  to  be  their  sovereign.  Such 
men  were  not  in  a  mood  to  be  influenced  by  irrational  or 
extremist  theories  of  State.  Their  principal  concern  was 
to  establish  a  form  of  government  planted  on  the  solid  ^7 
foundation  of  toleration  and  moderation.  It  was  the 
work  of  stern  men,  whose  political  zeal  had  in  it  all 
the  elements  of  a  religious  fervor.  Men,  many  of  whom 
had  fought  in  the  field  for  their  religious  convictions, 
had  defied  the  established  Church  and  their  king,   and 

*The  term  Middle  Class  when  applied  to  England  does  not  mean  the 
same  thing  as  the  bourgeoisie  as  it  is  known  on  the  Continent.  In  the 
first  instance  the  Commons  were  made  up  of  representatives  of  the  lower 
nobijjjty  and  of  the_  municipalities.  It  was  not  until  the  early  years"of 
the  19th  century  th^t  the  lerm  "Middle  Class"  in  England  can  be  con- 
sidered to  correspond  more  or  less  accurately  with  the  continental 
bourgeoisie. 


II 


32  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

won  a  twofold  battle,  of  religious  toleration  and  political 
freedom.  As  Lord  Morley  has  observed:^  "Passion 
and  logic  are  the  two  great  working  elements  of  revolu- 
tionary change."  The  passion  had  burned  itself  out 
during  the  innumerable  disturbances  of  the  half  century 
preceding  the  establishment  of  constitutional  government. 
Cold,  calculating  logic — in  so  far  as  an  assembly  of  men 
may  be  said  to  act  logically — seems  to  have  inspired  the 
framing  of  the  new  principles  of  government. 

Modern  constitutional  government  as  first  established 
in  England  was  tempered  by  the  fires  of  Puritanism.  Its 
founders  were  guided  by  an  intense  realism,  a  materialist 
insight  into  what  they  conceived  to  be  their  rights.  The 
form  of  government  they  wished  to  establish  and  did 
establish  secured  the  recognition  of  the  principle  of 
representation  as  the  basis  of  all  authority  in  the  State. 
This  new  theory  of  State  was  tolerant  rather  than  lib- 
eral. It  recognised  the  importance  of  man-made  laws, 
but  the  tendency  was  soon  manifest  in  Parliament  to 
arrogate  to  itself  many  of  the  arbitrary  powers  formerly 
exercised  under  absolutism.  Parliament  made  it  plain 
that  it  would  tolerate  no  check  nor  hindrance  to  its  au- 
thority. It  asserted  for  itself  the  right  to  change  the 
constitution,  alter  the  succession  to  the  throne,  confined 
"neither    for   persons    or   causes   within   any   bounds."  ^ 

^Life  of  Oliver  Cromivell,  p.  48. 

'As  Blackstone  has  commented:  "It  (Parliament)  hath  sovereign  and 
uncontrollable  authority  in  the  making,  confirming,  enlarging,  restraining, 
abrogating,  repealing,  reviving,  and  expounding  of  laws,  concerning  mat- 
ters of  all  possible  denominations:  ecclesiastical  or  temporal;  civil,  mili- 
tary, maritime,  or  criminal;  this  being  the  place  where  that  absolute 
despotic  power  which  must,  in  all  governments,  reside  somewhere,  is 
intrusted  by  the  Constitution  of  these  kingdoms.  All  mischiefs  and 
grievances,  operations  and  remedies,  that  transcend  the  ordinary  course 
of  the  laws,  are  within  the  reach  of  this  extraordinary  tribunal.  .  .  . 
It  can,  in  short,  do  everything  that  is  not  naiurally  impossible  to  be 
done;  and,  therefore,  some  have  not  scrupled  to  call  its  power,  by  a 
figure  rather  too  bold,  the  omnipotence  of  Parliament." 


GENESIS  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  GOVERNMENT   33 

These  factors  must  be  borne  constantly  in  mind  in  con- 
sidering the  subsequent  development  of  the  constitutional 
system. 

The  creators  of  representative  government  desired  not 
merely  to  safeguard  the  liberties,  but  to  affirm  the  priv- 
ileges and  prerogatives  of  the  Commons,  the  growing 
Middle  Class.  Their  successors  were  intent  on  the  one 
hand  in  extending  the  sway  of  parliamentary  control  as 
exerpplified  by  the  Act  of  Union  with  Scotland  (1707), 
'whirh  brought  that  realm  under  the  direct  government 
of  Westminster,  and  on  the  other  in  promoting  peace 
and  affording  an  opportunity  for  the  development  of  their 
material  wellbeing.  They  paid  little  heed  to  such  novel 
theories  as  the  "Rights  of  Man,"  the  "Sovereignty  of 
the  People,"  or  to  the  more  liberal  equalitarian  political 
ideology  which  was  rapidly  growing  up  throughout  con- 
tinental Europe. 

This  liberal  movement  manifested  itself  markedly  to- 
wards the  second  half  of  the  i8th  century.  From  Eng- 
land the  example  of  the  practical  working  of  constitu- 
tional government  had  spread  and  inspired  not  merely 
political  philosophers  but  statesmen  and  princes,  to  accept 
with  enthusiasm  various  programmes  and  theories  of  po- 
litical reformation.  "There  was  scarcely  a  throne  in 
Europe  which  was  not  filled  by  a  liberal  and  reforming 
king,  a  liberal  and  reforming  emperor,  or,  strangest  of 
all,  a  liberal  and  reforming  Pope;  the  age  of  Frederick 
the  Great,  of  Catherine  II,  of  Joseph  II,  of  Peter  Leo- 
pold, of  Benedict  XIV,  of  Ganganelli,  of  Pombal,  of 
Aranda;  when  the  very  Bourbons  of  Naples  were  lib- 
erals and  reformers."  ^ 

If  we  were  to  seek  for  the  cause  of  this  phenomenon 
we  would  find  it  in  the  ever-widening  interest  in  political 

^J.  S.  Mill,  Representative  Government,  Chap.  I. 


34  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

affairs  which  had  seized  hold  of  mankind.  The  minds  of 
men  were  in  a  ferment,  intoxicated  by  their  own  newly 
revealed  strength.  It  was  the  dawn  of  political  enlight- 
enment when  the  rising  sun  of  political  freedom  illumined 
not  only  statesmen  and  philosophers,  but  even  absolute 
sovereigns,  who  participated  eagerly  in  furthering  the 
new  theories,  unaware  of  the  anomaly  of  their  position. 
The  liberalism  which  could  arouse  the  enthusiasm  of  a 
Frederick  the  Great  or  a  Catherine  II  was  no  doubt 
purely  philosophical;  yet  the  new  ideas  of  political  free- 
dom, of  progress,  of  equality  and  humanity  ushered  in  in 
the  wake  of  representative  government,  were  spread- 
ing resistlessly. 


I 


CHAPTER  III 
The  Rise  of  Public  Opinion 

FRANCE    OF   THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY — HUMANITY — LIBERTY 
PRjpGRESS — ^MONTESQUIEU TURCOT — CONDORCET — ROUSSEAU 


THROUGHOUT  the  17th  century,  while  In  England 
Parliament  was  engaged  in  its  successful  struggle 
against  the  Crown,  on  the  Continent  absolutism  still 
held  undisputed  sway.  In  France  the  State,  guided  by 
men  of  genius,  served  by  soldiers  and  administrators  of 
superior  ability,  exalted  by  poets  and  philosophers  of  rare 
talent,  had  under  Louis  XIV  produced  the  most  brilliant 
civilisation  of  modern  times.  The  example  of  the  French 
King  was  imitated  throughout  Europe.  In  England, 
when  James  II  had  wished  to  follow  the  general  trend, 
it  had  led  to  his  overthrow;  while  the  petty  princes  of 
Germany  were  ruining  themselves  in  their  desire  to  fol- 
low the  lead  of  the  Great  King. 

It  was  not  until  the  Regency  ( 1 7 1 5-1 723 )  that  a  more 
liberal  spirit  began  to  make  itself  felt  in  France.  Its 
first  manifestation  is  to  be  noted  in  the  gradual  rise 
of  what  has  since  become  known  as  ''public  opinion." 
This  new  sodal  f^rce  was  an  outgrowth  of  the  empirical 
temper 'which  had  come  into  the  affairs  of  men  upon 
the  establishment  of  constitutional  government  in  Eng- 
land. We  no  longer  find  merely  factional  interests,  or 
opinion  dominated  by  the  sovereign,  but  a  public  opin- 

[35] 


w7 

^        •{30  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

ion  on  matters  of  general  and  social  interest  which  re- 
,  fleeted  and  expressed  the  thought  of  the  general  mind. 
I  as  constitutional  government  in  England,  it  was  believed, 
[  expressed  its  rights.  As  the  latter  was  representative 
government,  so  the  former  was  representative  opinion. 
An  acute  student  of  the  philosophy  of  history  has  re- 
marked that  it  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  French 
philosophers  produced  the  spirit  which  caused  the  Rev- 
olution; they  were  its  products,  its  propagators.  Already 
early  in  the  i8th  century  a  public  opinion  had  grown  up 
which  reflected  and  expressed  the  general  mind,  and 
became  the  most  potent  factor  in  national  life.  "It  dis- 
turbed the  judgment,  arrested  the  will,  unnerved  the 
arm  of  the  ruler;  rendered  every  speaker  or  writer 
formidable,  and  the  collective  influence  of  the  intelligent 
and  literary  portion  of  society  enormous.  Never  was 
the  connection  between  philosophy  and  public  opinion 
closer.  The  latter  dominated,  and  made  the  former  its 
handmaid."  ^ 

The  philosophy  of  the  i8th  century  was  essentially 
empirical  and  rational;  It  despised  metaphysical  niceties, 
and  was  bent  on  expressing  cogently  the  confused  opin- 
ions nascent  in  the  general  mind.  Its  philosophers  were 
eager  to  proselyte,  and  found  ready  to  hand  enthusiastic 
disciples  willing  to  undertake  to  reform  society,  and  suf-i 
fer  martyrdom  in  its  behalf.  They  believed  in  progress, 
justice,  toleration,  liberty,  fraternity,  the  sovereignty 
of  the  people,  the  rights  of  man,  and  humanity,  not 
merely  abstractly,  but  concretely  as  concepts  which  were 
to  be  realised  in  the  immediate  future  by  the  introduc- 
tion of  political  reforms.  These  were  the  topics  which 
public  opinion  had  seized  upon.     These  were  the  doc- 

*  Cf.  Robert  Flint,  History  of  the  Philosophy  of  History  in  France,  p.  240 
et  seq. 


THE  RISE  OF  PUBLIC  OPINION  37 

trines  which  the  rationalist  philosophers  preached  to  a 
docile  multitude.  They  reflected  the  opinions,  voiced 
forcibly  the  arguments  which  had  received  the  sanction 
of  public  opinion.  In  order  to  understand  the  real  sig- 
nificance of  the  fervid  enthusiasm  of  the  epoch,  to  gain 
an  insight  into  the  causes  of  the  energy  displayed  by 
political  agitators,  and  the  influence  of  doctrinaire 
philosophers,  who  were  able  to  stir  the  minds  of  men 
to  such  depths  that  on  the  one  hand  peers  like  Lafayette 
and  Rochambeau  were  induced  to  undertake  the  task  of 
helping  to  free  the  American  Colonies,  and  to  establish 
a  democratic  government  based  on  the  theories  of  a 
Montesquieu,  and  on  the  other  to  account  for  the  fa- 
natical excesses  of  the  French  Revolution,  it  is  essential 
to  inquire  briefly  into  the  elements  of  which  this  public 
opinion  was  composed. 


II 

Since  the  earliest  times  there  have  been  certain  funda- 
mental concepts  such  as  humanity,  liberty,  unity,  which 
are  words  used  to  express  the  desire  of  men  to  grasp 
at    and    secure    for   themselves    the   permanent    benefits     -    . 
of   social   wellbeing.      Every   epoch   in   history   has   con-       v    S 
tributed   its   share   in   building  up    this   ideology,    which  \^ 

forms  the  groundwork  of  our  social  structure,  and  bounds 
social  life. 

The  basic  concept  which  has  been  held  firmly  by  suc- 
ceeding generations  of  men,  with  varying  degrees  of 
emphasis,  is  that  the  foundation  of  society  is  humanity. 
Humanity  implies  unity  of  all  human  beings;  the  belief 
that  a  bond  of  mutual  relationship  unites  mankind,  ^t 
is  expressed  in  the  doctrine  of  brotherly  love  of  Christ, 


38 


THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 


( 


as  it  was  taught  by  Mlh-Teih  ^  In  China  five  centuries 
before  the  Christian  era. 

In  remote  antiquity,  in  spite  of  the  difficulty  of  com- 
munications and  the  fact  that  only  a  relatively  limited 
category  of  individuals  were  held  to  be  free  men,  the 
advantages  and  desirability  of  intercourse  between  the 
different  races  and  peoples  appear  to  have  been  rec- 
ognised, and  the  unity  of  mankind  may  reasonably  be 
supposed  to  have  been  understood,  if  not  expressed.  This 
would  appear  to  be  proved  negatively  by  the  pains  taken 
by  the  Brahmins  to  deny  the  truth  of  the  unity  of  man- 
kind and  establish  the  caste  system.  Buddhism,  the 
natural  reaction  against  the  perversions  of  this  system, 
taught  a  doctrine  of  charity  embracing  every  living  crea- 
ture. In  Persia  under  the  Great  Kings,  and  in  the 
Empire  established  by  Alexander,  we  find  the  first  actual 
attempt*  made  to  realise  a  form  of  political  unity  under 
the  sceptre  of  a  single  sovereign. 

Few  traces  of  a  feeling  of  humanity,  or  even  of  a  more 

limited  notion  thereof  such  as  national  unity,  are  to  be 

met  with  in  Greece.     During  the  days  of  its  greatness 

prejudice   against  the   foreigner  persisted.      It  was 

ared  by  Plato  and  Aristotle.  Whatever  tendencies  to- 
wards national  union  may  have  existed  were  based,  not 
on  elements  directly  political,  but  on  games  and  art. 
"The  contests  at  Olympia,  the  poems  of  Homer,  the 
tragedies  of  Euripides  were  the  only  bonds  that  held 
Hellas  together." 

It  was  not  until  after  the  disintegration  of  the  empire 
of  Alexander  and  the  subjugation  of  Greece  by  Rome, 

*  Cf.  James  Legge,  The  Chinese  Classics — T/ie  Opinions  of  Mih-Teih: 
"It  is  the  business  of  the  sages  to  effect  the  good  government  of  the 
empire.  They  must  examine  therefore  into  the  cause  of  disorder  and 
when  they  do  so  they  will  find  tkat  it  arises  from  the  want  of  mutual 
love." — Vol.  II,  p.  104. 


THE  RISE  OF  PUBLIC  OPINION  39 

that  the  idea  of  universal  citizenship  came  to  be  rec- 
ognised. The  sense  of  the  brotherhood  of  man  whichs  /l 
arose  at  this  time  was  the  result  of  despondency  and/  ' 
disillusion,  rather  than  of  a  hopeful,  optimistic  attitude. 
"The  Greek,  ideal  of  unity  was  essentially  negative, 
abstract,  empty,  unreal.  Men  took  refuge  in  the  thought 
of  being  citizens  of  the  world  because  actual  citizenship 
had  everywhere  lost  its  dignity."  ^ 

The  Romans  by  the  surrender  of  their  individuality 
^andbf  their  personality  gained  a  feeling  of  love  of  coun- 
try and  patriotism  unknown  to  the  Greeks.  Nevertheless, 
in  spite  of  the  conquests  of  Roman  arms,  the  unification 
of  the  known  world  under  Roman  laws,  and  the  extension 
of  Roman  citizenship  even  beyond  the  confines  of  Italy, 
there  is  no  evidence  which  would  induce  us  to  conclude 
that  the  Romans  even  during  the  late  Empire  possessed 
a  deep  feeling  of  the  solidarity  or  of  the  fundamental 
unity  of  mankind.  To  be  sure,  the  Stoics  had  taught  that 
all  men  must  be  regarded  as  members  of  one  great  com- 
munity who  have  need  of  each  other,  but  there  was  no 
wide  application  of  this  point  of  view  which  may  be  held  »  ^0^^*^ 
to  have  been  of  practical  significance. 

When  Alexandria  became  the  moral  capital  of  the 
Empire,  the  more  rigorous,  brutal,  and  commonplace 
utilitarianism  -  of  the  Romans  was  moderated  by  the  in- 
fluence of  the  teachings  of  Hellenistic  philosophy,  more 

'Cf.  Flint,  op.  cit. 

""Every  nation  of  antiquity  which  attained  internal  unity  strove  either 
directly  to  subdue  its  neighbors  as  did  the  Hellenic  States,  or  at  least 
render  them  innocuous  as  did  Rome.  .  .  .  The  policy  of  .  ome  vas  not 
projected  by  a  single  mighty  intellect  and  bequeathed  traditionally  from 
generation  to  generation;  it  was  the  policy  of  a  very  able,  but  somewhat 
narrow-minded  deliberative  assembly,  which  had  far  too  little  power 
for  grand  combination,  and  far  too  much  of  a  right  instinct  for  the 
preservation  of  its  own  commonwealth,  to  devise  projects  in  the  spirit 
of  a  Caesar,  or  a  Napoleon." — Mommsen,  History  of  Rome,  Vol.  II,  pp. 
521-522. 


40  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

especially  by  Neo-Platonism,  which  combined  the  ration- 
alism of  the  Greek  with  the  mysticism  of  the  Egyptian 
mind,   a  blending  of  Platonic  ideals  with  the  teachings 
of  Oriental  philosophies,   in   an  effort  to  erect   a  more 
satisfying    religious    system.      Neo-Platonism    taught    a 
striving  after  unity,  intellectually  understood,  a  mode  of 
thought  rather  than  of  feeling,  and  as  a  result  was  un- 
able to  cope  with   the  overpowering,   emotional   appeal 
of  Christianity.     The  teachings  of  Christ  emphasised  the 
jotoic  doctrine  of  universal  brotherhood,  though  they  also 
.  j^  took  into  account  the  eclecticism  of  the  Greeks,  and  the 
y        feeling  of  awe  borrowed  from  the  Oriental  cults  which 
J'  y,      had  become  familiar  to  the  Western  World.   Christianity 
^^       owed  Its  success  in  a  great  measure  to  the  fact  that  It 
^  v*'  was  the  happy  fusion  of  all  that  was  vital  and  viable 

Y  •  '  in  the  Italo-Greek  philosophic  systems  which  had  sur- 
vived. Like  all  truly_profpund_  religions,  It  concerned 
■^  Itself  more  with  "modes  of  feeling  than  modes  of 
■  thought."  This  assured  for  It  final  triumph,  and  kept 
alive  and  gave  renewed  vigor  to  the  concept  of  humanity. 
After  the  official  acknowledgment  of  Christianity  by 
the  Empire  the  idea  of  the  unity  of  mankind  was  again 
vaguely  apprehended.  The  barbarian  Invasions  checked 
Its  growth,  and  introduced  the  new  and  aggressively  rest- 
less elements  of  freedom  and  self-reliance :  of  diversity. 
Even  after  having  embraced  Christianity,  the  barbarian 
Invaders  tenaciously  defended  their  national  indepen- 
dence. The  separation  of  the  Church  and  State,  which 
grew  gradually,  was  only  effected  after  a  prolonged 
struggle  between  the  Pope  and  Emperor.  The  Church 
gained  a  spiritual  ascendancy  which  had  In  It  elements 
of  unity,  while  the  world  ruled  over  by  the  Emperor 
was  composed  of  a  heterogeneous  number  of  states  which 
only  paid  a  nominal  allegiance  to  him  as  their  overlord, 


THE  RISE  OF  PUBLIC  OPINION  41 

and  were  to  all  intents  and  purposes  independent.  The 
establishment  of  feudalism  seemed  to  prove  conclusively 
that  the  barbarian  concept  of  diversity,  the  Germanic 
ideals  of  self-dependence  and  self-determination,  had  tri- 
umphed over  the  Christian  ideal  of  world  unity. 

It  was  not  until  the  close  of  the  nth  century  that  we   0 
find  a  fresh  reawakening  of  the  idea  of  humanjlv.     The  .ac^*^ 

Crusades  which  continued  through  two  centuries  (1091-^'^  -^ 
1295)  brought  the  peoples  of  continental  Europe  in 
contact  with  each  other;  united  priest  and  peasant,  lord 
and  serf  in  a  common  enterprise,  and  taught  men  to  look 
beyond  the  narrow  boundaries  of  their  own  interests, 
and  give  their  lives  for  an  ideal. 

The  subsequent  development  of  the  concept  of  human- 
ity  down  to  our  own  times  has  been  slow,  but  continu- 
ous.    It  was  first  cogently  set  forth  during  the  Renais-      < 
sance,  when  the  ideal  of  classical^titiquity,  of  a  World 
State,  was  grafted  upon  the  concept  of  the  Church  Uni-  ^ 

versal.     The  period  of  industrial  and  commercial  expan-i    J^l 
sion,  the  discoverv  of  the  New  World,  the  opening  up\ 
of  new  trade  routes  to  the  East,  the  invention  of  print- 1 
ing,  the  growth  of  political  consciousness  and  social  sol- 
idarity, contributed  to  strengthen  and  diffuse  the  feeling 
that  all  men  are  members  of  a  common  family.     Though     x 
arrested  in   its   growth,    and   held   in   abeyance   at  vari- 
ous periods,   during  the    i8th   century   the   idea   of   hu- 
manity, conceived  as  a  broad  cosmopolitanism,  became 
the  rational  goal  towards  which,  it  was  believed,  man- 
kind was  striving.  » 

Liberty  has  been  an  object  of  man's  ceaseless  preoccu-  L^^ 

pation.     Since  the  dawn  of  history,  liberty  in  Its  various         ** 
modes   and   interpretations   has   been   recognised    as   the 
mainspring  of  moral,  political,  and  social  life,  though  the 
methods  used  to  attain  it  and  the  value  attached  to  its 


42  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

benefits  have  varied  greatly  during  succeeding  epochs. 
It  would  lead  too  far  afield  to  outline  even  in  meagre 
form  the  ideological  transitions  of  the  concept  of  liberty 
which  are  so  intimately  bound  up  with  the  nature  of 
man.  It  may  be  suflicient  to  note  that  the  idea  of  lib- 
erty has  never  been  entirely  lost  sight  of,  and  the  ideals 
of  political  liberty  have  always  been  rekindled  when- 
ever civilised  mankind  has  allowed  itself  to  sink  to 
a  level  of  servitude.  Political  history  is  a  record  of 
the  striving  of  men  to  secure  the  liberty  to  express  not 
merely  their  judgment,  but  their  will;  to  safeguard  their 
private  interests,  and  insure  their  public  welfare.  Ex- 
pressed in  terms  of  liberty,  equality,  and  fraternity,  this 
new  interpretation  of  the  concept  of  humanity  during  the 
latter  half  of  the  i8th  century  came  to  dominate  the 
general  mind,  and  found  its  fullest  expression  and  its 
deepest  inspiration  in  the  ronrepf  of  perfectibilitv.  in 
progress,  as  the  motive-force  of  society. 


J 


III 

The  contribution  of  the  Middle  Class  to  political 
philosophy  and  social  theory  may  be  summed  up  in  the 
word  "progress."  Though  in  our  times  progress  is  so 
often  taken  for  granted,  it  is  not  generally  recalled  that 
it  has  only  very  recently  come  to  be  held  a  fundamental 
ideal  of  mankind.  Yet  when  we  look  through  the  pages 
of  world  history  down  to  the  most  recent  times,  or  ex- 
amine the  philosophy  and  modes  of  thinking  of  Oriental 
peoples,  we  will  find  that  progress  was  either  unknown, 
discounted,  or  emphatically  denied. 

During  classical  antiquity  the  idea  of  progress  played 


THE  RISE  OF  PUBLIC  OPINION  43 

no  part,  either  in  speculative  philosophy  or  in  practical 
life.  On  the  contrary,  its  opposite,  regress,  was  accepted 
as  the  fundamental  law  of  life.  A  careful  search  through- 
out the  writings  of  Greek  and  Roman  philosophers  and 
historians  fails  to  reveal  any  passages  which  would  in- 
dicate that  progress  was  held  to  be  an  idea  either  of 
value  or  importance,  or  that  perfectibility,  which  is  im- 
plied in  progress,  was  entertained.  Empedocles  makes 
an  obscure  reference  to  it,  and  Cicero  alludes  in  pass- 
ing,:'to  philosophy  as  progressive,  but  there  are  no  in- 
dications that  progress  in  itself  was  deemed  of  sig- 
nificance. The  Roman  world  in  general  subscribed  to 
Seneca's  belief  in  the  inevitable  corruption  and  decay  of 
humanity. 

While  Christianity  developed  the  ideal  of  hope  and 
expectation,  which  had  been  borrowed  from  the  Jews, 
it  contributed  very  little  to  the  belief  that  progress  was 
possible  by  man's  own  efforts.  On  the  contrary,  the 
Church  discouraged  every  attempt  which  may  have  been 
made  by  man  to  apply  to  secular  affairs  the  doctrine 
of  man's  capacity  of  perfection  by  grace. 

It  was  not  until  the  13th  century  that  we  discover  any 
traces  of  the  conviction  that  development  and  growth 
are  Inherent  in  all  living  phenomena,  and  that  history 
might  afford  a  proof  of  progress.  Roger  Bacon  (1214- 
1294)  made  a  tentative  effort  to  demonstrate  the  plausi- 
bility of  progress  in  the  life  of  man.  He  stands  forth 
alone  during  this  period  as  pointing  the  way  to  intel- 
lectual emancipation  by  experimental  inquiry,  which  lent 
an  atmosphere  of  progressiveness  to  his  speculations 
rather  than  that  he  may  be  believed  to  have  considered  \>l 
progress  as  an  end  in  itself.  However,  the  idea  aroused 
little  interest.  More  than  three  centuries  were  to  elapse 
before    Bodin,    Francis    Bacon,    Descartes,    and    Pascal 


44  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

indirectly  called  attention  to  the  idea  of  progress  as 
a  guiding  principle  in  seeking  solutions  for  the  difficult 
problems  which  were  harassing  the  minds  of  men. 

Bi34ip  (1530-1596)  was  the  first  to  point  to  the  prog- 
ress made  in  science  which  had  revolutionised  man's  re- 
lation to  the  universe.  The  mariner's  compass,  the  inven- 
tion of  gunpowder,  the  discoveries  in  astronomy,  he  main- 
tained, far  surpassed  the  achievements  of  the  peoples 
of  classical  antiquity  and  Indicated  the  progressive  tend- 
ency of  the  human  mind.  But  he  failed  to  draw  there- 
from the  conclusion  that  in  the  future  similar  improve- 
ment would  In  all  probability  take  place.  Francis  Bacon 
( 1 561-1626)  sought  the  increase  of  the  "happiness  of 
mankind"  in  the  progress  of  science.  He,  also,  con- 
demned the  ancients  for  not  "assisting  mankind"  to  im- 
prove its  status,  and  presented  the  thesis  that  the  classical 
world  was  not  In  reality  the  ancient  world,  but  must  be 
held  the  youth  of  the  world,  which  in  his  day  was  ap- 
proaching old  age,  and  therefore  the  world  of  his  day 
was,  he  maintained,  far  wiser,  and  its  teachings  far  more 
worthy  of  credence  than  those  of  antiquity.  Though  he 
entertained  the  Idea  that  there  might  be  improvement, 
progress  as  an  end  In  itself  was  apparently  never  actually 
considered  by  Bacon.  He  was  Interested  in  the  material 
wellbeing  of  man,  and  believed  that  the  sole  object  of 
science  was  to  assist  in  securing  and  Increasing  the  store 
of  this  wellbeing.  He  prepared  the  soil  in  which  the 
seed  of  progress  was  soon  to  be  planted. 

Descartes  (i 596-1 650)  had  imbibed  Baconian  wis- 
dom and  completed  the  breakdown  of  the  influence  of  an- 
tiquity which  held  man  a  slave  to  old  outworn  ideas,  em- 
barrassed his  philosophical  speculations,  and  arrested  his 
scientific  initiative.  At  the  time  when  rationalism  as  a 
philosophical  doctrine  was  growing  vigorously,  soon  to 


THE  RISE  OF  PUBLIC  OPINION  45 

burst  forth,  Descartes  broke  definitely  with  the  past,  and 
sought  to  build  from  the  ground  up  a  new  philosophical 
and  scientific  system,  the  foundations  of  which  were 
reason  and  the  invariability  of  the  laws  of  nature.  It 
was  Descartes,  who  by  his  searching  analysis  based  on 
rational  methods  which  he  himself  had  devised,  was  to 
clear  away  the  detritus  of  theistic  influence,  and,  aflRrm- 
ing  the  supremacy  of  reason  over  providence,  emanci- 
pate; man  from  the  tryanny  of  traditionalism,  thus  pav- 
ing the  way  for  the  acceptance  of  the  icjea  of  progress 
and  its  coroUarYi  perfectibilitjL,  It  is  not,  however,  to 
be  apprehended  that  Descartes  himself  or  any  of  his 
immediate  followers  discovered  in  progress  a  distinc- 
tive characteristic  of  man  as  a  rational  being.  They 
merely  indicated  the  pathway  of  progressive  develop- 
ment which  the  men  of  the  i8th  century  were  to  assert 
was  the  ultimate  incentive  of  the  human  mind. 

The  history  of  the  rise  of  the  idea  of  pr9g,ress  is  ,in 
a  large  measure  the  history  of  the  struggle  of  the  Mid- 
dle  Class  tor  ascendancy  in  the  State.  Progress,  the 
outgrowth  of  a  rational  mode  of  thought,  is  inextricably 
linked  with  the  historical  development  of  the  Middle 
Class,  just  as  the  concept  of  providence  was  the  basis 
of  the  aristocratically  organised  society  of  the  Middle 
Ages.^ 

The  Idea  that  man  can  improve  himself  by  his  own 
efforts,  can  realise  his  own  destiny  by  his  own  strength, 
was  an  offshoot  of  the  same  spirit  which  induced  men 
to    establish    constitutional    government    as    the    State 

*It  may  be  of  interest  to  suggest  that  the  idea  of  progress  is  alien  to  the 
proletarian  mind.  Has  the  idea  of  progress  as  a  useful  incentive  for 
human  development  run  its  active  course?  Is  it  about  to  be  placed 
alongside  of  providence  as  an  avocational  idea?  Is  it  not  probable  that 
the  idea  which  may  serve  to  rally  the  new  order  will  in  the  first  in- 
stance be  interpreted  by  a  word  less  metaphysical  than  providence  and 
more  human  than  progress,  possibly  by  prevoyance  or  foresight? 


46  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

moulded  In  their  own  Image.  As  a  speculative  Idea, 
progress  preceded  the  active  political  propaganda  which 
led  to  the  transformation  of  the  State  and  the  over- 
throw of  the  existing  social  order.  Men  believed  that 
they  had  at  last  found  the  solution  of  the  riddle  of  social 
organisation.  Progress,  whether  consciously  expressed, 
or  subconsciously  understood  as  the  source  of  perfect- 
ibility, became  the  foundation  of  general  opinion,  the 
source  of  social  optimism.  "The  human  race,"  Pascal 
had  declared,  "is  a  man  who  never  dies  and  always  ad- 
vances towards  perfection."  Now  by  a  sort  of  philo- 
sophical alchemy  the  leaders^of  public  opinion  during  the 
second  half  of  the  i8th  century  came  to  regard  progress 
as  an  end  in  itself,  as  the  source  of  the  greatest  good 
to  mankind.  The  idea  of  progress  Included  that  of  the 
gradual  enlightenment  of_man's_  nature,  the  evolution 
^^  l}i?_i"t5l3iS^'^^^'  ^^^  expansion  of  his  moral  sense,  the 
Improvement  of  his  physical  wellbeing;  In  brief,  the 
spread  of  what  had  come  to  be  the  recognised  Ideals 
of  humanity. 

To  men  such  as  Tur2;ot  (1727-1781')  progress  was 
the  great  First  Cause.  All  the  activities  of  man — 
morals,  religion,  science,  art,  government — were  subject 
to  the  laws  of  progress  based  on  the  development  of  man. 
Turgot  did  not  deny  that  progress  was  often  interrupted 
and  delayed;  its  aims  violated  by  the  moral  debility  of 
man,  by  his  intellectual  slothfulness,  but  In  spite  of  these 
checks  to  growth,  these  impediments  to  progress,  he  ex- 
pressed full  confidence  in  the  perfectibility  of  mankind. 
Other  French  writers  advanced  similar  theories  of  In- 
definite perfectibility.  Condorcet  (1745-1794)  applied 
the  test  of  progress  to  current  ideas  oT  equality,  and 
claimed  that  a  recognition  of  the  essence  of  progress 


THE  RISE  OF  PUBLIC  OPINION  47 

leads  to  the  destruction  of  inequality,  not  merely  between 
classes,  but  between  nations.  He  maintained  that  man 
is  capable  of  indefinite  progress  and  improvement,  not 
merely  because  of  the  fact  that  the  accumulated  labor, 
the  wealth  of  the  past  remains  in  a  large  part  for  his 
enjoyment,  but  because  intellectual  acquisitions  do  not 
pass  away,  and  are  increased  and  improved  during  suc- 
ceeding generations. 

\Ye  can  discover  in  this  new  doctrine  of  progress  the 
elements  which  armed  man  with  an  intellectual  and  moral 
vigor  that  he  had  hitherto  not  possessed.  His  atten- 
tion had  been  called  to  progress.  Progress,  which  sig- 
nified perfectibility  in  which  man  was  not  only  the  agent 
but  the  beneficiary,  was  illustrated  and  explained  ap- 
parently with  such  incontrovertible  authority  and  aptness 
that  it  became  the  basis  of  speculation,  the  mainspring 
of  action,  the  groundwork  of  public  opinion.  Not 
content  with  viewing  the  successive  stages  of  progress 
historically,  or  merely  accepting  the  idea  as  worthy 
of  consideration,  in  the  alembi-c  of  public  opinion  it  was 
transformed  into  an  aggressive  agency  subject  to  the  rea- 
son of  man.  Here  we  have  the  source  of  the  exuberant 
energy  which  expressed  itself  in  the  humanitarian  doc- 
trines of  the  rights  of  man,  the  sovereignty  of  the  peo- 
ple, and  the  watchword  of  the  French  Revolution — lib- 
erty, equality,  and  fraternity. 

This  brief  historical  survey  will,  I  feel,  suffice  to  show 
how  the  politico-juridic  Ideology  which  resulted  in  its 
first  phase  in  the  establishment  of  representative  gov- 
ernment In  England,  under  the  influence  and  domination 
of  nationalism  and  its  corollary,  legality,  spread  to  con- 
tinental Europe,  and  by  public  opinion  was  to  be  spread 
from  there  throughout  the  world. 


THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 


IV 


It  was  inevitable  that  when  the  thoughts  of  men  had 
for  a  long  period  been  engaged  upon  theoretical  specu- 
lation, they  should  desire  to  see  the  practical  applica- 
tion of  their  theories.  The  assertive  nature  of  the  ra- 
tionalism of  the  1 8th  century  must  be  borne  in  mind  if 
the  logical  sequence  of  events,  the  growth  of  the  politico- 
juridic  theory  of  the  State  fashioned  in  the  image  of 
man  as  a  rational  being,  is  to  be  apprehended.  It  was 
not  the  arbitrary  taxation  of  the  English  Government, 
nor  the  denial  of  the  right  of  representation,  nor  the  al- 
leged despotism  of  the  rule  of  George  III  that  brought 
about  the  revolt  of  the  American  Colonies.  It  was  not 
the  burdensome  oppression  of  the  poor,  nor  the 
profligacy  of  the  aristocracy,  nor  the  tyranny  of  the  sov- 
ereign that  were  the  causes  of  the  French  Revolution. 
A_true^explanation  is  to  be  found  in  the  ferment  aroused 
^  '  1  by  the  active  inquiry  of  intelligent  investigators  into 
•  ^^^  \  the  nature  and  essence  of  political  doctrine.  It  was  in 
a  large  measure  due  to  the  conviction  that  man  ought  to 
be  governed  by  laws  of  his  own  devising,  that  he  could 
by  his  own  efforts  modify  and  improve  these  laws,  and 
that  it  was  his  duty  to  do  so.  Men  no  longer  believed 
in  Providence  as  the  first  cause.  They  had  lost  faith  in 
miracles,  in  effects  without  a  cause.  They  sought  for 
the  interpretation  of  events,  not  in  revelation  but  in  the 
opinions  of  their  fellow  men,  in  public  opinion.  The  at- 
tention of  man  had  become  rivetted  on  his  politicaj^tatus, 
as  a  hundred  years  before  it  had  been  engrossed  with  his 
religious  liberty,  and  as  a  century  later  it  was  to  be  con- 
cerned principally  with  his  economic  condition. 

Liberty,  equality,  fraternity,  justice,  and  other  watch- 


>^' 


THE  RISE  OF  PUBLIC  OPINION  49 

words  of  the  times  were  the  diverse  expressions  of  the 
same  aspiration,  which  it  was  believed  could  be  realised 
by  political  liberty.  As  Montesquieu  expressed  it:  "The 
political  liberty  of  a  citizen  is  a  tranquillity  of  mind  aris- 
ing from  the  opinion  each  has  of  his  own  safety.  In 
order  to  have  this  liberty  it  is  requisite  that  the  govern- 
ment be  so  constituted  that  one  citizen  be  not  afraid  of 
another."  ^  Montesquieu  had  devoted  twenty  years  of 
untiring  labor  to  inquiring  Into  the  nature  of  laws  and 
institutions.  He  had  pursued  his  investigation  in  what 
was  considered  at  the  time  a  scientific  manner,  and  he 
was  careful  not  to  advance  a  priori  theories  of  govern- 
ment. In  the  main  he  followed  Aristotle  -  though  he 
developed  and  emphasised  for  the  first  time  the  im- 
portance of  the  necessity  of  separating  the  three  major 
functions  of  constitutional  government — the  legislative, 
executive,  and  judicial. 

"When  the  legislative  and  executive  powers  are  united 
in  the  same  person,  or  in  the  same  body  of  magistrates, 
there  can  be  no  liberty;  because  apprehensions  may  arise, 
lest  the  same  monarch  or  senate  should  enact  tyrannical 
laws,  to  execute  them  in  a  tyrannical  manner. 

"Again,  there  is  no  liberty,  if  the  judiciary  power  be 
not  separated  from  the  legislative  and  executive.  Were 
it  joined  with  the  legislative  the  life  and  liberty  of  the 

^De  I'Esprit  des  Lois,  Book  XI,  Chap.  VI. 

'"Now  there  are  three  things  in  all  States  which  a  careful  legislator 
ought  well  to  consider,  which  are  of  great  consequence  to  all,  and  which 
properly  attended  to,  the  State  must  necessarily  be  happy;  and  ac- 
cording to  the  variation  of  which  the  one  will  differ  from  the  other. 
The  first, of  these  is  the  public  assembly;  the  second  the  officers  of  the 
State,  that  is,  who  they  ought  to  be,  and  with  what  power  they  should 
be  entrusted,  and  in  what  manner  they  should  be  appointed;  the  third, 
the  judicial  department." — Aristotle,  A  Treatise  on  Government,  Chap. 
XIV. 

Or  as  Montesquieu  has  it:  "In  every  government  there  are  three  sorts 
of  power:  the  legislative;  the  executive  in  respect  to  things  dependent  on 
the  law  of  nations;  and  the  executive  in  regard  to  matters  that  depend 
on  the  civil  law." — Op.  cit..  Book  XI,  Chap.  VI. 


50  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

subject  would  be  exposed  to  arbitrary  control;  for  the 
judge  would  then  be  the  legislator.  Were  it  joined  to  the 
executive  power  the  judge  might  behave  with  violence 
and  oppression. 

"There  would  be  an  end  of  everything  were  the  same 
man  or  the  same  body,  whether  of  the  nobles  or  of  the 
people,  to  exercise  those  three  powers,  that  of  enacting 
laws,  that  of  executing  public  resolutions,  and  of  trying 
the  causes  of  individuals."  ^ 

Montesquieu  gives  numerous  reasons  why  he  believes 
that  the  powers  of  government  should  be  distinct 
and  separate,  and  be  given  scope  to  develop  by  specialisa- 
tion of  function.  He  sets  forth  his  observations  in  a 
logical  manner,  which  he  illustrates  by  ample  and  often 
recondite  episodes  drawn  from  history. 

Rousseau  adopted  the  opposite  method.  Impatient 
alike  of  the  restraints  of  history,  and  of  logical  exposi- 
tion, he  contributed  little  that  was  sound  to  the  political 
practice  of  his  time.^  However,  by  his  forceful  delinea- 
tion of  the  sufferings  of  man,  by  his  acute  understanding 
of  the  mentality  of  the  multitude,  as  well  as  by  the 
vehemence  of  his  language,  he  became  the  most  influ- 
ential mouthpiece  of  public  opinion  in  that  he  gave  body 
to  Its  desires  and  voice  to  its  longings: 

'  Ibidem,  Book  XI,  Chap.  VI. 

*I  can  find  no  satisfactory  evidence  that  his  thesis  of  the  actual  pre- 
dominance of  the  general  will  and  its  union  with  the  will  of  all  as  the 
basis  of  sovereignty  was  adequately  appreciated  or  had  practical  sig- 
nificance in  his  day,  though  his  phraseology  was  widely  copied.  It  is, 
however,  of  importance  to  note  that  Rousseau,  with  his  characteristic 
vision,  and  suspicion  of  rationalism,  rejected  the  accepted  dogma  of 
progress  as  havmg  no  part  in  a  volitional  scheme  of  social  organisation 
of  which  he  may  be  said  to  have  been  the  precursor.  Both  Hobbes  and 
Locke  had  insisted  upon  the  importance  of  the  will.  As  Bosanquet  has 
pointed  out:  For  Hobbes  "political  unity  lies  in  a  will  which  is  actual 
but  not  general;  while  for  Locke  it  lies  in  a  will  which  is  general  but 
not  actual."  Rousseau  conceived  of  a  "will  at  once  actual  and  general." 
—Cf.  Philosophical  Theory  of  State,  Chap.  V. 


THE  RISE  OF  PUBLIC  OPINION  51 

"Man  is  born  free,  and  he  is  everywhere  in  chains. 
A  man  believes  himself  the  master  of  others,  but  is  for 
all  that  more  a  slave  than  they.  How  is  this  brought 
about?  I  do  not  know.  What  could  make  it  legitimate? 
I  think  I  can  answer  this  question. 

"If  I  considered  force  alone  and  the  effects  derived 
from  it  I  should  say:  As  long  as  a  people  is  compelled 
to  obey  and  obeys,  it  does  well;  as  soon  as  it  can  shake 
off  the  yoke,  and  shakes  it  off,  it  does  better:  for,  re- 
covering its  liberty  by  the  same  right  by  which  it  was 
tak;(&n  away,  either  a  people  is  justified  in  recovering  its 
liberty,  or  there  was  no  justification  in  taking  it  away."  ^ 

And  further  we  may  advisedly  quote : 

"The  body  politic  like  the  body  of  man  begins  to  die 
from  its  birth,  and  carries  within  itself  the  causes  of  its 
destruction.  Both  may  have  more  or  less  robust  con- 
stitutions which  may  preserve  them  for  a  longer  or 
shorter  period.  The  constitution  of  man  is  the  work 
of  nature;  that  of  the  State  is  the  work  of  art."  ^ 

The  simplicity  of  his  arguments  made  them  acceptable 
to  the  masses  who  were  beginning  to  acquire  political 
consciousness.  It  was  coming  to  be  felt  that  political 
liberty  was  a  need  not  only  of  the  more  enlightened 
classes,  but  one  in  which  the  people  {"le  peuple")  were 
to  have  a  full  share. 

Rousseau  in  his  Discourse  on  the  Origins  of  Inequal- 
ity among  Mankind,  declared : 

"It  follows  from  this  survey  that  there  is  scare  any 
inequality  among  men  In  a  state  of  nature;  all  that  we 
now  behold  owes  its  force  and  growth  to  the  develop- 
ment of  our  faculties  and  the  improvement  of  our  un- 
derstanding, until  at  last  it  becomes  permanent  and  law- 

*  Contrat  Social,  Book  I,  Chap.  I. 

*  Ibidem,  Book  III,  Chap.  XL 


52  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

ful  by  the  establishment  of  property  and  laws.  It  like- 
wise ensues  that  moral  inequality,  authorised  by  any 
merely  positive  right,  clashes  with  natural  right  as  often 
as  it  does  not  combine  in  the  same  proportion  with  phys- 
ical inequality;  a  distinction  which  sufficiently  deter- 
mines what  we  must  think  in  that  respect  of  that  kind 
of  inequality  which  obtains  in  all  civilised  nations,  since 
it  is  evidently  against  the  law  of  nature  that  a  child 
should  give  orders  to  an  old  man,  folly  conduct  wis- 
dom, and  a  handful  of  men  should  be  gorged  with  super- 
fluities, while  the  famished  multitude  want  the  common- 
est necessaries  of  life."  ^ 

The  arguments  he  advances  in  behalf  of  the  State 
organised  on  the  basis  of  contract  ^  show  it  to  be  a  form 
of  collective  despotism,  not  unlike  that  which  Hobbes 
advocated  as  monarchical  despotism.  Rousseau  substi- 
tuted the  sovereignty  of  the  people,  the  rule  of  the  ma- 
jority for  the  older  arguments  of  the  Leviathan. 

Montesquieu  and  Rousseau  summed  up  the  French 
politico-juridic  thesis  of  State,  which  was  to  have  so 
deep  an  influence  on  its  subsequent  development.  Their 
methods  and  modes  of  thought  were  radically  differ- 
ent, yet  they  are  so  complementary  that  it  would  be 
impossible  to  gain  an  understanding  of  the  Revolution- 
ary period  without  a  clear  appreciation  of  the  place 
which  they  occupied.  This  may  be  more  precisely  in- 
dicated by  calling  to  mind  that  the  Declaration  of  In- 

^  Concluding  paragraph. 

^"'To  find  a  form  of  association  which  shall  defend  and  protect  with 
the  public  force  the  person  and  property  of  each  member,  and  by  means  of 
which  each,  uniting  with  all,  shall,  however,  obey  only  himself,  and  re- 
main as  free  as  before.*  Such  is  the  fundamental  problem  of  which  the 
Social  Contract  offers  a  solution.  The  clauses  of  this  contract  are  so 
determined  by  the  nature  of  the  act,  that  the  least  modification  would 
render  them  vain  and  of  no  effect;  so  th^t,  although  they  may  perhaps 
never  have  been  formally  enunciated  they  are  everywhere  the  same, 
everywhere  tacitly  admitted  and  recognised  until,  the  social  compact  being 
violated,  each  enters  again  into  his  first  rights  and  resumes  his  natural 
liberty — thereby  losing  the  conventional  liberty  for  which  he  renounced 
it."— Rousseau,  op.  cit.,  Book   I,   Chap.   VI. 


THE  RISE  OF  PUBLIC  OPINION  53 

dependence  of  the  American  Colonists  of  July  4,  1776, 
reflects  the  grandiloquent  generalities,  the  impassioned 
truisms  of  Rousseau,  whereas  the  Constitution,  adopted^ 
by  the  United  States  in  1789  after  successive  failures  to 
form  a  "natural"  confederation,  bears  the  unmistakable 
stamp  of  the  influence  of  Montesquieu. 


CHAPTER  IV 

American  Independence 


CAUSES  AND  AIMS TEMPER  OF  THE   COLONISTS INFLUENCE  OF 

FRENCH  POLITICAL  THEORY — ENGLISH   PRACTICE 


THE  political  capacity  of  the  various  peoples  of  the 
West  is  difficult  to  appraise.  The  chauvinism  of 
politico-philosophical  inquirers  during  the  19th  century 
has  led  many  of  them  to  claim  for  their  countrymen  a 
monopoly  of  those  characteristics  denoting  political  sa- 
gacity which  were  apparently  deemed  essential  to  lead 
a  people  to  political  preeminence.  It  would  appear  un- 
necessary to  dwell  upon  such  comparisons,  the  more  so 
as  every  nation  which  has  constituted  itself  into  an  in- 
dependent State  could  no  doubt  find  among  its  members  a 
relatively  equivalent  number  of  men  endowed  with  those 
moral  and  ethical  qualities  without  which  the  good  gov- 
ernment of  a  community  as  it  was  currently  understood 
would  be  unrealisable.  Nor  can  it  be  admitted  that  any 
one  people  should  possess  a  monopoly  of  these  qualities. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  fact  that  in 
France  political  affairs  should  have  exerted  so  great  an 
influence  on  the  intellectual  life  of  the  people  would 
seem  to  indicate  that  the  abstract  philosophy  of  human 
rights,  as  expressed  in  terms  of  political  liberty  and  con- 
stitutional government,  had  there  a  meaning  altogether 
different  from  that  given  thereto  by  the  theory  and  prac- 

[54] 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  55 

tice  of  Englishmen,  Germans,  Italians,  or  Americans. 
Political  ideology  has  suffered  greatly  from  defective 
translation,  or  rather  from  the  reliance  placed  upon  the 
faulty  interpretation  occasioned  thereby.  It  is  not  our 
object  to  set  forth  here  in  detail  this  major  defect  of 
politics,  in  that  while  its  terminology  remains  a  con- 
stant its  interpretation  continues  a  variable,  so  that  in 
reality  the  essential  meaning  of  political  terms  can  be 
.arrived  at  only  by  association  of  ideas,  and  for  that 
reason  politics  lacks  a  sound  basis  of  universality. 

For  purposes  of  classification  and  in  order  to  render 
understanding  easier,  it  is  habitual  for  man  to  permit 
the  association  of  ideas  to  perform  the  function  of  search- 
ing inquiry,  and  thus  to  bridge  the  chasm  between  facts 
and  ideas.  The  more  complex  the  groundwork  of  facts, 
the  more  dogmatically  association  performs  its  function 
of  representation.  Whether  the  representation  leads 
back  logically  to  its  source  and  can  be  so  traced  de- 
pends upon  the  intellectual  capacity  of  the  individual. 
The  more  acute  his  perception,  the  more  difficult  it  will 
be  for  him  to  accept  a  representation  which  appears  il- 
logical or  irrational.  Political  theory  depends  for  its 
acceptance  and  spread  primarily  upon  such  association. 
Bearing  this  in  mind,  it  may  be  noted  that  political  ide- 
ology as  it  passed  from  people  to  people  was  destined 
to  develop  new  forms,  consonant  with  local  characteris- 
tics, so  that  what  is  meant  by  constitutional  government 
when  speaking  of  England,  means  something  very  differ- 
ent from  what  is  meant  when  this  same  terminology 
is  applied  to  the  States  of  continental  Europe  or  even 
to  the  United  States. 

It  is  a  good  example  of  the  apparent  logical  sequence 
of  historical  evolution  which  the  philosopher  of  history, 
or  those  interested  in  formulating  the  laws  of  history, 


56  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

would  seize  upon  with  avidity,  that  the  men  who  first 
instituted  and  developed  the  two  main  branches  of  con- 
stitutional government — Constitutional  Monarchy  and 
Constitutional  Democracy — should  have  belonged  to  the 
same  race.  The  setting  up  of  an  independent  and  sov- 
ereign state  in  America,  composed  of  former  British 
colonies,  was  the  outcome  of  a  conviction  that  an  in- 
dependent state  is  to  be  regarded  as  that  form  of  human 
society  in  which  men  are  best  fitted  to  work  out  problems 
of  political  liberty,  and  are  destined  to  realise  their 
highest  cultural  aims.  The  establishment  of  a  consti- 
tutional democracy  by  the  United  States  was,  however, 
an  entirely  new  experiment  in  statecraft,  which  must  be 
signalised  as  a  further  development  of  the  politicojiiiidic 
theory  and  therefore  requires  some  analysis. 


II 

Constitutional  government  in  England  had  been  estab- 
lished as  the  result  of  an  effort  to  reconcile  government 
with  social  institutions:  to  substitute  a  comprehensible 
political  system  for  an  absolutist  regime,  which  had  be- 
come irreconcilable  with  an  everyday  life  in  which  ma- 
terial prosperity,  perfectibility,  and  progress  were  about 
"^to  engross  the  full  attention  and  best  energies  of  a  large 
class  of  society.  Yet  it  must  not  be  lost  sight  of  that 
J  it  is  characteristic  of  the  empirical  temper  of  the  Eng- 
lish people  to  defend  tradition  against  the  encroachments 
of  interested  theory.  They  are  inflexible  in  the  main- 
tenance of  established  right  which  practice  has  sanc- 
tioned against  the  most  plausible  arguments  of  theorists, 
however  admirably  they  may  be  presented.     Thus  the 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  57 

political  rights  for  which  Englishmen  struggled,  and 
upon  which  their  constitutional  system  was  founded,  did 
not,  as  might  have  been  expected,  lead  them  to  abolish 
the  monarchical  form  of  government,  as  in  the  past  it 
had  proved  itself  a  strong  arm  of  defence  against  the 
abuses  of  an  arrogant  aristocracy.  On  the  contrary  con- 
stitutional government  in  England  made  use  of,  and  em- 
bodied in  its  system,  those  ancestral  laws  and  customs 
and  t|iat  machinery  of  government  which  had  grown  up 
with  "the  people,  had  been  modified  by  circumstance, 
tested  by  practice,  and  improved  by  experience. 

As  upon  the  rediscovery  of  the  Justinian  Code  ( 1 176) 
England  did  not  imitate  other  European  countries,  and 
send  her  lawyers  to  Bologna  to  be  trained  in  the  method 
and  practice  of  the  codified  Roman  law,  but  undertook 
the  reform  of  the  administration  of  the  law  by  the 
establishment  of  circuit  courts  of  her  own  devising,  and 
the  introduction  of  trial  by  jury,  thus  affording  a  refuge 
from  the  oppression  hitherto  exercised  by  the  caprice 
of  the  feudal  lords,  so  in  establishing  constitutionalism, 
England  maintained  her  characteristic  attitude  of  in- 
sularity, and  constructed  her  system  of  government  out  y 
of  the  elements  already  at  hand,  revamped  in  consonance 
with  the  spirit  of  the  age.  It  was  men  of  this  same 
race  who  had  settled  the  American  Colonies — English- 
men trained  to  trust  to  their  own  strength,  who,  trans- 
planted to  the  bleak  New  England  coast,  had  created 
for  themselves  a  condition  of  relative  wellbeing.  These 
early  settlers  had  cared  little  for  citizenship  in  a  secular 
State.  They  were  trained  by  the  Calvinist  creed  to 
an  unworldly  way  of  thinking.  Their  object  in  coming 
to  America  had  been  to  be  free  to  worship  their  God 
unmolested.  Less  tolerant,  but  no  less  fearless  than 
those  of  their  breed  who  remained  behind  to  fight  for 


0- 


58  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

political  freedom,  and  whose  sons  were  to  establish  con- 
stitutional monarchy  in  England,  these  Puritan  pilgrims 
in  America  had  not  neglected  to  educate  their  sons  in 
the  ways  of  freedom,  and  accustom  them  early  to  self- 
reliance  as  a  first  step  towards  self-government.  When 
a  century  later  the  peoples  of  the  American  Colonies 
sought  to  establish  a  government  conforming  to  the  so- 
cial institutions  which  had  grown  up  in  America,  the 
constitutional  system  which  they  set  up  accommodated 
itself  to  the  materials  it  found  at  hand. 

For  the  American  Colonists  of  1776  were  of  a  differ- 
ent stamp  and  character  from  their  forefathers.  The 
1 8th  century  had  witnessed  a  growth  of  material  pros- 
perity throughout  the  Western  World.  In  this  the  Amer- 
ican Colonies  had  had  an  ample  share.  The  guidance 
of  public  affairs  was  no  longer  in  the  hands  of  the  clergy, 
who  had  led  the  way  to  the  New  England  shores  and 
for  the  time  being  were  able  to  maintain  their  ascendancy 
in  secular  as  well  as  spiritual  matters,  by  establishing  an 
even  more  intolerant  type  of  politico-theistic  absolutism 
than  had  been  possible  in  Europe.  Towards  the  middle 
of  the  18th  century  the  current  of  liberalism  had  swept 
away  the  last  vestiges  of  Puritan  theocracy.  The  politi- 
cal life  of  the  Colonies  had  come  under  the  control  of 
men  who,  more  especially  in  New  England,  by  their_cflm- 
l  mercial  skill  and^  enterprise  were  responsible  for  the 
[material  prosperity  which  the  Colonies  enjoyed.  Having 
few  traditions,  save  those  of  self-reliance  and  self-govern- 
ment, the  more  radically-minded  Americans  had  not  been 
averse  to  absorbing  the  teachings  of  the  French  ration- 
alists. Men  such  as  Franklin  typified  the  new  material- 
ist tendency  of  the  age.  Their  minds  were  engrossed  in 
furthering  their  economic  wellbeing;  in  making  use  of 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 


59 


that  fund  of  energy  and  common  sense  with  which 
they  had  been  endowed,  to  prosper  in  business  and 
to  regulate  political  questions  so  as  to  promote  their 
personal  prosperity.  They  were  broad-minded  enough 
to  look  a^out  them  and  to  turn  to  good  account  what- 
ever came  their  way.  Local  self-government,  inherited 
from  their  forefathers,  was  pursued  with  diligence,  in 
this  new  spirit  of  alertness.  At  the  same  time  the  high- 
sounding  phrases  of  French  political  philosophy  did  not 
f aih  to  dazzle  those  among  the  colonial  leaders  who 
dared  to  look  forward  to  the  day  when,  by  putting  its 
precepts  into  practice,  a  political  millennium  might  be 
reached. 

However,  the  heady  French  political  theories  did  not 
immediately  affect  the  feelings  of  the  Americans  who 
still  regarded  France  as  their  traditional  enemy.  It 
was  not  until  after  the  battle  of  Quebec  (1759)  had 
assured  the  dominance  of  the  English  on  the  North 
American  continent,  that  the  American  Colonists  felt  free 
to  consider  ways  and  means  to  be  rid  of  their  over- 
seas suzerain,  and  declare  their  independence.  The  ac- 
tive armed  assistance  rendered  by  the  French  in  further- 
ing the  plans  of  the  Colonists,  the  presence  of  French 
officers  in  the  field  on  the  side  of  the  Americans,  no 
doubt  contributed  to  increase  the  debt  felt  towards 
France;  but  more  important  than  these  the  abstract  po- 
litical philosophy  of  human  rights  so  characteristically 
Frcndi,  combined  with  the  English  dortrine  of  the  jiiridir 
relation  as  a  basis  of  rational  hum?j,n  int-prrnnrsp.  were  to 
have  a  deep  influence  on  American  public  opinion  and 
public  policy  during  this  formative  period. 

Constitutional  government,  as  established  in  America, 
was  thus  a  compromise,  in  that  it  grafted  French  theory 


'fU'" 


v*^ 


© 
(^ 


It^-"^" 


6o  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

upon  English  practice,  and  evolved  American  principles 
of  government.^ 

The  Americans  borrowed  from  England  awe  of  an- 
cestral precedent  and  its  legal  system;  from  France,  sub- 
servience  to   public   opinion    and    a    radical   rationalism. 
Subsequent  development  was  to  show  that  while  the  ele- 
0^^         I  ments   contributed   by    French    ideology   were    to   grow 
!)     ?*         .  stronger,   and  the   rule  of  public  opinion,   as  expressed 
^  ^  in  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  and  the  tyranny  of  the 
''^  ^     .majority,  was  to  become  more  deeply  rooted,  the  older 
^    K^      fundamental   principles   of   English   constitutional   prac- 
^     J^      (  tice,  the  belief  that  the  record  of  experience  is  the  test 
vY^  of  true  right,  were  never  to  be  lost  sight  of. 


Ill 

English  constitutional  monarchy  and  American  consti- 
tutional democracy  were  thus  the  work  of  men  of  similar 
temperament  and  historical  tradition.  Both  belonged 
to  the  Middle  Class,-  both  had  a  closely  related  religious 

*Thus  an  English  observer  a  century  later  could  write  with  much 
complacent  satisfaction:  "No  people  except  the  choicest  children  of 
England,  long  trained  by  the  practice  of  local  self-government  at  home 
and  in  the  colonies,  could  have  succeeded  half  so  well." — Cf.  Bryce, 
American  Commoti'wealth.  Whereas  de  Tocqueville  noted  with  equal 
satisfaction  what  he  found  to  be  the  salient  characteristics  of  the  political 
creed  of  the  American  people:  "To  evade  the  bondage  of  system  and 
habit,  of  family  maxims,  class  opinions,  and  in  some  degree  of  national 
prejudices;  to  accept  tradition  only  as  a  means  of  information,  and  exist- 
ing facts  only  as  a  lesson  to  be  used  in  doing  otherwise  and  doing  better; 
to  seek  the  reason  of  things  for  one's  self  alone;  to  tend  to  results 
without  being  bound  to  means,  and  to  aim  at  the  substance  through  the 
form; — such  are  the  principal  characteristics  of  what  I  shall  call  the 
philosophical  method  of  the  Americans." — Democracy  in  America, 
Part  II,  Book  I,  Chap.  I.  And  again:  "The  civilisation  of  New  England 
has  been  like  a  beacon  lit  upon  a  hill,  which  after  it  has  diffused  its 
warmth  immediately  around  it,  also  tinges  the  distant  horizon  with  its 
glow."— Part  I,  Chap.  II. 

*  It  is  true  that  in  England  the  aristocracy  played  a  part  in  moulding 
constitutional  monarchy.    Yet  we  cannot  fail  to  recognise  the  fact  that  the 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  6i 

background,  both  sought  to  foster  the  conception  of  the 
importance  and  dignity  of  the  individual  as  expressed  in 
the  desire  for  self-determination  and  self-expression 
which  was  primarily  utilitarian,  an  outgrowth  of  a  puri- 
tanical, subjective  mode  of  thought.  The  moral  earnest- 
ness resulting  from  this  manner  of  viewing  life  had  bred 
a  confidence  in  the  ability  of  the  individual  to  mould 
his  own  destiny,  measured  in  terms  of  success,  which 
coul4  find  its  most  immediate  expression  in  commercial 
and'  industrial  enterprise. 

Further  inquiry  leads  to  the  discovery  of  divergences 
equally  important  which  mark  off  American  constitutional 
practice  as  distinct,  not  merely  as  a  form  of  government, 
but  as  a  theory  of  State,  which  has  fulfilled  its  historic 
role  side  by  side  with  that  of  the  monarchical  form, 
and  that  of  other  constitutional  governments  which  have 
since  arisen.  The  fact  that  the  United  States  adopted 
a  written  constitution,  whereas  England  had  not,  is  not 
of  itself  of  vital  importance.  Cromwell  had  attempted 
to  give  England  a  written  instrument  of  government, 
but  had  failed  in  that  it  was  alien  to  the  political  genius 
of  the  English  people.  The  authority  of  precedent  was 
so  fixed  in   the  English  mind  that  Parliament  required 

Middle  Class,  the  Commons,  were  the  ultimate  source  of  power  in  the 
State. 

In  the  same  way  in  America,  Virginia  and  the  adjacent  colonies  bore 
an  aristocratic  imprint.  They  were  settled  by  a  very  different  type  of 
men  than  those  of  New  England — wealthy  land-owners,  adventurers, 
free-booters,  with  a  later  admixture  of  vagabonds  and  criminals  trans- 
ported overseas  by  the  London  police.  These  settlers,  who  had  accepted 
episcopacy,  concerned  themselves  little  with  questions  of  religious  or 
public  welfare,  and  were  interested  only  in  personal  profit.  However, 
it  is  of  interest  to  note  that  the  attempt  made  to  provide  Carolina  with 
an  English-made  constitution,  drawn  up  by  no  less  an  authority  than 
Locke  (See  Constitution  of  Carolina)  in  1669,  though  liberal  in  tone, 
never  gained  wide  acceptance,  and  was  abolished  in  1693.  In  spite  of  the 
influence  of  foreign  elements  in  the  Pennsylvania  proprietary  colony 
and  of  the  Dutch  along  the  Hudson,  the  scheme  of  colonial  organisation 
of  the  colonies  was  that  of  which  middle  class  Massachusetts  is  the  best 
and  leading  example. 


62  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

no  stabilising  factor  to  support  its  authority,  and  would 
have  found  its  freedom  hampered  by  a  written  constitu- 
tion which  would  require  incessant  amendment,  or  at 
least  interpretation.^ 

In  the  United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  the  weakness 
of  constituted  authority  rendered  it  essential  that  a  fixed 
formula  of  government  should  be  at  hand  which  would 
act  as  a  stabilising  factor  among  the  anarchical  tendencies 
of  the  newly  formed  political  life.  A  written  constitu- 
tion could  best  perform  this  function.     The  Colonists, 

/  by  their  charters,  had  long  been  accustomed  to  written 
limitations  to  public  authority  and  precise  definition  of 
its  powers,  which  it  was  natural  for  them  to  wish  to 
continue. 

Yet  it  was  only  after  repeated  failure  and  long  delay, 
thirteen  years   after  the   Declaration   of   Independence, 
that  a  written  constitution  was  adopted.     The  American 
Constitution  adopted  in   1789  was  the  first  attempt  in  U 
modern  times  to  subject  the  government  of  an  independ- 

(  ent  state  to  a  fixed^jjyitten  code;  to  restrict  sovereignty 
of  the  State  by  requiring  compliance  and  concordance 
with  principles  set  down  and  defined.  Whatever  the 
drawbacks  of  a  written  constitution  may  be,  the  con- 
stitution adopted  at  Philadelphia  by  the  Constitutional 
Convention  which  had  labored  for  two  years  to  frame 
a  comprehensive  statement  of  the  basis  of  popular 
sovereignty,  must  be  looked  upon  as  an  important  mile- 
stone in  political  development.  Exactly  a  century  had 
elapsed  since,  in  the  Declaration  of  Right,  the  Parliament 
of  England  had  bound  itself  to   insure   the   protection 

^  In  England  the  constitution  comprises  the  whole  body  of  public  law, 
consuetudinary  as  well  as  statutory,  which  has  grown  up  during  the 
course  of  centuries,  and  is  being  continually  modified  by  the  action  of 
the  general  will,  as  interpreted  and  expressed  by  Parliament. — Cf.  Rudolf 
Gneist,  The  History  of  the  English  Constitution, 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  63 

of  civic  liberty  by  representation.  During  this  period 
constitutional  government  in  England,  while  steadfast 
in  practice,  remained  in  theory  a  vague  doctrine,  and 
the  powers  of  government  lacked  the  precision  of  con- 
cise definition.  In  England  constitutional  government 
had  been  grafted  upon  older  practice  so  that  to  the 
student  of  politics  it  remained  an  amorphous  structure. 
The  United  States  adopted  the  radical  course  of  defining 
sover.eignty  and  analysing  its  functions.  The  separation 
of  government  into  three  branches — executive,  legisla- 
tive, and  judicial — as  advocated  by  Montesquieu,  and  the 
checks  and  balances  it  sought  to  introduce,  led  to  the 
acceptance  of  the  theory  that  the  final  expression  of  au- 
thority in  the  State,  its  code  of  sovereignty,  is  set  forth  in 
the  articles  of  the  Constitution  as  interpreted  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  land.^  It  was  the  desire  to  insure 
permanence  and  order  which  had  led  the  Americans  to 
the  unqualified  acknowledgment  of^the  State  as  a  iuridic 
organism  in  which  the  mechanism  of  government  sought 
to  assure  strictly  legal  relations,  not  merely  between  citi- 
zens, but  between  the  governing  and  the  governed.  Con- 
formity to  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  Constitution  was  to 
become  the  principal  test  of  validity. 

Subsequent  practice  left  to  the  executive  and  legislative 
branches  of  the  government  a  very  broad  field  of  activity; 
especially  in  matters  relating  to  foreign  policy  the  execu- 
tive   was    left    relatively   unhampered.      However,    the 

^Article  III,  section  2,  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  reads: 
The  judicial  power  shall  extend  to  all  cases,  in  law  and  equity,  arising 
under  this  Constitution,  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  and  treaties  made, 
or  which  shall  be  made,  under  their  authority;  to  all  cases  affecting  am- 
bassadors, other  public  ministers  and  consuls;  to  all  cases  of  admiralty 
and  maritime  jurisdiction;  to  controversies  to  which  the  United  States 
shall  be  a  party;  to  controversies  between  two  or  more  States;  between 
a  State  and  citizens  of  another  State;  between  citizens  of  different  States; 
between  citizens  of  the  same  State  claiming  lands  under  grants  of  differ- 
ent States,  and  between  a  State,  or  the  citizens  thereof,  and  foreign 
States,  citizens  or  subjects. 


64  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

theory  of  State  which  can  be  adduced  from  the  American 
example,  though  never  definitely  formulated  by  the  fram- 
ers  of  the  Constitution,  asserts  the  principle  that  it  is 
the  juridic  relation  which  makes  possible  the  smooth 
functioning  of  organised  society.  The  chief  object  of  the 
State  is  to  assure,  within  legal  limits,  the  growth  of  in- 
dividual liberty  and  national  freedom;  self-help  and 
self-government.^ 

It  will  be  necessary,  when  discussing  the  question  of 
the  end  of  the  State,  to  return  to  a  more  ample  review 
of  the  American  theory.  It  may  suffice  for  the  present 
to  note  that  the  American  practice  had  a  far-reaching 
repercussion,  and  reacted  directly  on  the  trend  of  public 
affairs  in  Europe. 

^  All  subsequent  constitutions,  both  democratic  and  monarchical,  were  set 
forth  in  a  written  document,  signifying  the  importance  attached  to  the 
American  precedent.  Yet  except  for  the  slavish  imitation  of  Central 
and  South  American  republics,  regardless  of  the  fact  that  the  United 
States  theory  of  State  was,  in  many  cases,  wholly  unsuited  to  the  men- 
tality of  the  people  of  these  countries,  no  other  nation,  with  the  possible 
exception  of  vhe  Helvetic  Republic,  has  so  literally  adopted  the  juridic 
theory. 


I 


CHAPTER  V 

The  Middle  Class  Mind 


FREE  i^UMANITY — COSMOPOLITANISM — ECONOMIC   INTEREST — IN- 
^FLUENCE    OF    THE    PHYSIOCRATS ADAM    SMITH PO- 
LITICAL  LIBERTY — ECONOMIC   INDEPENDENCE 


THE  struggle  for  independence  and  the  setting  up 
of  an  independent  State  by  the  American  Colonists 
evoked  great  enthusiasm  among  the  ruling  classes  in 
France,  not  merely,  as  might  be  expected,  because  they 
saw  in  this  event  the  just  retribution  for  the  loss  of 
their  own  Canadian  provinces,  but  chiefly  because  the 
age  was  one  during  which  the  idea  of  "free  humanity" 
played  so  predominating  a  role.  The  last  quarter  of 
the  1 8th  century  witnessed  the  fruition  of  those  theories 
of  liberty,  equality,  humanity,  sown  so  lavishly  during 
the  preceding  decades.  The  common  bond  of  mankind 
was  the  thought  uppermost  in  the  minds  of  men.  Na- 
tionalism^andpatriotism  were  unknown.  Cosmopolitan- 
ism as  expressed  in  the  phrase  uhi  bene,  ibi  patria  was 
widely  acknowledged  as  a  reality  which  rational  men 
had  attained.  Plans  to  establish  leagues  for  the  assur- 
ance of  perpetual  peace  were  actively  pushed.  Men 
such  as  Kant  sought  to  devise  a  plan  which  would  make 
possible  the  organisation  of  a  State  universal,  to  formu- 
late a  political  constitution  which  would  insure  concord 
among  men.     A  host  of  other  politico-philosophical  in- 

[65] 


66  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

quirers,  following  in  the  steps  of  Rousseau,  were  simi- 
larly engaged  in  seeking  for  a  system  of  government 
which  would  reduce  to  a  minimum  all  political  inequalities 
and  would  eventually  lead  to  the  elimination  of  all  differ- 
ences and  anomalies  among  men.  It  was  fervently  be- 
lieved that  a  state  of  social  harmony  could  be  arrived 
at  in  which  civil  institutions  would  serve  the  progress  and 
welfare  of  mankind.  Man  would,  in  the  near  future, 
enter  upon  his  rightful  heritage  and  enjoy  as  his  inalien- 
able right  "life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness." 
Not  merely  philosophers  of  authority  and  political  think- 
ers of  great  originality,  but  all  rationally-minded  men 
readily  acknowledged  the  advantages  to  be  derived  from 
these  plans  of  political  reorganisation  and  social  better- 
ment. 

It  must  not  be  lost  sight  of  that  it  was  the  middle  class 
mind  which  offered  the  golden  mean  as  the  golden  rule 
of  life,^  and  never  conceived  of  the  possibility  that  a 
different  mentality  might  exist  among  other  classes  of 
society. 

There  was  nothing  extravagant,  nothing  unreasonable 
in  the  programmes  of  reform  outlined,  as  long  as  this 
middle  class  manner  of  viewing  life  was  adhered  to. 
It  was  apparently  never  considered  that  the  over-simple 
solutions  offered  for  the  difficult  social  problems  were, 
in  spite  of  their  rational  moderation,  liable  to  irrar 
tional  and  extravagant  interpretation.  There  had  grown 
up  in  the  varjous  capitals  of  Europe  a  coterie  of  middle 

*Even  Montesquieu  who  was  an  original  thinker  could  not  escape  from 
the  influence  of  his  times,  so  that  we  find  him,  in  discussing  the  measure 
of  political  liberty  enjoyed  by  the  English,  declaring:  "Neither  do  I  pre- 
tend by  this  to  undervalue  other  governments,  nor  to  say  that  this  extreme 
political  liberty  ought  to  give  uneasiness  to  those  who  have  only  a 
moderate  share  of  it.  How  should  I  have  any  such  design? — I  who  think 
that  even  the  highest  refinement  of  reason  is  not  always  desirable,  and 
that  mankind  generally  find  their  account  better  in  mediums  than  in 
extremes." — De  I'Esprit  des  Lois,  Book  XI,  Chap.  VI. 


THE  MIDDLE  CLASS  MIND  67 

class  philosophers,  political  innovators  and  reformers, 
whose  philanthropic  speculations  never  induced  them  to 
abandon  their  theoretical  viewpoint.  There  was  a  con- 
stant interchange  of  ideas  among  them,  and  this  cosmo- 
politan atmosphere  was  favorable  to  the  growth  of  the 
most  liberal  theories.  But  their  authors  had  lost  sight 
of  a  very  important  factor,  in  that  they  looked  out  upon 
life  with  a  strongly  tinged  middle  class  bias,  and  never 
conceived  of  the  practical  application  of  their  pro- 
grammes except  by  men  of  their  own  stamp.  The  sin- 
cerity of  their  views  cannot  be  called  into  question. 
Whether  we  look  to  Berlin,  to  Konigsberg,  or  Geneva, 
to  Paris,  London,  or  Edinburgh,  everywhere  we  find 
this  same  benign  cosmopolitanism. 

The  Western  World  was  in  an  inquiring  mood.  Men 
asked  all  manner  of  questions,  and  the  rational  mind 
felt  itself  competent  to  find  a  satisfactory  solution.  What 
was  the  value  of  art,  of  science,  of  religion,  of  politics, 
of  the  family,  of  the  State?  Men  dealt  in_generalities.  ^ 
They  looked  upon  life  in  a  broad  manner,  which  led  S 
them  to  despise  the  lessons  of  history  and  tradition,  and 
to  seek  to  solve  all  questions  by  applying  the  power  of 
the  mind.  The  ultimate  test  was,  "What  is  conducive 
to  happiness?"  Is  man  happier  under  a  free  or  despotic 
government?  Is  civilisation  a  benefit?  Is  inequality 
necessary?  It  was  believed  that  by  simplification,  by 
the  breaking  down  of  barriers  "1)6 1  we  en  classes  as  be- 
tween  peoples,  by  restraining  the  impetuous  and  urging 
on  the  laggards,  an  ideal  civil  society  would  result,  in 
the  creation  of  a  middle  class  cosmopolitan  World  State. 
It  is  necessary  to  emphasise  this  dominantly  liberal,  phil- 
anthropic, middle  class  point  of  view  in  order  to  gain 
an  understanding  of  the  subsequent  reaction. 

It  was  no  longer  necessary  to   apologise   for  an  in- 


68  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

terest  in  the  wellbeing  of  the  "people,"  as  Vauban  had 
done  when  in  17 17  he  declared  that  to  enrich  the  people 
was  the  only  way  to  enrich  the  King.^  The  French 
Physiocrats,"  influenced  no  doubt  by  the  fact  that  the 
luxury  of  the  court  and  the  artificial  civilisation  which 
it  fostered  had  brought  the  country  to  the  verge  of  ruin, 
advocated  a  return  to  nature,  by  setting  forth  in  logical 
argument  that  a  "state  of  nature"  was  the  only  rational 
mode  of  life.  They  conducted  an  active  inquiry  into 
the  nature  of  wealth,  not  as  had  been  the  practice  in 
the  past,  in  order  to  devise  means  for  filling  the  empty 

/royal  exchequers,  but  with  a  view  to   ameliorating  the 
condition   of   the  poorer  classes.      They  were   the   first 
to  enunciate  the  principles  of  freedom  in   inrliisfrv  and 
-/       'j^i^ommerce,    and   their  doctrines   of   laissez-faire,   which 
i      N^>^Cr  meant  that  anyone  should  be  permitted  to  make  what 
y^J^     he  likes  when  he  likes,   and  that   all   trades   should  be 
J/  open  to  everybody  without  government  interference,  and 

'  laisser-aller,  which  maintained  that  persons   and  goods 

should  be  allowed  to  travel  freely  from  one  place  to  an- 
other without  the  restrictions  of  tolls,  taxes,  or  vexatious 
regulations,  introduced  the  concept  of  liberty  into  eco- 
nomic enterprise,  and  gave  a  vital  impetus  to  the  new 
science  of  political  economy.^ 

Constitutional  government  was  the  contribution  of 
the  middle  class  to  political  practice  which  had  inspired 
confidence  in  its  capacity  and  fitness  to  control  the 
body  politic.  The  middle  class  now  added  to  the  store 
I  of  speculative  theory  certain  fundamental  doctrines  of 
economic    liberty,    as    correlative    with    man's    political 

^  Cf.  "Pauvres  paysans,  pauvre  royaume,  pauvre  rot." 

'  Cf.   Dupont   de    Nemours,   Physiocratie   ou    Constitution   naturelle   du 

gouvernement  le  plus  advantageux  du  genre  humain,  1768. 

'  Cf.  Alfred  Marshall,  Principles  of  Economics,  Appendix  B.  i.,  in  which 

he  gives  an  interesting  survey  of  the  growth  of  economic  science. 


THE  MIDDLE  CLASS  MIND  69 

liberty,  which  it  was  believed  were  essential  to  his  well- 
being. 


II 


4^ 


It  was  in  the  same  year  {i']']6)  in  which  the  Western 
World  was  engrossed  with  the  perusal  of  the  Declara- 
tion of  Independence  of  the  United  States,  and  the  middle 
class ,  humanitarians  all  over  Europe  learned  of  what 
seemed  to  them  the  fulfilment  of  their  fondest  dream, 
that  a  people  almost  in  a  "state  of  nature"  had  adopted  ^1     -^ 

the   noblest   formulae   of  social   organisation,    and  were    Mjf  pT 
about  to  set  up  a  government,  based  on  current  poHUj^l      L/^ 
platitudes^  of  the  rights  of  man  and  sovereignty  of  the  .^jX^ 
people  so  cherished  by   the   cosmopolitan  mind   of   the 
epoch,  that  Adam  Smith  published  his  Inquiry  into  the 
Nature  and  Causes  of  the  Wealth  of  Nations. 

Adam  Smith  was  a  respectable,  middle  class  Scotch- 
man, who  had  resided  for  a  prolonged  period  in  France, 
and  had  been  in  personal  contact  with  the  French  Physio- 
crats. He  was  a  good  example  of  a  leader  of  the  cos- 
mopolitan intelligentsia  of  the  age.  A  man  of  keen 
vision,  deep  insight,  and  great  capacity  for  painstaking 
inquiry,  it  has  been  said  of  him  in  our  own  day  that 
"there  is  scarcely  any  economic  truth  now  known  of 
which  he  did  not  get  some  glimpse !"  ^  Concerned  as 
he  was  with  the  social  aspects  of  wealth,  Adam  Smith 
developed  and  expounded  with  great  precision  the  French 
doctrine  of  free  trade.  It  was  in  harmony  with  the 
spirit  of  his  times  that  he  declared  that  economic  de- 
velopment must  be  free,  and  with  no  little  skill  he  brought 
proof  to  bear  in  showing  that  government  interference 
hinders  trade,  and  that  even  the  most  selfish  enterprise 

*  Cf.  A.  Marshall,  op.  cit. 


70  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

V    of  the  individual  is  of  greater  benefit  to  the  community 

than  the  best-intentioned  supervision  or  control  by  the 

State.     His  other  very  significant  social  contribution  was 

that  he  suggested  "value  as  a  measure  for  human  mo- 

\yjV      I    tive,"  and  made  money  the  standard  of  this  measure. 

y    ff^jL  Up  to  this  time  the  motive  of  human  conduct  had  been 

^"^       }       held  imponderable.     By  the  Church  motive  was  believed 

I  to  be  measured  by  man's  adherence  to  moral  law,  which, 

1    ^jV'^'^t  was  averred,  he  would  willingly  obey.     By  the  State 

it  had  come  to  be  held  the  acknowledgment  of  ethical 

considerations,  as  expressed  in  the  laws  and  statutes  of 

/    iT'     civilised  communities,  which  obligated  the  individual  to 

<^^'*'^     forego    certain   liberties,   which   might   be    injurious   to 

others,  in  return  for  the  numerous  benefits  of  protection 

afforded  by  the  State.     But  the  factors  which  compelled 

compliance  were.  In  either  case,  of  necessity  difficult  to 

,  measure.     They  were  essentially  personal,  variable,  tem- 

.Operamental,  and  as  such  distasteful  to  the  middle  class 

'-^"V  rationalists,  who  were  confident  that  a  measure  of  motive 

^I^  which  might  act  as  the  norm  of  social  life  could  be  dis- 

^  covered.     Adam  Smith,  by  methods  of  diligent  inquiry 

^  and  analysis,  had  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  it  was 

2f  demonstrable  that  the  motive  of  man's  action  was  in  a 

s  greater  number  of  instances  economic,  and  could  be  meas- 

^  ured  on  the  one  hand  by  the  desire  to  obtain  wealth, 

and  on   the  other  by  the  efforts   and  privations  which 

would  be  endured  to  produce  it.      Money,  he   argued, 

could  be  taken  as  the  fixed  standard  of  measure.     Eco- 

^  nomic  freedom  was,   therefore,   as  essential  to  man  as 

^  political  freedom.     In  order  that  man  could  have  fullest 


i 


"i  ^  political  freedom.  \.r\  order  that  man  could  have  rullest 
^  y  scope  to  develop,  to  be  free,  it  was  altogether  as 
^       important  that  governments  should  not  hamper  individ- 


^  '^ 


-i       ual  freedom  to  trade,  and  should  assure  to  all  men  en- 
•«^       gaged  in  commerce  and  industry  the  same  liberty  and 


THE  MIDDLE  CLASS  MIND  71 

protection  which  constitutional  government  had  secured 
to  them  as  members  of  the  body  politic. 

We  henceforth  are  to  find  two  manifestations  of  the 
concept  of  liberty — political  and  economic.  Both  were 
to  increase  the  stature  and  importance  of  the  individual. 
The  Middle  Class  had  attained  political  liberty.  It 
now  drew  attention  to  economic  liberty,  in  the  first  in- 
stance with  the  magnanimous  generosity  of  the  cosmo- 
politan, humanitarian  point  of  view,  which  was  later 
narrowed  down  by^__^ve.r-iity,  and  degenerated  into  a 
new  form  of  absolutism  as  the  lower  classes,  pushing 
upward,  sought  to  dispute  with  the  Middle  Class  the 
benefit  of  this  newly  formulated  economic  liberty. 

The  contribution  of  Adam  Smith  to  the  ideology  of 
liberty  has  possibly  not  been  as  fully  acknowledged  as 
it  deserves,  though  his  work  as  the  founder  of  economic 
science  has  been  over-emphasised.  Hume  and  Stewart, 
his  contemporaries,  to  say  nothing  of  the  French  Physio- 
crats, had  contributed  largely  to  the  storing  up  of  that 
fund  of  information  of  which  Adam  Smith  made  so  ex- 
cellent a  use.  But  what  Adam  Smithy  did  do  was  to 
issue  a  declaration  of  economic  independence,  when  he 
asserted  that  tree  trade  and  the  treedom  oi  the  economic 
man  are  a  vital  necessity  in  a  free  State,  the  affirmation 
of  true  liberty.  Economics,  as  a  separate  branch  of 
social  science,  was  declared  co-equal  with  politics. 

However,  this  declaration  of  economic  independence 
remained  for  the  time  little  more  than  a  declaration; 
though  the  questions  Adam  Smith  raised  attracted  the 
attention  of  a  number  of  sympathetic  and  industrious  in- 
quirers.^ Numerous  historical  and  descriptive  treatises 
concerning  economic  conditions,  particularly  among  the 
working  classes,  drew  attention  to  the  poor,  who  hitherto 

*Cf.  works  of  Young,  Eden,  Tooke,  McCulloch,  and  Porter. 


72 


THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 


had  remained  outside  the  scope  of  speculative  Inquiry. 
Economics,  like  politics,  was  dealt  with  in  a  philosophical 
spirit,  and  reflected  the  inquiring  attitude  of  the  middle 
class  mind,  which  had  had  so  large  a  share  in  influencing 
public  opinion. 

It  must  not  be  lost  sight  of  in  considering  the  state  of 
public  opinion  In  Western  Europe  on  the  eve  of  the 
French  Revolution,  that  the  men  who  were  giving  form 
and  substance  to  the  new  political  and  economic  theories 
were  leading  recluse  lives.  They  were  primarily  con- 
cerned with  theory  rather  than  practice,  with  doctrine 
and  dogma  rather  than  with  useful  solutions  to  the  prac- 
tical problems  which  they  had  raised.  Constantly  formu- 
lating new  hypotheses,  opening  new  vistas  of  progress, 
they  were  Interested  mainly  In  exploring  the  new  path- 
ways. As  a  rule  they  were  men  devoid  of  psychological 
perception,  apparently  blind  to  the  ferment  they  had 
aroused  among  the  masses.  Separated  by  a  wide  chasm 
from  everyday  life,  they  sought  refuge  In  reason  rather 
than  In  action.  The  vigor  of  their  Intellect  far  outran 
their  power  of  decision.  Busied  with  bold  schemes  of  the 
liberty,  equality,  and  fraternity,  of  humanity,  and  perpet- 
ual peace,  they  believed  that  they  had  solved  the  riddle  of 
the  universe,  or  at  least  that  it  was  solvable  by  pursuing 
the  course  opened  up  by  their  rational  methods. 


CHAPTER  VI 

The  French  Revolution 

FOREIGN   INFLUENCE — THE   NEW   SPIRIT THE   TIERS   ETAT — THE 

/<    RIGHTS  OF   MAN THE  CONSTITUTION   OF    1791 


IT  is  beyond  the  scope  of  the  present  volume  to  pursue 
further  the  streams  which  fed  the  stagnant  pool  of 
political  and  economic  oppression  in  France  on  the  eve 
of  the  Revolution,  which  overflowed  and  rushed  onward 
like  a  torrent,  bearing  the  scum  on  its  uppermost  crest. 
It  has,  however,  been  essential  to  outline  briefly  the  char- 
acter of  the  epoch  immediately  preceding  the  Revolution, 
in  order  to  comprehend  the  full  sweep  of  the  work  of 
demolition  it  accomplished. 

The  revolutions  and  civil  wars  in  England  during  the 
17th  century  were  the  work  of  "men  of  action  and  men 
of  God";  men  who  fought  rather  than  men  who  thought; 
men  who  desired  to  regulate  rather  than  innovate;  men 
of  quick  decision,  but  slow  deliberation;  men  whose  field 
of  vision  was  limited,  but  whose  purpose  was  distinct, 
whose  task  was  narrow  but  well-defined.  They  were 
in  close  touch  with  the  spirit  of  the  age  which  had  been 
long  in  maturing.  To  them  liberty  was  the  essence  of 
man,  and  moral  law  fixed  beyond  phenomena.  At  the 
same  time  there  was  a  constant  and  close  intercourse 
between  the  men  of  action  and  the  men  of  theory;  the 
latter   followed   rather   than   preceded,    formulated   the 

I73] 


74  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

accomplished  rather  than  posited  the  potential,  or  con- 
founded it  with  the  actual. 

The    establishment    of    constitutional    government    in 
England  was  thus  not  the  result  of  revolutionary  acci- 
dent, but  of  political  evolution.     The  Middle  Class  had 
come  into  power  without  violently  displacing  the   aris- 
tocracy, which  remained  strong  enough  to  assert  for  it- 
self a  share  of  authority  in  the  government  of  the  land,         jT* 
and  even  to  restrain  the  hand  of  the  Commons  when  UV 
needful.     The  peerage  was,  however,   being  constantlysf* 
renovated  by  accessions  from  the  be&t..^ains  of  the  Mid- 
dle  Class.     Thus  while  the  aristocracy  in  England  re- 
tained many  of  its  outward  insignia  of  a  privileged  caste, 
already  towards  the  close  of  the   i8th  century^  it  had 
become  largely  middle  class  in  its  interests  and  point  of 
view,  and  in  politics  had  begun  to  adopt  a  middle  class,     ^ 
timid,  conservative  policy,  totally  alien  to  the  true  temper 
of  boldness,  independence,  and  social  responsibility  which 
distinguishes  a  vigorous  aristocracy  as  a  distinct  force  in 
the  State.     Middle  class  ascendancy  had  grown  to  ma- 
turity by  a  process  of  internal  assimilation  so  character- 
istic of  the  Anglo-Saxon  peoples. 

As  has  been  pointed  out,  the  American  War  of  Inde- 
pendence may,  though  the  connection  is  slight,  be  looked 
upon  as  preliminary  to  the  French  Revolution  in  that 
it  put  into  practice  in  part  the  political  ideology  of 
the  French  theorists.  Here  men  for  the  first  time  drew 
their  swords  ostensibly  for  the  sake  of  abstract  rights,  \ 
as  outlined  in  the  Declaration  of  Independence  of 
1776. 

But  the  American  experiment  was  one  of  State  building 

*  During  the   period   1700-1800  no   less  than   34  dukes,  29  marquesses, 
109  earls,  85  viscounts,  248  barons  were  created. 


i 


t  THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION  75 

on  a  small  scale,  where  there  was  no  work  of  demolition  c 

to  be  accomplished.     The  Americans  had  to  look  only '|j   (j'**'^^  L 
I  to  the  present  and  needed  to  give  little  heed  to  the  past,/  riAA/^P^ 
J  or  even  to  consider  the  future.     In  America  the  revolu-*/&^  Ui*^ 
tion  had  been  practically  wimlly— CQOSiructive.      It  had   f^.^^-*-*-'^^ 
been   weakly    and   inadequately   opposed,    and   had    tri-    in'-ei't^'*^ 
umphed  more_by_ae£Ldeilt  than  by  design.     Its  underlyinp^ 
rnotive  was  chiefly  economic,  and  as  a  political  event  it 
was  (?ven  to  those  concerned  of  secondary  importance.. 
The'men  who  carried  through  the  revolution  in  America 
were  men  who  had  long  enjoyed  the  privilege  of  personal 
freedom  and  knew  the  value  of  liberty,  understood  its  *^®*V*2/  ^ 
necessary  limitations,   and   appreciated  that  its  benefits  V^''^'^ 
could  be  enjoyed  only  by  a  strict  adherence  to  law  and 
order. 

How  different  were  the  circumstances  in  France  in 
1789  !  For  more  than  two  generations  the  Middle  Class 
had  been  asserting  itself.  It  had  gained  control  of  the 
channels  of  trade,  of  industry,  of  science,  of  philosophic 
inquiry,  of  public  opinion.  Disgusted  with  the  conduct 
of  the  monarchy,  which  had  let  slip  the  reins  of  govern- 
ment, and  with  the  aristocracy,  which  had  sunk  to  a  low 
level  of  effeminate  incompetency,  the  Middle  Class  in 
France,  though  conscious  of  its  strength  as  the  most 
vigorous  and  important  element  in  the  State,  had  no  share 
in  shaping  its  political  destiny.  One  hundred  and  seventy- 
five  years  had  elapsed  since  the  Tiers  Etat — the  Com- 
mons— had  last  been  summoned  (1614),  when,  owing 
to  the  desperate  financial  situation  of  the  country,  and 
the  failure  of  successive  ministers  to  raise  the  necessary 
funds,  Louis  XVI,  as  a  last  resort,  was  induced  to  call 
for  elections  to  the  States  General  (1789). 


76  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 


II 

The  members  elected  to  the  Tiers  Etat  of  1789  were 
of  a  different  stamp  from  those  who  had  humbly  ad- 
dressed their  sovereign  on  bended  knee  at  the  last  ses- 
sion of  the  States  General  early  in  the  17th  century. 
Now  these  lawyers,  farmers,  doctors,  journalists,  and 
pamphleteers  who  had  been  elected  to  represent  the  great 
Middle  Class  knew  themselves  to  be  the  real  power  in 
France.  At  last  the  day  had  come  when  the  theories  of 
the  rights  of  man,  the  sovereignty  of  the  people,  political 
liberty  and  equality  were  to  be  put  into  practice.  The 
Middle  Class  suddenly  found  that  it  had  rallied  to  its 
support  the  great  mass  of  the  population,  the  lower 
classes,  whom  the  majority  of  middle  class  political  theor- 
ists had  never  considered  as  possible  participants  in  po- 
litical freedom.  This  sudden  and  unexpected  accession 
of  strength  must  be  held  in  view  in  estimating  the  chaos 
which  ensued.  Except  possibly  for  the  harangues  of 
Rousseau,  no  voice  had  been  raised  in  behalf  of  the 
political  enfranchisement  of  the  lower  classes.  Logical 
historical  development  seemed  to  demand  that  the  Middle 
Class  of  France,  the  lovers  of  law  and  order,  of  modera- 
tion and  of  peace,  should  have  a  chance  to  reform  the 
body  politic,  and  establish  a  constitutional  monarchy 
which  would  be  relatively  no  more  radical  than  that  set 
up  by  Englishmen  of  this  same  class  a  century  before. 
Such  was  the  programme  of  the  Tiers  Etat.  Excluded  by 
force  of  arms  from  participating  in  the  States  General 
with  the  nobility  and  the  clergy,  the  Tiers  Etat  thereupon 
constituted  itself  into  a  National  Assembly,  and  invited 
the  two  other  orders  to  join  it. 

The  situation  soon  got  out  of  hand.     The  Middle 


THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION  77 

Class  had  formulated  the  theory,  the  lower  classes  under- 
took the  execution,  and  we  have  the  storming  of  the 
Bastille  and  the  sacking  of  the  chateaux  of  the  nobles. 
Then  followed  such  episodes  as  that  of  August  4th,  when 
the  abject  political  worthlessness  of  the  aristocracy  was 
made  evident.  These  supporters  of  a  rationalised  abso- 
lutism, ostensibly  the  strong  arm  of  law  and  order  in  the 
land,  voluntarily  surrendered  their  political  privileges  and 
immunities  in  a  fit  of  helplessness,  hoping  by  this  act  of 
sacrifice  of  something  they  knew  they  could  not  hold, 
to  save  something  which  they  hoped  that  they  could. 

Then  came  the  famous  statement  of  the  Rights  of 
Man,  August  18,  1789,  which  we  may  for  a  moment 
compare  with  the  Declaration  of  Right  of  1689.  Here 
we  find  the  teachings  of  the  middle  class  philosophers 
of  the  1 8th  century  embodied  in  a  document  of  State, 
solemnly  adopted  by  the  National  Assembly,  and  later 
ratified  by  the  King. 

The  "Rights  of  Man"  set  forth  that  all  men  are  orig-   I 
inally  equal;  that  the  ends  of  social  union  are  liberty,   / 
property,    security,    and   resistance    to    oppression;    that  I 
sovereignty   resides   in   the   nation,    and   that   all   power  I 
emanates  from  it;  that  freedom  consists  in  doing  every- I 
thing  which  does  not  injure  another;  that  law  is  the  ex- 
pression of  the  general  will;  that  public  burdens  should 
be  borne  by  all  the  members  of  the  State  in  proportion 
to  their  fortunes;  that  the  elective  franchise  should  be 
extended  to  all;  and  that  the  exercise  of  natural  rights 
has  no  other  limit  than  their  interference  with  the  rights  J 
of  others. 

In  spite  of  the  success  of  the  Revolution  the  Middle 
Class,  with  characteristic  moderation,  clung  to  its  cher- 
ished plan  of  a  constitution,  and  we  find  the  National 
Assembly  transforming  itself  into  a  Constituent  Assembly 


78  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

(January  1790)  for  the  purpose  of  framing  a  constitu- 
tion, which  was  to  make  a  place  for  the  King,  and  even 
a  House  of  Peers.  Thereafter  constitution-making  pro- 
ceeded, and  in  1791  a  constitutional  monarchy  was  de- 
creed in  writing,  as  unlike  the  English  model  of  constitu- 
tional monarchy  as  the  declaration  of  the  Rights  of  Man 
is  unlike  the  Declaration  of  Right.  The  Constitution  of 
1 79 1  showed  clearly  the  influence  of  JBlil^seau,  and  his 
theory  of  the  two  powers — legislative  and  executive — in 

'  government,  combined  with  that  of  the  three  powers 
adopted  by  the  United  States  two  years  before.  The 
Constitution  of  1791  was  believed  by  its  framers  to  be  a 
masterpiece  of  political  wisdom.  It  was  in  effect  a  com- 
promise, an  effort  to  amalgamate  monarchy  with  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people.  While  it  made 
the  King  the  servant  of  the  will  of  the  people,  it  put  him 
in  an  untenable  position  in  that  he  had  no  share  in  form- 
ing this  will. 

The  Constitution  of  1791  had  set  up  an  irreconcilable 

/  opposition  between  the  legislative  and  executive  branches 
of  government  and  rendered  the  smooth  functioning  of 
government  impossible.  The  only  way  out  of  the  diffi- 
culty was  for  one  or  the  other  to  surrender  its  authority. 
The  King  felt  that  he  could  not;  the  Assembly  would  not. 
Thus  the  principle  upon  which  the  Constituent  Assembly 
had  framed  its  constitution,  "le  nation  veut,  le  roi  fait" 
soon  proved  itself  inadequate.^  Whether  consciously  or 
not,  the  Middle  Class  had  by  this  time  abandoned  its 
intended  moderation,  had  lost  its  grip,  and  was  for  the 
time  being  becoming  submerged  by  the  rapidly  rising 
influence  of  the  masses.    The  Legislative  Assembly  which 

^Mirabeau,  who  was  the  President  of  the  Constitutional  Convention,  in 
speaking  of  sovereign  princes  exclaimed:  "Vous  etes  les  salaries  de  vos 
sujets,  et  vous  devez  subir  les  conditions  auxquelles  vous  est  accorde  ce 
salaire  sous  peine  de  le  perdre." — Essai  sur  le  Despotism,  Vol.  II,  p.  279. 


THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION  79 

undertook  to  govern  in  conjunction  with  the  King,  accom- 
plished nothing.  It  was  swept  aside  by  the  National 
Convention,  which  abolished  the  monarchy,  and  decreed 
the  death  of  the  King  in  1793. 

Immediately  a  fresh  constitution  was  drawn  up.  It 
aimed  at  a  representative  system,  following  the  American 
plan,  republican  in  form,  radical  in  content.  The  Reign 
of  Terror  ensued,  and  when  the  storm  had  subsided  still 
another  constitution  was  framed  (1795).  It  provided 
for  a  democratic  system  of  two  councils,  one  of  five 
hundred,  the  other  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  members; 
the  former  with  the  privilege  of  enacting  legislation, 
the  latter  with  the  right  to  veto  it.  The  executive  au- 
thority was  entrusted  to  a  Directory  of  five;  each  director 
to  be  its  president  for  three  months.  The  Revolution 
was  at  an  end.  The  Directory  survived  for  four  years,  * 
to  make  way  for  the  Consulate,  the  dictatorship  of 
Napoleon,  and  the  Empire. 


CHAPTER   VII 

The  Idea  of  Nationalism 


THE   EFFECTS  OF  THE  REVOLUTION — THE  NEW   CONCEPT  OF   LIB- 
ERTY  NATIONAL      SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS NAPOLEON      I 

HIS  POLITICAL  IMPORTANCE — HIS  HISTORICAL  ROLE 


THE  Revolution  In  France  had  made  a  clean  sweep  of 
the  old  institutions,  had  destroyed  all  political  bar- 
riers between  classes,  and  had  left  standing  neither  cen- 
tral nor  local  authority.  Middle  class  public  opinion  had 
triumphed.  The  Middle  Class  had  come  to  feel  itself 
the  ruling  power  in  the  State.  In  spite  of  the  excesses 
committed  in  the  name  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people 
and  the  rights  of  man,  these  concepts  survived  as  political 
catchwords.  They  were  more  precisely  defined  in  the 
new  political  theories.  Political  freedom  had  been  trans- 
ferred from  being  an  attribute  merely  of  the  individual 
to  that  of  the  State.  The  individual  will  had  fused  Itself 
with  the  national  will.  The  State  was  no  longer  held  a 
geographical  expression,  or  even  a  sum  of  racial  affinities, 
but  an  Imponderable,  intangible  composite  of  opinion.  As 
public  opinion,  so  enthusiastically  led  by  the  proselyting 
political  philosophers  of  the  mid-i8th  century,  aroused 
the  Individual  to  cast  off  the  yoke  of  constituted  authority, 
and  displaced  the  centre  of  gravity  in  the  State  from  the 
governing    to    the    governed,    thus    realising    Individual 

liberty,   so  now  the   French   people,   conscious   of   their 

[80] 


THE  IDEA  OF  NATIONALISM  8i 

national  vigor,  were  anxious  to  bestow  upon  adjoining 
States  the  benefits  of  political  liberty,  which  they  believed 
that  they  alone  enjoyed.  A  crusading  zeal  had  seized 
hold  of  the  French.  They  felt  it  to  be  their  mission  to 
free  the  world  from  the  burden  of  monarchical  absolutism 
and  divinely  sanctioned  kings,  if  need  be  by  force  of  arms. 
They  were  convinced  that  they  would  be  welcomed  en- 
thusiastically by  neighboring  peoples.  They  outlined  and 
carried  into  effect  plans  for  the  incorporation  of  the  terri- 
'torifjs  of  the  latter  in  France,  so  that  they  might  be  satis- 
fied that  the  full  privileges  of  "freedom"  would  be 
assured. 

It  is  in  this  spirit  that  the  Convention  of  1792  voted 
to  render  aid  to  all  oppressed  peoples,  and  to  liberate 
them  from  their  rulers.  Instructions  in  this  sense  were 
issued  to  French  commanders  in  the  field,  and  we  find 
French  forces  penetrating  the  Rhenish  provinces,  Bel- 
gium, and  Savoy.  By  plebiscites  carried  through  after 
campaigns  of  intense  propaganda,  these  areas  were  in- 
corporated and  made  over  into  French  departments.  By 
1795  the  frontiers  of  France  had  reached  the  Rhine. 
Such  were  the  conquests  carried  but  in  the  name  of  po- 
litical liberty.  There  is  no  evidence  to  show  that  up  *^ 
to  this  time  the  motives  of  action  were  other  than  un-  ^  ' 
selfish,  though  the  methods  used  were  in  many  instances 
arbitrary. 

Throughout  this  period  French  national  feeling  con- 
tinued to  be  strengthened.  National  self-consciousness, 
national  dignity  had  become  political  factors  of  determin- 
ing importance.  It  is  no  surprise  to  find  that  it  was  in 
France  that  this  sense  of  militant  nationalism  was  first 
attained.  The  State  fashioned  in  the  image  of  man  had  ^ 
been  endowed  with  self-consciousness,  and  just  as  the 
individual  seeks  new  fields  of  activity,  more  room  to 


82  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

grow,  so  the  State — a  composite,  articulate,  organic, 
individualised  body  politic — must  be  permitted  to  grow, 
to  progress. 

Such  was  the  first  tangible  result  of  the  putting  into 
practice  of  the  theories  of  progress,  of  liberty,  of  hu- 
manity, which  had  been  the  daily  gospel  of  Europe  dur- 
ing the  three  preceding  decades.  With  naive  intensity  the 
people  of  France  proclaimed  It  not  only  their  right,  but 
their  duty  to  impose  political  liberty  upon  those  who  they 
felt  would  not  otherwise  accept  the  new  doctrines. 

The  constructive  phase  of  revolutionary  propaganda 
had  begun.  Middle  cla,ss  cosrnopolitanism  had  dev.£lopf  d 
into  national  egotism  in  an  jLstonishingly  brief  period. 
The  bolder  Ideas  of  cosmopolitanism  seemed  to  offer 
no  tangible  possibility  of  successful  materialisation.  They 
were  historically  premature.  The  long  road  of  national- 
ism had  to  be  laid  behind  before  International  concepts 
could  gain  ground. 

The  first  flowering  of  unselfish  abstract  nationalism, 
the  spreading  of  political  liberty  to  all  peoples,  and  the 
awakening  of  national  self-consciousness,  matured  under 
such  unusual  circumstances,  withered  rapidly.  By  1798 
France  had  abandoned  her  policy  of  political  altruism; 
the  proselyting  zeal  had  spent  itself  or  rather  had 
been  transformed  into  an  inordinate  lust  for  territorial 
conquest,  which  was  to  find  in  Napoleon  the  leader 
needed  for  such  enterprise. 

Though  the  restless  energy  of  Napoleon  was  ill-suited 
to  brook  the  harassing  burden  of  a  system  of  balances 
and  checks,  inseparable  from  the  polltlco-juridic  concept 
of  the  State,  as  expressed  in  constitutional  government, 
yet  he  realised  that  this  was  the  mould  into  which  the 
State  of  his  times  must  be  fashioned,  and  he  made  use 
of  it.    He  acknowledged  that  the  people  were  the  source 


THE  IDEA  OF  NATIONALISM  83 

of  all  power,  and  embodied  in  himself  their  professed 
sovereignty.  He  opened  the  path  of  preferment  to  the 
individual  and  made  fullest  use  of  intelligence  and  merit 
to  consolidate  his  position,  and  thus  established  a  democ- 
ratised despotism.^  Napoleon's  conception  of  his  true 
historical  mission  was  too  strong  to  permit  anything 
to  stand  in  the  way  of  its  accomplishment.  He  bent  his 
full  energy  to  carry  on  the  work,  of  the  Revolution,  to 
secur,e  the  consolidation  and  the  unification  of  greater 
France  into  a  conscious  national  unit,  and  as  a  corollary, 
the  hegemony  of  this  national  unit  in  Europe.  He  mo- 
nopolised for  himself  and  directed  this  national  conscious- 
ness and  embodied  the  newly-created  national  egotism, 
which  rendered  France  Irresistible  when  faced  by  peoples 
whose  national  consciousness  had  not  been  awakened. 
As  Louis  XIV  -  had  believed  himself  the  embodiment 

*  "To  sum  up  the  imperial  system,  it  may  be  said  that  its  basis  is 
democratic,  since  all  the  powers  are  derived  from  the  people;  whilst  all 
the  organisation  is  hierarchical,  since  it  provides  different  grades  in 
order  to   stimulate    all   capacities. 

"Competition  is  opened  to  40,000,000  souls;  merit  alone  distinguishes 
them;  different  degrees  of  the  social  scale  reward  them." — Napoleonic 
Ideas,  Chap.  Ill,  written  by  Prince  Louis  Napoleon,   later  Napoleon  III. 

^According  to  the  doctrine  set  forth  by  Louis  XIV  in  his  own  words: 
"The  King  represents  the  whole  nation;  all  power  vests  in  the  King, 
and  there  is  none  other  in  the  Kingdom  but  such  as  he  decrees.  The 
nation  is  of  no  importance  {ne  fait  pas  corps)  in  France,  it  is  entirely 
absorbed  in  the  person  of  the  King.  Kings  are  absolute  monarchs,  and 
have  by  the  nature  of  things  fullest  authority  and  control  over  all  the 
chattels  and  effects  belonging  not  only  to  the  laymen  but  to  the  clergy.  He 
who  has  given  Kings  to  the  world  willed  it  that  they  be  respected  as 
His  lieutenants,  reserving  for  Himself  the  sole  right  to  examine  their  con- 
duct. It  is  His  Will  that  whoever  is  born  a  subject  should  obey  without 
question." — Quoted  from  C.  Thibaudeau,  "Hisioire  des  Etats  Generaux," 
Vol.  Ill,  p.  218. 

It  is  of  interest  to  compare  this  with  the  Napoleonic  theory:  "Napoleon 
was  the  supreme  chief  of  the  State,  the  elect  of  the  people,  the  represen- 
tative of  the  nation.  In  his  public  acts,  it  was  the  Emperor's  pride  to  ac- 
knowledge that  he  owed  everything  to  the  French  people.  When  at  the 
foot  of  the  Pyrenees,  surrounded  by  kings,  and  the  object  of  their  homage, 
he  disposed  of  thrones  and  empires,  he  claimed  with  energy  the  title  of 
first  representative  of  the  people,  a  title  which  seemed  about  to  be  given 
exclusively  to  members  of  the  legislative  body." — Cf.  Napoleonic  Ideas, 
Chap.  V. 


84  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

of  the  State — the  patrimony  of  France,  the  country  and 
its  passive  populations — so  Napoleon  during  the  years 
of  his  ascendancy  embodied  the  newly-roused  national 
consciousness  of  the  active,  participant  people.  Here 
we  can  see  the  source  of  his  power,  the  spontaneity  of 
his  success.  Had  he  confined  himself  to  the  single  pur- 
pose of  the  national  consolidation  of  France,  it  is  possible 
that  he  would  have  modified  the  course  of  history  and 
accelerated  the  smoother  evolution  of  nationalism.  But 
the  distant  conquests  which  he  had  undertaken  at  the 
behest  of  the  Directory  had  tested  the  new-found  strength 
of  the  State  and  awakened  Its  sense  of  power  in  the  pur- 
suit of  difficult  enterprise.  The  campaigns  In  Italy  and 
in  Prussia  had  made  it  plain  to  Napoleon  that  a  closely- 
knit  national  State  with  conscript  armies  must  inevitably 
conquer  the  older  State  organisation,  where  the  morale 
had  become  debilitated,  and  the  spirit  of  nationalism 
had  not  yet  kindled  a  patriotic  fervor. 


II 

No  new  contribution  was  made  by  Napoleon  to  the 
theory  of  State;  no  real  progress  in  political  practice  is  to 
be  found  during  the  years  of  his  rule.  He  regulated  and 
systematlsed  the  loose  ends  of  Revolutionary  policy,  and 
restored  a  semblance  of  order  and  discipline  to  the  newly- 
formed,  conscious  national  will.  He  invented  little,  but 
borrowed  copiously  and  judiciously;  from  the  bees  for 
his  coat  of  arms  from  Chllperic  to  the  ceremonial  of 
his  court  from  Charlemagne;  from  the  Pandects  of  Jus- 
tinian for  his  code  of  laws  to  the  ideas  of  Rousseau  for 
public   pronunciamentos.^      Most   significant   of    all,   he 

^  Cf.    the   interesting   study   by   Rene   Johannet,   Le   Principe    des   Na- 
tionalites. 


THE  IDEA  OF  NATIONALISM  85 

adopted  in  so  far  as  he  was  able  the  cardinal  tenet  of  the 
programme  of  government  of  the  dethroned  Bourbons, 
their  family  policy,  allying  himself  with  the  House  of 
Austria  by  marriage,  and  placing  his  relatives  on  the 
thrones  of  adjoining  States  as  outposts  of  the  power  of 
France.  In  his  wars  of  conquest  he  sought  elbow  room 
for  the  growing  national  State.  The  discipline  of  these 
conflicts  served  to  consolidate  France  into  a  strongly  cen- 
tralized Nation-State. 

The  more  one  inquires  into  the  conscious  political  role 
of  the  first  French  Emperor,  the  mr7rp  one  rpf^ljses  ]r\ctw 
deep  was  the  impy^ss  of  middle  class  influence  on  his  char- 
acter. To  him  power  was  the  rational  attribute,  the  log- 
ical objective  ot  the  mdividual.  He  conceived  power  in  a 
subjective  sense  and  his  point  of  view  remained  to  the  end 
that  of  a  confirmed  middle  class  individualist.  He  was 
dazzled  by  the  concept  of  cosmopolitanism,  while  he  made 
himself  the  missionary  of  nationalism.  It  would  seem  as 
though  he  believed  that  by  his  successful  wars,  carried  on 
with  conscripted,  national-service  armies,  he  could  realise 
the  middle  class  ideal  of  a  federated,  cosmopolitan  World 
State.  Napoleon  was  never  able  wholly  to  shake  off  the 
incubus  of  the  doctrinaire  teachings  of  pre-Revolutionary 
days.  He  sought  no  blending  of  national  groups,  no  fu- 
sion of  peoples  on  a  basis  of  equality.  Himself  appar- 
ently devoid  of  a  feeling  of  patriotism,  by  birth,  tradition, 
and  temperament  an  Italian,  he  had  placed  himself  unre- 
servedly at  the  head  of  the  French,  as  the  people  that  had 
first  attained  national  consciousness.^  He  apparently 
never  looked  beyond  the  hegemony  of  France  in  a  fed- 
erated European  State.     Here  we  find  the  motive  which 

^  Years  later  at  St.  Helena  we  find  him  exclaiming:  "If  I  had  been 
born  a  German  I  would  have  united  the  thirty  million  Germans  under 
my  sceptre  .  .  .  and  they  would  have  remained  faithful   to  me." 


86  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

impelled  him  to  endeavor  to  unite  the  congeries  of  Euro- 
pean peoples;  Swedes,  Spaniards,  Prussians,  Danes,  Ital- 
ians, Tsardom  and  the  Papacy,  absolutists,  monarchists, 
republicans,  all  were  called  upon  to  play  their  part. 

Not  content  with  imitating  the  Bourbon  family  system, 
Napoleon  openly  sought  to  erect  a  World  State  with 
France  as  the  head,  and  the  other  States  as  the  subor- 
dinate members  of  the  body  politic.  Engrossed  though 
he  was  by  the  mirage  of  a  cosmopolitan  World  State, 
Napoleon  was  to  the  end  of  his  reign  conscious  of  the  im- 
portance of  national  unity  as  the  basis  of  the  political  re- 
generation of  the  various  peoples  of  Europe,  as  he  had 
been  in  the  days  when,  in  accepting  the  crown  of  Italy, 
he  declared  to  the  deputation  which  waited  upon  him:  "I 
have  always  had  the  intention  of  creating  a  free  and 
independent  Italian  nation.  I  will  accept  the  crown,  but 
for  only  so  long  as  my  interests  require  it." 

History  offers  few  such  examples  of  inflexible  irony. 
For  it  is  difficult  to  accept  the  view  that  Napoleon  had 
not  the  breadth  of  vision  or  political  acumen  necessary 
to  foresee  that  by  carrying  the  torch  of  nationalism  so 
high — in  Germany,  in  Italy,  in  Spain,  wherever  his  armies 
penetrated  and  remained — the  spirit  of  national  self-con- 
sciousness would  be  aroused,  and  would  grow  until  these 
peoples,  in  turn  becoming  nationally  conscious,  would 
struggle  to  secure  national  independence  and  ultimately 
compass  his  overthrow.  He  thus  became  the  most  active 
agent  of  his  own  downfall.  As  Lamartine  has  expressed 
it,  "ayant  souleve  les  nationalites,  les  nationalites  I'en- 
gloutissaient." 

Europe  as  Napoleon  found  it  was  strewn  with  the 
wreckage  of  decayed  political  systems;  there  was  little 
that  was  glorious  or  sacred  left  standing,  save  a  rich  fund 
of  high  political   ideals;   a   real   and  vigorous   faith   in 


THE  IDEA  OF  NATIONALISM  87 

political  liberty.  It  would  have  been  too  great  a  task  even 
for  a  Napoleon  to  have  erected  a  World  State  out  of 
the  peoples  of  Europe  who,  for  centuries  politically  pas- 
sive, were  just  awakening  to  national  and  political  con- 
sciousness. His  reign  was,  therefore,  of  necessity  ephem- 
eral. He  had  built  his  State  out  of  a  patch-work  of  de- 
crepit absolutisms,  into  which  he  had  sought  to  breathe 
the  breath  of  national  life. 

However,  it  may  be  said  of  Napoleon  with  even  greater 
truth  than  it  has  been  said  of  Caesar  that  when  "fresh 
nations  in  free  self-movement  commenced  their  race  to- 
wards the  new  and  higher  goals,  there  were  found  among 
them  not  a  few  in  which  the  seed  sown  by  Caesar  had 
sprung  up,  and  which  owed,  as  they  still  owe  to  him,  their 
historical  individuality."  ^ 

^Mommsen,  History  of  Rome,  closing  paragraph. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

The  Restoration 

THE    SPREAD    OF    CONSTITUTIONAL    GOVERNMENT SICILY    (1812) 

SPAIN    (181  2) FRANCE    (1814) MINOR  GERMAN   STATES 

THE  DESTINY  OF  EUROPE THE  CONGRESS  OF  VIENNA 

THE     HOLY    ALLIANCE THE     POLICY    OF     LEGIT- 
IMACY   AIX-LA-CHAPELLE TROPPAU LAI- 
BACH — THE    MONROE   DOCTRINE 


PATRIOTISM,  which  during  the  French  Revolutionary 
period  had  evolved  out  of  compatriotism,  ^ith  which 
it  may  be  held  synonymous,  the  binding  of  men  in  a 
Strongly-knit  social  group  by  ties  of  family,  of  kinship, 
of  interest,  the  cockade  of  faction,  the  conviction  of  party, 
and  lastly  by  an  awakening  of  national  consciousness,  had 
served  to  render  France  dominant  in  Europe.  Political 
unity  had  hastened  the  evolution  of  this  patriotic  national 
self-consciousness  in  France.  Now  national  self-con- 
sciousness easily  learned,  zealously  pursued,  fanatically 
practised,  was  to  lead  to  political  liberty  and  national 
independence  among  other  peoples,  in  the  first  instance 
in  their  emancipation  from  the  control  of  their  French 
initiators,  as  the  preliminary  to  a  long  struggle  for  con- 
stitutional freedom. 

While  France  was  engaged  in  carrying  out  Napoleon's 
programmes  of  cosmopolitan  aggrandisement  and  na- 
tional enlightenment,  England  remained  steadfastly  aloof, 
relatively  untouched  by   the   influence   of   revolutionary 

[88] 


THE  RESTORATION  89 

policy.  For  the  people  of  England  remained  impervious 
to  the  blandishments  of  French  political  doctrines,  which 
they  looked  upon  with  mistrust  and  suspicion.  They 
sought  to  combat  the  French  political  theories  of  national 
self-consciousness  with  their  own  more  cherished  principle 
of  individual  liberty.  The  ruling  Middle  Class  in  Eng- 
land, thoroughly  frightened  by  the  excesses  of  the  French 
Revolution,  not  only  became  increasingly  conservative, 
but  al,so  exerted  its  whole  strength  and  resources  to  check 
the  progress  of  French  political  propaganda.  The  doc- 
trine of  nationalism,  or  national  consciousness,  as  the 
basis  of  an  independent  State,  was  thoroughly  distasteful 
to  the  English,  who  relied  on  the  united  strength  of  the 
various  peoples — Scots,  Welsh,  Irish,  as  well  as  English 
— to  support  the  fabric  of  the  State.  We  can  here  trace 
the  causes  of  the  reactionary  influence  which  led  to  the 
further  tightening  of  the  reins  of  parliamentary  control, 
as  exemplified  by  the  abolition  of  the  Irish  Parliament 
after  the  disturbances  of  1798  afforded  the  desired  op- 
portunity of  making  Ireland  an  integral  part  of  the 
kingdom  (1801).  This  anti-nationalist  policy  at  home 
did  not  prevent  England  from  fostering  nationalist  propa- 
ganda on  the  Continent,  and  cooperating  actively  with  the 
Spaniards,  Italians,  and  Prussians  in  their  plans  for  na- 
tional independence  to  drive  out  the  French  and  crush 
Napoleon. 

As  England  during  the  Middle  Ages  had  on  the  whole 
remained  outside  the  great  leavening  influence  of  the 
Crusades,  and,  though  bound  to  participate  in  European 
policy,  yet  had  evolved  her  own  peculiar  political  insti- 
tutions, so  now  the  country  felt  only  indirectly  the  effects 
of  the  sudden  growth  of  nationalist  principles  which  was 
to  shape  the  political  destiny  of  the  peoples  of  Europe 
during  the    19th  century.      For   a   time   it  appeared   as 


90  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

though  this  destiny  was  to  depend  solely  upon  the  will  of 
France,  and  the  retrenchment  of  England  had  in  it  many 
of  the  characteristics  of  despair.  Nevertheless  when 
after  1808  it  became  evident  that  Napoleonic  plans  were 
unrealisable,  we  find  English  emissaries  abroad  urging  the 
advantages  of  British  constitutional  liberty,  as  against  the 
Napoleonic  plans  of  cosmopolitan  despotism,  at  the  same 
time  making  good  use  of  the  patriotic  ferment  aroused 
by  French  nationalist  theories. 

Thus  we  find  that  it  was  the  English  Minister  to  Sicily, 
acting  under  instructions  from  his  Government,  who 
brought  about  the  framing  of  the  first  constitution  on  the 
English  model  to  be  adopted  on  the  Continent  (18 12). 
The  Sicilian  constitution  was  built  on  a  modernised  Eng- 
lish plan.  While  it  provided  for  a  Lower  House  and  a 
Chamber  of  Peers,  the  King  remained  a  separate  power, 
outside  of  Parliament,  though  parliamentary  sanction  was 
made  obligatory  for  most  of  his  acts.  All  feudal  privi- 
leges and  immunities  were  suppressed,  and  the  influence 
of  the  French  doctrine  of  the  rights  of  man  was  recognised 
as  underlying  the  attempt  to  amalgamate  revolutionary 
theory  with  English  monarchical  principles,  the  latter  pre- 
vailing in  form. 

In  the  same  year  in  Spain,  with  a  great  part  of  the 
country  still  under  the  rule  of  the  French,  a  very  complete 
constitution  was  drawn  up,  which  recognised  the  constitu- 
tional monarchical  principle,  provided  for  a  King,  but 
included  only  a  single  Chamber  or  Cortes,  with  no  House 
of  Peers,  and  made  the  King  subservient  to  the  will  of 
Parliament.  Neither  of  these  attempts  to  establish  a 
constitutional  system  survived  the  reaction  which  set  in 
upon  the  downfall  of  Napoleon.  On  the  day  when  Na- 
poleon set  sail  for  Elba  (May  4,  18 14)  the  restored 
King  of  Spain,  Ferdinand  VIII,  celebrated  the  circum- 


THE  RESTORATION  91 

stance  by  abrogating  the  constitution,  and  it  was  not 
until  1836  that  absolutism  was  overthrown;  and  only 
after  prolonged  revolutionary  struggles  was  constitutional 
monarchy  at  last  established  (1875). 

In  Sicily  a  similar  fate  befell  the  constitution,  and 
the  heavy  hand  of  Austrian  despotism  prevented  the 
realisation  of  a  constitutional  regime  until  the  coun- 
try was  liberated  by  Garibaldi  and  united  to  Italy 
(i860). 

'  If  we  look  through  the  pages  of  the  history  of  the 
struggle  for  constitutional  government  throughout  Eu- 
rope we  meet  everywhere  with  the  same  vicissitudes.  In 
France  Louis  XVIII  granted  a  charter  (June  4,  18 14). 
It  shows  traces  of  the  influences  of  English  principles, 
but  left  more  power  in  the  hands  of  the  King,  affirming 
"that  all  authority  in  France  rests  in  the  King."  This 
charter  provided  for  two  Houses,  but  electoral  privilege 
to  the  Lower  House  did  not  take  into  consideration  the 
great  mass  of  the  population  which  had  become  politically 
conscious,  and  had  played  such  an  important  part  in  the 
affairs  of  State  during  the  revolutionary  period.  Thus 
the  charter  acted  as  an  irritant,  and  served  to  foment  the 
discontent,  which  manifested  itself  in  the  revolutions  of 
1830  and  1848. 

So  it  was  in  Germany.  When  the  days  of  the  Napo- 
leonic regime  had  passed,  and  the  Wars  of  Liberation  had 
freed  the  country  from  foreign  occupation,  the  reaction- 
ary forces  were  still  too  strong  to  permit  the  establish- 
ment of  more  liberal  political  institutions.  Particularist 
influences  had  not  been  sufficiently  overcome  to  allow  the 
national  consciousness,  which  had  been  so  spontaneously 
aroused  during  the  period  of  Sturm  und  Drang,  to  en- 
trust the  conduct  of  public  affairs  to  a  strong  central  au- 
thority.    Some  of  the  minor  German  princes  did  ^rant 


92  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

limited  constitutional  rights:  Nassau  in  1814,  Baden  and 
Bavaria  in  18 18,  Wurttemburg  in  18 19,  and  others  later. 
But  as  long  as  the  larger  states,  Prussia  and  Austria,  re- 
mained under  absolutist  control,  these  minor  efforts  were 
without  immediate  political  significance. 


II 

The  Revolution  had  awakened  the  spirit  of  national- 
ism, the  Restoration  did  all  in  its  power  to  suppress  it. 
The  Revolution,  the  work  of  the  Middle  Class,  had 
spread  Hberalism  among  the  peoples  of  Europe;  the  Res- 
toration made  it  its  duty  to  drive  these  peoples  back 
under  the  yoke  of  absolutism.  The  Revolution  and  the 
Napoleonic  regime  had  been  a  period  of  conscious  na- 
tionalist expansion,  of  growth,  of  action.  There  was  cur- 
rent a  broad  faith  in  political  liberty  and  a  fervent  con- 
viction that  n;a£^possessed  certajji-imfijxscriptiblf'  rights. 
Now  there  ensued  a  period  of  nervous  unrest  and  irrita- 
bility throughout  Europe,  For  the  time  being  the  ex- 
hilarating principle  of  nationalism  was  to  be  supplanted 
by  a  political  subterfuge,  well  suited  to  the  petty  temper 
of  the  Restoration. 

It  is  claimed  that  Talleyrand,  in  order  to  save  France 
from  partition,  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna  advanced  the 
principle  of  legitimacy  as  the  test  of  rational  political 
practice.  The  idea  in  itself  has  little  to  commend  it.  It 
is  a  natural  resultant  of  war-weariness;  a  desire  to  restore 
the  regime  of  days  gone  by;  as  such  it  is  an  historical 
anachronism,  and  is  inevitably  doomed  to  failure.  But  if 
put  into  practice,  such  a  political  doctrine  can  and  does 


THE  RESTORATION  93 

retard  the  natural  flow  of  historical  development.  While 
it  never  leads  to  great  events,  it  keeps  men  stirred  up  and 
disaffected  until  finally  it  is  eliminated  by  the  force  of  its 
own  ineptitude.  It  may  thus  be  looked  upon  as  a  para- 
sitic doctrine,  of  which  there  are  numerous  examples  in 
history. 

Legitimacy  as  a  political  doctrine  claims  that  authority 
in  the  State  is  not  founded  on  power,  but  on  accepted  prac- 
tice ^nd  high  antiquity.  As  Pascal  has  remarked:  "Jus- 
tice is  that  which  is  established,  and  thus  all  of  our  laws 
which  are  established  will  be  held  of  necessity  to  be  just 
without  being  examined,  for  the  reason  that  they  are 
established."  ^ 

The  bastard  rule  of  Napoleon  and  his  satellites  was  an 
offence  against  the  social  order,  which  had  to  be  wiped 
out.  The  legitimate  rulers  must  again  be  seated  on  their 
thrones,  and  the  old  institutions  restored.  Incidentally 
the  principle  of  nationality  was  to  be  suppressed;  national 
aspirations  were  to  be  crushed.  Such  was  the  doctrine 
which  was  to  be  the  mainspring  of  all  political  combina- 
tion and  manoeuvring.  The  Congress  of  Vienna,  which 
spared  France  from  spoliation  on  legitimatist  grounds, 
undid  the  constructive  work  initiated  by  Napoleon,  again 
dismembered  Italy  and  Germany,  establishing  there  a 
number  of  petty  sovereign  States;  partitioned  Poland 
afresh,  and,  as  if  to  show  its  contempt  for  the  principle 
of  nationality,  provided  for  the  forcible  union  of  two 
racially  and  religiously  antagonistic  peoples  in  the  patch- 
ing up  of  a  single  State  out  of  Belgium  and  Holland. 
At  the  same  time  a  Grand  Alliance  composed  of  the 
legitimate  sovereigns  of  the  five  great  States  of  Europe 
was  formed  to  regulate  the  relations  of  the  States  of 

*  Cf.  Pensees  sur  la  Morale, 


94  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

Christendom,  "on  principles  of  Christian  charity."  ^  It 
proved  to  be,  as  was  to  be  expected,  a  combination  of 
absolutist  monarchs  bent  upon  assuring  the  maintenance 
of  the  status  quo  ante  on  the  basis  of  the  territorial  settle- 
ment of  1 8 15.  The  Bourbons  were  everywhere  to  be  re- 
stored to  their  ancient  royal  occupations,  and  by  a  special 
article  of  the  text  of  the  Alliance,  the  Bonaparte  family 
was  excluded  forever  from  occupying  a  throne. 

Legitimacy  was  henceforth  to  be  the  sole  test  of  fitness, 
not  merely  in  the  administration  of  affairs  of  State  and  in 
politics,  but  religious  questions,  educational  matters,  even 
scientific  research  and  philosophic  speculation  were  to  be 
subject  to  legitimatist  supervision  and  censorship.     The 

^  It  is  to  be  recalled  that  this  alliance  (November  20,  1815)  brought 
within  the  realm  of  practical  politics  the  vague  evangelical  generalities 
of  the  treaty  signed  by  the  Emperors  of  Russia  and  Austria  and  the 
King  of  Prussia,  known  as  the  Holy  Alliance  (September  1815).  Here 
is  set  forth  "in  the  name  of  the  Most  Holy  and  Indivisible  Trinity"  a 
basis  for  establishing  a  European  policy:  "conformably  to  the  words  of  the 
Holy  Scriptures  which  command  all  men  to  consider  each  other  as 
brethren,  the  three  contracting  monarchs  will  remain  united  by  the  bonds 
of  a  true  and  indissoluble  fraternity,  and,  considering  each  other  as 
fellow  countrymen,  they  will,  on  all  occasions  and  in  all  places,  lend 
each  other  aid  and  assistance."  And  further  that  "the  three  allied 
Princes  looking  on  themselves  as  merely  delegated  by  Providence  to 
govern  three  branches  of  the  One  family,  namely,  Austria,  Prussia,  and 
Russia,  thus  confessing  that  the  Christian  world,  of  which  they  and  their 
people  form  a  part,  has  in  reality'  no  other  Sovereign  than  Him  to  whom 
alone  power  really  belongs,  because  in  Him  alone  are  found  all  the 
treasures  of  love,  science,  and  infinite  wisdom;  that  is  to  say,  God,  our 
Divine  Saviour,  the  Word  of  the  Most  High,  the  Word  of  Life."  Here 
was  an  attempt  to  enunciate  a  new  type  of  mystical  cosmopolitanism 
which  would  justify  any  reactionary  policy  pursued  to  check  the  spread  of 
Revolutionary  propaganda.  All  European  sovereigns  (except  the  Pope 
and  the  Sultan)  were  invited  by  the  three  Emperors  to  sign  the  Covenant 
of  the  Holy  Alliance  and  with  the  exception  of  the  Prince  Regent  of 
England  did  so.  Even  the  English  ruler  let  it  be  known  that  it  was  only 
owing  to  constitutional  disability  that  he  refrained  from  appending  his 
signature,  as  he  agreed  fully  with  the  principles  set  forth  in  the  treaty 
and  intended  to  be  guided  by  its  "sacred  maxims."  Though  the  Holy 
Alliance  never  had  any  practical  application  as  a  diplomatic  instrument, 
yet  the  name  came  to  be  applied  to  the  reactionary  policy  pursued  by 
European  cabinets  during  the  ensuing  decade,  and  fixed  itself  firmly  in  the 
public  mind  as  a  conspiracy  of  kings  against  the  attempts  of  their  sub- 
jects to  gain  political  liberty. 


THE  RESTORATION  95 

Cabinets  of  Europe  were  now  kept  busy  with  their  new 
inquisitorial  functions,  repressing  and  checking  spiritual 
insubordination  and  political  heresy.  Government  degen- 
erated into  purely  police  functions;  politics,  to  police- 
court  transactions. 

Few  periods  in  history  ^  offer  so  sorry  a  spectacle  as 
this  decade  (18 15-1825),  filled  with  the  machinations, 
schemes,  and  intrigues  of  the  miscellany  of  diplomatists 
whose  naturally  limited  horizon  had  found  in  legitimacy  a 
'poKcy  well  suited  to  their  talents.  The  Congresses  of 
Aix-la-Chapelle  (18 18),  Troppau  (1820),  Laibach 
(1821),  and  Verona  (1822),  called  to  consider  ways 
and  means  to  enforce  legitimatist  policy,  proved  how 
hopeless  the  task  had  become  of  attempting  to  govern 
without  the  consent  of  the  governed.  At  Troppau,  Rus- 
sia, Austria,  and  Prussia  had  issued  a  circular  note  setting 
forth  the  principle  of  joint  armed  intervention  in  any 
State  in  which  revolutionary  movements  might  arise.  No 
longer  able  to  keep  order  within  their  own  boundaries, 
the  Austrian,  Prussian,  and  Russian  sovereigns  agreed  to 
render  to  one  another  mutual  assistance.  England  was 
the  first  to  withdraw  from  the  legitimatist  coalition  by 
refusing  to  be  a  party  to  such  a  compact.  The  prin- 
ciple of  legitimacy  was  already  beginning  to  be  under- 
mined. Canning  gave  it  a  further  severe  blow  when  he 
actively  supported  the  contention  of  President  Monroe 
of  the   United   States   that   any   attempt  to   extend   the 

*  An  interesting  comparison  might  be  drawn  between  this  period  and 
the  decade  which  began  in  1919.  Then  it  was  agreed  "to  renew  at 
stated  intervals  meetings  sacred  to  the  great  common  interests  and  to  the 
examination  of  the  measures  which  in  each  of  these  periods  shall  be 
deemed  most  salutary  to  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  Europe."  The  idea 
was  to  make  these  congresses  a  regular  institution  through  which  the 
Great  Powers  should  control  Europe  and  watch  France. — Cf.  Seignobos, 
A  Political  History  of  Contemporary  Europe,  Part  III,  Chap.  XXV.  By  a 
slight  change  of  names  of  States  we  may  ascertain  the  historical  back- 
ground of  much  that  appears  enigmatical  in  present-day  history. 


96  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

European  system  to  the  Western  Hemisphere,  as  threat- 
ened by  the  Holy  Alliance  (1823)  in  its  plans  to  restore 
the  revolted  Spanish  Colonies  in  America  to  Spain,  would 
be  viewed  by  the  United  States  as  dangerous  to  their 
peace  and  safety,  "an  unfriendly  disposition  towards  the 
United  States."  The  Holy  Alliance  thereupon  desisted 
from  its  plan  of  intervention  in  American  affairs. 

The  ruling  princes  of  continental  Europe,  concerned 
solely  with  their  coterie  policy,  took  little  account  of 
practical  political  problems.  They  had  never  been  in 
contact  with  public  opinion,  which  they  pretended  to  de- 
spise. No  longer  directed  with  skill,  nor  assessed  at  its 
real  value  by  the  existing  governments,  neglected  except 
when  it  expressed  itself  obnoxiously  in  the  press,  public 
opinion  found  itself  without  leadership,  out  of  sympathy 
with  public  policy,  and  again  passed  under  the  control 
of  the  Middle  Class,  who  for  the  time  being  deprived  of 
political  rights,  was  to  make  use  of  this  instrument  to 
gain  control  of  power  in  the  State. 

Legitimacy  as  a  political  principle  had,  as  was  to  be 
expected  of  so  rococo  a  doctrine,  failed  to  gain  the  sup- 
port of  the  great^ody  of  politically-enlightened  men, 
who  had  been  taught  by  the  lessons  of  the  Revolution  to 
take  an  interest  in  political  affairs.  Thus,  in  spite  of  the 
rigorous  and  unabated  persecution  and  irritating  repres- 
sion resorted  to  by  the  legitimatist  Governments,  a  new 
and  vigorous  public  opinion  was  spreading,  undermining 
absolutism  at  every  turn. 


CHAPTER  IX 

The  Aftermath 


THE     TEMPER     OF     THE     EARLY     NINETEENTH     CENTURY — NEW 

^      SCHOOLS  OF  POLITICS THE  SOCIALIST  DOCTRINE — ST.  SIMON 

— THE  INCREASING  IMPORTANCE  OF  ECONOMICS 


THE  temper  of  the  19th  century  was  already  beginning 
to  show  itself  radically  different  from  that  of  the 
t8th.  The  1 8th  century  had  been  concerned  with  y| 
generalities,  had  dogmatically  asserted  the  omnipotence'/ 
of  human  reason  and  the  supremacy  of  the  individual. 
It  had  exalted  liberty  and  equality;  sought  to  frame  gov- 
ernments on  principles,  and  deduce  political  programmes 
from  theory.  This  ideology  had  covered  France  with 
ruins,  had  drenched  Europe  in  blood,  dislocated  society, 
and  brought  about  a  reaction  so  violent  that  it  had 
strengthened  the  hand  of  monarchical  absolutism,  and 
plunged  the  peoples  of  continental  Europe,  including  the 
Middle  Class,  into  a  condition  of  political  servitude  more 
vexatious  and  harassing  than  that  experienced  under  the 
old  regime.  The  Restoration  had  taught  caution.  It 
was  now  felt  that  too  much  trust  had  been  placed  in  the  \ 
individual;  too  much  confidence  in  high-flown  generalities 
and  in  a  priori  theories.  Those  holding  the  most  diver- 
gent opinions,  the  fiercest  opponents  of  the  Revolution  as 
well  as  its  apologists,  agreed  that  the  criterion  of  political 
theory  and  practice  must  be  sought,  not  in  the  individual, 

[97] 


9&  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

but  in  the  nation.  In  brief,  individualism,  the  keynote  of 
political  speculation  during  the  i8th  century,  which  had 
made  possible  the  career  of  a  Napoleon,  was  to  give  way 
to  nationalism.  Private  judgment  was  denounced  as 
fallacious;  the  judgment  of  the  majority  believed  to  be 
more  reliable  than  the  wisest  council  of  kings. 

We  now  find  in  France,  on  the  one  hand,  a  so-called 
theocratic  school  of  politics  springing  up.  Its  followers 
claimed  to  have  discovered  in  trg^ition  the  source  of  all 
historical  truth.  They  rejected  the  doctrine  of  perfectibil- 
ity and  progress  as  an  illusion.  They  held  that  faith,  not 
reason,  and  submission  to  constituted  authority  must  gov- 
ern social  relations;  for  "sovereignty  in  the  secular 
'  sphere  corresponds  to  infallibility  in  the  religious  sphere." 
In  spite  of  their  outward  adherence  to  the  doctrines  of 
the  ancien  regime  it  was  the  leader  of  this  movement, 
Joseph  de  Maistre,  who  was  among  the  first  to  proclaim 
the  new  naTionalTst  thesis,  when  he  declared :  "There  is  no 
man  in  the  world.  I  have  seen  Frenchmen,  Italians,  Rus- 
sians, but  as  for  man  I  declare  I  have  never  met  him  in 
my  life."  At  the  opposite  extreme  a  frankly  radical  so- 
cial theory  was  being  evolved  by  a  group  of  politico- 
social  innovators  who  became  known  as  Socialists. 
Though  they  accepted  progress  and  maintained  that  his- 
tory cannot  turn  back  a  page,  yet  they  viewed  with  ab- 
horrence the  middle  class  doctrine  of  unfettered  personal 
liberties  and  a  social  order  based  on  maintaining  in- 
dividualist theories.  According  to  their  view,  the  in- 
dividual is  to  be  held  of  secondary  importance.  Society 
is  not  to  be  regenerated  by  man,  but  man  by  society.  It 
was  not  the  abstract  man  of  pre-Revolutionary  days,  but 
a  nationally-caas£ious  individual  who  felt  himspj_f  a  mepi- 
ber  of  a_definitesocial  group.     The  individual,  shorn  of 


THE  AFTERMATH  99 

all  of  his  Insignia  of  rank  and  political  prerogative,  de- 
personalised, was  by  the  Socialists  considered  to  be  of 
value  merely  as  a  social  unit.  ,   ^w 

The  first  broad  forecast  of  Socialism  is  to  be  found  in  v  Cy<^ 
the  works  of  St.  Simon. ^  He  claimed  that  neither  the  cP' 
Church  nor  the  State  had  been  able  to  fulfil  its  true  social 
mission  and  that  therefore  a  new  social  order  was  neces- 
sary, based  on  socialist  principles  "scientifically"  arrived 
at.^  Though  it  was  left  to  his  followers  to  systematise 
his  i'deas,  it  is  clear  that  St.  Simon  had  in  mind  the  erec- 
tion of  an  industrial  State,  scientifically  managed  by  those 
who  were  engaged  upon  the  production  of  the  good 
things  of  life.  He  aimed  at  the  elimination  of  the 
consumingclass.  which  had  hitherto  ruled  the  State, 
confident  that  this  would  lead  ultimately  to  the  aboli- 
tion of  war.  The  chief  importance  of  St.  Simon  as  a 
precursor  of  Socialism  lay  in  the  fact  that  he  was 
among  the  first  to  insist  upon  limiting  the  scope  of  the 
unfettered  individualism  which  had  been  left  as  a  heri- 
tage by  the  Revolution. 

Political  emancipation  had  always  been  the  objective  of 
the  Middle  Class.  The  politico-juridic  concept  of  the 
State,  which  in  everyday  practice  became  known  as  con- 

*  Socialism  in  its  present  historical  sense  is  a  product  of  the  19th  century. 
Though  what  may  be  termed  socialist  views  were  held  by  many  i8th 
century  philosophers  and  pamphleteers,  yet  they  were  generally  vague 
and  Utopian  in  character.  During  the  Revolution,  Noel  BabcEuf,  a  polit- 
ical agitator,  propounded  a  definite  scheme  of  a  socialist  society  which 
had  considerable  influence  during  the  early  years  of  the  19th  century.  He 
advocated  a  fantastic  plan  whereby  the  State  was  to  inherit  all  property 
and  sought  to  outline  a  rigid  code  in  order  to  arrive  at  social  equality. 
In  his  view  the  aim  of  society  is  the  happiness  of  all,  and  "happiness 
consists  in  equality."  It  is  significant  of  the  temper  of  the  Revolution 
that  Baboeuf  was  executed  for  taking  part  in  a  conspiracy  to  establish 
a  government  which  would  carry  out  his  principles.  Many  of  the  doc- 
trines later  advocated  by  Fourier  and  others  are  traceable  to  Baboeuf. 

'Cf.  Du  Systeme  Industriel  (1821)  and  Le  Nouveau  Christianisme 
(182s). 


100 


THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 


stitutional  government,  was  a  middle  class  creation.  In 
establishing  this  form  of  government,  the  middle  class 
political  theorists  and  politicians  had  relied  on  what  they 
believed  to  be  the  innate  moderation  of  man,  the  convic- 
tion that  man  is  born  good,  that  evil  springs  from  his 
social  environment,  and  that  the  reform  of  society  can 
be  effected  only  by  the  reform  of  the  individual.  The 
Revolution  had  strengthened  this  individualist  bias.  In 
a  measure  it  served  to  transfer  this  individualism  from 
the  individual  to  the  State,  and  Invest  the  State  with  those 
privileges,  characteristics,  and  prerogatives  which  It  was 
believed  belonged  to  the  Individual.  The  epoch  which 
followed  was  to  fix  more  firmly,  and  at  last  lead  to  the  full 
triumph  of  the  middle  class  principles  of  the  politlco- 
juridic  organisation  of  the  State.  However,  a  new  and 
increasingly  numerous  group  of  men,  followers  of  St. 
Simon  and  later  of  Karl  Marx,  was  to  take  up  the  strug- 
gle against  these  principles,  not  so  much  in  the  first  In- 
stance for  political  liberty  as  for  economic  independence 
as  a  stepping-stone  to  social  equality. 

For  the  time  being  public  opinion  remained  infinitely 
less  self-confident  than  it  had  been  during  the  i8th  cen- 
tury, less  ready  to  jump  at  conclusions,  determined  to  test 
theory  in  the  crucible  before  putting  it  Into  practice.  This 
was  in  a  large  measure  due  to  the  fact  that  the  average 
man  who  had  prospered  during  the  later  days  of  the 
Revolution  and  the  Empire  had  grown  accustomed  to 
concern  himself  little  with  his  rights,  and  to  confine  his 
attention  to  the  care  of  his  interests.  It  would  be  Impos- 
sible to  arrive  at  a  conception  of  the  spirit  of  the  new 
age,  and  gain  an  understanding  of  the  causes  which  led 
to  the  facile  triumph  of  the  Restoration,  without  in- 
quiring into  the  preponderating  part  played  by  economic 
expansion. 


THE  AFTERMATH  loi 


II 


Economic  freedom  appeared  less  difficult  to  secure, 
less  vexatious  to  safeguard,  its  benefits  were  found  to  be 
more  tangible,  its  influence  more  peaceful,  its  results  more 
immediately  satisfying  to  the  individual,  than  the  hard- 
ships which  had  to  be  endured  to  secure  so  incommensur- 
able,^ benefit  as  political  freedom.  The  desire  for  polit- 
Icalemancipation  had  led  to  the  wars  of  the  Revolution- 
ary and  Napoleonic  era,  which  had  devastated  Europe, 
had  squandered  the  wealth  of  nations,  and  left  the  people 
burdened  with  taxation  and  misery.  It  is  not  to  be  won- 
dered at  that  peace,  even  at  the  cost  of  political  servitude, 
should  for  a  time  be  welcomed.  The  lesson  which  the 
Napoleonic  interlude  had  taught  was  that  great  men, 
who  employ  their  talents  in  affairs  of  State,  disturb  the 
social  fabric  and  confer  few  benefits.  Like  natural  laws, 
they  are  violent  and  often  vicious.  Whereas  the  applica- 
tion of  genius  in  producing  mechanical  inventions,  the 
harnessing  of  steam  for  motive  power,  for  example,  which 
further  industrial  enterprise  and  increase  material  well- 
being,  alone  can  confer  lasting  good  and  accelerate  prog- 
ress. The  study  of  mathematics  and  physical  sciences  had 
led  to  such  inventions.  The  use  of  new  machinery  and 
motive  power  in  industry,  and  the  consequent  industrial 
and  commercial  expansion,  had  given  added  influence  to 
the  Middle  Class,  and  assisted  it  in  consolidating  its 
control  of  the  means  of  production.  This  gave  a  fresh 
impulse  to  competitive  expansion,  which  reacted  on  the 
political  life  of  the  period. 

The  Middle  Class,  while  retaining  its  distinctively 
undisciplined,  individualist  attitude  which  found  expres- 
sion in  competition,  was  alert  to  the  political  possibilities 


LIBRARY 

UiSiVErolTY  OF  CALIFORN] 
SANTA  BARRARA 


I02 


THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 


of  the  new  Industrialism,  which  might  assure  for  it  as- 
cendancy in  the  State.  It  was  perceived  that  material 
I  wellbeing  and  wealth  would  afford  the  Middle  Class  the 
^\leisure  necessary  to  pursue  the  struggle  for  political  power 
jwith  greater  efficacy,  and  that  the  industrial  movement, 
which  was  developing  rapidly  into  the  discipline  of  the 
factory  system,  might  best  afford  the  social  security  which 
it  craved. 

It  was  from  England,  where  the  control  of  the  body 
politic  by  the  Middle  Class  had  been  long  and  steadily 
evolving,  that  the  industrial  system  had  spread  to  the 
Continent.  Free  competition,  which  was  the  outcome  of 
the  middle  class  individualist  doctrine,  as  expressed  in  the 
terms  of  "a  fair  field  and  no  favorites,"  or  again  "chacun 
pour  soi  et  Dieu  pour  tous,"  rejected  cooperation  as  an 
antiquated  survival  of  the  guild  system.  Labor  was  held 
to  be  a  commodity;  the  workman  an  economic  coefficient 
of  mechanical  development.  The  possibility  of  the  ma- 
terial or  social  improvement  of  the  condition  of  the  work- 
ing classes  was  not  considered.  That  the  me'fi  who 
composed  it  should  receive  political  rights  for  their  bene- 
fit as  a  class,  or  even  to  ameliorate  their  economic  con- 
dition, was  held  presumptuous.  Hurnanj^^"'^^  -was  . -dis- 
regarded. Economic  laws  were  formulated  in  which  the 
profits  of  the  middle  class  employer  were  calculated  in 
relation  to  wages  as  fixed  quantities,  the  bare  minimum  to 
sustain  life,  wherein  the  wage-earner  as  a  human  being 
was  not  taken  into  consideration.  The  Middle  Class,  en- 
grossed with  economic  questions  which  it  endeavored  to 
reduce  to  equations  as  rigid  as  those  of  mathematical 
science,  paid  no  heed  to  questions  of  social  development. 
Small  enterprises,  controlled  by  the  workers  themselves, 
a  survival  of  the  older  system,  were  being  rapidly  ab- 
sorbed by  middle  class  capitalists,  who  organised  their 


THE  AFTERMATH 


103 


business  on  a  large  scale,  and  acquired  an  efficiency  and 
economy  in  production  which  it  had  hitherto  been  im- 
possible to  attain. 

As  a  result  the  working  classes  were  constantly  receiv- 
ing into  their  midst  members  of  the  Middle  Class  who 
had  been  forced  down  by  the  competitive  system,  which  by 
a  process  of  selection  stimulated  the  strong  elements  to 
increased  activity  and  wealth,  and  cast  out  into  the  great 
mass,  of  unorganised  workers  those  who  had  not,  for  one 
reason  or  another,  been  able  to  prosper.  On  the  one 
hand  the  middle  class  capitalist,  by  enforcing  factory 
discipline,  was  preparing  the  way  for  the  rise  of  class 
consciousness  among  the  workers,  and  on  the  other,  as 
a  result  of  the  ruthless  individualism  of  the  competitive 
system,  the  working  classes  were  receiving  a  better  edu- 
cated, more  intelligent,  but  embittered  leaven  from  the 
lower  Middle  Class.  Such  were  the  immediate  effects  of 
economic  expansion,  when  the  Middle  Class  on  the  Con- 
tinent felt  itself  strong  enough  to  seek  political  con- 
trol in  the  State,  which  it  now  considered  its  rightful 
possession. 


^ 


CHAPTER   X 

The  Triumph  of  the  Middle  Class 

GREEK      INDEPENDENCE THE       REVOLUTION       OF       183O — LOUIS 

PHILIPPE   KING   OF   THE    FRENCH — THE   WHIGS  IN    POWER — 
THE   REFORM   ACT    (1832) — BELGIAN    INDEPENDENCE — 

ECONOMICS       AND        POLITICS THE        COMPETITIVE 

IDEAL — CAPITALISM    AND    NATIONALISM — THE 

BUSINESS  MAN  IN  POLITICS THE  CASE  OF 

ALGERIA — PORTENTS       OF       DECAY — 
CHARTISM 


LEGITIMACY,  which  had  succeeded  In  forcing  national- 
ism temporarily  into  abeyance,  declined  after  1825, 
and  nationalism  once  more  came  to  the  fore.  The  right 
of  Intervention,  formulated  at  the  Congress  of  Laibach, 
was  seized  upon  by  the  Nationalists  as  an  entering  wedge. 
It  was  now  declared  that  such  intervention  was  "legiti- 
mate," when  it  supported  the  principle  of  nationality. 
Here  was  a  doctrine  which  was  to  lead  far  afield  during 
later  periods.  At  the  time  it  found  immediate  application 
in  the  affairs  of  the  Greeks,  who  for  six  years  had  been 
struggling  to  emancipate  themselves  from  the  control  of 
the  Porte  and  set  up  an  independent  national  State,  when 
at  last  in  July  1827,  France,  England,  and  Russia  de- 
cided to  intervene.  The  motive  which  stimulated  these 
governments  to  action,  in  spite  of  their  marked  distaste 
for  nationalist  principles,  was  neither  the  pressure  of 
public  opinion  nor  coordination  of  policy.  Each  State 
that   participated    was    inspired   by    its    own    individual 

policy,  consonant  with  its  aims.     The  naval  battle  of 

[104]  ""■ 


THE  TRIUMPH  OF  THE  MIDDLE  CLASS      105 

Navarin.0,  which  by  the  destruction  of  the  Turkish  fleet 
brought  about  the  success  of  the  Greek  cause,  and  the  first 
practical  application  of  the  nationalist  principle,  also  wit- 
nessed the  first  use  of  steam  vessels  in  warfare.  In  both 
senses  it  was  a  distinct  triumph  for  the  Middle  Class. 
The  result  was  the  creation  of  an  independent  Greek  State 
(1829),  and  nationalism  was  ■jfixiiilY„.fixed  in  the  public 
mjnd  as  the  new  guidinp'  motive  of  public  policy,  which 
middle  class  publicists  took  great  pains  to  exploit  to 
adv'antage. 

Nationalism  as  a  political  principle  is  the  natural 
coroTIary  oT  middle  class  individualism.  Both  depend 
directly  on  the  competitive  ideal.  Botfi  are  antagonistic 
to  cooperation.  In  its  simplest  form  nationalism  would 
seem  to  indicate  that  "every  people  has  the  right  to  form 
an  independent  State,"  but  in  reality  it  came  to  mean  that 
"everypeople  has  the  right  to  form  an  independent  State 
which  can  as  such  survive."  Competition3^j_to_becQme 
the  basis_of  political  iibert¥..a&.lt  was  that  .of  economic 
independence.  Henceforth  trade  principles  were  to  pre- 
vail in  politics.  The  Middle  Class  felt  that  it  had  dis- ' 
covered  the  secret  of  economic  wellbeing  in  free  compe- 
tition, and  that  by  applying  these  methods  to  politics  it 
could  secure  the  reins  of  government  and  further  its 
personal  fortunes.  Politics  and  economics  were  linked 
together;  political  motive  was  given  a  semblance  of  life 
in  nationalism;  economic  design  as  a  political  incentive, 
though  present,  remained  concealed  for  a  prolonged 
period. 


CyOO* 


II 


The  first  historically  successful  experiment  which  the 
Middle  Class  made  in  gaining  the  seats  of  sovereignty 


io6  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

in  continental  Europe  came  in  France  in  1830,  when  the 
opportunity  was  offered  by  the  blind  policy  of  Charles  X, 
to  whom  even  the  Restoration  seemed  too  progressive. 
The  coup  d'etat  which  drove  him  from  his  throne  was 
accomplished  with   such   facility   that   the   middle   class 
leaders  were  not  prepared  to  handle  the  crisis  unaided. 
It  is  typical  of  future  method  that  they  had  no  desire 
to  overthrow  the  monarchy,  but  merely  to  gain  control 
of  the  government.     So  that  when  the  revolution  had 
accomplished  its  purpose  and  brought  the  Middle  Class 
into  power  we  find  a   Paris  banker,   LafitteT  proposing 
the  crown  of  France  to  Louis  Philippe,  Duke  of  Orleans, 
who  had  taken  no  part  in  the  revolution,  in  terms  re- 
minding one  of  typical  business  methods.      "You  are  to 
take  your  choice  between  a  crown  and  a  passport,"  the 
new  middle  class  king-maker  is  said  to  have  remarked. 
On  August  9,   1830,  Louis  Philippe  was  established  on 
the  throne,  not  as  King  of  France  but  as  King  of  the 
French.     This  subtle  distinction  of  title  was  to  prove  of 
importance  for  future  nationalist  development.     It  Im- 
plied the  acceptance  of  the  principle  that  sovereignty  had 
been  conferred  upon  the  Prince  by  the  French  people,  or 
rather  by  their  self-appointed  middle  class   representa- 
tives.   The  old  idea  of  France,  the  country  and  its  people, 
//l,\the  passive  Inarticulate  property  of  kings,  had  for  all 
f^'      Itime  given  way  to  the  newer  principle   of   the   nation, 
Ithe  French  people,  who  were  represented  as  sovereign 
by  the  title  of  their  King.     Louis  Philippe  showed  that 
he  felt  himself  the  enthroned  representative  of  the  Mid- 
dle Class.     He  called  upon  his  banker-sponsor  to  form 
a    cabinet,    cultivated    amicable    relations    with    foreign 
States,   repressed  extremists,   and  inaugurated  the  juste 
milieu  policy  of  moderation,   so  ^easing  to   the   bour- 
geoisie. 


jj^ 


THE  TRIUMPH  OF  THE  MIDDLE  CLASS      107 

The  year  1830  is  of  much  importance  in  the  annals 
of  the  struggle  of  the  Middle  Class  for  political  ascend-  \/^*^  ^ 
ancy.  It  marks  its  definite  control  of  the  State,  the 
beginning  of  a  new  practice  in  politics.  French  political 
theory  and  English  economic  practice  were  to  be  the 
irn2elliflg_jTiotives  in  the  evolution  of  the  new  theory 
of  State.  Both  bore  a  distinctively  middle  class  Ifh- 
print.  Nationalism  and  capitalism  were  developing  hand 
in  h^nd. 

Fbur  months  after  the  Middle  Class  in  France  had 
gained  control  of  the  State,  in  England  the  Tory  Gov- 
ernment, headed  by  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  resigned 
(November  1830),  and  the  Whigs,  or  middle  class  lib- 
erals, came  into  power  and  carried  through  the  Reform 
Act  (1832).  By  this  act  their  representation  in  Parlia- 
ment was  extended,  and  their  actual  control  of  policy, 
which  was  inspired  chiefly  by  economic  motives,  was 
secured. 

Profiting  by  the  occasion  of  the  French  revolution  of 
1830,  Belgium  had  revolted,  seceded  from  Holland,  and 
established  an  independent  government,  which  the  Brit- 
ish and  French  in  conference  at  London  undertook  to  le- 
galise. The  Dutch  objected  to  the  terms  proposed  and 
resorted  to  arms  to  regain  the  lost  territory.  The  French 
thereupon  occupied  Antwerp,  and  a  joint  British  and 
French  fleet  blockaded  the  Dutch  coast.  In  1833  ^ 
definite  treaty  of  separation  was  signed,  and  Belgian  in- 
dependence was  assured. 

The  new  middle  class  government  of  France,  while 
opposed  to  war  with  a  people  of  equal  strength  and 
economic  development  which  might  interfere  with  trade 
and  dislocate  industry,  and  therefore  anxious  to  cultivate 
friendly  relations  with  strong,  immediate  neighbors, 
viewed  in  an  altogether  different  light  the  possibility  of 


io8  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

absorbing  weaker  and  more  backward  States.^  As  busi- 
ness men  held  that  the  absorption  of  weaker  competitors 
who  were  not  exploiting  their  industries  with  sufficient 
energy  was  their  legitimate  and  natural  right,  so  for  the 
first  time  this  thesis  was  held  to  apply  in  the  field  of 
pollftcai-cxpansion. 

Across  the  Mediterranean  lay  a  rich,  unexploited  coun- 
try, Algeria.  It  had  been  for  a  long  time  a  weak  though 
annoying  neighbor.  The  Algerians  molested  French 
traders  and  hampered  French  business  enterprise,  more 
especially  those  engaged  in  the  coral  fisheries  off  Bona. 
The  French  Government  had  an  outstanding  loan  with 
certain  Algiers  bankers,  which  had  been  the  cause  of 
friction  and  dispute.  These  pretexts  were  now  for  the 
first  time  held  ample  motives  for  armed  intervention. 

Under  Charles  X  the  French  Government  had,  since 
1827,  kept  up  a  desultory  blockade  of  Algiers,  but  had 
taken  no  definite  aggressive  steps  when,  on  April  30, 
4830,  in  a  final  attempt  to  placate  the  rising  discontent 
of  the  Middle  Class  by  acceding  to  its  insistent  de- 
mands for  more  vigorous  action  in  Algeria,  an  imposing 
French  force  was  landed  on  the  African  coast,  and 
Algiers  was  occupied.  Three  months  later  Louis  Philippe 
and  the  middle  class  government  came  into  power.  No 
time  was  lost.  The  campaign  to  subdue  the  country  was 
energetically  pushed.  The  drastic  methods  adopted  by 
the  French,  such  as  the  massacre  of  an  entire  Arab  tribe 
at  El  Uffia,  and  the  execution  of  Arab  chieftains  who 
had  been  invited  to  Algiers  under  a  French  safe-conduct, 
the  plundering  of  rich  estates,  the  desecration  of  ceme- 

*  It  was  probably  part  of  the  French  programme  to  prepare  for  the 
annexation  of  Belgium  on  nationalist  grounds,  but  the  veto  of  England, 
the  hostility  of  Prussia,  and  the  opposition  of  Austria  prevented  the 
accomplishment  of  this  design  at  the  time,  and  Belgium  was  neutralised, 
so  as  to  be  placed  beyond  the  absorptive  aims  of  French  expansion  (1839). 


THE  TRIUMPH  OF  THE  MIDDLE  CLASS      109 

teries  and  holy  places,  Indicate  sufficiently  the  methods 
adopted  by  the  Middle  Class  in  power  of  which  one  may 
find  so  many  examples  during  the  later  years  of  the  19th 
century.  These  methods  were  altogether  in  keeping  withT  *7C>' 
current  theories  prevalent  in  competitive  business,  where 
the  weak,  were  considered  natural  prey,  to  be  blamed 
rather  than  pitied  for  their  misfortune. 

The  influence  of  the  business  man  in  politics  had  led 
to  tjie  exploitation  of  foreign  policy  by  business  methods, 
and  the  example  set  by  the  French  in  Algeria  was  to  be 
followed  later  on  by  all  great  States.  It  is  necessary 
to  bear  in  mind  the  inauguration  of  this  policy  under  the 
newly  created  middle  class  government  of  France  in 
order  to  keep  clearly  in  view  the  close  parallelism  between 
nationalism  and  capitalism.^ 


Ill 

As  during  the  i8th  century,  certain  members  of  the 
aristocracy  had  held  what  were  then  considered  advanced 
views  and  helped  to  further  the  spread  of  the  new  middle 
class  doctrines  of  political  liberty  and  progress,  to  the 
great  detriment  of  their  own  interests  as  members  of  the 
ruling  class,  so  now  we  find  a  group  of  middle  class  think- 
ers for  the  first  time  occupying  themselves  with  the  inter- 
ests and  needs  of  the  working  classes.  It  was  in  England, 
where  the  industrial  movement  had  grown  most  rapidly 
and  the  working  classes  had  been  gaining  in  strength, 

^  The  exploitation  of  India  and  other  English  colonial  domains  had 
been  granted  under  charters  and  was  carried  on  through  the  medium 
of  companies  avowedly  as  commercial  enterprises.  The  occupation  of 
Algeria,  by  an  armed  French  force  in  behalf  of  business  interests,  was 
the  first  instance  of ._it&. .Jcind  ujidertaJ£fijQ.._directly  and  officially  W_,a 
government.  It  1¥  therefore  deemed  advisable  to  give  a  few  salient 
details  as  of  historical  importance  in  showing  the  new  methods  of 
colonial   enterprise  subsequently  adopted  by  all  the  Great  Powers. 


no  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

^.fN^'    ^that  as  early  as  1825  trade-unions  had  been  legally  sanc- 

^c-'  tioned  for  certain  specific  purposes.     The  organisation 

of    trade-unions   had    awakened    a    new   sense    of    class 

solidarity  among  the  workers  and  had  led  to  a  rapid 

•  ^*^  growth  of  political  consciousness,  which  found  its  first 

S*^         expression  in  Chartism. 

Some  explanation  of  the  real  nature  of  the  Chartist 
movement  is  required,  in  order  to  mark  the  various  phases 
of  political  development  which  are  being  outlined.  As 
a  result  of  several  years  of  continued  bad  harvests  ( 1835- 
1837),  of  food  shortage  and  general  industrial  depres- 
sion, accompanied  by  the  closing  of  factories,  the  posi- 
tion of  the  greater  mass  of  the  industrial  workers  in 
England  had  grown  unendurable.  The  opinion  became 
current  among  the  more  intelligent  workingmen,  as  well 
as  among  a  few  of  the  more  open-minded  of  the  Middle 
Class,  that  as  the  workingman  was  excluded  from  all 
participation  in  the  affairs  of  government,  his  interests 
were  not  safeguarded,  nor  was  his  welfare  promoted.  Six 
members  of  Parliament  joined  with  six  workingmen  in 
framing  a  bill  which  was  to  be  presented  to  Parliament, 
providing  for  the  extension  of  suffrage  to  every  male  of 
sound  mind  who  had  reached  the  age  of  twenty-one,  or 
if  foreign  born,  who  had  resided  for  at  least  two  years 
in  the  country. 

This  was  the  principal  demand  of  the  so-called  "Peo- 
iJ^  pie's  Charter"  of  1838.     It  contained  other  provisions 

for  parliamentary  reform  along  democratic  lines,  includ- 
^  ing:  no  property  qualification  for  members;  vote  by 
ballot;  equal  electoral  districts;  annual  sessions  of 
Parliament;  and  payment  of  members.  These  proposals 
were  held  at  the  time  to  be  extremely  radical. 

Mass-meetings  took  place  throughout  the  country  to 


) 


THE  TRIUMPH  OF  THE  MIDDLE  CLASS      in 

agitate  in  favor  of  forcing  Parliament  to  grant  the  ex- 
tension of  suffrage  to  the  working  classes.    The  Middle 
Class,  though  having  only  recently  (1832)   acquired  full 
control  of  the  government,  held  its  ground  firmly,  and 
refused   concessions.      The    more    turbulent   among   the 
Chartists  advocated  a  resort  to  arms,  while  the  leaders 
of  the  movement  attempted  compulsory  tactics,  and  even   1 
considered  a  general  cessation  of  work    (the  first  time  /     ' 
the,  idea  of  the  use  of  a  general  strike  for  political  pur-     ff^'^'^^Jl 
poses  was  advocated).     In  June    1839,  a  petition  bear-         ^ 
ing  approximately  one  and  a  quarter  million  signatures, 
demanding  consideration  of  the  Charter,  was  presented 
to  Parliament.     The  Middle  Class  in  power,  with  anjn-     ^  n,h 
stinctive  perception  of  the  strength  of  its  position  and         '      ' 
of   the   historical   immaturity   of    Chartism,    refused   to 
yield,  in  spite  of  renewed  agitation,  which  did  not  die 
down  altogether  during  the  ensuing  decade. 

During  the  height  of  the  Chartist  agitation  plans  for 
the  complete  reorganisation  of  society  were  made,  in- 
cluding nationalisation  ofJand.  remodelling  of  the  cur- 
rency, and  state  loans  to  laborers  who  desired  to  be- 
come capitalists.  This  last  provision  shows  clearly  the 
true  nature  of  the  movement.  The  Chartists  had  little 
sympathy  with  socialist  views  which  were  already  spread- 
ing abroad.  There  is  no  evidence  of  a  desire  to  sub- 
ordinate man  to  society,  and  the  doctrine  of  individual 
rights,  the  bulwark  of  the  middle  class  theory  of  state, 
was  faithfully  adhered  to  by  the  great  majority. 

On  the  return  of  more  prosperous  times,  after  the  re- 
peal of  the  corn  laws,  and  the  extension  of  free  trade, 
the  Chartist  movement  died  down.  The  subsequent  par- 
liamentary reforms,  which  were  eventually  to  include  all 
the  demands  of  the  Chartists,  were  not  granted  as  the 


112  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

result  of  such  methods  of  popular  pressure.  The  Middle 
Class  in  England,  strengthened  politically  by  the  firm  at- 
titude it  had  assumed  in  repressing  Chartism,  was  now 
free  to  turn  its  full  attention  to  problems  of  trade  de- 
velopment, industrial  progress,  and  colonial  expansion. 


BOOK  II 


CHAPTER  I 

Political  Maturity 

COMPARATIVE    METHODS — THE    TIME     ELEMENT — METAPHYSICAL 
/CHARACTER   OF    POLITICS PHYSICAL    FACTORS DURATION 


POLITICAL  history  among  civilised  peoples  is  in  a  great 
measure  a  critical  survey  of  the  course  of  their  so- 
cial development.  The  phases  of  this  development  can 
best  be  placed  in  cogently  related  order  by  methods  of 
comparative  analysis.  The  fact  that  the  human  mind  can 
of  itself  form  no  distinct  image  of  time,  though  the  suc- 
cession of  historical  events  takes  place  in  time,  makes  it 
the  more  difficult  to  perceive  the  direct  sequence  of  events 
or,  as  we  say,  the  cause  thereof.  By  accumulating  corre- 
lated events  side  by  side,  regardless  of  their  time  ele- 
ment, we  may  hope  to  arrive  at  a  clearer,  more  systematic 
conception  of  their  true  relations.  Some  even  go  so  far 
as  to  claim  to  be  able  to  discern  certain  laws  of  historical 
periodicity. 

Thus  the  comparative  method  in  history  is  one  of 
simplification;  a  short  cut  to  a  clearer  presentation  of 
what  at  first  sight  appears  as  a  complex  and  complicated 
series  of  historical  phenomena.  By  placing  the  Declara- 
tion of  Right  of  1689  side  by  side  with  that  of  the  Rights 
of  Man  of  1789,  a  certain  correlativity  is  arrived  at.  We 
might  add  to  these  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
also   of    1789,   and  without   great  difficulty  incorporate 

I115J 


<s 


< 


ii6  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

these  three  important  political  landmarks  in  one  series, 
and  deduce  therefrom  a  composite  historical  concept  of 
the  development  of  the  constitutional  theory  of  govern- 
ment. History  affords  a  great  number  of  such  related 
episodes,  from  which  the  time  element  must  be  eliminated 
in  order  to  arrive  at  an  understanding  of  their  proper 
significance.  It  is  a  most  useful  contribution  of  his- 
torical research  that  it  affords  the  possibility  of  such 
comparative  analysis  by  the  elimination  of  the  time  ele- 
ment, which  to  the  human  mind  is  irrelevant,  but  which 
is  the  guiding  factor  in  the  application  of  political  ideology 
to  practice.  Such  research  may  further  render  the  very 
good  service  of  assisting  us  to  determine  what  may  be 
called  political  maturity. 

It  is  naturally  not  by  the  mere  juxtaposition  of  events 
recorded  in  history  of  what  appears  to  be  political  de- 
velopment, that  one  may  be  expected  to  arrive  at  a  pre- 
cise knowledge  of  the  actual  stage  of  development  at  a 
given  time.  Nor  can  the  duration  of  such  a  stage  be  fore- 
cast with  any  degree  of  accuracy.  That  a  given  cause 
has  a  tendency  to  produce  a  given  effect  is  all  that  can 
be  vouchsafed.  But  a  more  profound  inquiry  than  has 
hitherto  been  attempted  into  the  psychical  as  well  as 
the  physical  factors  of  political  motive  will  lead  to  the 
formation  of  hypotheses  which  need  take  no  more  for 
granted  than  do  the  more  exact  sciences  or  logical  spec- 
ulation; for  politics  no  less  than  philosophy  must  con- 
struct its  own  subject-matter.  Its  manifestations  are  not 
independent  of  the  human  mind,  as  the  events  in  history 
are  not  independent  of  the  human  will.  To  select  any 
particular  phase  of  human  experience  or  natural  features 
of  environment,  climate,  fertility  of  the  soil,  or  even 
iethnic  character  of  a  people,  as  has  so  often  been  done, 
and  attempt  to  deduce  therefrom  the  causes  of  the  forma- 


POLITICAL  MATURITY  117 

tion  of  a  given  political  complex  is  merely  a  partial  anal- 
ysis. Politics  in  its  true  sense  is  the  vigorous  expression  of 
tTTe"  assertive  characteristics  of  the  complete  man.  Politi- 
cal theory  and  practice  in  their  broadest  application  are, 
during  a  period  of  maturity,  to  be  interpreted  as  the  ra- 
tional expression  of  the  cultural  development  of  a  peo- 
ple. Politics  cannot  be  understood  unless  looked  upon 
as  the  sum  total  of  all  the  factors  of  human  experience, 
all  t|ie  motives  of  human  action,  of  the  applied  energy, 
virility,  and  intellect  of  man;  his  ideas  and  ideals,  dogmas 
and  doctrines;  their  practice  and  resultants,  which  when 
viewed  from  the  heights  of  history  in  perfect  balance 
show  the  picture  of  a  rationalised  social  life. 

One  might  be  inclined  to  conclude  therefrom  that 
epochs  of  what  we  may  call  political  maturity  are  pro- 
longed for  long  periods  when  once  social  progress  has 
come  to  fruition.  Active  inquiry  fails  to  confirm  such 
an  hypothesis.  Periods  of  political  maturity  are  ex- 
tremely brief.  In  the  life  of  the  Greek  peoples,  whose 
intellectual  ascendancy  continued  dominant  through  many 
centuries,  political  maturity,  as  it  is  sought  here  to  de- 
fine it,  continued  at  the  most  for  sixty  years.  In  that 
of  the  Romans,  the  age  of  the  first  Caesar  culminated  in 
less  than  a  generation,  though  its  effects  were  felt  dur- 
ing the  next  two  thousand  years. 

It  would  be  impossible  to  calculate  with  any  degree 
of  mathematical  exactitude  the  period  during  which  any 
given  form  of  government  may  be  expected  to  survive. 
Historical  research  might  afford  some  grounds  for  com- 
parative computation,  but  it  would  be  of  no  great  ad- 
vantage, as  the  process  of  political  evolution  is  not  de- 
termined or  limited  by  the  prevalence  of  any  particular 
form  of  government  or  theory  of  State.  Looked  at  in 
this  light,  kingship,  one  of  the  earliest  forms  of  consti- 


ii8  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

tuted  authority,  as  well  as  pure  democracy,  and  the  later 
forms  of  monarchical  absolutism  or  liberal  representative 
government  which,  with  various  modifications,  have  pre- 
vailed throughout  successive  centuries  as  the  system  of 
maintaining  viable  social  relations,  are  based  on  the 
assumption  of  the  existence  of  a  great  mass  of  politically 
unconscious  humanity.  In  the  civilisation  of  antiquity, 
slaves  represented  this  element,  which  in  more  modern 
times  was  replaced  by  the  serfs  and  latterly  by  the 
Proletariat. 

History  affords  a  graphic  survey  of  the  awakening  of 
political  consciousness  in  an  ever-widening  circle.  The 
maturity  of  a  given  political  movement  may  be  measured 
in  terms  of  political  experience  as  manifested  in  the 
desire  for  a  share  of  authority  in  the  State,  by  a  newly 
awakened  politically  conscious  group.  Thus  in  France 
during  the  i8th  century  political  ideology  outran  politi- 
cal consciousness,  and  cosmopolitanism  was  speedily 
smothered  by  nationalism  which  was  a  politically  mature 
ideology. 


II 

The  question  of  political  maturity  thus  resolves  itself 
^  into  an  inquiry  into  the  progressive  spread  of  what  we 
have  termed  political  consciousness.  Political  capacity 
is  first  met  with  only  in  the  most  limited  sphere  among 
men  who  have  attained  an  objective  social  viewpoint. 
History  shows  us  that  this  has  taken  place  in  some- 
what the  following  order:  the  tyrant,  the  king,  the 
oligarchy,  the  aristocracy;  and  only  after  a  further  awak- 
ening of  political  consciousness,  the  middle  class,  in  our 
own   times,   has   had   a   share   therein.      Each   category 


POLITICAL  MATURITY  119 

of  the  social  hierarchy  as  it  attained  control  of  the  reins 
of  authority  concerned  itself  with  its  peculiar  personal 
needs  or  as  we  might  say  established  a  dictatorship.  It 
safeguarded  in  the  first  instance,  then  strengthened  and 
protected  political  prerogative,  and  proceeded  to  mete 
out  what  it  considered  would  be  just  and  good  within 
the  limits  of  its  strength;  in  other  words  to  establish  a 
government.  Justice  gives  rise  to  law;  goodness  to  \ 
public  welfare.  Both  conduce  to  the  permanence  in 
power  of  the  authority  which  can  assure  them.  But  their 
wise  distribution  in  turn  awakens  political  consciousness 
among  a  wider  group  of  men,  who  will  then  attempt  to 
gain  a  share  in  exercising  this  distinctive  authority. 

In  this  way  it  will  be  seen  that  the  principles  of  1789 
were  too  broad  for  immediate  application,  and  the  at- 
tempt made  to  adopt  them  resulted  in  the  violent  social 
upheaval  of  the  French  Revolution,  whereas  the  political 
development  of  the  Middle  Class  in  England  a  century  <^ 
before,  coming  after  a  long  and  arduous  trial  at  arms, 
manifested  itself  more  rationally,  and  in  closer  touch  with 
actual  conditions,  resulting  in  a  smoother  transition.  The 
principles  of  1689  were  politically  mature,  and  spread 
with  rapidity  during  the  ensuing  century.  The  abstract 
humanitarian  principles  of  1789  were  premature,  and 
did  not  come  even  to  partial  recognition  until  the  middle 
of  the  following  century.  In  their  broader  aspects  the 
ideals  of  1789  were  never  realised.  Amalgamated  with 
the  newer  concepts  of  Communism  they  were  systema- 
tised,  transformed,  and  used  in  part  to  formulate  the 
basis  of  some  of  the  social  doctrines  of  the  Proletariat. 

It  has  been  necessary  to  dwell  at  some  length  on  this 
question  of  political  maturity  in  order  to  make  plain  the 
political  practice  of  the  crucial  decades,  1 840-1 860,  which 
in  point  of  time  mark  the  full  development  of  the  middle 


II 


I20  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

class  theory  of  State,  and  the  birth  of  a  new  thesis  of 
social  organisation. 

A  concise  synthesis  of  the  middle  class  concept  of  the 
State  which  reached  its  mature  form  at  this  time  had  led 
to  the  acceptance  of  the  belief  that  the  State,  fashioned 
in  the  image  of  man,  is  endowed  with  a  body  and  soul, 
and  as  such  is  born,  grows,  and  dies.  According  to  this 
conception,  the  State  was  held  to  be  (i)  A  group  of 
men — of  indeterminate  number,  (2)  occuping  a  fixed 
territory,  of  indeterminate  size — who  have  sufficient  co- 
herence of  motive  to  act  as  a  working  unit  in  public  af- 
fairs, i.e.  (3)  national  unity.  Furthermore  the  State 
was  (4)  a  living  organism,  which  had  a  (5)  growth  and 
development  of  its  own  as,  a  (6)  moral  and  spiritual 
being,  (7)  endowed  with  constitutional  functions,  which 
determine  the  relations  between  (8)  the  governing  and 
the  governed,  and  as  a  (9)  legal  person  between  States 
and  possessing  (10)  a  national  spirit  and  national  will. 
Some  political  theorists  of  the  time  even  went  so  far' 
as  to  insist  upon  determining  the  sex  of  the  State,  and 
declared  that  the  State  is  a  "moral  organised  masculine 
personality."  ^ 

Here  we  have  reached  the  height  of  the  personalisation 
of  £h£-^State.  Nationalism  had  become  the'cohesive  force 
in  the  body  politic.  To  achieve  national  unity  and  in- 
dependence became  henceforth  the  ambition  of  all  the 
peoples  of  the  West.  For  political  ideology  knows  no 
national  boundaries;  politico-social  evolution,  no  geo- 
graphical limits.  In  the  end  artificial  as  well  as  natural 
barriers,  differences  of  language,  geographical  position, 
education,  and  even  racial  or  historical  divergence  can 
*  do  no  more  than  retard  the  spread,  but  cannot  arrest 
the  growth  of  a  satisfying  dogma.     Such  a  creed  was 

'  Bluntschli,  The  Theory  of  the  State,  p.  23. 


POLITICAL  MATURITY  121 

nationalism.  It  was  the  most  inspiriting  doctrine,  the 
moist  powerful  asset  of  the  Middle  Class,  in  that  it  united 
a  people  with  a  quasi-religious  fervor  in  the  pursuit  of  a 
common  aim — the  greatness  and  power  of  the  Nation- 
State. 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Spread  of  Nationalism 

LOUIS  NAPOLEON CONSOLIDATION  OF  MIDDLE  CLASS  CONTROL  IN 

FRANCE COMTE THE      TEACHINGS       OF       POSITIVISM UTILI- 
TARIANISM   IN    ENGLAND THE    SITUATION    IN     GERMANY 

THE       ZOLLVEREIN FICHTE — RACIAL       INFLUENCES 


DURING  the  twenty-five  years  which  had  elapsed  since 
Waterloo  the  Napoleonic  legend  had  been  slowly 
gaining  in  strength.  The  Holy  Alliance,  a  combination 
of  kings,  had  for  a  time  replaced  the  Napoleonic  plan 
of  a  so-called  holy  alliance  of  peoples.  "The  Holy  Al- 
liance is  an  idea  stolen  from  me,"  Napoleon  is  made 
to  declare  in  the  graphic  survey  of  the  aims  and  policy 
of  the  great  Emperor  written  by  his  nephew  Louis  Na- 
poleon and  published  in  1839.  The  author  then  adds: 
"That  is  to  say,  a  holy  alliance  of  the  nations  through 
their  kings,  and  not  of  the  kings  against  the  nations.  In 
this  consists  the  immeasurable  difference  between  his  idea 
and  the  manner  in  which  it  was  realised.  Napoleon  had 
displaced  the  sovereigns  for  the  temporary  interests  of 
the  nations;  in  1815  the  nations  were  displaced  for  the 
particular  interests  of  the  sovereigns.  .  .  .  The  policy  of 
the  Emperor,  on  the  contrary,  consisted  in  founding  a 
solid  European  association,  by  causing  his  system  to  rest 
upon  complete  nationalities,  and  upon  general  interests 
fairly    satisfied."  ^      Such    was    the    political    policy    of 

'  Napoleonic  Ideas,  Chap.  V. 

1 1 22] 


THE  SPREAD  OF  NATIONALISM  123 

the  first  Napoleon,  according  to  his  nephew,  who 
was  to  inherit  the  task  of  carrying  it  to  its  logical 
conclusion. 

Louis  Napoleon  was  a  man  of  vigorous  Intellectual 
attainments  and  shrewd  political  judgment.  His  en- 
tire career  shows  him  to  have  been  the  willing  servant 
of  the  political  theories  which  he  believed  had  been 
created  out  of  whole  cloth  by  Napoleon  L  Louis 
Nappleon  apparently  never  perceived  that  the  doctrine 
of  nationalism  was  the  basis  of  the  middle  class  theory 
of  State  which  had  evolved  out  of  the  i8th  century  In- 
dividualism, and  had  been  made  use  of  by  Napoleon  I 
as  a  stepping-stone  to  world  power  which  he  Identified 
with  cosmopolitanism.  Louis  Napoleon's  horizon  was 
more  limited.  He  was  so  engrossed  with  the  idea  of 
carrying  on  the  nationalist  policy  begun  by  his  uncle  that 
he  repeatedly  marred  his  prospects  by  his  inability  to 
wait  upon  opportunity.  As  early  as  1830  we  find  him 
taking  part  in  a  nationalist  rising  in  the  Papal  States, 
which  ended  In  a  fiasco. 

The  Influence  of  the  Napoleonic  name,  which  exalted 
Louis  Napoleon  as  the  natural  heir  of  the  "greatest  cap- 
tain of  all  ages,"  was  reviving  throughout  Europe.  It 
was  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  in  the  following  year 
the  leaders  of  the  Polish  insurrection  In  their  national 
rising  against  Russia  should  have  offered  to  Louis  the 
command  of  their  forces  and  the  crown  of  Poland.  This 
was  a  direct  challenge  to  the  edict  of  the  Holy  Alliance. 
However,  the  Polish  outbreak  was  crushed  before  he 
could  avail  himself  of  the  offer. 

In  1832  the  Duke  of  Reichstadt  died,  and  Louis  Na- 
poleon henceforth  considered  himself  the  rightful  heir 
to  the  French  throne,  the  standard-bearer  of  nationalism. 
His  prestige  in  France  was  growing.     He  had  written 


124  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

several  essays  on  political  subjects  which  had  won  for 
him  marked  consideration.  Unwilling  even  now  to  await 
a  favorable  occasion  whereby  he  might  hope  to  win 
a  sure  following  in  France,  or  at  least  prepare  and  ma- 
ture a  plan  which  might  have  some  chance  of  success, 
we  find  him  intriguing  with  a  colonel  of  artillery  to 
subvert  the  Strassburg  garrison.  As  was  to  be  ex- 
pected, the  attempt  failed  and  Louis  was  banished  from 
France. 

In  the  meantime  public  opinion  in  France  had  seized 
hold  of  the  idea  of  nationalism  with  renewed  vigor.  It 
had  come  to  be  recognised  that  the  glory  of  France  had 
been  raised  to  a  higher  level  under  Napoleon  I  than 
during  any  other  period  in  her  history.  Nationalism, 
as  exemplified  by  Napoleon  I,  had  endowed  the  nation 
with  patriotic  consciousness,  had  made  possible  the  ac- 
ceptance of  a  rational  nationalist  ideology,  and  had 
spread  the  prestige  of  France  throughout  Europe.  It 
was  in  response  to  the  insistent  demands  of  public  opin- 
ion, as  a  recognition  of  the  great  services  rendered  by 
the  Emperor,  that  the  ashes  of  Napoleon  I  were  brought 
from  St.  Helena  back  to  France  (1840).  Louis  Na- 
poleon, with  his  usual  impetuosity,  sought  to  make  cap- 
ital out  of  this  event  by  effecting  a  landing  at  Boulogne. 
Again  he  failed  in  his  design,  was  captured,  sentenced 
to  imprisonment  for  life,  and  confined  in  the  fortress  of 
Ham. 

Nationalism,  henceforth  the  dominant  political  motive 
in  France,  consolidated  middle  class  control,  and  came 
to  be  associated  with  the  name  of  Napoleon  in  spite  of 
the  grotesque  part  Louis  had  played  at  Strassburg  and 
Boulogne. 


THE  SPREAD  OF  NATIONALISM  125 


II 

If  we  attempt  to  summarise  the  political  position  of 
France  in  1840  we  find  that  a  new  spirit  was  manifest- 
ing itself.      The   ascendancy  of  the   Middle    Class   had 
given  rise  to  a  more  compact  social  organisation.     The 
older,    more    brutal,    and    arrogant    individualism    was 
dyang  out.     It  was  felt  that,  unchecked,  it  weakened  the 
social  fabric.     A  new  sense  of  discipline  was  being  in- 
troduced which  led  to  middle  class  bureaucracy  in   the  ! 
State,  and  more  efficient  organisation  by  division  of  labor  | 
in  industrial  enterprise.     It  was  during  this  period,  when' 
nationalism  was  gaining  fervent  adherents  in  continental 
Europe,  and  the  Middle  Class  was  tightening  its  hold  on 
the  body  politic,  that  Auguste  Comte  was  engaged  with    i^ 
his  lectures  on  Positive  Philosophy   (i  830-1 842).  ^Vt 

Positivism,  though  a  direct  outgrowth  of  St.  Simonian 
Socialism,  appears  in  the  light  of  its  true  historical  per- 
spective as  an  attempt  to  formulate  a  precise  middle 
class  theory  of  State,  which  would  reconcile  existing 
anomalies  and  eliminate  the  disruptive  individualist  bias 
of  middle  class  ideology  by  substituting  therefor  a  rigid 
yet  rational  social  discipline. 

The  middle  class  juridic  concept  is  the  basis  of  Pos- 
itivism: "Life  and  conduct  shall  stand  wholly  on  a  basis 
of  law."  At  the  same  time  it  was  asserted  that  the  in- 
dividual has  no  rights  except  to  do  his  duty.  After  sur- 
veying the  history  of  European  civilisation,  Comte  came 
to  adopt  the  view  suggested  by  Condorcet  that  the  va- 
rious peoples  pass  on  the  torch  of  progress  as  if  they 
were  one  single  people.  In  his  law  of  the  three  stages 
— theological,  metaphysical,  and  positive  or  scientific — 
he  claimed  to  have  discovered  a  satisfactory  norm  for 


126  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

the  interpretation  of  history.  Comte  declared  that  Eu- 
rope was  on  the  threshold  of  the  third  or  positive  stage, 
and  made  it  his  mission  to  give  scientific  precision  to 
social  phenomenon,  to  establish  social  science,  sociology, 
on  the  basis  of  law,  just  as  natural  science  was  being 
codified.  He  attempted  to  prove  that  social  phenomena 
are  subject  to  variations,  the  causes  of  which  are  race, 
cliniate,  and  political  action.  But  underlying  these  causes 
of  variation  is  the  mam  current  of  historical  develop- 
ment of  progressive  growth.  Comte's  voluminous 
denunciation  of  equality,  sovereignty  of  the  people,  of 
the  rights  of  man,  was  essentially  in  keeping  with  the 
new  spirit  of  his  time,  though  he  was  not  deterred  from 
making  use  of  arguments  so  favored  during  the  i8th 
century  in  support  of  his  own  theories.  Comte's  plan 
to  reorganise  society,  and  the  methods  he  proposed  to 
create  a  new  social  order  by  giving  to  man  a  fixed,  im- 
movable place  in  the  social  hierarchy  such  as  prevailed 
during  the  Middle  Ages,  as  well  as  his  self-conferred  title 
of  "Fondatetir  de  la  Religion  de  I'Humanite,"  need  not 
detain  our  attention  beyond  our  noting  in  Positivism 
what  appears  as  an  attempt  made  to  counterbalance  the 
development  of  the  political  consciousness  of  the  Pro- 
letariat. It  is  not  suggested  that  Comte  definitely 
apprehended  the  immediate  rise  of  proletarian  class 
consciousness,  but  rather  that  he  endeavored  to  give 
to  the  Middle  Class  so  recently  in  power  in  the  State 
a  formula  which  would  make  possible  the  development 
of  a  harmonious  social  organisation,  and  at  the  same  time 
provide  for  the  absorption  of  the  rising  Proletariat.  He 
recognised  the  weakness  of  the  middle  class  politico- 
social  programme  which  could  exploit  the  advantages 
of  the  division  of  labor,  but  had  not  hitherto  found  it 


THE  SPREAD  OF  NATIONALISM  127 

possible  to  adopt  them  for  itself.  We  can  thus  dis- 
cover in  positivism  an  effort  to  bolster  up  middle  class 
ideology,  which,  vigorous  and  unassailed,  had  hitherto 
relied  principally  on  the  emotional  vagaries  of  national- 
ism as  a  doctrine  capable  of  winning  nation-wide  sup- 
port. Comte  endeavored  to  introduce  order,  discipline, 
precision,  finality,  to  call  attention  to  empirical  method, 
to  limit  speculation  and  knowledge  to  observed  facts, 
tQ^  reduce  the  intelligible  to  mere  phenomena,  and  not 
advance  beyond  strictly  scientific  analysis  and  construc- 
tion. 

In  England  utilitarianism  ^  which  arose  at  about  this 
time  was,  like  positivism,  of  which  it  was  an  offshoot, 
though  lacking  the  more  rigid  discipline  of  Comte's  sys- 
tem, a  manifestation  of  a  similar  spirit  of  middle  class 
moderation,  as  incapable  of  self-denial  as  it  was  of  hero- 
ism. Here  capitalism  evolved,  under  the  influence  of 
this  new  doctrine,  that  duty  coincides_  strictly  with  inter- 
ejtj  and  that  a  perfectly  prudent  man  is  necessarily  a 
perfectly  virtuous  one. 

In  France  nationalism  was  to  be  made  to  serve  a 
selfish,  limited,  political  philosophy.  Divorced  from  the 
idealism  which  had  attended  upon  its  early  development, 
it  was  to  lead  France  to  Sedan.  Both  France  and 
England  and  following  their  example  all  other  great 
States,  as  they  attained  national  consciousness,  were  to 
accept  as  axiomatic  in  political  practice  that  "the  histories 
of  ancient  Rome  and  not  a  few  modern  States  prove 

*Cf.  J.  S.  Mill,  On  Liberty— Introductory:  "It  is  proper  to  state  that 
I  forego  any  advantage  which  could  be  derived  to  my  argument  from  the 
idea  of  abstract  right,  as  a  thing  independent  of  uti!it>'.  I  regard  utility 
as  the  ultimate  appeal  on  all  ethical  questions;  but  it  must  be  utility 
in  the  largest  sense,  grounded  on  the  permanent  interests  of  man  as  a 
progressive  being." 


[ 


<, 


128  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

that  a  career  of  consistent  rapacity,  ambition,  selfishness, 
and  fraud  may  be  eminently  conducive  to  national 
prosperity."  ^ 

Up  to  1840  the  progress  of  constitutional  liberalism 
throughout  Europe,  and  the  spread  of  nationalism  and 
capitalism,  had  been  slow.  Beyond  the  Rhine,  the  Alps, 
and  the  Pyrenees,  middle  class  political  theory  and  cap- 
italist economic  development  had  remained  In  a  rudi- 
mentary state.  In  spite  of  the  propaganda  carried  on 
by  the  more  energetic  young  liberals,  absolutism  had 
retained  a  relatively  firm  grip  In  all  of  these  countries.^ 
In  certain  States  in  Germany  even  the  mediaeval  orders 
had  been  retained.  The  Empire  had  been  fashioned 
by  the  Congress  of  Vienna  into  a  new  Germanic  Con- 
federation modelled  on  the  old  Holy  Roman  Empire 
which  Napoleon  had  disrupted  in  1806.  Austria  was 
again  the  leading  State  In  the  Confederation,  and  the 
Diet  of  Frankfort  was  an  assembly  representing  the 
various  governments  In  which  none  of  the  peoples  had 
a  share.  In  the  Hapsburg  realm,  composed  of  various 
national  groups,  the  unity  of  the  State  was  based  on 
the  racial  antipathies  of  Its  component  peoples,  and 
nationalism  as  a  political  principle  of  independence  had 
hitherto  been  skilfully  suppressed  by  playing  off  these 
antagonisms  one  against  the  other,  more  especially  in 
Italy  where  the  nationalist  ferment  was  the  strongest. 

In  Germany  proper  the  ascendancy  of  Prussia  was  be- 
coming Increasingly  manifest.  The  disabilities  under 
which  German  commerce  suffered   as  the  result  of  the 

^  Cf.  Lecky,  History  of  European  Morals,  Vol.  I. 

^  In  1836  the  Queen  Regent  of  Spain  was  compelled  to  recognise  the 
Constitution  of  1812.  The  following  year  a  new  constitution  was  granted 
which  provided  for  two  Houses,  a  Senate  and  a  Chamber  of  Deputies.  In 
1838  a  revised  constitution  was  adopted  in  Portufjal.  But  in  both  coun- 
tries the  people  took  little  active  share  in  political  affairs,  .except  as 
partisans  of  clerical  reaction  or  of  anarchical  radicalism. 


1 


THE  SPREAD  OF  NATIONALISM 


129 


fact  that  each  of  the  numerous  petty  principalities  had 
its  separate  custom-house,  had  led  to  the  formation  of 
the  Zollverein,  which  placed  Prussia  in  a  preponderant 
position  in  dictating  the  economic  policy  of  a  greater  part 
of  the  country.  Thus  the  first  steps  towards  national 
unity  under  Prussian  hegemony  proceeded  from  an 
economic  impulse,  which  was  quickeneH~~by  the  subse- 
quent development  of  political  consciousness. 


u.. 


^ 


III 

The  political  sense  of  the  German  people  has  been 
variously  estimated.  Their  capacity  to  establish  a  stable, 
durable,  uniform  government  over  the  great  area  in- 
habited by  ethnically  and  socially  related  peoples  is  lim- 
ited by  the  strain  of  diversity  in  their  character,  which 
Inclines  them  to  particularism.  We  also  find  among 
them  a  speculative,  philosophical  cast  of  mind  which  pre- 
cludes a  nice  adjustment  between  the  possible  and  im- 
possible, or  an  understanding  of  the  proper  use  of  com- 
promise, a  sine  qua  non  of  political  development  as 
currently  understood. 

Among  no  other  European  people  has  philosophical 
inquiry  so  completely  influenced  political  practice.  The 
absence  of  an  individual  bias,  amenability  to  discipline 
and  self-abnegation,  which  are  racial  characteristics  of 
the  German  people,  the  frank  striving  for  a  spiritualised 
aesthetic,  rather  than  a  materialist  ethical  ideal,  had  pro- 
duced among  them  a  tendency  towards  political  idealism  / 
not  to  be  met  with  among  other  races  in  Europe.  This  is 
in  part  to  be  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  the  Ger- 
mans have  remained  in  a  great  measure  outside  the 
sphere  of  Italo-Greek  culture,  and  in  their  political  de- 


.^ 


1 


/ 


/ 


130  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

velopment  evolved  a  theory  of  State,  outwardly  pat- 
terned on  prevailing  models  which  came  to  them  from 
abroad,  yet  were  never  thoroughly  acclimated  among 
them.  In  more  recent  times  when  the  politico-juridic 
concept  of  the  State  was  adopted  by  the  Germans  it  was 
destined  to  remain  alien  to  their  national  character,  which 
lacked  the  definiteness  and  precision,  the  civility  to  appre- 
ciate the  nice  balance  of  parts  it  set  up  in  the  State. 
However,  it  cannot  be  gainsaid  that  the  Germans  of  the 
North,  at  least,  came  to  imitate  its  forms,  the  clockwork 
of  government,  with  greater  success  than  their  masters, 
precisely  because  this  politico-juridic  concept  did  not 
interfere  with  the  essence  of  Statehood,  as  they  under- 
stood it. 

Of  all  the  peoples  in  the  West  who  have  hitherto  at- 
tained political  consciousness,  the  Germans  are  the  most 
akin  to  the  Orientals;  endowed  with  the  fierce  prejudices 
and  still  fiercer  enthusiasms  of  an  Eastern  people.  They 
brought  with  them  into  the  heart  of  Europe  their  spirit- 
ual fecundity,  their  prolific  idealism,  their  unsettled 
and  unsettling  pantheism,  and  above  all  a  consciousness 
of  r,;g,ciaLpiJrity  and  homogeneity,  a  survival  of  the  caste 
system  distinctive  of  their  Indo-Germanic  ancestry.  This 
was  especially  true  of  the  Prussians,  who  had  remained 
a  politically  insignificant  group  until  Frederick  II  as- 
cended the  throne  of  Prussia  in  1740.  An  acute  student 
of  history,  he  recognised  the  paths  which  lay  open  to  him 
to  increase  his  prestige  by  the  use  of  force  and  awaken 
the  German  people  to  the  part  they  might  one  day  be 
called  upon  to  play  as  arbiters  of  European  destiny. 
Thoroughly  tutored  in  the  subtleties  of  French  political 
theory  and  practice  of  his  time,  of  which  he  made  such 
good  use,  unscrupulous  in  his  methods,  reminding  one 
of  the  versatile  intriguers  of  the  Renaissance,  he  was 


THE  SPREAD  OF  NATIONALISM  131 

to  be  continuously  engaged  in  aggrandising  his  country. 
During  the  century  which  had  elapsed  since  that  date, 
the  people  of  Prussia  had  responded  to  the  pressure 
placed  upon  them.  The  paternalism  of  Frederick  II,  the 
numerous  wars  he  waged  to  increase  the  power  and 
prestige  of  Prussia  had,  in  his  day,  failed  to  arouse  a 
sense  of  national  consciousness  among  his  people.  This  Cs) 
was  in  part  due  to  the  fact  that  the  King  despised  his 
own  language  and  the  customs  of  the  Germans  as  semi- 
barbarous,  and  together  with  the  other  ruling  princes 
of  Germany  imitated  the  French.  In  part,  it  is  to  be  Qu) 
accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  the  middle  class  cos- 
mopolitan  viewpoint,  which  had  spread  from  France, 
found  in  Prussia  many  enthusiastic  and  sincere  support- 
ers, to  whom  it  seemed  that  at  last  by  the  enforcement 
of  this  new  cosmopolitanism  the  Prussians,  hitherto  held 
a  Knechtsvolk,  might  be  admitted  into  the  European 
family  on  terms  of  social  and  political  equality. 

It  was  not  until  after  the  disastrous  defeat  at  the 
hands  of  the  French  at  Jena  and  Auerstadt  (1807)  and 
the  annihilation  of  Prussian  forces,  that  a  voice  was 
raised,  by  one  who  had  been  a  leader  in  the  cosmopolitan 
movement  in  which  Hegel  in  his  early  years  also  took  so 
prominent  a  part,  in  behalf  of  nationalism  and  political 
liberty.  It  was  the  philosopher  Fichte  who  first  called 
the  attention  of  the  Germans  to  their  national  homo- 
geneity and  racial  purity,  and  postulated  the  abysmal 
contrast  between  an  Urvolk  (the  Germans)  and  a  Misch- 
volk  (the  French)  whose  nationalism  was  the  product  of 
political  theory,  and  not  of  racial  homogeneity.  The 
logical  outcome  of  such  a  doctrine,  which  stirred  to  the 
depths  the  primitive  racial  pride  of  the  hitherto  sub- 
servient peoples  of  Germany,  was  shown  In  the  battle  of 
the  Nations    (1813),  in  the   triumph  of  those  fighting 


P 


-( 


132  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

for  their  fatherland  over  those  contending  for  political 
hegemony. 

Henceforth  a  vigorous  racial,  as  distinct  from  politi- 
cal, nationalism  was  to  grow  up  in  Europe.  The  nebulous 
doctrines  of  humanity,  universality,  or  cosmopolitanism 
of  Kantian  days  were  to  make  way  for  the  concretion 
of  a  theory  of  State  in  which  the  principal  practical  thesis 
was  to  be  based  on  the  profound  conviction  of  the  racial 
supremacy  of  the  German  people. 


i 


CHAPTER  III 

The  Awakening  of  Germany 

THE  INFLUENCE  OF   HEGEL — HIS   POLITICAL  IDEAS THEIR  WIDE- 

^  SPREAD  ACCEPTANCE COMPARISON   OF   GERMAN,   FRENCH, 

AND    ENGLISH    THEORY — THE    ACCESSION    OF    FRED- 
ERICK WILLIAM  IV — ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT 
THE    NEW    NATIONALISM 


THE  new  German  theory  of  State  received  its  ac- 
cepted formulation  by  Hegel.  In  his  rather  in- 
volved way  of  putting  it:  "The  State  is  the  self-con- 
scious ethical  substance,  the  unification  of  the  family 
principle  with  that  of  civil  society."  ^  Upon  this  thesis 
Hegel  proceeded  to  establish  the  theory  that  the  State  is 
the  foundation  of  all  social  life,  apart  from  which  the 
individual  has  no  importance,  no  commensurable  value. 
According  to  his  view  the  State  is  organised  liberty. 
Liberty  is  cognisable  only  when  the  individual  will  is 
joined  with  the  collective  will  as  expressed  in  laws  and 
institutions:  "Really  every  genuine  law  is  a  liberty  .  .  . 
it  embodies  a  liberty.  .  .  .  But  the  more  we  fortify  lib- 
erty, as  security  of  property,  as  possibility  for  each  to 
develop  and  make  the  best  of  his  talents  and  good  qual- 
ities, the  more  it  gets  taken  for  granted."  And  again: 
"A  constitution  only  develops  from  the  national  spirit 
identically  with  that  spirit's  own  development,  and  runs 

*  Cf.  Hegel,  Philosophy  of  Mind  (translated  by  W.  Wallace),  Section 
35- 

[133] 


134  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

through  at  the  same  time  with  it  the  grades  of  forma- 
tion, and  the  alterations  required  by  its  concept."  ^ 

Hegel  tells  us  that  in  outlining  his  idea  of  the  State 
he  has  not  in  mind  any  particular  State.  Nevertheless, 
it  was  impossible  for  him  not  to  have  reference  to  the 
Prussian  State  as  it  existed  in  his  day,  and  the  historical 
circumstances  of  his  epoch.  It  was  only  natural  that 
this  precise  and  logical  formulation  of  a  theory  of  State, 
which  took  into  consideration  the  peculiar  genius  of 
the  German  people,  their  political  plasticity  and  growing 
national  consciousness,  should  have  been  adopted  by 
Prussia,  and  later  on  have  been  exaggerated  and 
perverted  into  an  official  theory  of  State  which  the  united 
energy  of  the  nation  was  to  seek  to  bring  to  a  speedy 
realisation. 

When  Hegel  exclaimed  that  absolute  government  is 
divine,  self-sanctioned,  and  not  made,  or  that  "the  mon- 
archical constitution  is  therefore  the  constitution  of  de- 
veloped reason :  all  other  constitutions  belong  to  lower 
grades  of  development  and  realisation  of  reason,"  he 
was  glonfying  the  Prussian^tate.  Yet  Hegel  was  not, 
as  has  often  been  maintained,  blind  to  political  progres- 
siveness;  we  find  him  declaring,  "The  spiritual  bond  be- 
tween sovereign  and  subject  is  public  opinion.  ...  It  is 
the  true  legislative  body,  national  assembly,  the  declara- 
tion of  the  universal  will,  which  lives  in  the  execution  of 
all  commands."  ^ 

While  Hegel  had  no  confidence  in  representative  gov- 
ernment, he  despised  the  old  bureaucracy.  He  railed 
against  the  lifeless  routine  of  the  Prussian  political  life 
of  his  day,  and  asserted  loudly  that  "everything  which 


^Op.  cit.,  Section  539-540. 
'  Op.  cit.,  Section  542. 


THE  AWAKENING  OF  GERMANY  135 

is  not  directly  required  to  organise  and  maintain  the  force 
for  giving  security  must  be  left  by  the  central  govern- 
ment to  the  freedom  of  the  citizens." 

Hegel  conceived  of  the  State  as  an  organic  totality, 
founded  on  political  loyalty.  He  fused  public  and  private 
duty,  and  erected  the  State  into  an  immanent.  all-jQ^ervad- 
ing  power.  Of  the  political  practice  of  States  he  has 
little  tosay.  Political  functions  he  regarded  as  empty 
formulae,  though  he  emphasised  the  social  functions  of 
the  State,  especially  its  educational  system,  and  its  cul- 
tural and  social  discipline. 

Many  of  the  suggestions  made  by  Hegel  (for  they  are 
no  more  than  suggestions)  are  altogether  removed  from 
the  realm  of  the  practical.  We  have  selected  from  the 
great  obscure  mass  a  few  of  the  more  salient,  which  may 
serve  to  clarify  the  basis  of  the  theory  of  State  which 
was  to  evolve  in  Germany  during  the  ensuing  decades. 

It  has  been  necessary  to  dwell  at  some  length  on  the 
Hegelian  concept  of  the  State  in  view  of  the  prepond<'^•i^<•- 
ing  influence  it  was  to  have  on  political  development,  dur- 
ing  the  commg  era.  For  the  first  time  since  the  Reforma- 
tion,  Germany  was  to  contribute  to  social  development 
a  distinctivfiJLkeory  of  social  organisation,  which  was  to 
find  concrete  application.  When  we  compare  the  Hegel- 
ian theory  with  that  which  prevailed  in  France,  absorbed 
as  the  French  were  by  the  struggle  of  the  Middle  Class 
for  supremacy  in  the  State  and  the  extension  of  French 
hegemony  abroad,  or  with  the  practice  of  England,  en- 
grossed as  were  the  English  with  questions  of  trade 
expansion  and  the  development  of  capitalism,  In  both 
of  which  the  tendency  towards  a  purely  materialist,  utili- 
tarian, egoistical  concept  of  the  State  was  being  fos- 
tered,  we    find   that   the    ideal   elements   of    the    newly 


< 


136  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

formulated  German  theories,  in  spite  of  their  disciplinary 
harshness,  gave  to  the  State  something  of  its  former 
spiritual  significance. 

Henceforth,  side  by  side  with  the  French  theory  of 
State,  with  its  concept,  equality,  and  its  expression,  na- 
tionalism, and  the  English  thesis  of  individuai_economic 
^      liberty,  and  its  expression,  cagrtalism,  we  find  the  Ger- 
man theory  of  racial  supremacy,  and  its  subsequent  ex- 
X       pression,  imperialism. 

The  peoples  of  Western  Europe,  under  the  influence  of 
France,  were  henceforth  to  strive  to  attain  national  unity, 
as  a  forerunner  of  political  liberty,  and  entrust  the  guid- 
ance of  the  body  politic  to  the  Middle  Class,  as  most 
fitted  to  realise  these  ends.    In  Central  Europe,  under  the 
leadership  of  Prussia,  national  unity  was  imposed  by  the 
£r  authority  of  the  State.     The  Germans  were  to  gain  na- 
y^     tional  unity  and  political  independence  inspired  by  the 
^\/      ideal   of   racial   supremacy   rather   than   by   a   conscious 
V*    appreciation  of  the  benefits  thereof. 


II 

The  influence  of  Hegelian  ideology  first  began  to  make 
itself  felt  in  the  realm  of  practical  affairs  after  the  ac- 
cession of  Frederick  William  IV.  More  than  thirty 
years  had  elapsed  since  the  Fichtian  thesis  of  racial  su- 
premacy had  aroused  a  sense  of  national  patriotism 
among  the  German  people,  and  united  them  in  driving 
out  the  French.  During  the  reaction  which  followed 
after  the  War  of  Liberation  in  Germany,  the  irritating 
persecutions  which  accompanied  the   reestablishment  of 


THE  AWAKENING  OF  GERMANY  137 

absolutism  had  awakened  a  sense  of  disgust  at  the  meth- 
ods of  government  in  vogue.  The  men  who  had  sacrificed 
so  much  for  the  cause  of  national  liberty  found  them- 
selves enslaved  by  the  reactionary  rule  of  the  petty 
princes,  whose  sole  aim  was  to  further  their  particular- 
ist  ambitions. 

In  Prussia  the  revival  of  material  prosperity  had  been 
rapid,  and  the  economic  expansion  of  many  German 
States  was  greatly  facilitated  by  the  Zollverein.  It  was 
coming  to  be  felt  that  Prussia  was  the  natural  head 
of  the  German  confederacy,  and  that  Austria  with  her 
polyglot  peoples  was  no  longer  destined  to  be  the  real 
leader  in  German  affairs.  Nevertheless,  Frederick  Wil- 
liam III  adhered  conscientiously  to  the  tenets  of  absolut- 
ism, and  lent  his  active  support  as  a  member  of  the 
Holy  Alliance  to  crushing  all  attempts  to  establish  more 
liberal  institutions. 

It  was  at  this  juncture  that  Frederick  William  IV 
ascended  the  throne.  He  began  his  reign  by  promising 
to  introduce  a  number  of  needed  political  reforms,  and 
did  actually  take  some  steps  to  renovate  the  antiquated 
machinery  of  government.  But  he  was  temperamentally 
unsuited  to  carry  out  consistently  any  single  policy  and 
had  little  sympathy  with  the  rising  liberal  movement, 
which  he  looked  upon  as  an  importation  from  abroad. 
However,  he  exerted  much  energy  in  fostering  the  spirit 
of  nationalism  and  sentiment  of  racial  unity  among  the 
German  peoples.  He  showed  by  his  policy  and  conduct, 
in  spite  of  the  mystical  strain  in  his  character  and  his 
naturally  vacillating  temper,  that  he  was  fully  conscious 
of  the  historical  importance  of  the  movement  of  national 
unity.  As  Hegel  had  expressed  it:  "In  the  existence  of 
a  Nation  the  substantial  aim  is  to  be  a  State  and  pre- 


o 

\ 


138  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

serve  itself  as  such.  A  nation  with  no  state  formation 
{a  mere  nation)^  has,  strictly  speaking,  no  history — like 
the  nations  which  existed  before  the  rise  of  states  and 
others  which  still  exist  in  a  condition  of  savagery."  ^ 

The  view  of  Hegel  that  a  monarchy  must  concern  it- 
self with  social  problems  even  more  than  with  purely 
political  quesFimis,  feceived  the  new  King's  full  endorse- 
ment. It  is  not  intended  to  convey  the  impression  that 
Frederick  William  IV  was  a  strong  leader  of  German 
political  development,  but  rather  that  in  spite  of  his 
prejudiced  views  he  felt  compelled  to  take  part  in  the 
revival  of  the  earnest  spirit  of  nationalism,  and  seek  in 
its  development  to  secure  for  Prussia  the  leadership  of  a 
new  German  confederation  from  which  Austria  was  to 
be  excluded.  Nationalism  in  Germany  thus  became  some- 
thing altogether  different  from  what  it  meant  when  the 
term  was  used  either  by  the  French,  or  in  reference  to 
France. 

In  France  the  question  of_race_djdLn.Qt__efiter.  The 
old  struggle  for  racial  supremacy  between  the  Gauls  and 
Franks  had  never  been  settled;  these  as  well  as  the  other 
heterogeneous  racial  elements  which  composed  the  French 
State  had  been  sufficiently  fused  for  all  practical  politi- 
cal purposes  into  a  single  French  people.  Nationalism 
in  France  had  rapidly  developed  as  the  focus  of  middle 
class  political  theory,  the  motive-force  of  their  control 
in  the  State,  the  unifying  bond  of  public  policy  which 
had  received  the  sanction  of  public  opinion.  Much  of 
the  enthusiasm  for  the  establishment  of  States  on  nation- 
alist principles  so  current  in  the  days  of  Napoleon  I,  or 
as  when  Lamartine  had  declared :  "Ressusciter  I'ltalie 
suffirait  a  la  gloire  d'un  peuple,"  seemed  to  be  disappear- 

^  Philosophy  of  Mind,  Section  549. 


THE  AWAKENING  OF  GERMANY  139 

ing,  and  an  egotistical  interpretation  was  growing  up, 
which  was  to  influence  the  conduct  of  foreign  policy. 
As  capitalism  in  England  had  marked  out  a  new  orienta- 
tion of  foreign  affairs,  so  now  in  France  nationalism  was 
coming  to  be  identified  with  strictly  utilitarian  motives. 
Both  contained  elements  of  dynamic  expansion.  Eng- 
land, under  the  pressure  of  capitalism,  was  opening  up 
distant  markets,  acting  on  the  assumption  that  every 
new  British  colony  was  to  be  considered  a  market  for 
British  goods,  and  as  such  a  speculative  enterprise  which 
was  worth  the  expense  incurred  in  securing  and  govern- 
ing it.  The  French  were  not  blind  to  the  advantages 
of  an  aggressive  colonial  policy.  The  growing  national 
self-consciousness  among  the  peoples  of  Europe  and  the 
decreasing  prestige  which  the  French  foresaw  they  would 
inevitably  suffer  thereby,  led  them  to  seek  new  fields 
of  activity  in  distant  lands.  The  dream  of  attaining 
the  hegemony  of  Europe  as  the  champions  of  the  na- 
tional aspirations  of  subject  peoples  had,  however,  by 
no  means  died  out. 

Both  nationalism  and  capitalism  frankly  aimed  at  in- 
creasing political  prestige  and  material  prosperity.  New 
outlets  were  needed  for  the  growing  national  energy.  It 
was  becoming  imperative  to  mark  off  for  future  exploita- 
tion such  parts  of  the  world  as  could  provide  the  raw 
materials  and  cheap  food  supply  essential  to  maintain 
a  rapidly  increasing  industrial  population.  At  the  same 
time,  the  Middle  Class,  avid  for  gain,  saw  to  it  that  its 
own  material  wellbeing  should  increase  in  a  geometrically 
progressive  proportion  as  between  the  middle  class  cap- 
italist'and  the  proletarian  wage-earner. 

Foreign  policy,  under  middle  class  guidance,  soon  con- 
fused the  motives  of  nationalism  and  capitalism,  so  that 


^ 


ir 


140  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

in  the  course  of  time  they  became  practically  synonymous, 
and  gave  rise  to  a  new  single  expression — imperialism.^ 
In  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  nationalism  was  in  its 
^  early  phases  a  racial  as  opposed  to  a  political  theory.  As 
has  been  pointed  out,  it  was  base'd^'on  a  belief  in  the 
racial  purity  and  consequent  superiority  of  the  Germanic 

\,>         peoples.     Nationalism  so  interpreted  had  in  it  the  ele- 
^     <    ments   of  ideal   rather   than   material   aims.      It   sought 

I  to  bring  about  racial  emancipation,  and  was  as  such  a 

centripetal  force.  In  seeking  internal  consolidation  and 
internal  national  unity,  the  leaders  of  the  new  national 
movement  in  Germany  had  to  combat  the  intense  par- 
ticularism or  regional  allegiance  which  was  a  remnant 
of  the  old  Germanic  spirit  of  diversity.  During  this 
stage,  nationalism  in  Germany  remained  a  metaphysical, 
as  distinguished  from  a  political  motive.  Yet  it  was 
not  uninfluenced  by  economic  considerations.  It  was 
/felt  that  trade  requirements  demanded  a  more  closely  knit 
/national  state,  and  industrial  expansion  fostered  this 
'  desire.  To  the  Germans  nationalism  was  an  economic 
and  social,  as  opposed  to  a  political  and  rational  concept. 
Nationalism  thus  understood  may  be  compared  to  a 
natural  force,  which  was  destined  to  develop  untutored, 
among  a__^ople  who  lacked  political  balance,  and  had 
little  gift  for  social  organisation. 

It  was  soon  evident  that  nationalism  in  Germany  would 
lead  to  a  policy  of  territorial  expansion  in  which  the 
vigor  of  the  strongest  and  most  military  state,  Prussia, 
would  make  use  of  the  only  methods  it  understood  to 
realise  its  hegemony — the  resort  to  arms. 

*It  is  significant  to  record  that  imperialism  in  its  Franco-English  in- 
terpretation {see  p.  249  note),  and  in  its  Germanic  sense,  the  latter  possi- 
bly the  more  politically  accurate  usage,  should  have  converged,  making 
conflict  between  the  two  groups  unavoidable. 


THE  AWAKENING  OF  GERMANY  141 

In  considering  the  position  of  Germany  shortly  after 
1840  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that,  in  spite  of  the 
growth  of  national  consciousness,  there  was  still  little 
expression  of  national  solidarity.  Germany  proper  was 
split  up  into  thirty-three  kingdoms  and  principalities  of 
all  sizes  and  all  shades  of  government,  from  mediaeval 
despotism  to  the  most  moderate  constitutional  regime. 
Among  these  Prussia  stood  forth  as  the  strongest  and 
most  populous,  but  it  lacked  the  moral  prestige  to  rally 
thfe  other  states  to  its  support,  and  its  leaders  were  pe- 
culiarly unskilled  in  the  arts  of  political  persuasion.  Pub- 
lic opinion,  such  as  there  existed,  supported  the  idea  of 
nationalism,  and  the  concept  of  national  unity  was  ap- 
proved by  a  great  majority  of  the  German  people.  How- 
ever, none  of  the  German  States  was  willing  to  sur- 
render its  distinctive  prerogatives,  and  preferred  the 
loose  and  dispirited  hegemony  of  Austria  to  the  rigorous 
discipline  of  Prussia. 

In  Austria  nationalism  was  a  disruptive  force.  The 
nationalist  ferment  among  the  various  races  was  already 
beginning  to  threaten  the  life  of  the  State.  The  tactics 
of  playing  off  one  nationality  against  the  other  were  no 
longer  wholly  successful.  The  Hapsburgs,  who  had 
hitherto  exerted  a  powerful  influence  in  European  af- 
fairs and  were  the  leaders  in  the  reactionary  policy  of 
the  Restoration,  still  clung  tenaciously  to  absolutism  and 
were  uniformly  hostile  to  all  constitutional  reforms.  The 
anomaly  of  having  Austria,  which  was  structurally  op- 
posed to  the  principle  of  nationality,  and  whose  whole 
theory  of  state  was  to  be  summed  up  in  the  words  divide  et 
impera,  retain  the  hegemony  of  the  German  confedera- 
tion was  patent  to  all. 

But  Prussia  lacked  the  political  experience  to  avail 


142  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

itself  of  the  opportunity  offered  in  1849  ^o  acquire  by 
peaceful  means  the  headship  in  Germany.  Therefore 
the  final  overthrow  of  Austrian  supremacy  and  the 
establishment  of  the  new  German  Empire  were  left  to  a 
decision  at  arms. 


CHAPTER  IV 

1830-1848 

LOUIS  PHILIPPE — ECONOMIC  FACTORS — ATTITUDE  OF  THE  MIDDLE 

CLASS — THE   RIGHT   TO   VOTE THE    EXTENSION   OF   SUFFRAGE 

^ti— REVOLUTIONARY    OUTBREAKS    OF    I  848 CAUSES^ ITALY 

'^' FRANCE — GERMANY — AUSTRIA — HISTORICAL    MOTIVES 


IN  spite  of  outv^^ard  calm  and  the  absence  of  great  wars 
or  Other  disturbances  In  Europe  for  nearly  two  dec- 
ades ( 1 830-1 848),  the  feeling  of  political  unrest  was 
again  spreading.  France  still  remained  the  fountainhead 
of  political  liberalism,  and  the  active  restlessness  of 
her  politically  alert  people  continued  to  influence  the 
policy  and  political  programmes  of  the  other  peoples  of 
Europe. 

During  these  last  years  of  French  ideological  hegemony, 
a  change  had  come  over  the  Middle  Class  in  power  in 
France.  Signs  of  political  fatigue  were  beginning  to 
become  evident.  The  ruling  class,  no  longer  a  coterie 
or  even  a  small  group,  but  now  expanded  into  a  dis- 
tinct governing  class  which  made  itself  felt  throughout 
the  land,  lacked  the  stability  of  a  fixed  social  order. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  Middle  Class  received  new  re- 
cruits from  among  the  more  successful  and  prosperous 
of  the  working  class;  on  the  other,  the  successful  bank- 
ers, merchants,  and  manufacturers  endeavored  to  buy 
their  way  into  the  socially  exclusive  aristocracy,  of  which 
a  figment  still  remained,  and  withdrew  from  an  active 

[143J 


144  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

participation  in  affairs,  A  policy  of  political  laissez-faire 
which  had  resulted  in  the  loss  of  a  consistent  course  of 
action  had  developed  a  marked  subservience  to  material 
interests.  Nationalism  was  being  transformed  into  an 
interest  and  was  no  longer  an  inspiring  incentive. 

The  narrow,  individualist  policy  of  retrenchment 
pursued  by  Louis  Philippe's  Government  had  led  to  a 
distrust  of  the  growth  of  nationalism  in  Germany  and 
Italy.  This  was  not  the  result  of  any  clear-sighted  per- 
ception of  the  possible  outcome  of  the  establishment  of 
two  great  rival  States  across  the  Rhine  and  the  Alps. 
For  no  steps  were  taken  to  interfere  with  the  process 
of  national  consolidation  which  was  there  proceeding, 
as  had  often  been  done  in  the  past  in  accordance  with 
the  traditional  French  policy,  so  successfully  pursued 
especially  in  Germany  since  the  treaty  of  Westphalia 
(1648),  of  weakening  the  cohesive  strength  of  neigh- 
boring peoples. 

De  Tocqueville  has  judiciously  remarked:  "Commerce 
^renders  men  independent  of  each  other,  gives  them  a 
lofty  notion  of  their  personal  importance,  leads  them  to 
seek  to  conduct  their  own  affairs,  and  teaches  them  how 
to  conduct  them  well;  it  therefore  prepares  men  for 
/C  freedom,  but  preserves  them  from  revolutions.  .  .  . 
Violent  political  passions  have  but  little  hold  on  those 
who  have  devoted  all  their  faculties  to  the  pursuit  of 
their  wellbeing.  The  ardor  which  they  display  in  small 
matters  calms  their  zeal  for  momentous  undertakings."  ^ 
Though  when  writing  these  words  he  may  have  had  in 
mind  the  people  of  the  United  States,  they  refer  with 
great  precision  to  the  Middle  Class  in  France  and  Eng- 
land at  this  time.  In  both  instances  the  Middle  Class 
had  succeeded  in  establishing  a  limited  democracy,  gov- 

^ Democracy  in  America,  Book  III,  Chap.  XXI. 


1830-1848  145 

erned  as  a  limited  monarchy.  Political  restraint  was  tol- 
erated as  long  as  it  did  not  exceed  the  minimum  com- 
patible with  permanence  of  government  and  public  order, 
as  this  was  held  the  most  desirable  method  of  maintaining 
peaceful  conditions  in  the  State,  and  peaceable  relations 
with  neighbouring  States.  Towards  the  middle  of  the 
century  the  Middle  Class  had  adopted  this  conservative 
viewpoint,  though  it  had  not  as  yet  altogether  lost  its 
mental  elasticity.  The  political  privileges  and  im- 
munities, based  on  tradition  and  birth,  which  had  been 
enjoyed  by  the  aristocracy  under  the  old  regime,  had  been 
transmuted  into  economic  privileges  and  Immunities  as 
the  basis  of  political  rights  of  which  the  Middle  Class 
held  the  monopoly. 

We  may  here  trace  the  rise  of  the  new  thesis  that  man's 
chief  concern  in  life  is  in  reality  economic,  and  that  his 
political  activity  as  hitherto  understood  was  destined 
to  become  an  avocation.  In  accordance  with  this  concep- 
tion the  Middle  Class  had  come  to  believe  that  it  had 
realised  the  ideal  form  of  government,  which  technically 
vests  sovereignty  in  the  whole  number  of  citizens  or  sub- 
jects; though  the  exercise  of  sovereign  power  is  entrusted 
to  a  limited,  politically  conscious  group — the  electorate 
— which  in  turn  delegates  the  actual  business  of  state, 
Its  government  and  administration,  to  a  very  small  num- 
ber of  selected  or  sanctioned  representatives.  The  elec- 
torate was  thus  a  politically  privileged  class,  and  po- 
litical  privilege  was  based  on  a  property  qualification, 
consonant  with  the  Interests  of  the  Middle  Class  with 
which  it  had  come  to  be  Identified.^ 

Outside  of  this   relatively  limited  group   of  electors, 

^  The  political  prerogatives  exercised  at  this  period  by  the  House  of 
Lords  in  England,  and  the  House  of  Peers  in  France,  must  be  looked 
upon  as  survivals  of  decreasing  importance,  more  especially  as  middle 
class  views  prevailed  in  both  houses. 


146  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

there  remained  the  great  mass  of  the  unenfranchised, 
who  contributed  to  the  creation  of  the  material  prosperity 
of  the  State  and  made  possible  the  economic  expansion 
and  material  wellbeing  upon  which  middle  class  ascend- 
■^ncy  rested.  It  is  not  intended  to  suggest  that  the  Middle 
-A    Class  had  as  yet  become  parasitical,  nor  that  there  had 

(o  grown    up    within    it    that    rapitalistjc    ph'garrhy    which 

Y^*\  was  later  on  to  seek  to  control  public  policy.     But  the 

^"^  Middle  Class,  still  essentially  individualistic,  had  lost 
whatever  energetic  political  cohesion  it  had  possessed. 
The  rank  and  file  were  already  beginning  to  lose  in- 
terest in  affairs  of  State.  The  majority  were  content 
to  entrust  to  their  selected  and  sanctioned  representatives 
the  conduct  of  public  affairs,  relying  on  the  vigor  of 
public  opinion  to  act  as  a  corrective  should  the  need 
arise.  In  surveying  the  state  of  mind  of  this  ruling 
class,  it  is  readily  discerned  that  it  had  come  to  neglect 
moral  agencies  in  political  practice.  The  Middle  Class 
was  henceforward  to  depend  more  and  more  upon  the 
triumphs  of  science  and  inventions  as  applied  to  indus- 
frial  enferpri{;e.  Tt  was  to  be  its  principal  preoccupation 
to  have  at  hand  an  abundj,nt  supply  of  cheap  labor, 
trained  to  serve  the  newly-created,  highly-specialised  in- 
dustrial machinery,  and  rich  sources  for  raw  materials, 
rather  than  to  concern  Itself  with  problems  relating  to 

•  the  well-ordered  functioning  of  the  body  politic. 

•  It  had  come  to  be  accepted  by  the  majority  of  the 
Middle  Class,  and  historical  precedent  was  cited  to 
confirm  the  current  conviction,  that  "the  happiness  and 
welfare  of  mankind  are  evolved  much  more  from  selfish 
than  from  virtuous  acts,  and  that  the  prosperity  of 
nations  and  the  progress  of  civilisation  are  mainly  due 
to  the  exertions  of  men  who,  while  pursuing  strictly  their 


5-^ 


\&^ 


^'^ 


1830-1848  147 

own  interests,  were  unconsciously  promoting  the  interest 
of  the  community."  ^ 


II 

It  was  during  this  epoch,  when  the  character  of  com- 
merce and  industry  was  being  transformed,  when  skilled 
workmanship  as  a  conscious  and  absorbing  interest  of 
the  worker  was  giving  way  to  purely  mechanical  labor, 
and'  the  working  classes,  no  longer  absorbed  in  their 
tasks,  were  pursuing  their  occupations  more  Uy  reflex  j 
than  by  the  continuous  use  of  their  faculties,  that  go- 
litical  self-consciousness  along  new  and  independent  lines 
began  to  manifest  itself  among  them.  The  example  set 
by  the  middle  class  electorate,  whose  will  was  expressed 
by  a  numerical  majority,  had  led  to  the  question  whether 
the  will  of  the  majority  in  the  State,  as  Rousseau  had  out- 
lined it,  might  not  better  be  arrived  at  by  an  expression 
of  the  political  convictions  of  the  actual  numerical  ma- 
jority of  all  the  citizens.  Would  not  the  removal  of  all 
political  disabilities  which  still  subsisted  and  kept  a 
greater  section  of  the  adult  male  population  in  subjection 
to  the  enfranchised  classes,  be  of  immense  advantage  to 
the  working  classes?  ' 

The  demand  for  the  extension  of  the  suffrage  was  C^ 
thus  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  masses  to  secure  a 
share  in  government  which,  under  the  constitutional  sys- 
tem, had  developed  altogether  to  the  advantage  of  the 
Middle  Class.  The  politico-juridic  concept  of  the  State 
had  evolved  out  of  the  theory  of  the  legality  of  con- 
stituted-authority, which  had  set  up  a  contractual  re- 
lation between  the  governed  and  _th£.4;au£rning.     It  had 

*  Cf.  Lecky,  History  of  European  Morals,  Vol.  I,  p.  38. 


148  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

created  an  opposition  between  these  two  elements  in  the 
State  in  which  self-identity  was  not  at  first  realised  by 
the  Middle  Class. 

By  a  process  of  dilution  of  authority,  inevitable  under 
a  representative  system  which  was  essentially  democratic, 
the  electorate  had  come  to  feel  itself  the  mns(  powerful 
factor  in  the  State,  and  looked  upon  constituted  authority 
as  the  servant  of  the  individual  will.  The  functions  of 
government  had  come  to  be  performed  by  delegation, 
and  all  authority  not  specifically  delegated  was  held  to 
remain  vested  in  the  politically  conscious  class — the  elec- 
torate. But  this  electorate  was  an  elite  whose  numbers 
were  relatively  limited.  The  suffrage  so  understood  was 
an  expression  of  sovereignty.    Theoretically,   such  sov- 

/  ereignty  must  correspond  to  the  political  status  of  the 
person  exercising  it.  The  extension  of  the  suffrage  was 
thus  the  demand  for  partnership  in  sovereignty  in  the 
State  by  those  who  believed  they  were  entitled  to  par- 
ticipate on  a  basis  of  equality  with  the  existing  electorate. 
Both  in  England  and  France  the  question  of  the  exten- 
sion of  the  suffrage  had  been,  and  was  to  continue  to  be, 
agitated.  By  a  minimum  of  concession,  judiciously 
granted,  in  many  instances  to  further  the  political  de- 
signs of  the  party  in  power,  electoral  reforms  that  were 
carried  through  in  England  satisfied  the  more  insistent 
demands;    so    that  throughout   the    19th   century   fresh 

1<      strength  was,  in  varying  doses,  infused  into  the  electcn-al 
body.     It  was  less  diflScult  to  carry  through  such  a  pro- 
gramme in  England,  where  the  aristocracy  had  retained 
a  certain  politico-social  significance,  and  class  distinctions  • 
remained  more  fixed. 

In  France  the  problem  of  electoral  reform  was  more 

1-  complex.  No  fixed  socjal  status  had  survived  the  Rev- 
olution.     It  was  more  difficult  than  in  England  to  de- 


1830-184S  149 

fine  with  any  degree  of  precision  upon  whom  the  right 
to  vote  should  be  conferred.  The  political  value  of  the 
individual  and  what  should  constitute  the  basis  of  the 
right  of  suffrage  had  become  a  pressing  political  issue. 
The  idea  that  all  citizens  possessed  the  inborn  right  to 
participate  on  equal  terms  in  electoral  privileges  was  re- 
pudiated even  by  the  more  liberal-minded,  who  sought 
to  establish  certain  distinctive  tests,  useful  in  ascertain- 
ing the  political  maturity  of  the  individual  voter.  Eng- 
lish theorists  suggested  wealth,  int^ligence,  sociaL  posi- 
tion. Later,  educajjon  was  seized  upon  as  the_best  pos- 
sible  test  of  fitness.  For  a  prolonged  period,  it  had  been 
accepted  by  the  Middle  Class  that  authority  in  the  State 
should  represent  the  interests  of  those  concerned.  The 
dread  of  the  control  of  the  body  politic  by  mere  num- 
bers, and  of  the  domination  of  the  State  by  the  illiterate, 
became  widespread  at  this  time.  It  was  believed  by 
some  that  such  an  eventuality  could  best  be  obviated  by 
the  extension  of  educational   facilities,  which  would  re-  . 

suit  in  a  broader  participation  of  a  greater  number  of    ^^^^^^ 
educated  persons   in    affairs   of   State.     Such   were   the  — ^ 

developments  which  were  to  mark  the  progressive  stages 
of  the  extension  of  the  suffrage,  and  served  to  prolong 
the  retention  of  interest  in  the  representative  system. 

For  the  time  being,  the  individualist  bias  of  the  social 
structure,  which  had  arisen  with  middle  class  control  in 
the  State,  was  too  strong  to  permit  any  further  partition 
of  political  privilege,  which  in  France  and  England  was 
looked  upon  as  the  distinctive  prerogative  of  the  Middle 
Class. 

The  importance  of  the  individual  elector  had  been  mag- 
nified to  such  an  extent  that  he  came  to  consider  himself       / 
a   free  agent  whose   influence  could  make  itself  felt  in 
the  State.     There  was  an  absence  of  political  discipline, 


I50  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

a  lack  of  balance  in  estimating  the  value  of  the  right 
of  suffrage  viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  the  individual, 
which  not  only  made  of  it  an  important  social  func- 
tion, but  vested  in  it  the  final  expression  of  political 
liberty. 

The  right  ot  suffrage  was  exclusive  because  it  was 
valued,  and  valued  because  it  was  exclusive.^  To  the 
Middle  Class  in  power  it  was  a  patenFof  superiority. 
To  it  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  was  no  longer  a 
generic  expression,  understood  in  a  collective  sense,  but 
was  interpreted  as  the  sum  of  the  individual  enfranchised 
wills.  It  was  apparently  unmindful  of  the  fact  that 
in  practice  actual,jsi3.i:erelgnty  was  entrusted  to  the  control 
of  the  will  of  the  .majority  as  delegated  to__the  duly 
elected  or  sanctioned,  representatives.  As  such  it  was 
distinctly  contradictory  to  the  doctrine  of  Rousseau  upon 
which  it  was  based,  that  sovereignty  is  vested  in  the 
general  will,  cannot  be  delegated,  and  is  inalienable.^ 
Sovereignty,  according  to  his  theory,  is  the  expression  of 
the  will  of  the  acUi a]  majority,  which  is  embodied  in  laws. 
Laws  are  not  fixed,  but  subject  to  change  as  the  will  of 
the  majority  changes,  and  thus  the  majority  has  the 
right  to  resist  constituted  authority,  if  need  be  to  change 
the  constitution  and  make  a  new  social  contract  which 
will  be  binding,  but  only  as  long  as  upheld  by  the  ma- 
jority.     Rousseau  had   in   mind  the   absolute   numerical 

*  No  better  proof  of  the  declining  importance  of  the  suffrage  as  a 
measure  of  political  motive  need  be  adduced  than  its  vulgarisation  during 
the  succeeding  half  century  until  at  the  close  of  the  second  decade  of 
the  2oth  century  it  had  come  to  include  not  merely  all  males  but  females 
as  well.  In  its  early  stages  suffrage  was  a  privilege  with  obligations; 
its  spread  led  to  perversion  of  its  privilege  and  the  abandonment  of  its 
obligations. 

^"Sovereignty  cannot  be  represented  for  the  same  reason  that  it  cannot 
be  alienated;  it  consists  essentially  in  the  general  will,  and  the  will 
cannot  be  represented;  it  is  the  same  or  it  is  different;  there  is  no  mean." 
—Contrat  Social,  Book   III,  Chap.  XV. 


J 


1 830-1 848  151 

majority   in    a    State    in    which    none    suffered    political 
disabilities. 

But  the  Middle  Class  which  had  gained  political  power 
after  so  prolonged  a  struggle  was  unwilling  to  share  its 
control  of  the  State,  which  it  conscientiously  believed 
worked  for  the  greater  benefit  of  mankind.  The  idea 
that  all  adults  should  be  entitled  to  equal  suffrage,  re- 
gardless of  differences  of  wealth,  sex,  social  position,  or  |«. 
education,  was  held  inconsistent  with  the  scientific  basis 
upon  which  representative  government  had  developed  as 
an  image  of  tjie  _best,  not  of  the  lower  average  man. 

Such  was  the  position  taken  by  those  in  power  in  1848 
in  face  of  the  growing  political  ferment  which  permeated 
the  working  classes.  In  France  the  demand  for  an  equal 
share  in  sovereign  power  in  the  State,  the  right  to  vote, 
was  to  cause  a  violent  revolutionary  outbreak.  In  other 
continental  States  where  absolutist  rule  still  survived, 
the  working  masses  joined  with  the  Middle  Class  in  de- 
manding political  liberty,  or,  as  in  the  case  of  Italy  and 
Hungary,  national  independence. 


Ill 

A  survey  of  the  fundamental  factors  which  led  to 
the  revolutionary  outbreaks  of  1848  reveals  three  causes 
of  this  spontaneous  movement,  which  embraced  all  the 
States  of  continental  Europe,  and  left  such  a  deep  im- 
pression on  subsequent  political  development.  Two  of 
these  factors  were  closely  related  and  indicative  of  the 
strength  and  vigor  of  middle  class  liberalism  which  had 
been  spread  abroad  by  the  enthusiastic  exponents  of 
constitutional  liberty  and  nationalism;  the  third  was  in 


7 


152  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

the   nature    of    a   premature    expression    of    proletarian 
consciousness. 

It  was  in  Italy  that  the  first  attack  on  surviving  ab- 
solutism was  made.  Milan  and  Sicily  rose  in  revolt. 
The  movement  spread  throughout  the  peninsula.  Not 
only  were  constitutions  granted  by  Charles  Albert  in  Pied- 
mont and  Francis  II  at  Naples,  but  Charles  Albert  also 
placed  himself  at  the  head  of  a  coalition  of  forces,  con- 
tributed by  all  the  sovereign  princes  of  Italy  including 
the  Pope,  for  the  purpose  of  driving  out  the  Austrians. 
No  sooner  had  the  plan  been  decided  upon,  than  the 
lack  of  political  perception  and  broader  insight  into  the 
possibility  of  the  success  of  the  movement  caused  a  re- 
action. The  Pope  withdrew  his  approval,  and  the 
Neapolitan  forces  retired.  Then  followed  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  short-lived  Venetian  and  Roman  repub- 
lics and  the  flight  of  the  Pope  from  Rome.  The  Pied- 
montese  were  beaten  and  dispersed  by  the  Austrians 
at  Novara  (March  1849).  Austrian  authority  was  re- 
established in  northern  Italy,  and  ruthless  repressive 
measures  were  instituted.  At  the  end  of  two  years,  noth- 
ing remained  of  the  great  enterprise  in  constitutional 
nation  building  except  the  constitution  granted  in  Pied- 
mont, to  which  the  King  faithfully  adhered. 

Meanwhile  similar  events  were  taking  place  elsewhere. 
In  February  1848,  Louis  Philippe  was  dethroned  as  a 
result  of  his  insistent  refusal  to  grant  an  extension  of 
the  franchise,  and  the  Republic  of  1848  was  established 
after  a  proletarian  outbreak  had  been  violently  re- 
pressed. The  government  set  up  was  based  on  a  rep- 
'^  resentative  system  which  provided  for  and  elected  a 
President. 

In  Prussia  the  popular  movement  demanding  a  con- 
stitution arose  with  unexpected  suddenness.     Frederick 


1 830-1848  153 

William  IV  professed  that  he  was  ready  to  give  up  his 
royal  titles  and  prerogatives  for  the  sake  of  the  wel- 
fare of  his  people,  should  they  demand  it.  He  sought 
to  impress  upon  the  German  princes  the  necessity  of 
abandoning  their  particularist  pretensions,  in  order  to 
assist  in  the  formation  of  a  united  German  State  under 
the  leadership  of  Prussia,  offering  himself  as  candidate 
for  the  imperial  dignity.  In  the  meantime,  he  under- 
took various  liberal  reforms  and  summoned  a  representa- 
tive, assembly  to  discuss  and  draw  up  a  constitution.  But 
the  Diet  at  Frankfort  of  1849,  owing  principally  to  the 
intrigues  of  Austrian  diplomacy,  failed  to  approve  of 
Frederick  William's  plan  for  German  unity  under  Prus- 
sian control.  As  in  the  case  of  Italy,  nothing  came  of 
the  movement  at  the  time.  The  Prussian  King  did  not 
even  keep  his  word  in  regard  to  the  promised  constitu- 
tional reforms,  and  all  of  his  pledges  remained  unful- 
filled. 

In  Austria  a  similar  wave  of  political  unrest  threatened 
the  unity  of  the  Hapsburg  lands.  The  army,  however, 
remained  loyal.  As  a  result  the  constitutional  liberties, 
granted  under  duress,  were  never  carried  into  effect  after 
the  nationalist  risings  in  Hungary  and  Italy  had  been 
quelled. 

In  an  effort  to  arrive  at  a  true  appreciation  of  the 
real  significance  of  the  historical  events  of  an  epoch,  too 
much  importance  is  apt  to  be  ascribed  to  episodic  dis- 
turbances, revolutions,  wars,  on  the  ground  that  during 
such  upheavals,  changes  are  brought  about  which  render 
it  easier  to  trace  direct  translation  of  theory  into  prac- 
tice, of  motive  into  action.  Yet  it  would  be  difficult  to 
discover  any  very  real  support  for  the  widespread  belief 
that  during  periods  of  disorder  or  of  armed  conflict  the 
correlation  of  motive  and  action  is  simplified.     History 


154  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

must  concern  itself  wrth  something  more  than  a  mere 
account  of  events,  of  action,  which  of  itself  is  sterile 
unless  we  are  ablp  to  arriyg  at  some  understandinjg 
of  the  umifiil^ng  mgtjyes.  Motive  is  the  psychical, 
action  may  be  termed  the  physical  aspect  of  reality.  The 
subservience  ot  Ijoth  to  an  identic  unity  is  difficult  of 
proof.  Yet  it  is  this  unity,  which  when  it  finds  ex- 
pression, impels  to  growth,  decay,  or  change.  In  other 
words,  the  action  or  event  is  the  execution  of  the  motive 
which  has  reached  maturity.  It  is  conceivable  that  it 
might  be  possible  to  trace  a  cyclic  series  of  motives  which, 
schematically  presented,  would  show  clearly  when  motive 
develops  into  action.  Or  better  yet,  as  a  clock  measures 
time  by  subdividing  time  into  hours,  minutes,  and  sec- 
onds and  has  rendered  it  possible  for  men  to  coordinate 
activity,  to  introduce  order  and  discipline  into  social  life, 
so  it  was  coming  to  be  believed  that  tli£.jaall,  the  con- 
ductor of  action,  can  in  a  sense  be  measured  in  terras  of 
motive,  and  understood  as  ajrtion.  In  this  way  it  may 
be  seen  that  in  social  intercourse  the  will  appears  as  the 
inexhaustible  medium  of  energy,  of  dynamic  life,  the 
agency  of  behavior  from  which  history  derives  its  com- 
mensurable unity.  It  is  on  this  foundation  that  the 
unity  and  continuity  of  historical  processes  have  been 
built.  History  endeavors  to  trace  the  systematic  de- 
velopment of  this  evolution:  the  h;eeirig_jaf_the  will-f rom 
the  trammels  of  the  supernatural,  the  superstitious  and 
finally  the  dogrnatic  domination  of  the  teachings  of  classi- 
cal antiquity — in  brief,  the  concept  of  free  will  which 
finds  its  truest  expression  in  the  term,  political  liberty. 
The  fact  that  such  liberty  is  something  that  can  be  ac- 
quired, that  It  is  an  attribute  of^hg.  will  rather  than  of 
reason,  has  hitherto  been  only  imperfectly  understood 
as  tlie  fundamental  motive  of  political  development.    The 


I  830-1  848  155 

idea  that  the  will  in  point  of  fact  governs  the  actions  of    1      U 
man  rather  than  his  reason  was  destined  to  become  the    '        *•    -^ 
most  powerful  incentive  of  social  growth,  which  was  to  jH^ 

bring  about  the  overthrow  of  the  accepted  concept  that  J 

the  social  order  is  rationally  sanctioned  by  its  legality.^ 
Political  society  under  middle  class  rule  had  established 
the  axiomatic  character  of  the  rational  social  order;  now 
the  element  of  volition  as  the  decisive  expression  of  so- 
cial consciousness  was  to  be  introduced.  The  realisation 
of,^the  fact  that  the  individual  as  such  can  make  himself  . .) 

fi^te  in  spite  of  his  previous  condition  of  servitude,  that   '-  ^' 
liberty  as  the  motive  becomes  the   measure  of  the  im-  po"^ 

pulse,  the  will  to  action,  and  finds  fullest  expression  in    ^    .  ^<^ 
political  liberty  had,  as  is  shown  by  the  events  of  1848,  '<^ 

become  a  permanent  acquisition  of  the  peoples  of  Europe. 
Political__j:£uisciousness  thus  understood  was  henceforth 
held  the  expression_oLji  d4'sirf?,„.fnr  liberty,  the  benefits 
of  which  were,  at  the  period  under  review,  only  obscurely 
realised  by  the  majority. 

The  causes  of  the  scant  success  which  attended  the 
revolutionary  movements  of  1848  can  thus  be  accounted 
for.     The  most  significant  outward  cause  of  failure  was       q> 

the    pKcpnr^^jvTjrr^^    '^f    aCtJ^",    Q^=f^^*^'g^  tjon,    flPd    St^^d'- 

ness  of  purpose.  In  other  words,  the  motive  of  the  move- 
ment was  in  a  great  measure  only  vaguely  realised.  To 
the  majority  it  was  still  a  subiective  desire  for  freedom^ 
the  desire  of  individuals  who  were  excluded  from  sharing 
in  something  that  other  individuals  already  possessed. 
Given  the  organisation  and  preparation — when  political 

*It  is  not  to  be   understood   that   the   opponents   of   the   middle   class 
thesis  of  State  were  able  to  perceive  at  the  time  the  divergence  between 
the   rational   and  the  volitional   interpretation   of   historical    development.        i      p /^ 
Nevertheless  we  can  now  trace  the_first  tentative  application  of  this  idea     CA- 
in  Comrnunism,  which  can  be  adequately  comprehended  only  when  viewed         |J         A' 
as  the^awn  of  the  volitional,  rather  than  the  twilight  of  rational  politico-  ^jA* 

social  philosophy.  v**''^     \M 


I 


156  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

and  national  freedom  had  become  a  clear  objective  aim 
and  was  no  longer  merely  a  subjective  impulse;  in  other 
words,  when  unity  of  motive  and  action  was,  realised — 
it  was  destined  to  succeed  and  go  beyond  its  original 
boundaries.  This  unity  was  achieved  within  less  than 
three  decades,  for  the  reason  that  there  was  nothing 
radically  new,  nothing  fundamentally  different  in  the 
demands  made  for  constitutional  liberty  and  national 
independence  which  had  already  acquired  the  fixity  and 
sanction  of  established  practice.  It  was  not  a  new  theory 
of  human  freedom,  not  a  new  social  order  that  was  being 
demanded,  but  a  mere  extension  of  political  practice. 
Such  was  the  nature  and  general  scope  of  the  closely 
correlated  movements  for  the  spread  of  the  accepted 
doctrines  of  political  liberty,  national  and  constitutional, 
in  1848. 

There  was  a  third  and  new  element  infused  into  the 
conflict  by  a  small  group,  which  categorically  denied  the 
alleged  benefits  to  be  derived  from  constitutional  gov- 
ernment or  the  politico-juridic  concept  of  the  State.  The 
pi/Kply  indiyidiialist  bias  of  middle  class  political  theory 
was  denounced  by  the  leaders  of  the  new  movement  as 
anti-social.  They  denied  that  the  principles  of  equality 
and  le_gality  are  to  belield  the  basis  of  true  liberty,  or 
that  the  State  under  the  rule  of  the  Middle  Class,  even  if 
the  liberal  principles  of  representative  governments  were 
extended  to  their  utmost  limits,  could  satisfy  the  needs 
of  the  working  classes;  for  it  was  not  equality,  political 
or  social,  which  they  sought.  They  frankly  demanded 
the  establishment  of  a  new  social  order  under  the  dic- 
tatorship of  the  workers,  hereafter  calling  themselves  the 
Proletariat. 


CHAPTER  V 

Communism 

THE   MANIFESTO   OF    1 848 — THE    MARXIAN    THEORY — HISTORICAL 
MATERIALISM — THE    INFLUENCE    OF    HEGEL ECONOMIC    IN- 
TERPRETATION OF  HISTORY OPPOSITION  TO  DEMOCRATIC 

DOCTRINES — REVOLUTIONARY    TACTICS 


IT  was  in  February  1848  that  the  Manifesto  of  the 
Communist  Party  was  Issued  In  London  on  the  eve 
of  the  revolutionary  outbreaks  which  occurred  at  Paris, 
Vienna,  Berlin,  and  Palermo.  For  the  first  time  the 
Proletariat  as  an  organised  group  was  to  take  an  active 
part  In  public  affairs.  The  more  sanguine  hoped  that  In 
Paris,  at  least,  by  overthrowing  the  existing  government 
It  might  be  possible  to  establish  a  social  organisation 
based  on  communist  principles. 

The  "Manifesto,"  which  contains  the  fundamental 
thesis  of  Communism,  was  drawn  up  by  a  committee  of 
radical  agitators  under  the  guidance  of  Karl  Marx  and 
Engels.  In  view  of  subsequent  developments  and  the  his- 
torical importance  of  the  new  movement,  it  will  be  nec- 
essary to  inquire  Into  the  background  and  evolution  of 
Communism.  Viewed  from  an  historical  standpoint. 
Communism  presented  a  programme  of  politico-social 
reorganisation  as  distinctly  original,  and.  In  this  sense, 
no  more  radical  than  those  of  1689  and  1789,  which  pre- 
pared the   way   for  the   triumph   of   the   politlco-jurldic 

[157] 


158  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

theory  of  State,  and  the  control  of  the  body  politic  by 
the  Middle  Class. 

Since  the  days  of  Plato's  republic,  through  the  cen- 
turies at  repeated  Intervals,  plans  for  an  Ideal  social  order 
have  been  drawn  up.  In  more  recent  times,  Sir  Thomas 
More's  Utopia  and  Tommaso  Campanella's  Civitas 
Soils  had  a  considerable  influence  on  the  writings  of  the 
political  philosophers  of  the  i8th  century.  However, 
it  was  not  until  after  the  French  Revolution,  during  the 
early  years  of  the  19th  century,  that  any  real  attempt 
was.  made  to  put  into  practice  the  so-called  communist 
theories,  such  as  the  schemes  of  Sj:_Simon  and  the 
phalanges  of  Fourier  in  France,  of  QsLfiH  in  England,  and 
others.  While  Marx  did  not  deny  their  value  he  repudi- 
ated all  such  plans  as  one-sided,  fantastic  caricatures  of 
the  social  order  of  the  future,  which  have  no  counter- 
part In  reality  except  in  so  far  as  they  presage  a  social 
organisation  in  which  class  antagonism,  class  struggle 
will  have  been  eliminated. 

The  basis  of  Communism,  according  to  the  Marxian 
theory,  is  to  be  found  in  this  class-  struggle.  "The  his- 
tory of  every  society  down  to  our  own  times  has  been 
the  history  of  class  struggles,"  are  the  opening  words 
of  the  body  of  the  "Manifesto."  The  leaders  of  Com- 
munism sought  to  overturn  the  social  order  and  to  es- 
tablish new  social  arrangements  as  part  of  their  plan 
to  eliminate  the  unfair  exploitation  of,  and  miserable 
economic  conditions  prevalent  among,  the  working  classes 
which  the  Middle  Class,  since  it  had  assumed  the  domi- 
nating role  In  the  State,  had  merely  sought  to  ameliorate 
by  offering  the  panacea  of  constitutional  liberties.  The 
Communists  maintained  that  all  plans  of  social  reform 
were  to  no  purpose,  as  in  the  fulness  of  time  the  ascend- 


COMMUNISM  159 

ancy  and  dictatorship  of  the  Proletariat  was  its  natural 
destiny,  an  inevitable  historical  necessity. 

This  element  of  historical  determinisrp  is  the  ideologi- 
cal  foundation  upon  which  Communism,  according  to  the 
Marxian  thesis,  is  built.  As  such  Communism  is  not 
classed  as  an  ideal  or  even  a  desired  goal;  it  is  not  an 
aspiration  of  a  group  of  political  innovators,  but  is  held 
to  be  the  ineyjtpblp  niifrnmp  of  the  process  of  historical 
evglution,  of  the  class  conflict  which  has  narrowed  itself 
down  to  a  struggle  on  the  part  of  the  Middle  Class  to 
retain  its  control  of  the  body  politic,  and  of  the  Pro- 
letariat to  overthrow  this  ascendancy  and  establish  a  new 
social  order. 

It  is  directly  from  Hegel  that  Marx  borrowed  his  the- 
ory of  growth_by,antagoxiisin ;  of  .strugglfi^as  the  principal 
factor  of  development.  He  transformed  the  Hegelian 
triad  of  thesis,  antithesis,  and  synthesis,  the  abstrac- 
tion of  growth  by  antithesis,  into  a  positive  historical  fac- 
tor as  explaining  the  processes  of  proletarian  political 
action. 

Marx  tells  us  ^  that  it  was  while  preparing  a  critical 
review  of  Hegel's  Rechtsphilosophie  that  he  came  upon 
the  idea  which  was  to  serve  as  the  ground  of  all  of  his 
future  speculations.     As  he  expressed  it: 

"In  the  production  of  means  of  existence,  men  enter 
upon  definite  relations,  which  are  inevitable  and  inde- 
pendent of  their  will;  relations  of  production,  which  are 
correlative  with  the  stage  of  the  development  of  produc- 
tive forces.  The  complex  of  these  relations  of  produc- 
tion is  the  economic  basis  of  society — that  is  to  say,  it 
is  the  real  foundation  upon  which  is  raised  the  super- 
structure of  political  and  juridical  society,  and  to  which 

*  Cf.  Zur  Kritik  der  politischen  Oekonomie,  Preface,  pp.  iv-vi. 


i6o  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

the  determined  forms  of  the  social  order  correspond. 
The  methods  of  production  of  the  necessities  of  material 
life  determine  in  general  the  social,  political,  and  intel- 
lectual processes  of  life.  It  is  not  man's  consciousness 
which  determines  his  existence,  but  on  the  contrary  his  so- 
cial  life  which  dgiermiaeshis-cansrinnsnfss.  .  .  .  Asocial 
system  does  not  destroy  itself  before  it  has  developed  all 
the  productive  force  which  it  could  contain,  and  other 
methods  of  production  do  not  take  its  place  before  they 
have  been  incubated  in  the  old  social  order.  Furthermore 
mankind  always  puts  questions  which  it  can  answer  sat- 
isfactorily, for  in  examining  the  problem  closely  it  will 
be  seen  that  the  question  is  raised  only  after  the  material 
conditions  which  permit  of  its  solution  are  at  hand.  .  .  . 
The  relations  of  production  of  the  Middle  Class  are  the 
last  antagonistic  form  of  social  production  .  .  .  but  in 
the  productive  forces  which  are  developing  in  the  bosom 
of  the  middle  class  social  order  are  to  be  found  the 
material  conditions  necessary  to  resolve  this  antagonism." 

And  Marx  hopefully  adds:  "With  this  social  organ- 
isation the  prehistoric  period  of  humanity  comes  to  an 
end." 

According  to  this  doctrine  it  Is  the  inevitable,  ulti- 
mate destiny  of  the  Proletariat  to  succeed  the  Middle 
Class  in  control  of  society;  a  historical  necessity,  the  filia- 
tion of  which  can  be  traced  as  distinctly  as  that  of  the 
rise  of  the  Middle  Class  upon  the  overthrow  of  the 
aristocracy.  Just  as  during  the  close  of  the  mediaeval 
period  certain  enlightened  men  foresaw  the  transforma- 
tion of  the  social  order,  the  rise  of  modern  States,  and 
modern  political  organisation  under  the  control  of  the 
Middle  Cj,ass  which  was  to  rest  on  nationalism  and  cap- 
italism, an  outcome  of  the  increased  importance  of  the 
individual,  so  now  according  to  this  doctrine  the  middle 
class  regime  is  drawing  to  a  close,  and  far-sighted  per- 
sons can  already  perceive  the  signs  of  the  dawn  of  the 


COMMUNISM  i6i 

new  social  arrangements,  and  the  domination  of  the  so- 
cial order  by  the  Proletariat.  The  moderate,  liberal, i 
philanthropic,  individualistic,  middle  class  ideology  is 
to  make  way  for  a  haxsher,  more  dogmatic,  disciplined, 
arbitrary,  cooperative  social  theory,  which  in  the  realm  II  \ 
of  practical  affairs  will  be  more  akin  to  the  domination 
of  the  aristocracy  during  the  feudal  period. 

The  social  revolution  advocated  by  Marx  and  his 
coi;nmunist  followers  was,  they  believed,  inevitable. 
Those  who  read  aright  the  lessons  of  history,  they 
averred,  can  trace  all  historical  development  to  its 
underlying  "economic   substructure." 

Such  is  the  groundwork  of  historical  materialism,  called 
by  its  supporters  the  "ultimate  and  final  philosophy  of 
history"  which  purports  to  be  a  scientific,  as  distinguished 
from  an  ideological,  analysis  of  historical  evolution.^ 
According  to  this  theory  it  is  not  by  their  own  free  choice, 
but  because  they  cannot  do  otherwise,  that  men  first 
satisfy  their  most  elementary  wants,  which  in  turn  give 
rise  to  other  more  complex  wants.  In  order  to  satisfy 
these  new  demands  men  invent  new  implements  and  or-  f 
ganise  new  methods  of  production,  which  precede  and 
influence  all  subsequent  growth  and  historical  develop- 
ment. The  materialist  interpretation  of  history  is  an 
attempt  to  reconstruct  the  genesis  and  subsequent  de- 
velopment of  social  life,  based  upon  the  economic  bias  i 
of  all  historical  progress.  History  is  merely  the  nar- 
rative of  the  struggle  between  those  who  possess  the 
means  of  production  and  those  who  do  not;  a  class  con- 
flict in  which  those  who  are  excluded  from  sharing  in 
the  benefits  of  the  means  of  production  seek  to  wrest 
them  from  those  who  possess  them.  Thus  history  shows 
three  great  economic  epochs:  slayery,  serfdom,  and  cap- 

*Cf.  Antonio  Labriola,  Del  Materialismo  Storico. 


i62  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

italist  organisation.  The  fourth,  according  to  the  Marx- 
ian thesis,  will  be  cooperative  exploitation  when  class  an- 
tagonism will  have  been  overcome.  From  the  Marxian 
viewpoint  the  Reformation  is  to  be  looked  upon  as  a 
rebellion  of  the  German  people  against  their  economic 
exploitation  by  the  Papacy.  Economic  j:jjuses  underlie 
aljJiiiLtorical  eyojvjtion,  which  by  the  modern  methods  of 
historical  criticism  have  been  brought  to  light,  though  the 
sequence  of  events  is  in  many  instances  obscure.  In  brief^ 
there  is  no  episode  in  history  which  does  not  by  its  origin 
refer  to  underlying  economic  factors.  "At  the  dawn 
of  traditional  history  economics  is  already  operative." 
History  according  to  this  view  is  the  work  of  man. 
It  "is  the  work  of  man  in  so  far  as  man  can  create 
and  improve  his  instruments  of  labor  and  with  these  in- 
struments can  create  an  artificial  environment,  whose  com- 
plicated effects  react  upon  him  and  which  by  its  present 
state  and  successive  modifications  is  the  occasion  and 
condition  of  his  development."  ^  Historical  factors 
cannot  be  held  the  result  of  man's  critical  or  rational 
faculties,  but  are  determined  solely  by  hii,.^exterjial  needs 
and  opportunities,  which  serve  to  develop  his  faculties. 
Thus  the  course  of  human  events  is  a  sum,  a  succession, 
a  series  of  conditions  which  men  have  accumulated  in 
the  course  of  their  changing  social  life,  and  as  such  does 
not  represent  either  a  fixed  course  of  action  and  activity, 
or  a  deviation  from  an  altogether  perfect  and  felicitous 
plan.  Progress  is  purelyempirical.  Historical  materi- 
alism rejects  the  thesis  that  political  action,  scientific 
evolution,  juridic  development  are  civilising  factors  which 
assist  in  the  interpretation  of  history.  Its  supporters 
hold  that  historical  development  is  to  be  traced  to  eco- 
nomic causes,  and  can  only  be  fully  interpreted  in  the 

^Cf.  Antonio  Labriola,  op.  cit.,  Chap.  IV. 


COMMUNISM  163 

light  of  their   true   relations,   and   that   these   are   pre- 
determined. 

This  new  economic  interpretation  of  history  was  "born 
on  the  battle-field  of  Communism."  It  presupposed  the 
appearance  of  a  Proletariat  on  the  scene  of  political  ac- 
tion, it  took  for  granted  the  existence  of  the  Middle 
Class  and  the  social  order  as  it  actually  existed  in  Europe 
and  America.  It  claimed  to  be  a  scientific  revolutionary 
doctrine  in  that  it  alleged  to  have  discovered  the  funda- 
mental causes,  traced  the  course  of  action,  and  forecast 
the  development  of  the  revolution  of  the  Proletariat,  It 
attempted  to  lay  bare  the  causes  of  all  other  social  revolu- 
tions which  have  taken  place  in  the  past  and  the  condi- 
tions under  which  they  occurred,  and  to  show  at  what 
point  class  antagonism  results  in  the  overthrow  of  the 
old  order  and  its  substitution  by  the  new. 


II 

Historical  materialism,  the  economic  interpretation  of 
history  which  Marx  and  his  followers  claimed  to  be  the 
only  rational  means  of  preparing  for  the  advent  of  Com- 
munism, was  the  object  of  much  obloquy,  even  among 
the  Socialists.  Scientific  Socialism,  or  Critical  Com- 
munism as  Marx  called  his  doctrine  in  the  Manifesto 
of  1848,  took  pains  to  distinguish  itself  from  other 
Socialist  groups.  The  latter  were  characterised  as 
middle  class  Socialists,  social  reformers,  and  social  Ideal- 
ists, who  sought  to  sow  dissension  among  the  working 
class  by  attempting  to  patch  up  the  old  social  order  by 
means  of  political  and  economic  reforms,  Instead  of 
assisting  in  breaking  it  down.  Strong  in  their  conviction 
of  the   scientific  basis   of  their   thesis,   the   Communists 


i64  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

boldly  announced  the  final  triumph  of  the  working  class 
over  the  Middle  Class,  and  the  dictatorship  of  the  Prole- 
tariat as  an  historically  necessary  event.  The  Proletariat, 
they  claimed,  formed  a  distinct  and  separate  social  group, 
which  it  would  be  historically__im2ossible  to  integrate 
with^the  Middle  Class  of  which  it  was  an  outgrowth, 
as  the  Middle  Class  itself  and  the  politico-juridic  organ- 
isation of  the  State  and  representative  government  had 
grown  out  of  the  aristocratic  feudal  system.  The  Pro- 
letariat, therefore,  was  not  destined  to  be  absorbed, 
in  spite  of  all  the  philanthropic  programmes  of  social 
betterment  which  might  in  the  future  be  undertaken 
by  the  Middle  Class.  The  sufferings,  the  hardships,  the 
neglect,  the  injustice  which  the  Proletariat  suffered  and 
was  destined  to  suffer,  were  to  be  welcomed  as  serving 
to  consolidate  and  strengtljenits  sense  of  class  conscious- 
ness,  and  endow  it  with  class  solidarity,  so  that  when  the 
time  came  it  would  be  ready  to  overthrow  the  existing 
social  order,  and  revolutionise  the  capitalistic  system  by 
abolishing  middle  class  political  and  social  organisation 
of  classes  and  of  States. 

The  Communists  rejected  the  doctrine  of  equality,  the 
juridic_basis  of  social  order,  the  government  of  States 
as  instituted  by  the  Middle  Class.  Justice  and  equality 
among  individuals,  they  declared,  are  illusions  which  no 
sophistical,  juridic  theory  can  render  valid.  The  diffu- 
sion and  widespread  acceptance  of  this  "liberal"  ideology 
had  made  possible  the  rise  to  power  of  the  Middle  Class, 
and  entrenched  individualism  behind  the  ramparts  of 
so-called  political  liberty.  The  politico-juridic  concept  of 
the  State,  with  its  individualistic  terminology  and  con- 
ceits, its  psychological  categories  and  its  liberal  profes- 
sions, had  enervated  mankind  by  placing  too  heavy  a 
burden  on  the  individual.     The  individual  has  no  true 


COMMUNISM  165 

initiative;  he  is  the  servant  of  his  economic  status,  or, 
as  has  already  been  noted,  "Ideas  are  the  reflexes  of  eco- 
nomic relations;  methods  of  production  first  present 
themselves  to  the  mind  as  representations;  ideas  and 
ideals  are  nothing  more  than  translations  of  these  eco- 
nomic factors."  The  individual  is  of  secondary  impor- 
tance, and  all  individualism  must  be  suppressed  to  al- 
low for  the  fullest  and  most  rapid  development  of  class 
consciousness  among  the  Proletariat.  This  is  essential 
'in  order  to  prepare  for  the  final  struggle  with  the  Middle 
Class,  which  will  inevitably  result  in  the  triumph  of  the  ^ 
Proletariat,  owing  to  its  corporate  sense  and  absence 
of  individualist  bias. 

Class  antagonism,  the  Communists  declared,  must  re- 
main until  the  Proletariat  has  overthrown  the  capitalist 
system  and  gained  control  of  political  power  in  the  State, 
which  will  then  lead  to  the  establishment  of  a  new  co- 
operative social  order  wherein  true  equality  will  be  • 
realised.  But  as  long  as  the  Middle  Class  survives  as 
the  sole  political  power  in  the  State;  as  long  as  govern- 
ment remains  "an  executive  committee  of  the  Middle 
Class,"  so  long  the  Proletariat  is  destined  to  struggle  to 
bring  about  the  destruction  of  the  existing  social  system. 
The  growth  of  the  wealth  of  the  Middle  Class  need  not 
deter  the  Proletariat,  as  it  is  inevitably  bound  up  with 
the  strengthening  of  proletarian  consciousness.  The  in- 
crease of  the  means  of  production,  the  increase  of  the 
number  of  producers,  the  growth  of  capital  and  its  con- 
centration in  the  hands  of  the  capitalist  class  are  accom- 
panied by  the  growth  of  the  Proletariat  in  vigor,  numbers, 
and  class  consciousness. 

Throughout  the  Manifesto,  and  in  fact  throughout  the 
writings  of  Marx  and  his  followers,  the  ruthless  realism 
of  their  doctrine  is  everywhere  in  evidence.     There  is 


i66  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

nothing  Utopian,  nothing  vague  or  extravagant  in  their 
programme,  when  viewed  in  its  proper  perspective  and 
interpreted  in  the  light  of  its  context.  It  is  not  main- 
tained that  Communism  is  a  natural  or  desirable  doctrine. 
It  is  not  claimed  that  it  is  suited  to  all  men  or  to  all  social 
conditions  at  all  times,  or  that  if  detached  from  its  his- 
^  torical  setting  it  would  not  be  looked  upon  as  a  wholly 
unnatural  thesis  of  social  organisation.  It  is  merely  a 
symptom  of  the  dissolution  of  capitalist  society;  a  dis- 
solving force,  a  destructive  weapqn  to  accomplish  a  work 
»  of  demolition  and  make  way  for  a  constructive  social 
^  organisation.  It  is  to  be  looked  upon  as  a  poison,  violent 
and  devastating,  which  is  to  destroy  the  middle  class 
individualist  exploitation  of  mankind  and  to  break  down 
^  the  tissue  of  the  "vicious  circle  of  production,"  the  com- 
petitive system. 

The  Communists  had  no  sympathy  with  the  various 
forms  of  State  Socialism,  such  as  were  advocated  by 
Lasalle  or  Louis  Blanc.  State  Socialism,  while  it  con- 
tained revolutionary  elements,  harked  back  to  legality 
and  equality,  the  right  to  work,  the  righj;_tii_a  living  wage, 
which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Marxians,  is  an  altogether 
middle  class  manner  of  envisaging  the  problem  of  labor 
in  a  capitalistic  and  not  a  proletarian  sense.  The  failure 
of  the  June  revolt  of  1848  at  Paris  had  made  plain  the 
futility  of  such  halfway  measures  as  the  so-called  national 
workshops  and  other  similar  attempts  to  graft  prole- 
tarian theories  on  middle  class  practice. 

Nor  can  any  attempts  which  may  be  made  by  the  Mid- 
dle Class,  primarily  in  its  own  interest,  to  increase  the 
efficiency  of  labor,  by  remedying  the  abuses  of  the  in- 
dustrial system,  by  social  legislation,  by  improving  wages 
and  diminishing  hours  of  work,  do  more  than  retard  the 
final  triumph  of  the  Proletariat  and  the  socialisation  of 


COMMUNISM  167 

the  means  of  production.  As  a  part  of  the  natural  process 
of  decay  of  the  Middle  Class  such  social  legislation  is 
to  be  expected.  It  will  aim,  in  the  first  instance,  at  se- 
curing the  nationalisation  of  the  land  and  the  placing  of 
the  State  in  control  of  raw  materials  and  the  necessities 
of  life.  These  are  proposals  which,  according  to  the 
Marxian  thesis,  it  may  be  expected  will  be  offered  by 
social  reformers  and  middle  class  Socialists  to  preserve 
the  ascendancy  of  the  Middle  Class  by  modernising  the 
poUtico-juridic  theory  of  State  and  establishing  a  new 
form  to  be  called  social  democracy. 

But  Communism  will  have  nothing  to  do  with  democ- 
racy, which  it  holds  essentially  the  product  of  middle 
class  individualism.  It  is  of  some  significance  and  a 
proof  of  its  essentially  destructive  nature,  that  Com- 
munism outlined  no  programme  to  provide  for  the  re- 
construction of  the  social  order,  and  concerned  itself 
essentially  with  the  overthrow  of  the  existing  regime.  1 
Marx  formulated  no  system  of  social  reorganisation,  leav- 
ing it  open  for  the  future  to  evolve  naturally  its  own 
social  structure.^ 

The  Manifesto  does,  however,  specifically  outline  a 
mode  of  procedure  to  be  followed  in  destroying  the  ex- 
isting middle  class  hierarchy.  It  may  be  summed  up  in 
the  single  proposition:  The  abolition  of  private  prop-  <s 
erty.  This  is  not  so  revolutionary  a  proposal  as  it  may 
at  first  sight  seem.  Property  has  throughout  history  un- 
dergone successive  transformations.  The  French  Rev- 
olution abolished  all  feudal  property  and  made  room 
for  the  rise  of  middle  class  property.     The  Communists 

^  Marx  in  a  letter  to  the  English  Socialist  Beesby — whom  up  to  that 
time  (1869)  he  had  considered  the  only  true  English  revolutionary 
Socialist  or  Communist — after  having  read  an  article  published  by  the 
latter  on  the  future  of  the  working  class,  stated  that  he  now  realised 
that  he  (Beesby)  was  at  heart  a  reactionary,  for  "whoever  lays  down  ^ 
a  programme  for  the  future  is  a  reactionary." 


i68  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

urged  the  abolition  of  middle  class  property,  as  the  liv- 
ing embodiment  of  the  exploitation  of  the  Proletariat, 
and  looked  upon  the  transfer  to  the  Proletariat  of  the 
means  of  production  merely  as  a  preparatory  stage. 
When  class  distinctions  have  been  abolished,  a  coopera- 
tive method  of  production  is  to  take  the  place  of  middle 
class  individual  ownership.  "Communism  deprives  no 
one  of  the  power  to  appropriate  for  himself  his  share  of 
production;  it  merely  deprives  men  of  the  power  to  gain 
control  over  the  work  of  another." 

The  aKolitinn  nf  jrivate  privilege  is  by  the  Communists 
to  be  extended  to  include  the  entire   fabric  of  middle 
class  society.     Thus  established  religion,  edugation,  the 
family,  the  State,  which  are  conceived  of  as  expressions 
of   individualism,    of    individual    initiative    in   a   middle 
class  sense,  are  to  be  done  away  with.     To  achieve  this 
purpose  they  discarded  all  accepted  ethical  and  moral  con- 
siderations.    "Abolish  the  exploitation  of  man  by  man,      / 
jT  I ,  y     and  you  will  do  away  with  the  exploitation  of  one  State  by 
'      jl7       another."    When  class  antagonism  shall  have  disappeared 
*    .in  a  State,  hostility  between  nations  will  disappear. 
Q^     Though  the  Manifesto  admits  that  workingmen  have 
••^no  country:   "The  struggle  of  the  Proletariat  with  the 
Middle    Class,    although    not    intrinsically    a    national 
Vstruggle,   nevertheless   has    assumed   the    form   thereof. 
The  Proletariat  of  each  country  must  first  of  all  over- 
throw  its    own    Middle    Class,"    yet    Communism    con- 
centrated  its  entire  energy  in  bringing  about  the  over- 
•*  ^^ythrow  of  the  Middle  Class  in  each  separate  State,  and 
y   \  did  not  have  in  mind  the  destruction  of  national  States, 
y^    J  but  merely  the  placing  of  the  Proletariat  in  control  in 
Y  the  State,  which  would  thus  transform  its  character  and 

/a        social  ordering  without  destroying  its  ethnic  or  national 
characteristics. 


j:/ 


COMMUNISM  169 


III 


Such  is  a  brief  outline  of  the  main  principles  upon  which 
Communism  rested.  It  contained  no  constructive  pro- 
gramme of  policy.  It  was  a  symptom  of  the  decay  of  the 
Middle  Class,  a  factor  of  demolition  of  political  society 
built  up  on  nationalist  principles  and  based  on  juridic 
relations.  Conscious  that  the  Middle  Class  had  first  to 
fulfil  its  historical  role,  Marx  had  no  oversanguine  hopes 
of  tlie  immediate  success  of  Communism.  He  merely  as- 
serted that  the  phase  of  the  control  of  the  social  order 
by  the  Middle  Class  would  pass  in  due  time  and  that  that 
of  the  Proletariat  would  take  its  place.  It  was  the  duty 
of  the  Proletariat,  as  part  of  its  historical  mission,  to 
hasten  the  overthrow  of  the  Middle  Class  which  should 
be  no  longer  delayed. 

Thus  in  1848  we  find  the  Communists  in  France  help- 
ing the  social  democrats  and  more  radical  liberals  in  their 
struggle  against  the  conservative  middle  class  govern- 
ment of  Louis  Philippe.  Yet  when  he  was  dethroned, 
the  Middle  Class  firmly  held  the  reins  of  power,  estab-  ^ 
lished  a  republic,  and  repressed  the  Communist  attempt  to 
carry  out  its  programme.  In  England  the  Communists 
had  lent  support  to  the  Chartist  movement;  in  America 
to  various  programmes  of  agrarian  reform.  In  Switzer- 
land they  helped  the  radicals,  who,  though  a  middle  class 
party,  were  struggling  for  a  broadening  of  popular  con- 
trol. In  Poland,  in  Hungary,  in  Italy  the  Communists 
pledged  their  support  to  the  nationalist  movements.  In 
Germany  and  Austria  they  took  an  active  part  in  promot- 
ing middle  class  aims  in  the  struggle  against  absolutism. 
But  in  all  these  various  revolutionary  movements  the 
Communists  never  "neglected  an  opportunity  to  awaken 


I70  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

in  the  minds  of  the  working  class  the  consciousness  of 
the  inherent  antagonism  between  the  Middle  Class  and 
the  Proletariat,  so  that  when  the  time  should  come  the 
Proletariat  would  be  ready  to  take  up  the  struggle  in  its 
own  behalf." 

Viewed  historically,  Communism,  as  outlined  in  1848, 
was  a  reaction  against  the  loosely  framed,  vague,  al- 
truistic formulae  of  1789,  which  had  professed  to  insure 
political  liberty  to  mankind,  but  which  had  in  reality 
brought  about  the  economic  enslavement  of  the  majority 
of  the  peoples  of  the  Western  World,  and  the  rise  of  a 
new  class  of  unenfranchised  workers  to  whom  the  benefits 
of  political  liberty,  as  well  as  of  social  equality,  had  been 
denied.  It  was  the  aim  of  Communism  in  the  first  in- 
stance to  arouse  a  sense  of  class  solidarity  and  political 
consciousness  among  this  unwieldy,  uneducated,  unorgan- 
ised social  group;  to  introduce  a  semblance  of  discipline 
and  order,  to  coordinate  projects  of  social  reform,  and 
above  all  to  oppose  the  strong  current  of  uncontrolled 
romanticism  which  had  arisen  among  visionary  and  im- 
practical social  workers  and  was  manifesting  itself  in  such 
movements  as  Fourierism,  Owenism,  Brook  Farm,  and 
Harmony  Hall. 

Looked  at  from  a  broad,  unprejudiced  viewpoint,  Com- 
munism appears  as  an  attempt  to  transfer  to  the  arena  of 
class  conflict  the  doctrine  of  might  versus  right,  of  com- 
petitive struggle  for  power,  which  had  been  so  successful 
in  fostering  the  growth  of  national  States.  Marx  recog- 
nised what  he  conceived  to  be  the  practical  validity  of 
the  Hegelian  concept  of  the  State.  Pie  wished  to  trans- 
form it  in  accordance  with  the  scientific,  historical  spirit 
which  had  led  him  to  formulate  the  materialist  inter- 
pretation of  history.  Hegel,  he  remarked,  had  stood 
history  on  its  head;  it  was  necessary  to  stand  it  on  its 


COMMUNISM  171 

feet  again.  That  is  to  say,  that  to  Hegel  the  idea  was 
reality.  Marx  declared  that  reality  was  transformed  by 
man  into  ideas;  in  other  words  historical  materialism, 
the  economic  moment  showed  the  way  to  be  followed  in 
investigating  the  processes  of  social  development. 

As  the  control  of  power  in  the  State,  the  moulding 
force  in  society,  had  through  succeeding  ages  become  sub- 
divided and  diluted  until  it  had  been  inherited  by  the 
Middle  Class,  who  kept  up  the  old  forms  under  the  new 
methanism  of  democratic  government  and  public  opinion, 
so  by  a  natural  sequence  of  argument,  the  logical  con- 
clusion was  reached  that  the  numerically  preponderant 
Proletariat  was  destined  some  day  to  become  the  domi- 
nant group  in  the  State.  Marx,  in  spite  of  his  originality, 
never  emancipated  himself  from  the  strong  national 
bias  in  his  character.  All  the  programmes  he  subse- 
quently set  forth  in  the  international  movement  betray 
this  innate  conviction  of  German  racial  supremacy.^  He 
never  went  beyond  a  purely  national  point  of  view.  The 
cry  of  the  Manifesto,  "Proletariat  of  all  countries, 
unite!"  was  made  with  a  mental  reservation.  In  this 
sense  Marx  remained  altogether  under  the  influence  of 
the  spirit  of  his  times.  The  era  that  was  opening  was  to 
pay  little  attention  to  Communist  doctrines,  but  much  to 
those  of  nationalism  and  of  national  unity. 

'  It  has  been  suggested  that  Marx,  owing  to  his  Jewish  origin  and  more 
especially  his  cosmopolitan  training,  was  in  point  of  fact  indifferent  to 
questions  of  nationality,  and  that  he  conceived  of  the  State  as  "built  on  the 
ruins  of  a  hundred  living  polities."  But  that  he  did  not  have  an  abstract, 
toned-down  sense  of  nationality  is  proved  by  the  active  support  which  he 
gave  in  later  years  to  the  aggressive  policy  of  Prussia,  in  the  war  with 
France;  his  high  admiration  for  Moltke  and  Bismarck,  and  the  enthusiasm 
with  which  he  celebrated  the  victories  of  Germany  over  France,  to  the 
great  surprise  of  his  disciples  and  followers  abroad. 


f 


CHAPTER  VI 

The  Nation-State 

THE    FRENCH    CONSTITUTION    OF    1 852 — THE    SECOND    EMPIRE- 
THE    CENTRALISATION    OF    AUTHORITY — COLONIAL    EX- 
PANSION— THE   BRITISH    EMPIRE — INDUSTRIAL 
EXHIBITIONS PROSPERITY  AND  POLITICS 


THE  revolution  that  had  swept  Louis  Philippe  from 
his  throne  had  gone  beyond  the  limits  agreeable 
to  the  Middle  Class.  The  four  June  days  of  the  sociaHst 
rising  at  Paris  had  caused  an  immediate  reaction.  In 
the  Constituent  Assembly,  which  at  once  assembled  (June 
13,  1848)  to  draw  up  a  constitution,  an  unexpected  fig- 
ure appeared.  Louis  Napoleon,  who  had  escaped  from 
his  French  gaolers  two  years  before  and  had  fled  to 
England,  hastened  to  France  on  the  outbreak  of  the 
revolution  in  February  and  professed  himself  in  full 
sympathy  with  the  Provisional  Republican  Government. 
He  was,  however,  requested  to  leave  France,  which  he 
agreed  to  do.  But  on  being  elected  a  member  of  the 
Constituent  Assembly,  he  took  his  seat.  His  presence 
aroused  a  storm  of  protest  among  a  large  section,  who 
foresaw  the  possibility  of  his  intriguing  to  gain  control 
of  the  reins  of  government.  In  the  face  of  the  oppo- 
sition so  openly  manifested,  Louis  Napoleon  resigned  his 
seat  and  quitted  the  country. 

The  prospect  of  the  return  of  a  member  of  the  Bona- 

[172] 


THE  NATION-STATE  173 

parte  family  to  executive  authority  in  France  haunted  the 
framers  of  the  new  constitution.  The  Napoleonic  legend 
had  grown  to  great  dimensions.  The  prestige  and  glamour 
of  the  dead  Emperor,  whose  burial-place  had  become  a 
shrine  of  pilgrimage,  had  inflamed  popular  opinion.  The 
majority  had  grown  very  weary  of  the  petty,  inconse- 
quential policy  of  Louis  Philippe's  government,  which  the 
new  Provisional  Government  had  adhered  to.  Louis 
Napoleon  thereupon  once  again  returned  to  France  in 
September  1848  to  take  his  seat  again  in  the  Assembly. 
He  had  been  elected  by  five  separate  constituencies. 

Meanwhile,  the  work  of  constitution-making  proceeded. 
The  alarm  of  the  Middle  Class  at  the  reappearance  of  a 
Napoleon  is  reflected  in  the  form  of  government  which 
was  provided  for.  The  power  of  the  President  was 
limited  by  a  series  of  checks,  which  left  the  final  authority 
in  the  hands  of  the  National  Assembly. 

Three  months  later  Louis  Napoleon  was  elected  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic.  His  Presidency,  his  coup  d'etat  and 
dictatorship  of  1850-185 1,  the  popular  approval  ex- 
pressed by  ballot  of  his  assumption  of  imperial  dignity, 
and  the  new  constitution  of  1852  whereby  Napoleon  III 
was  proclaimed  "by  the  grace  of  God  and  the  national 
will  Emperor  of  the  French,"  are  to  be  explained  in  the 
light  of  a  new  orientation  in  political  practice. 

It  is  necessary  to  go  beneath  the  surface  of  the  sem- 
blance of  absolutism  which  Louis  Napoleon  revived. 
Napoleon  III  owed  his  title  to  the  nation.  He  had  been 
elected  President  and  sanctioned  as  Emperor  by  popular 
vote.  The  new  constitution  of  1852  recognised  the  prin- 
ciple of  universal  manhood  suffrage.  In  reality  it  pro- 
vided for  only  two  powers  in  the  State :  the  will  of  the 
majority  and  that  of  the  Emperor.  The  will  of  the  people 
was  held  to  be  the  source  of  all  power  In  the  State.    The 


174  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

constitution  was  to  be  submitted  to  them  for  approval. 
It  provided  that  imperial  authority  derived  its  strength 
from  their  sanction.  But  the  conduct  of  public  affairs, 
the  initiative  in  legislation,  the  control  of  foreign  policy, 
of  the  army  and  civil  service,  were  left  unreservedly  in 
the  hands  of  the  Emperor.  Ministers  could  be  dismissed 
at  pleasure  and  served  only  to  defend  the  policy  of  the 
Emperor  before  the  Chamber,  which  could  reject,  but 
not  improve,  harmful  legislation. 

It  would  seem  as  though  the  French  people,  tired  of 
the  endless  debates  and  the  hedging  policy  of  a  represen- 
tative assembly,  when  it  could  at  last  express  its  opinion 
by  ballot,  preferred  to  vest  unlimited  executive  authority 
in  a  single  man,  confident  that  the  ultimate  court  of  ap- 
peal was  the  nation.  Representative  government  in 
France  had  for  the  time  being  been  eclipsed.  Political 
privilege  as  expressed  by  universal  suffrage,  which  had 
been  extended  to  the  adult,  male  population,  had  sought  to 
give  to  the  nation  a  unity  and  coherence  which  it  had  not 
hitherto  attained.  The  Middle  Class,  at  first  so  alarmed 
at  the  rise  of  another  Napoleon,  was  not  slow  to  perceive 
that  in  reality  the  new  Empire  did  not  injure  its  broader 
interests.  There  now  seemed  no  obstacle  in  the  way  of 
the  indefinite  expansion  of  the  power  and  wealth  of  a 
State  which  would  adhere  to  a  capitalist-nationalist  pro- 
gramme. Class  struggle  with  the  rising  Proletariat,  which 
had  begun  to  define  itself,  seemed  eliminated.  The  nation 
appeared  to  present  a  united  front.  The  niagic^iif_num- 
JiSj'S,  the  vote  of  the  millions  of  citizens  which  had  legally 
sanctioned  the  change  in  government,  seemed  to  have 
given  rise  to  a  new  sense  of  national  power  and  national 
solidarity.  The  nation  had  for  the  first  time  expressed 
itself. 

It  was  this  new  form  of  nationalism  that  was  to  become 


THE  NATION-STATE  175 

the  controlling  factor  during  the  rule  of  Napoleon  III. 
He  was  to  take  up  the  old  programme  of  Napoleon  I  and 
make  it  the  key  of  his  political  practice.  To  do  this  it  was 
necessary  to  unite  all  authority  in  a  single  hand.  The 
nation  was  ready  and  willing  to  grant  this  authority.  The 
past  decade  had  been  one  of  vacillation  and  distrust.  Po- 
litical theorists  and  idealists,  men  of  moderate,  liberal 
views,  who  wished  to  avoid  entangling  obligations,  who 
favored  laissez-faire  in  politics  as  they  did  in  business,  had 
continued  in  control  of  the  government.  They  had  grown 
hostile  to  the  development  of  nationalism  abroad,  which, 
they  seemed  intuitively  to  grasp,  would  not  ultimately 
be  of  benefit  to  France.  The  Republic  of  1848  under  the 
guidance  of  the  poet  Lamartine  had  made  ample  profes- 
sions of  faith  in  favor  of  the  nationalist  movement.  But 
in  point  of  fact  the  Provisional  Government  had  refused 
any  real  assistance  to  the  Italians,  the  Poles,  and  the  Irish. 
Louis  Napoleon,  upon  his  election  to  the  Presidency, 
put  an  end  to  this  vacillating  policy.  He  felt  himself  the 
acknowledged  champion  of  nationalism.  He  was  ready 
to  rehabilitate  France  in  the  eyes  of  Europe  and  the 
world.  To  do  this  he  was  to  undertake  to  realise  the  dic- 
tum of  the  great  Napoleon  who  had  proclaimed:  "The 
Government  that  will  be  the  first  to  raise  the  standard  of 
nationalism  and  proclaim  itself  the  defender  thereof  will 
dominate  Europe.'* 


II 

The  Europe  of  1850  was  no  longer  that  of  1830.  A 
spirit  of  ruthless  competition  was  beginning  to  control  the 
relations  between  States.  National  patriotism  and  na- 
tional loyalty  were  being  made  to  serve  the  ends  of  eco- 
nomic and  political  expansion.    National  spirit  was  taking 


176  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

shape  and  fixing  itself  as  the  formative  force  of  great, 
strongly  consolidated  States.  The  national  will  hence- 
forth was  to  become  identified  with  the  concept  of  the 
State.  To  develop  national  strength,  to  become  a  Great 
Power,  and  if  possible  a  World  Power,  was  the  main 
ambition  of  the  concentrated  energy  of  the  State. 

To  carry  out  the  new  political  programmes,  centralisa- 
tion of  authority  was  essential.  It  was  felt  necessary 
to  define  and  render  precise  the  character  of  the  State, 
to  fuse  all  regional  characteristics  in  one  national  figure. 
John  Bull  as  England,  or  France  represented  as  Mari- 
I  anne,  were  more  than  mere  symbols  for  the  use  of  political 
cartoonists.  By  them  the  State  was  personalised.  The 
Nation-State  thus  conceived  had  come  to  represent  and 
visualise  the  fusion  of  national  energy  and  national  ca- 
pacity, and  compel  attention  by  its  overtowering  strength. 
To  increase  this  strength  by  expanding  its  boundaries 
hand  in  hand  with  its  commerce  and  industries  was  deemed 
the  surest  and  simplest  method  to  heighten  national  pres- 
tige and  add  new  power  to  the  State.  Government  was 
looked  upon  as  a  mechanism  which  was  to  function  for 
the  purpose  of  giving  life  and  vigor  to  the  State,  to  excel 
in  competition  with  other  States  as  men  sought  to  excel 
in  competition  with  other  men. 

The  State  was  to  become  the  hero  of  a  new  hero- 
worship.  Liberty  was  translated  into  privilege,  in  politics 
as  in  business.  De  Tocqueville  has  pointed  out  that  "So- 
ciety is  tranquil  not  when  it  is  conscious  of  its  strength 
and  wellbeing  but,  on  the  contrary,  when  it  believes  itself 
I  to  be  feeble  and  infirm,  and  fears  that  it  will  die  if  it 
'make  the  slightest  effort." 

The  restless  activity  of  the  ensuing  decades  would  seem 
to  testify  to  the  fact  that  the  peoples  of  Western  Europe 
had  become  conscious  of  their  strength   and  wellbeing. 


.o^ 


THE  NATION-STATE  177 

It  cannot  be  gainsaid  that  there  was  a  vigorous  expansive  ^^ 

energy  displayed,  which  promoted  difficult  enterprise.  An~^  ^ 
assertive  outlook  on  life,  a  realist  perception  of  what  ap- 
peared to  be  the  needs  of  the  moment,  a  positivist,, 
mechanistic  view  of  the  relation  of  men  to  their  environ- 
ment, a  blind  subservience  to  the  tenets  of  competition 
had  increased  the  nerve  force  and  power  of  resistance  of  ^ 
the  peoples  of  Western  Europe.  The  wellbeing,  which 
had  resulted  from  the  tireless  pursuit  of  economic  ends, 
had  translated  itself  into  power. 

The  democratic,  middle  class  social  structure  of  the 
19th  century  and  the  struggle  for  equal  opportunity  had 
accustomed  men  not  to  look  too  closely  for  a  nice  balance 
between  cause  and  effect.  There  was  no  time  for  search- 
ing inquiry  into  the  possible  unforeseen  results  of  a  plan 
of  action  or  policy  which  was  to  be  entered  upon.  It 
was  felt  that  if  too  much  time  was  spent  in  plans,  too 
little  would  be  left  for  their  realisation.  Men  were  con-  fK^>^ 
tent  to  take  big  risks_..  The  success  of  some  of  the  great-  e\«*^*' 
est  Inventions  which  had  revolutionised  the  economics  of 
social  life  had  hitherto  often  been  retarded  by  timidity 
and  lack  of  faith  in  new  undertakings.  Speculative  _ 
enterprise  which  produced  such  successful  results  re- 
quired an  acute  appreciation  of  the  needs  of  the  moment, 
rather  than  a  patient  Inquiry  into  the  detailed  working 
out  of  their  consequences.  '  The  Industrial  system  had 
bred  a  type  of  man  who  combined  caution  with  darinff.  V^^ 
thrift  with  Initiative.  "The  romantic,  contemplative  spirit 
of  the  generation  that  had  been  reared  during  the  Napo- 
leonic wars  had  all  but  vanished.  Men  were  eager  for 
new  enterprise,  not  to  be  undertaken  in  a  spirit  of  adven- 
ture, but  frankly  for  profit. 

It  is  in  this  new  spirit  that  the  great  colonial  empire, 
which  England  had  been  building  up,  was  brought  to  its 


^L.^..-^?^ 


178  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

logical  climax.  Trading  companies  were  no  longer  given 
monopolies  and  grants.  The  principle  o^  free  trade  had 
triumphed,  and  the  State  asserted  its  sovereign  rights  by 
occupation,  cession,  or  conquest.  That  the  sun  never  sets 
in  the  British  Empire  became  the  boast  of  power,  the 
incentive  to  fresh  effort  among  her  industrious,  patriotic 
Middle  Class,  whose  prosaic  outlook  on  life  was  lighted 
up  by  the  reflected  glory  of  the  vast  World  State  which 
its  industry  had  made  possible,  and  its  commerce  and 
enterprise  held  together.  The  people  of  England  now 
wished  to  let  the  world  know  what  they  had  accomplished 
along  the  lines  of  trade  expansion.  In  185  i  we  find  the 
Prince  Consort  engaged  in  promoting  the  plans  for  an 
International  Industrial  Exhibition  to  be  held  at  London; 
the  first  of  these  exhibitions  which  were  to  become  so 
prominent  a  feature  of  the  ensuing  era.  Queen  Victoria 
headed  the  subscription  list  to  raise  the  funds  necessary 
to  advertise  to  the  world  the  progress  and  preeminence 
of  British  wares.  As  long  since  Catholicism  had  under- 
stood that  "meme  Dieu  a  besoin  de  ses  cloches,"  so  now 
it  was  felt  that  the  State  had  need  to  be  known,  to  ad- 
vertise its  power  measured  in  terms  of  its  products.  High 
hopes  were  placed  in  these  industrial  exhibitions,  which 
followed  each  other  in  rapid  succession  in  various  parts 
of  the  world.  They  were  intended  to  "diffuse  a  love  of 
industry  and  peaceful  emulation  over  the  whole  globe," 
and  while  it  was  admitted  that  commerce  had  its  weak 
and  even  degrading  elements,  it  was  believed  that  "few 
occupations  of  man  are  more  humanising,  or  tend  more 
to  teach  the  value  of  peace  and  goodwill."  Such  were 
the  opening  scenes  of  the  drama  of  nationalism  and  capi- 
talism, as  enacted  by  the  Middle  Class,  as  soon  as  it  had 
secured  complete  control  in  the  State.  It  was  not,  how- 
ever, as  was  expected,  to  result  in  establishing  peace  and 


THE  NATION-STATE  179 

goodwill  among  men,  but  to  lead  to  a  fierce  and  embit- 
tered struggle  for  power  among  States. 

Though  a  small  orthodox-liberal  group  viewed  with 
suspicion  the  increasing  encroachments  of  the  State  in 
what  had  hitherto  been  considered  the  domain  of  private 
affairs,  and  the  diversion  of  public  attention  from  the 
traditional  middle  class  policy  of  laissez-faire,  which  had 
made  possible  the  progressive  advance  in  national  pros- 
perity, a  greater  majority  was  daily  being  won  over  to  the 
new  way  of  thinking.  The  State  had  become  a  Jiving 
reality,  a  concrete  factor  in  everyday  life.  As  it  was  felt 
the  aim  and  duty  of  the  individual  to  develop  his  natural 
capacity  and  prove  his  ability,  so  the  personalised  State 
was  expected  to  strain  its  full  energy,  to  prove  and  mani- 
fest its  capacities,  to  develop  its  national  power.  It  was 
coming  to  be  believed  that  petty  States  had  a  very  "du- 
bious and  insecure  existence,"  which  they  could  only  ren- 
der secure  by  seeking  the  protection  of,  or  attaching  them- 
selves to,  stronger  States.  The  chief  recognised  means  of 
increasing  the  power  of  the  State  in  competition  with  . 
other  States  was  by  a  skilful,  rlaringL^for(^J£n  ppliry  sup-  / 
ported  by  a  strojig_jjj»y.     The  internal  prosperity  of  \ 

the  State  was  best  fostered  by  affording  full  scope  to  in- 
dividual enterprise  within  the  limits  of  national  interest.      wA^. 
The  private  life  of  the  individual  was  subordinated  to  1 1    i^*^ 
the  needs  of  the  State.     The  State  arrogated  to  itself      J^X""^ 
close  supervision  of  its  citizens  in  order  to  strengthen 
itsauthority.      It  now  required  s_tncL_adherence  to  the 
laws  of  the  land  which  regulated  more  minutely  than 
ever  the  varied  activities  of  the  individual.      It  demanded 
peremptorily  the  performance  of  such  recognised  obli- 
gations as  the  payment  of  taxes  or,  in  some  States,  also 
military  service.     On  the  Continent  the  introduction  of 
compulsory  military  service,  the  strategic  disposition  of 


i8o  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 


^v 


the  chief  railways,  which  were  all  constructed  so  as  to 
ass  through  the  capital,  the  telegraph  system,  which  was 
looked  upon  as  the  nervous  system  of  the  State,  con- 
tributed to  render  more  distinct  the  image  of  the  person- 
alised State.  It  came  to  be  accepted  that  "nationality 
gives  the  chief  impulse  to  public  life." 


CHAPTER  VII 

Napoleon  III 

HIS    NATIONALIST   POLICY — RELATIONS   WITH    FOREIGN    POWERS- 

f^HE    POSITION    OF    RUSSIA — PAN-SLAVIC    MOVEMENT THE 

'^         CRIMEAN  WAR — THE  ROLE  OF  ENGLAND THE  CON- 
GRESS   OF    PARIS — RUSSOPHILE    TENDENCIES 


IT  was  during  this  final  phase  of  the  formative  period  of 
the  Nation-State  that  Napoleon  III  found  himself 
with  a  free  hand  to  carry  forward  the  programme  of 
the  nationalist  expansion  of  France.  The  policy  he  pur- 
sued to  achieve  this  end  has  been  variously  estimated. 
There  are  those  who  would  see  in  the  Emperor  the  cham- 
pion of  oppressed  nationalities,  who  kept  Europe  in  a 
state  of  continuous  turmoil  in  carrying  out  an  altruistic 
policy  which  was  to  compass  his  downfall.  There  are 
others  who  claim  that  Louis  Napoleon  had  a  very  shrewd 
perception  of  the  best  methods  to  be  pursued  to  increase 
the  power  and  glory  of  France,  and  that  he  undertook  no 
enterprise  without  seeing  to  it  that  France  was  paid  in 
full  for  whatever  services  she  rendered.  "It  is  true  that 
Napoleon  interested  himself  in  a  number  of  oppressed 
nationalities,  but  he  never  went  to  war  in  their  behalf." 
He  opened  up  negotiations  with  Hungarian  revolutionists 
in  order  to  urge  them  to  war  against  Austria.  He  as- 
sisted the  Italians  only  upon  condition  of  their  agreeing 
to  the  annexation  of  Savoy  and  Nice  to  France.     He 

I181] 


i82  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

urged  Prussia  to  drive  Austria  out  of  the  German  Con- 
federation, and  after  this  had  been  accomplished,  de- 
manded compensation  for  his  benevolence  and  good  ad- 
vice in  the  form  of  the  right  to  acquire  Luxemburg. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  but  that  there  is  a  part  of  truth 
in  both  these  points  of  view.  Napoleon  III  was  es- 
sentially a  man  of  his  epoch,  sensitive  to  its  moods  which 
he  interpreted  in  all  circumstances  as  favorable  to  his  own 
plans.  It  was  commonly  accepted  in  the  Europe  of  the 
day  that  France  represented  the  "principle  of  national- 
ity." Under  the  rule  of  Napoleon  III  France  was  to 
become  the  patjtejpi- of  a  closely-knit,  homogeneous  Na- 
tion-State, whose  government  and  administration  were 
looked  to  as  worthy  of  imitation.  He  took  advantage 
of  every  opportunity  to  Increase  this  opinion  by  proving 
that  it  is  by  competitive  methods,  identical  with  those  of 
the  business  world,  that  the  State  may  be  expected  to 
rise  to  power,  and  enjoy  prosperity. 

In  1850  three  States  besides  France  were  counted  as 
Great  Powers:  England,  Austria,  and  Russia.  England 
was  well-known  to  Napoleon  III.  Its  people  had  on  more 
than  one  occasion  offered  him  a  safe  refuge.  As  his 
nearest  neighbor,  who  was  daily  growing  wealthier  and 
more  powerful.  Napoleon  III  felt  drawn  to  friendly 
intercourse  with  England;  the  more  so  as  the  British 
Government,  still  engrossed  with  assimilating  its  newly 
acquired  colonial  domain,  was  disinterested  in  the  affairs 
of  continental  Europe,  and  would  give  him  a  freer  hand 
there  and  protect  him  from  flank  attack.  The  mistake 
Napoleon  I  had  made  in  antagonising  England  was  to 
be  remedied  by  his  nephew  who,  during  the  early  years 
of  his  reign,  cultivated  the  friendliest  relations  with  the 
Court  of  St.  James. 

Austria,  with  its  legitimist,  absolutist  theory  of  State, 


NAPOLEON  III  183 

its  anti-nationalist  structure  and  policy,  was  looked  upon 
by  French  public  opinion  as  the  natural  rival  of  France. 
The  harsh  methods  of  repression  of  the  nationalist  risings 
in  Italy  and  Hungary  had  resulted  in  awakening  a  strong 
sentiment  of  animosity  against  the  Austrian  Governm.ent,  C. 
which  in  France  was  now  held  to  be  "a  standing  menace 
to  Europe."  The  fact  that  the  Vienna  authorities  had 
already  repudiated  their  promise,  won  during  the  days 
of,  the  revolutionary  outbreak  of  1848,  to  grant  liberal 
reforms,  and  had  withdrawn  the' concession  of  a  represen- 
tative assembly  as  soon  as  they  felt  strong  enough  to  do 
so,  added  to  the  distrust  which  the  people  of  France  felt 
towards  the  Austrian  Government,  and  strengthened  the 
position  of  Napoleon  III  in  prosecuting  an  anti-Austrian 
policy  which  had  the  approval  of  public  opinion. 

Russia  at  this  time  lay  beyond  the  sphere  of  intimate 
contact.  The  Tsar  maintained  his  absolutist  regime  ap- 
parently intact,  untroubled  by  revolutionary  propaganda, 
which,  when  it  became  annoying,  was  rapidly  stamped  out. 
Nevertheless,  nationalism  as  a  political  incentive  to  ag- 
grandisement found  even  in  the  Emperor  Nicholas  I  a 
fervent  disciple.  But  it  was  a  different  nationalist  im- 
pulse from  that  which  prevailed  in  the  West.  It  was 
wholly  egoistical,  and  was  made  to  promote  the  autocratic 
power  of  Russia  and  to  denadojialise  her  non-Russian 
subject   peoples.      To    increase    the   prestige   of   Russia,  . 

Nicholas  I  made  war  on  the  Persians  and  then  on  the  /N/'<^lTt>l^ 
Turks.  He  initiated  the  Pan-Slavic  movement,  which  was 
extended  to  the  Balkans  and  to  Austria  in  later  years.  He 
attempted  to  Russi anise  all  his  subjects,  and  forcibly  to 
convert  the  Roman  Catholics  to  the  Orthodox  ritual.  His 
hostile  attitude  towards  the  Poles,  his  conversion  of  that 
country  into  a  province,  and  other  similar  activities  which 
were  reprobated  in  Western  Europe,  were  inspired  by 


i84  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

the  same  nationalist  sentiment  which  had  become  the 
motive-force  of  public  policy  there,  and  proved  the 
political  and  social  solidarity  of  Russia  with  Western 
Europe,  in  spite  of  the  paramount  interest  of  Russia  in 
Asiatic  affairs,  which  had  hitherto  contributed  to  keep  the 
country  outside  the  orbit  of  Western  political  progress. 
Nicholas  I  had  remained  aloof  from  Western  European 
affairs.  He  viewed  with  suspicion  the  increasing  prestige 
of  the  British  in  Central  Asia,  and  watched  closely  the 
development  of  liberalism  in  the  West.  When  in  Poland 
liberalism  had  assumed  the  form  of  a  national  insurrec- 
tion he  had  repressed  it  with  vigor.  Called  upon  by  the 
Austrians  for  assistance  to  stamp  out  the  nationalist  re- 
volt of  the  Magyars,  he  sent  a  powerful  force  into  Hun- 
gary in  1849,  with  the  result  that  this  nationalist  rising 
also  was  suppressed.  By  this  act  Russia  had  gained  the 
enmity  of  the  peoples  of  the  West. 


II 

The  real  causes  of  the  Crimean  War  were  complex. 
The  encroachments  of  Russia  on  Turkey  and  the  ac- 
tivity the  Russians  displayed  in  Central  Asia  threatening 
British  possessions  in  India  were  contributing  factors. 
While  public  opinion  in  France  would  have  viewed  a 
war  against  Austria  with  more  enthusiasm,  the  fact  that 
Russia  had  assisted  Austria  in  suppressing  the  struggle 
for  national  liberty  of  the  Magyars,  and  the  sympathy 
aroused  for  the  Poles  by  the  harsh  treatment  they  had 
endured  at  the  hands  of  Nicholas  I,  had  made  popular 
any  aggressive  policy  which  Napoleon  III  might  choose 
to  pursue  against  Russia. 

It  was  expected  of  Napoleon  III  that  he  would  resur- 


NAPOLEON  III  185 

rect  the  military  prestige  of  France  by  a  successful  for- 
eign campaign.  Though  the  memory  of  the  galling  de- 
feat of  the  French  in  18 12  had  no  part  in  practical  poli- 
tics, yet  the  recollection  of  the  Moscow  campaign  was 
ready  to  hand,  and  was  skilfully  made  use  of  to  arouse  L 
patriotic  enthusiasm  for  a  war  against  Russia.  The  les- 
sons of  the  history  of  Napoleon  I  had  not  been  lost  upon 
Napoleon  III.  The  latter  realised  that  a  well-balanced 
coalition  is  inevitably  stronger  than  a  single  State,  no  mat- 
ter!what  the  other  odds  may  be. 

As  soon  as  Napoleon  III  had  consolidated  his  position 
at  home  and  by  the  assumption  of  the  imperial  dignity 
felt  this  position  secure,  he  began  to  venture  on  foreign 
enterprise.     He  drew  closer  to  England  and  found  her  ^^-i 

willing  to  listen  to  the  arguments  In  favor  of  a  campaign      ^^o*^ 
against  Russia.     The  pretext  for  war  was  found  in  the  f^ 
dispute  over  the  protection  of  the  holy  places  in  Palestine, 
which  Napoleon  III  claimed  for  France  in  the  name  of 
the  Roman  Catholics,  and  Nicholas  I  demanded  on  be- 
half of  the  Orthodox  clergy. 

It  would  appear  that  Russia  counted  on  being  sup- 
ported by  Austria  in  case  the  situation  should  become  un- 
duly strained.  Nicholas  I  sent  a  special  ambassador  to 
Constantinople  In  February  1853  to  press  his  claims,  and 
at  the  same  time  demanded  the  sole  right  of  protecting 
the  Orthodox  Christians  In  Turkey.  The  Porte  appealed 
to  the  Western  Powers.  In  June  a  French  and  English 
fleet  sailed  into  the  Eastern  Mediterranean.  Negotia- 
tions continued  until  Turkey,  supported  by  the  Allies,  de- 
clared war  on  Russia  (October  5,  1853). 

A  Franco-British  expeditionary  force  was  in  due  course 
landed  in  the  Crimea,  and  the  siege  of  Sebastopol  was 
begun.  Austria  failed  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  Russia, 
and  as  the  result  of  diplomatic  pressure  even  went  so  far 


i86  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

as  to  join  the  Western  allies,  though  she  took  no  active 
part  in  military  operations.  The  war  dragged  on  with- 
out decisive  result.  Epidemics  ravaged  the  allied  armies 
and  caused  more  casualties  than  active  fighting. 

The  French,  who  had  borne  the  brunt  of  the  operations, 
were  growing  tired  of  the  war.  On  March  2,  1855, 
Nicholas  I  died,  and  was  succeeded  by  his  son,  Alexander 
II.  The  accession  of  the  new  Emperor  seemed  to  presage 
the  gratification  of  the  French  desire  for  peace.  Nego- 
tiations were  opened  at  Vienna  to  find  a  suitable  ground 
for  an  adjustment,  but  nothing  came  of  the  attempt. 

The  siege  of  Sebastopol  was  pressed  with  renewed 
vigor.  Napoleon  III  made  ready  to  proceed  to  the 
Crimea  to  take  over  the  command  of  the  allied  forces  in 
person.  Then  came  the  news  of  the  French  victory  at  the 
Malakoff,  the  fall  of  Sebastopol,  and  the  destruction  of 
the  greater  part  of  the  Russian  Black  Sea  fleet  in  Its 
harbor    (September   1855). 

In  the  meantime  Napoleon  had  given  up  his  plan  of 
proceeding  to  the  scene  of  operations,  so  that  after  the 
victory  Paris  witnessed  a  military  triumph  the  like  of 
which  had  not  been  seen  since  the  days  of  Napoleon  I. 
The  Te  Deum  at  Notre  Dame  was  made  the  occasion  of 
a  magnificent  military  display.  "All  Paris  turned  out 
to  see  the  procession  pass,  and  when  the  gala  carriage 
drawn  by  eight  horses  led  by  equerries  on  foot,  in  which 
Napoleon  III  clad  in  the  uniform  of  a  general  had  taken 
his  place,  appeared,  a  great  cheer  broke  forth  from  the 
assembled  crowds :  'Vive  I'Empereur,  Vive  VArmee.'  "  ^ 
The  honor  of  French  arms  had  been  avenged.  Napoleon 
III  had  refurbished  the  military  glory  of  France.  He 
was  ready  for  peace. 

But  such  was  not  the  mood  of  England.    The  news  of 

*  Cf.  La  Gorce,  Histoire  du  Second  Empire,  Vol.  I. 


NAPOLEON  III  187 

the  destruction  of  the  Russian  Black  Sea  fleet  was  re- 
ceived with  enthusiasm.  The  British  were  now  anxious  to 
continue  the  war  with  renewed  vigor.  The  capture  of 
Sebastopol  was  regarded  by  them  merely  as  a  preliminary 
operation.  England  was  intent  upon  dispatching  a  fleet  to 
attack  and  annihilate  the  Russian  Baltic  fleet.  But  public 
opinion  in  France  was  tired  of  the  war,  which  had  been  of 
little  profit  to  the  country.  Moreover,  the  destruction  of 
the  Russian  fleet  in  northern  waters  would  have  given 
England  too  great  a  naval  superiority.  Napoleon  III 
realised  that  the  only  possible  object  which  might  induce 
the  French  to  continue  the  war  was  the  restoration  of  the 
Kingdom  of  Poland.  To  this  project  England  refused  to 
give  its  adherence.  Thereupon  Napoleon  III,  while  out- 
wardly preparing  for  the  continuance  of  the  war,  never- 
theless let  it  clearly  be  understood  by  Russia  that  he  was 
ready  for  peace.  The  preliminary  negotiations  were  con- 
ducted through  Vienna.  The  conditions  were  submitted 
to  Russia  in  the  form  of  an  ultimatum,  on  November  14, 
1855.  The  neutralisation  of  the  Black  Sea,  the  cession  of 
Moldavia  and  part  of  Bessarabia  were  stipulated.  After 
some  tortuous  negotiations  and  delays,  Russia  finally  ac- 
cepted the  demands  (January  16,  1856).  One  month 
later  a  peace  congress  was  convoked  to  meet  at  Paris. 
Seven  European  States  were  represented.  Prussia,  who 
took  no  part  In  the  war,  had  begged  to  be  admitted,  as 
questions  of  International  Importance  were  to  be  dis- 
cussed; while  Piedmont  had  won  the  right  to  a  seat  in  the 
Congress,  as  she  had  dispatched  a  small  force  to  partici- 
pate in  the  expedition. 

The  Congress  of  Paris  began  its  work  in  earnest  on 
February  28.  Napoleon  III  soon  found  himself  playing 
the  role  of  arbiter  between  the  English  delegates,  whose 
disappointment  at  not  continuing  the  war  had  translated 


i88  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

itself  into  a  desire  to  exact  a  humiliating  peace,  and  the 
Russians,  who  though  they  had  lost  the  war,  now  felt 
that  they  had  gained  in  Napoleon  III,  if  not  a  friend,  at 
least  a  benevolent  well-wisher,  who  would  use  his  influ- 
ence in  restraining  any  exaggerated  claims  which  might 
be  put  forward  by  the  British  Government.  In  return, 
for  these  good  services,  Russia,  the  enemy  of  yesterday, 
was  ready  to  support  French  policy  as  long  as  not  incom- 
patible with  her  direct  interests.  Napoleon  III,  in  re- 
sponse to  public  opinion,  desired  to  help  the  process  of 
the  formation  of  national  States  in  the  Balkans.  The 
protectorate  of  Russia  over  Moldavia  and  Wallachia 
had  been  abolished  by  preliminary  agreement.  France, 
in  pursuance  of  its  nationalist  policy,  proposed  the  union 
of  these  two  principalities  as  the  basis  of  the  formation 
of  a  new  Nation-State.  Russia  agreed;  but  Austria  and 
Turkey  violently  objected  to  the  interference  of  France 
in  what  they  deemed  to  be  the  internal  affairs  of  the 
Balkans.  To  avert  the  danger  of  widening  the  breach 
between  France  and  her  former  allies,  it  was  thought 
advisable  to  adjourn  the  settlement  of  this  question  until 
the  conclusion  of  peace. 

Three  weeks  after  the  opening  of  the  peace  conference 
the  atmosphere  had  become  tense.  "Everybody  is  an- 
noyed; it  is  time  to  sign,"  the  Austrian  ambassador  noted, 
voicing  the  general  sentiment  of  the  delegates.  On  March 
30,  to  avoid  further  complications,  peace  was  speedily 
signed.  England  and  Austria  were  loud  in  their  recrimi- 
nations against  Napoleon  III  for  having  intervened  on 
behalf  of  Russia  and  softened  the  terms  of  the  treaty. 
He  had  in  addition  sacrificed  Polish  freedom  to  his  new 
Russian  friendship.  The  protocol  of  November  14,  1855, 
had  provided  for  the  signing  of  a  secret  treaty  of  alliance 
between  France,  England,  and  Austria  to  guarantee  the 


NAPOLEON  III  189 

enforcement  of  the  terms  of  the  treaty  and  the  integrity 
of  Turkish  territory.  Napoleon  III  took  no  great  pains 
to  conceal  his  lack  of  enthusiasm  at  being  a  party  to  such 
an  agreement,  which  he  was  nevertheless  compelled  to 
enter  upon   (April  15,  1856). 

The  new  Russophile  attitude  of  Napoleon  III  was  in  a 
measure  due  to  the  skilful  policy  pursued  by  the  Russian 
peace  envoy  to  the  Paris  Congress.  Napoleon  III  was 
not  insensible  to  the  flattery  implied  by  the  deferential 
aititude  of  the  Russian  Government,  which  had  in  the 
past  been  the  leading  spirit  in  the  Holy  Alliance  and  the 
most  implacable  enemy  of  his  house.  At  the  same  time, 
the  Emperor  of  the  French  was  already  preparing  plans 
for  future  aggrandisement  nearer  home,  in  which  the 
neutrality,  if  not  the  active  cooperation,  of  Russia  was  an 
essential  element. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

The  New  Nationalism 


SURVEY     OF     THE     INTERNATIONAL     SITUATION RELATIONS     BE- 
TWEEN STATES NAPOLEON  III  AND  ITALIAN   UNITY THE  WAR 

WITH  AUSTRIA VILLAFRANCA EFFECTS  OF  UNION  OF  ITALY 

POLAND FRANCO-RUSSIAN       TENSION THE       MEXICAN 

EXPEDITION BISMARCK  AND  THE  WAR  WITH  DENMARK 

ANNEXATION    OF    THE    DANISH    DUCHIES PRUSSIA 

AND  AUSTRIA — SADOWA THE   TREATY  OF   PRAGUE 

THE     NORTH     GERMAN    CONFEDERATION THE 

COLLAPSE     OF     THE      MEXICAN      EMPIRE THE 

LUXEMBURG  INCIDENT THE  GERMAN  MEN- 
ACE  THE     WAR     OF    187O SEDAN THE 

FOUNDATION  OF  THE  GERMAN   EMPIRE 


IT  has  been  necessary  to  enter  in  some  detail  Into  the 
situation  arising  out  of  the  Crimean  War  and  the 
Paris  Congress,  In  order  to  make  clear  the  factors  of 
continental  European  policy,  which  were  destined  to  have 
SO  deep  an  influence  on  political  evolution. 

Russia  had  again  been  drawn  into  the  vortex  of  West- 
ern European  affairs  and  was  making  friendly  overtures 
to  Napoleon  III,  though  the  Tsar  was  congenitally  op- 
posed to  the  latter's  interpretation  of  nationalism  and  the 
erection  of  Nation-States.  England  had  allied  herself 
with  France,  partly  with  the  view  of  avoiding  the  pos- 
sibility of  another  Napoleonic  war,  partly  to  make  use  of 
France  in  thwarting  Russian  expansion  in  Central  Asia 
and  if  possible  to  involve  Russia  in  a  Western  policy. 

[190] 


THE  NEW  NATIONALISM  191 

The  old  German  Empire  was  on  the  eve  of  dissolution, 
and  Prussia  was  pushing  forward  her  claims  to  German 
hegemony,  which  it  was  beginning  to  be  realised  could  be 
accomplished  only  by  the  forcible  ejection  of  Austria  from 
the  Germanic  Confederation.  The  Hapsburg  realm,  torn 
by  nationalist  dissensions,  nevertheless  retained  a  sem- 
blance of  its  former  influence.  Vienna  had  become  the 
scene  of  all  negotiations  of  Near  Eastern  problems. 

In  the  Balkans  the  various  peoples  still  under  the  rule 
of  the  Turks  were  beginning  to  f^eMhe_st4«4ftg-  of  the 
national  impulse  to  state  building.  The  Danubian  prin- 
cipalities had  acquired  autonomy;  the  Greeks  were  de- 
manding the  annexation  of  Crete;  the  Serbs  and  Bulgars 
were  agitating  for  Independence.  In  Italy,  Piedmont  had 
the  same  task  before  it  as  Prussia  had  in  Germany,  but 
Cavour,  the  leading  statesman  of  his  day,  was  convinced  1 
that  the  Italians  were  not  strong  enough  to  confront  the 
Austrians  unaided,  and  was  looking  for  assistance.  At 
the  Paris  Congress  he  had  had  occasion  to  discover  that 
Napoleon  III  would  lend  a  willing  ear  to  his  plans  for 
the  national  unity  of  Italy  under  the  House  of  Savoy,  and 
he  worked  assiduously  to  assure  for  himself  this  proffered 
aid.  Such  was  the  situation  In  Europe  during  the  decade 
when  Western  policy  and  Western  political  practice,  die-  ^, 
tated  by  the  Middle  Class,  and  still  to  all  intents  and 
purposes  uninfluenced  by  the  pressure  of  the  Proletariat, 
may  be  said  to  have  become  pivotal  throughout  the  world. 

In  the  Orient  Japan  was  being  opened  to  peaceful 
Western  intercourse  by  the  United  States,  and  China  was 
entering  upon  closer  relations  with  the  West.  British 
trade  with  China  had  grown  to  be  of  great  importance, 
and  an  occasion  was  soon  to  be  found  to  force  an  enter- 
ing wedge  which  was  to  open  China  to  Western  com- 
mercial penetration.     The  French  and  British  were  act- 


192  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

ing  in  concert  in  Chinese  waters,  and  the  new  markets, 
of  the  East  required,  it  was  believed,  a  more  energetic 
Europeanising  policy,  which  could  best  be  promoted  by- 
securing  direct  diplomatic  intercourse  with  Peking. 

In  the  United  States  the  economic  as  well  as  the  social 
factors  of  slavery  had,  with  the  growth  of  industrial  and 
commercial  enterprise,  the  consequent  wellbeing  in  the 
Northern  States,  and  the  more  direct  and  intimate  inter- 
course of  the  latter  with  the  South,  resulted  in  a  distinct 
cleavage  of  policy  regarding  the  extension  of  slavery.  It 
was  coming  to  be  felt  that  the  country  could  no  longer 
remain  "half  slave  and  half  free."  While  the  Southern 
States  were  essential  to  the  industrial  prosperity  of  the 
North,  the  South,  with  a  market  for  its  cotton  in  Eng- 
land, could,  it  was  thought  by  some  of  the  Southern 
leaders,  have  a  prosperous  existence  as  an  independent 
State.     Here  also  war  clouds  were  gathering. 

The  world  had  suddenly  become  a  smaller  place  to  live  \ 
in.  The  various  peoples  had  become  dependent  upon 
one  another,  in  order  to  be  able  to  satisfy  their  wants. 
Under  the  impetus  of  the  competitive  system  these  wants 
were  continuously  being  enlarged,  and  greater  efforts 
were  being  made  to  satisfy  them.  Commercial  expansion 
had  become  closely  linked  with  national  expansion,  and  it 
had  come  to  be  believed  that  the  strong,  national  StatesjL 
were  the  ones  most  fitted  to  promote  commercial  pros- 
perity and  assert  their  position  in  world  affairs. 

In  Europe  the  nationalist  impulse  had  come  to  dominate 
political  life.  England  in  pursuing  her  more  selfish  plans 
of  capitalist  expansion  sought  to  reconcile  the  desire  for 
national  independence,  in  so  far  as  it  concerned  foreign 
States,  with  her  own  liberal  views  of  government  in  which 
democratic  principles  were  recognised,  without  commit- 
ting her  to  any  nationalist  programme  at  home.     It  was 


THE  NEW  NATIONALISM  193 

left  to  France  to  assume  the  more  perilous  role  of  active 
champion  of  nationalism,  which  for  the  time  being  was 
tending  to  make  her  again  the  principal  factor  In  Euro- 
pean affairs. 

In  spite  of  the  growing  hostility  oetween  Russia  and 
England,  Napoleon  III  adhered  closely  to  his  plan  of  re- 
maining on  good  terms  with  England  and  promoting  the 
alliance  between  the  two  countries.  With  the  friendship 
of  Russia  seemingly  assured,  and  with  England  as  his  ally, 
Napoleon  III  felt  that  he  could  safely  venture  to  Intervene 
In  the  affairs  of  the  Italian  peninsula.  No  time  was  lost 
in  laying  the  foundations  for  this  undertaking.  Six 
months  after  the  Paris  Congress  a  Franco-British  fleet 
appeared  In  Neapolitan  waters,  to  remonstrate  against 
what  these  two  Powers  professed  to  deem  the  misgov- 
ernment  of  the  King  of  Naples.  Russia,  somewhat  to 
the  surprise  of  France,  promptly  protested  against  this 
action  as  interfering  with  the  rights  of  an  Independent 
sovereign.  The  allies,  posing  as  supporters  of  liberalism 
and  good  government,  persisted  In  their  plans.  How- 
ever, Napoleon  III  felt  that  before  pursuing  his  policy 
It  would  be  better  to  come  to  some  definite  understanding 
with  Russia.  An  era  of  diplomatic  Intrigue  now  opened 
which  continued  uninterruptedly  throughout  the  Second 
Empire. 

The  aim  of  Napoleon  III  was  to  succeed,  on  the  one 
hand,  in  restraining  Russia  from  actively  assisting  Aus- 
tria as  she  had  done  in  1849  ^"  Hungary  should  the 
Italians  seek  to  throw  off  the  yoke  of  the  Austrians;  on 
the  other,  to  insure  Russian  neutrality  In  the  event  of 
French  intervention  in  Italy,  and  if  possible  secure  the 
support  of  Russia  by  Inducing  her  to  mobilise  a  Russian 
army  along  the  Galician  frontier  as  a  threat  against  Aus- 
tria.    France  further  reserved  for  herself  the  right  of 


L 


i94  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

territorial  acquisitions  at  the  expense  of  Italy  and  in  re- 
turn promised  to  agree  to  the  revision  of  the  clauses  of 
the  treaty  of  Paris  regarding  the  neutralisation  of  the 
Black  Sea,  which  Russia  deemed  intolerable.  These 
negotiations  were  kept  secret  and  not  even  carried  on 
through  regular  diplomatic  channels,  but  by  a  personal 
agent  of  Napoleon  III  at  the  court  of  Alexander  II, 
which  serves  to  lend  credence  to  the  belief  that  in  Italy 
the  French  Emperor  pursued  a  purely  personal  policy. 


II 

Napoleon  III  now  was  free  to  take  a  more  active  part 
in  posing  as  the  protector  of  the  Italian  peoples  and  to 
champion  their  aspirations  for  national  unity.  The  Pied- 
montese  were  soon  to  afford  a  favorable  opportunity  for 
more  aggressive  action.  In  the  meantime,  perceiving 
that  war  was  inevitable,  Austria  turned  for  support  to 
the  States  of  North  Germany. 

As  the  result  of  a  secret  agreement  entered  into  be- 
tween Napoleon  III  and  Cavour  at  Plombieres  (July 
1858),  Italy  was,  under  certain  eventualities,  promised 
the  support  of  French  arms.  Austria  readily  fell  into 
the  trap  set  for  her.  The  Vienna  Government  dispatched 
an  ultimatum  to  Turin  and  soon  thereafter  declared  war 
(April  1859).  French  assistance  was  thus  secured.  The 
French  won  signal  victories  at  Magenta  and  Solferino. 
In  the  midst  of  these  successful  operations,  Napoleon  III 
suddenly  agreed  to  come  to  terms  with  Austria,  and  an 
armistice  was  signed  at  Villafranca  (July  11,  1859) 
followed  by  a  patched-up  peace.    The  causes  of  this  volte 


? 


THE  NEW  NATIONALISM  195 

face  are  not  far  to  seek.  Russia,  alarmed  at  the  propor- 
tions of  the  nationalist-iiising  in  Italy  and  its  possible  re- 
percussion in  Poland,  had  begun  to  waver  in  her  friendly 
support.  It  is  even  suggested  that,  owing  to  her  prepon- 
derant influence  at  Berlin,  she  was  able  to  induce  the  Prus- 
sians to  mobilise  along  the  Rhine,  or  at  least  did  not  pre- 
vent them  from  doing  so.  Napoleon  III  was  afraid  that 
he  had  committed  himself  unduly.  His  interest  in  Italian 
unjty  was  secondary  to  his  project  of  carrying  forward  a  I 
profitable  anti-Austrian  policy,  which  at  the  time  was  ' 
immensely  popular  in  France,  and  to  securing  adequate 
territorial  compensation,  which  would  make  him  appear 
as  a  conqueror  in  the  eyes  of  his  own  people. 

However,  the  process  of  the  unification  of  Italy  was 
not  stopped  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  French.     The  na- 
tionalist movement  continued.    The  British  lent  their  sup-     ^^  f 
port  to  Garibaldi  in  his  enterprise  against  Naples.     In        ^;^,4-u 
the  meantime  Napoleon  III  again  changed  his  attitude. 
He  now  threatened  the  Piedmontese  with  armed  inter-    ^ 
vention  should  they  attempt  to  occupy  Umbria,  and  he 
reinforced  the  French  garrison  of  Rome. 

Alexander  II  expressed  his  satisfaction  at  this  change 
of  front,  and  hoped  that  the  French  would  carry  out 
their  threat.  Though  nothing  came  of  it,  the  treachery 
of  the  French,  as  it  was  qualified  by  the  Italians,  left  a 
deep  impression  in  Italy,  and  influenced  subsequent  Italian 
foreign  policy. 

In  spite  of  this  setback  the  process  of  the  unification  of 
Italy  continued.  The  Kingdom  of  Italy,  including  all  the 
States  of  the  peninsula  excepting  Venetia  and  Rome,  was 
proclaimed  an  independent  State  under  the  sceptre  of  the 
House  of  Savoy,  and  as  such  was  recognised  by  the  Pow- 
ers with  the  exception  of  Austria  (1861).     In  payment 


196  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

for  the  part  the  French  had  played  in  the  Italian  war  of 
liberation,  Savoy  and  Nice  were  annexed  to  France;  a 
very  profitable  compensation  for  a  campaign  which  had 
lasted  only  nine  weeks. 

Looked  at  in  the  light  of  its  actual  accomplishment, 
Italian  unity  appears  merely  as  a  part  of  the  complicated 
nationalist  programme  of  Napoleon  III.  In  reality  it  was 
i;  founded  on  the  far  deeper  motive  of  racialjiamogeneity 
as  the  basis  of  state  building,  which  at  this  epoch  came 
to  historical  maturity.  It  was  the  expression  of  the  na- 
tional consciousness  of  a  people  whose  political  develop- 
ment along  lines  of  middle  class  liberalism  had  been  re- 
tarded. In  Italy,  as  in  Germany,  nationalism  was  not 
primarily  a  political  project,  but  a  racial  requirement. 
It  was  currently  believed  by  the  supporters  of  the  new 
nationalist  doctrine  that  it  was  an  historical  necessity 
that  the  peoples  of  Italy  should  be  united  in  a  nationally 
homogeneous  State.  This  consolidation  could  no  longer 
be  delayed. 

The  position  of  Napoleon  III  was  now  preeminent  in 
Europe.  He  was  already  looking  for  new  fields  of  ac- 
tivity. Again  the  Polish  question  had  come  to  the  fore. 
The  successful  struggle  for  national  unity  in  Italy  had, 
as  was  to  be  expected,  a  direct  repercussion  in  Poland. 
While  friendly  relations  with  Russia  were  highly  desir- 
able. Napoleon  III  realised  that  the  plight  of  Poland 
had  aroused  French  public  opinion  to  such  a  pitch  that  it 
would  be  useful  for  him  to  take  some  action.  Russia 
perceived  the  new  orientation  of  French  policy  and  the/ 
tendency  of  Napoleon  III  to  consider  himself  strong* 
enough  to  forego  conciliating  Russian  feelings.  Alex- 
ander II  drew  closer  to  Prussia.  The  Berlin  Government 
was  called  upon  by  the  Tsar  to  cooperate  with  Russia  in 
keeping  the  Poles  in  subjection.      When  the  Polish  ques- 


THE  NEW  NATIONALISM  197 

tion  ^  was  beginning  to  be  the  cause  of  tension  between 
France  and  Russia,  Napoleon  III  became  conscious  of  the 
mistake  he  had  made  in  arousing  the  antagonism  of  the 
Tsar.  He  was,  therefore,  unwilling  to  resort  to  arms  to 
assist  the  Poles  to  obtain  their  independence,  especially 
after  he  had  received  information  regarding  the  rap- 
prochement which  had  taken  place  between  Berlin  and 
St.  Petersburg.  He  now  sought  to  divert  the  attention 
of  France  by  engaging  upon  an  expedition  on  the  Amer- 
ican ^4:ontinent. 


III 

The  disturbed  situation  in  Mexico  had  long  been  the 
subject  of  complaint  of  the  European  Powers.  Profiting 
by  the  circumstances  arising  out  of  the  Civil  War,  then 
raging  in  the  United  States,  which  left  that  country  out 
of  cause,  France,  England,  and  Spain  in  1861  sent  an 
expedition  to  Mexico  for  the  purpose  of  compelling  com-  1/ 
pliance  with  the  claims  presented  by  their  respective  sub-  ' 
jects.  The  Mexican  Government  then  in  power  became 
alarmed,  and  an  agreement  was  entered  into  which  was 
approved  by  England  and  Spain,  but  which  France  on  one 
pretext  or  another  refused  to  ratify.  When  the  Spanish 
and  English  contingents  were  withdrawn  the  French 
remained  behind,  and  In  April  1862  Napoleon  III  de- 
clared war  on  Mexico. 

Reinforcements  were  sent  out,  and  on  June  10,  1863, 
the  French  occupied  Mexico  City.  Napoleon  III  was 
now  In  nominal  possession  of  a  vast  overseas  domain. 
The  United  States  torn  by  a  war,  which  It  seemed  at  the 

*  In  regard  to  the  Poles  Napoleon  III  is  said  to  have  declared:  "J'ai 
change  ma  maniere  de  voir  siir  bien  des  points,  disaii  il  a  I'lin  de  ses 
amis,  mais  je  pense  sur  la  Pologne  comme  en  1831." — E.  Olliver,  Empire 
Liberal,  Vol.  VI,  Chap.  III. 


< 


198  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

time  would  probably  result  in  the  splitting  of  the  country 
into  two  relatively  weak  States,  was  unable  to  assert 
forcibly  the  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which 
for  forty  years  had  served  to  protect  the  American  con- 
tinents from  European  intervention. 

In  spite  of  his  success  In  Mexico,  in  Europe  the  prestige 
of  Napoleon  III  had  been  shaken.  He  had  been  unable 
to  procure  the  active  cooperation  of  England  in  his  project 
for  securing  the  independence  of  Poland,  and  he  had 
turned  to  Austria  for  assistance,  which  had  been  only 
half-heartedly  conceded.  In  February  1863  the  Polish 
nationalists,  confident  that  they  would  receive  armed  as- 
sistance from  the  French,  were  carrying  on  a  strong  cam- 
paign against  the  Russians.  France  now  found  herself 
confronted  with  the  alternative  of  declaring  war  on 
Russia,  or  of  receding  from  her  position.  Napoleon  III 
sought  refuge  in  a  compromise.  A  joint  diplomatic  inter- 
vention on  the  part  of  Austria,  England,  and  France  was 
proposed,  which  was  to  secure  the  recognition  of  the  civil 
and  religious  liberty  of  Poland.  In  June  a  demarche  In 
this  sense  was  made,  but  Russia,  confident  that  England 
would  not  take  up  arms  and  that  Austria  was  loth  to 
do  so,  refused  to  consider  the  proposals  made,  and  France 
for  the  first  time  since  the  accession  of  Napoleon  III 
found  herself  Isolated  In  Europe.  Public  opinion  in 
France  was  in  favor  of  the  war  against  Russia,  and  a  war 
party  at  court  urged  the  Emperor  to  take  a  decisive 
stand,  but  this  he  prudently  declined  to  do,  and  war  was 
averted.  But  the  Franco-Russian  friendship  had  been 
destroyed.  The  Polish  revolt  was  suppressed  by  the 
Tsar  with  his  habitual  firmness.  The  animosity  of  the 
Russians  had  been  aroused,  and  they  took  occasion  to 
show  it  by  cultivating  more  assiduously  the  existing  inti- 
mate and  friendly  relations  with  Prussia,  by  favoring  her 


THE  NEW  NATIONALISM  199 

projects  for  expansion,  and  by  approving  of  the  plan  of 
annexation  of  the  Danish  Duchies.  The  British  Govern- 
ment, mistrustful  of  the  growing  power  of  France'which 
had  been  increased  by  the  Mexican  adventure,  welcomed 
the  breaking  off  of  the  friendly  relations  between  France 
and  Russia. 

There  is  no  historical  evidence  upon  which  to  base  the 
assumption  that  Napoleon  III  at  this  time  entertained  any 
suspicion  of  the  ulterior  designs  of  Prussian  aggrandise- 
men-t.  On  the  contrary,  he  seems  to  have  favored  the 
creation  of  a  strong  Prussian  state  as  essential  to  the 
balance  of  power  in  Central  Europe.  Deprived  of  the 
support  of  Russia,  conscious  of  the  lukewarm  feelings 
growing  in  England,  Napoleon  III  turned  to  Austria. 
Here  we  can  perceive  the  motive  which  led  to  the  selection 
of  Archduke  Maximilian  as  Emperor  of  Mexico.  Napo- 
leon III  hoped  thereby  to  win  the  support  of  Austria  and 
allay  the  suspicions  of  England,  while  maintaining  a  suffi- 
cient control  over  the  new  sovereign  of  Mexico  to  re- 
tain for  himself  a  free  hand  in  American  affairs.  In  May 
1864  the  new  Emperor  and  Empress  of  Mexico  landed 
at  Vera  Cruz.  The  French  army  of  occupation  remained 
in  the  country,  assisted  by  an  Austrian  contingent  and  a 
Belgian  legion. 

Meanwhile  the  situation  in  Europe  was  'rapidly  ap- 
proaching a  crisis.  The  guidance  of  international  policy 
was  passing  from  the  French.  Prussia,  strengthened  "by 
the  proferred  friendship  of  Russia,  was  making  ready  to 
assert  her  ascendancy  in  Europe.  Bismarck  had  com- 
pleted his  tour  of  duty  as  Ambassador  to  Russia  and  to 
France,  and  had  returned  to  Berlin  to  put  through  the 
plans  for  the  reorganisation  of  the  army  in  the  face  of 
strong  popular  disapproval.  In  official  quarters  it  was 
even  feared  that  a  revolutionary  outbreak  would  result 


II 


li 


200  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

from  the  harsh  methods  Bismarck  pursued.  He  grasped 
at  the  opportunity  offered  to  find  a  happy  diversion  for 
national  energy  in  a  war  against  Denmark,  With 
Austrian  cooperation  Denmark  was  easily  brought  to 
terms.  Schleswig-Holstein  was  occupied;  and  Europe 
confronted  with  the  fait  accompli  (1864).  Confident  in 
the  strength  of  his  newly-formed  army,  Bismarck  was 
already  preparing  for  the  war  against  Austria.  By  his 
skilful  manoeuvring  Austria  was  led  into  a  difficult  posi- 
tion over  the  question  of  the  annexed  duchies.  A  formal 
attempt  to  avoid  war  was  made  by  Russia,  France,  and 
England.  Russia  was  not  seriously  concerned  with  re- 
straining Prussia,  and  France  appears  to  have  viewed  the 
aggressive  attitude  of  Prussia  without  undue  alarm. 

The  Mexican  enterprise  was  giving  Napoleon  III  more 
cause  for  concern.  In  November  1865  the  United  States 
had  addressed  an  urgent  note  to  France,  demanding 
the  withdrawal  of  the  French  forces  from  Mexico,  in- 
sinuating that  the  United  States  would  be  compelled  to 
intervene  in  behalf  of  the  republican  party  in  Mexico 
in  case  French  support  was  not  withdrawn.  For  a  time 
Napoleon  III  paid  little  heed  to  the  demands  of  the 
American  Government.  He  was  watching  the  develop- 
ments of  the  situation  in  Europe. 

The  struggle  between  Prussia  and  Austria  for  suprem- 
acy in  Germany  could  no  longer  be  postponed.  The  brief 
month's  campaign  led  to  the  rout  of  the  Austrians  at 
Sadiis^a  and  the  armistice  of  Nikolsburg  (July  1866). 
Napoleon  III  seemed  suddenly  to  realise  the  peril  of  the 
military  superiority  of  Prussia.  If  her  victorious  prog- 
ress was  not  checked,  Prussia  would  come  to  occupy  a  pre- 
ponderant position  in  Europe.  Without  delay  he  set  to 
work  to  arrest  the  further  rise  of  Prussia.  The  Italians, 
who  had  declared  war  against  Austria   simultaneously 


THE  NEW  NATIONALISM  201 

with  Prussia,  had  suffered  defeat,  but  were  ready  and 
anxious   to   continue    the   war.      Napoleon   III   brought      . 
pressure  to  bear  and  restrained  the  Italians  from  per- 
sisting in  the  campaign.    Venetia,  which  had  been  handed 
over  to  him,  he  turned  over  to  Italy.     Bismarck  for  his 
part  had  ulterior  reasons  for  not  pressing  Austria  and  her    > 
South  German  allies  unduly.      He  did  not  wish  to  throw 
them   into   the   camp   of   the   irreconcilable   enemies   of 
Prussia.     He    foresaw   that   the   South   German   States 
which  had  sided  with  Austria  in  this  war  would  soon  be    ^ 
incorporated  in  the  new  German  Empire,  which  he  hoped 
to  revive  under  Prussian  leadership. 

Within  another  month  the  treaty  of  Prague  (August 
23,  1866)  was  signed.  By  it  Austria  was  excluded  from 
participation  in  the  new  organisation  of  German  States. 
The  possession  of  Venetia  was  confirmed  to  Italy.  Prussia 
formally  annexed  the  Danish  Duchies,  and  various  North 
German  States  which  had  sided  with  Austria  were  in- 
corporated. The  new  North  German  Confederation  was 
constituted  (1867).  The  King  of  Prussia  thereby  be- 
came the  hereditary  President  and  General  of  the  Confed- 
eration, to  whom  was  entrusted  the  sole  direction  of 
German  foreign  policy.  He  was  assisted  by  a  responsible 
Chancellor  whom  he  nominated.  The  authority  of  the 
President  was  in  a  measure  checked  by  the  Reichstag,  a 
representative  body  elected  by  universal  suffrage,  and  by 
the  Bundesrat  which  represented  the  governments  of  the 
allied  States  of  the  Confederation.  To  these  the  legis' 
lative  power  and  the  control  of  the  federal  administration 
were  entrusted. 

In  Austria,  also,  political  reorganisation  had  taken 
place.  Since  i860  the  process  of  granting  local  self- 
government  to  the  various  races  had  been  undertaken. 
By  the  Fundamental  Law  (February  1861)  each  racially 


202  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

distinct  national  group  was  to  have  its  own  Landtag  and 
enjoy  partial  autonomy,  while  all  were  to  elect  members 
to  a  common  Reichstag,  which  was  to  control  the  Imperial 
Government  and  enact  the  general  legislation  of  the 
realm.  However,  Hungary  had  consistently  refused  to 
send  representatives  to  this  Reichstag.  After  the  treaty 
of  Prague,  Vienna  made  renewed  attempts  to  conciliate 
the  Magyars,  who  demanded  that  the  Hungarian  Con- 
stitution should  be  acknowledged,  and  the  laws  of  1848 
and  the  virtual  independence  of  Hungary  be  recognised. 
This  was  finally  agreed  to  by  Vienna.  It  meant  the 
restoration  of  the  dualist  system  whereby  Austria  and 
Hungary,  though  ruled  over  by  the  same  sovereign,  was 
each  to  have  a  separate  Parliament  and  separate  Min- 
istries. The  two  appointed  a  joint  Assembly  or  Delega- 
tions, which  was  to  act  with  Ministers  common  to  both 
States  in  matters  concerning  foreign  affairs,  finance,  and 
war. 

The  outcome  of  the  Austro-Prussian  War  left  no 
doubts  in  the  mind  of  Napoleon  III  as  to  the  policy  of 
expansion  which  Prussia  would  soon  embark  upon.  The 
prospect  of  having  to  carry  on  a  war  with  the  United 
States  over  Mexico  had  become  serious,  owing  to  the 
firm  attitude  of  Washington.  Therefore,  soon  after 
Sadowa  the  Emperor  ordered  the  recall  of  French  troops 
fromTVIexico.  He  realised  that  the  cause  of  the  Imperial 
Government  in  Mexico  was  lost,  and  he  urged  Maximilian 
to  abandon  his  throne.  This  Maximilian  refused  to  do. 
The  evacuation  of  the  French  was  spread  over  a  period 
of  six  months.  Finally  in  February  1867  it  was  com- 
pleted. As  was  to  be  expected,  the  Mexican  republicans 
took  up  arms,  and  in  May  the  Empire  was  overthrown, 
the  Emperor  was  taken  prisoner,  and  executed  (July 
1867). 


THE  NEW  NATIONALISM  203 


IV 

The  position  of  Napoleon  III  was  now  seriously  im- 
paired. His  foreign  policy  was  violently  attacked  in  the 
Corps  Legislatif.  His  autocratic  rule  was  beginning  to  be 
felt  to  be  irksome.  The  docility  with  which  the  nation  ,, 
had  followed  and  supported  his  various  foreign  enter-  I 
prises  had  changed  into  an  attitude  of  resistance.  The 
^  Emperor  found  himself  compelled  to  make  concessions 
to  the  popular  demand  for  the  return  to  a  more  liberal 
constitutional  regime.  Various  decrees  were  issued  dur- 
ing the  early  months  of  1867  modifying  the  constitution 
in  this  sense.  These  were  carried  out  during  the  next 
two  years.  Both  Houses  were  granted  the  right  of  initiat- 
ing legislative  measures.  Ministers  were  permitted  to 
become  members  of  Parliament,  and  were  to  be  held 
responsible  to  the  Senate. 

In  order  to  retrieve  his  waning  fortunes,  Napoleon  III 
now  sought  to  obtain  adequate  compensation  for  his 
benevolent  neutrality  towards  Prussia  during  the  war  of 
the  latter  against  Austria.  At  first  it  had  seemed  plau- 
sible to  the  Emperor  to  seek  this  compensation  in  territory 
along  the  Rhine,  and  he  actually  did  present  demands  for 
the  left  bank,  including  the  city  of  Mayence  (August 
1867).  The  Berlin  Government  was  unwilling  to  listen 
to  such  proposals,  and  Napoleon  III  cast  his  eyes  upon 
Belgium  and  Luxemburg.  Before  proceeding  further 
with  these  negotiations  he  sought  to  sound  Alexander  II 
and  secure  the  views  of  the  Russian  Government,  which 
he  hoped  would  possibly  be  willing  to  lend  its  assistance  in  * 
pressing  his  demands  amicably  in  order  to  avoid  friction 
with  Prussia.  But  he  found  the  Russian  Emperor  im- 
passible, and  received  no  encouragement  from  that  source. 


I 


204  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

Meanwhile  Napoleon  III  had  determined  to  secure  the 
approval  of  Berlin  of  the  purchase  of  Luxemburg  from 
the  King  of  Holland.  Negotiations  were  entered  into 
and  met  with  apparent  success,  both  at  the  Hague  and 
Berlin.  Satisfactory  progress  had  been  made,  signatures 
were  about  to  be  affixed  to  the  final  documents  of  transfer, 
when  on  April  i,  the  newly  assembled  Reichstag  voiced 
its  disapproval  and  demanded  that  the  German  Govern- 
ment see  to  it  that  negotiations  be  stopped  and  the  sale  of 
Luxemburg  to  France  be  prevented.  It  was  the  first  time 
that  the  new  united  Germany  had  spoken,  yet  its  demand 
was  not  to  be  disregarded.  Russia  warned  Napoleon  III 
of  the  probability  of  war  should  he  persist  in  his  project. 
To  save  his  face  the  Emperor  was  compelled  to  agree  to 
the  neutralisation  of  Luxemburg,  and  a  congress  was  con- 
voked to  meet  at  London  to  adjust  the  matter. 

After  the  Luxemburg  incident  it  was  evident  to  shrewd 
political  observers  that  a  war  with  Prussia,  which  had 
just  been  so  narrowly  averted,  could  not  be  long  delayed, 
especially  since  it  was  evident  that  Russia  seemed  little 
inclined  to  restrain  Prussian  ambitions.  The  Tsar  took 
every  occasion  to  tighten  the  bonds  of  his  relations  with 
Prussia,  and  resisted  the  repeated  efforts  now  made  by 
France  to  detach  Russia  from  her  Prussian  alliance.  For 
some  years  past  Russia  had  been  held  by  France  a  negli- 
gible quantity.  Now  Napoleon  III  realised  that  an  un- 
derstanding with  Alexander  II  was  essential  if  the  po- 
litical equilibrium  of  European  States  was  to  be  main- 
tained. Externally  relations  with  Russia  had  greatly  im- 
proved since  the  crisis  caused  by  the  Polish  question.  Na- 
poleon III  endeavored  to  point  out  to  the  Russian  Em- 
peror that  the  continued,  unchecked  growth  of  Germany, 
the  fostering  of  the  new  nationalism  based  on  racial 
unity,  would  inevitably  result  in  an  attempt  on  the  part 


THE  NEW  NATIONALISM  205 

of  the  Prussians  to  incorporate  all  German-speaking 
peoples,  from  Courland  to  Alsace,  in  one  vast  empire.^ 
But  he  was  unable  to  detach  Alexander  II  from  his 
German  affiliations,  and  the  Tsar  took  the  occasion  of  an 
interview  with  the  King  of  Prussia  to  agree  upon  a 
friendly  policy  which  Russia  would  pursue  in  the  event  of 
a  war  between  France  and  Prussia  (June  1870). 


1\  V 

The  increasing  influence  of  the  Hohenzollerns  in  inter- 
national affairs  had  been  shown  by  the  election  of  a 
prince  of  the  elder  branch  of  the  house  as  Prince-Regent 
of  the  Danubian  Principalities.  Having  been  successful 
in  placing  a  Hohenzollern  prince  on  the  throne  of  a  rising 
Balkan  State,  the  Berlin  Government,  now  for  the  first 
time  conscious  of  its  political  ascendancy  and  desirous  of 
asserting  its  newly-acquired  strength,  put  forward  the 
candidature  of  another  Hohenzollern,  the  elder  brother 
of  the  regent  of  the  Principalities,  Prince  Leopold,  for 
the  vacant  throne  of  Spain  (February  1870). 

France  suddenly  found  herself  confronted  by  what  ap- 
peared to  be  a  serious  menace.  The  spectre  of  the  re- 
vival of  the  Empire  of  Charles  V  seemed  to  haunt  French 
public  opinion.  The  threat  of  German  hegemony  in 
Europe  had  become  a  reality.  Napoleon  III,  the  de- 
fender of  nationalism,  the  instigator  of  national  unity,  <^ 
who  had  sought  to  dominate  Europe  by  the  creation  of  a 
number   of   satellite   Nation-States,    now   found   himself 

'Before  proceeding  to  his  post  at  St.  Petersburg  (October  1869) 
the  new  French  Ambassador,  General  Fleury,  received  the  following 
special  instructions  from  Napoleon  III:  "Le  General  Fleury  fcra  com- 
prendre  le  danger  que  fait  courir  a  I'Europe  I'idee  germanique  qui  si 
elle  continue  a  grandir,  doit  naturellement  englober  en  sa  sphere  d'action 
tous  les  pays  qui  parlent  allemand  depuis  la   Courlande  jusqu' Alsace." 


2o6  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

faced  by  the  new  racio-nationjjly  united-Ggnnany,  whose 
vitality  and  aggressive  power  seemed  to  destine  her  to 
supplant  France  as  the  dominant  State  on  the  Continent. 

Nationalism,  as  interpreted  by  the  Germans,  was  not  a 
political  principle  which  was  merely  to  be  made  use  of  to 
serve  diplomatic  intrigue,  but  a  dynamic  social  force, 
which  was  to  sweep  the  French  thesis  aside.  Racial  unity, 
rnnfrollerl  and  disciplined,  was  tn  be  the  corner-stone 
of  the  new  state  building.  Nationalism,  as  understood 
in  Germany,  was  a  physical  as  well  as  a  political  need.  It 
was  born  of  a  combination  of  racial  and  intellectual  pride, 
which  promoted  the  belief  that  everything  was  possible 
which  strong  men  dare  to  undertake.  It  was  a  nation- 
alism bred  of  the  absolute  spirit  of  the  preceding  gen- 
eration; ne.i.ther_persqnal  nor  Jjidividual,  but  racial,  col- 
lectivej^and  social.  The  German  people  felt  ready  to 
shape  their  own  destiny, 

Europe  had  watched  with  interest  the  rise  of  Prussia 
and  the  successive  stages  of  her  political  evolution.  It 
had  applauded  the  outcome  of  the  Austrian  campaign, 
and  the  rebuff  administered  to  France  in  the  Luxemburg 
affair  was  looked  upon  as  a  manifestation  of  the  vigour 
of  German  national  consciousness,  which  was  greeted 
without  undue  censure  by  the  other  Powers.  England,  in- 
terested chiefly  in  the  maintenance  of  the  balance  of 
power,  remained  a  somewhat  cynical  spectator  of  what 
she  imagined  was  still  the  old  political  game  that  was 
being  played  on  the  continental  chess-board.  Austria  had 
not  forgotten  the  humiliation  of  1866  and  could  under 
certain  circumstances,  it  was  believed  in  Paris,  be  induced 
to  take  up  arms  against  Prussia. 

As  the  result  of  pressure  brought  to  bear,  the  can- 
didacy of  Prince  Leopold  to  the  throne  of  Spain  had  been 
withdrawn.     But  the  difficulties  which  beset  Napoleon 


THE  NEW  NATIONALISM  207 

III  still  remained.  Unrest  at  home  and  the  continued 
financial  crisis  had  undermined  the  prestige  of  his  govern- 
ment. It  seemed  that  the  only  way  out  was  to  be  found 
in  a  successful  foreign  war.  In  spite  of  the  great  progress 
made  by  Prussia  in  her  military  reorganisation,  the  French 
armies,  which  had  seen  much  fighting  in  distant  lands 
under  difficult  conditions,  were  held  superior  in  equip- 
ment, tactical  training,  and  strategic  leadership.  The 
probability  of  Austria  and  the  South  German  States  join- 
ing'the  French  was  not  to  be  excluded.  Here  Napoleon 
III  would  have  a  coalition  which  he  was  confident  would 
be  victorious.  The  nation  seemed  to  stand  solidly  behind 
the  Emperor  in  his  firm  attitude  towards  Prussia.  The 
aspirations  of  the  latter  to  European  hegemony,  the 
adoption  of  the  favored  French  doctrine  of  nationalism 
as  the  aggressive  factor  of  her  foreign  policy  directed 
against  France,  had  aggravated  the  feeling  of  enmity 
which  had  been  growing  up.  When  war  could  apparently 
no  longer  be  prevented,  France  took  up  the  challenge  and 
declared  war  (July  19,  1870). 

On  August  5  the  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Paris 
notified  the  French  Government  that  "if  Austria  mo- 
bilises, Russia  will  mobilise;  if  Austria  attacks  Prussia, 
Russia  will  attack  Austria."  With  Austria  ^  thus  immo- 
bilised the  last  hope  of  assistance  had  vanished.  Then 
came  in  rapid  succession  the  defeats  of  the  French  armies, 
culminating  in  Sedan  (September  2,  1870),  the  surrender 
of  Napoleon  III,  the  Revolution  of  September  4.     Na- 

*It  may  be  of  interest  to  recall  that  during  the  early  part  of  June 
1870  Napoleon  III  dispatched  a  confidential  emissary  to  Vienna  to  ar- 
range the  plans  for  a  joint  invasion  of  Prussia  by  France  and  Austria. 
Napoleon  III  also  expected  Italy  to  join  in  the  expedition  and  it  was 
agreed  that,  in  the  event  of  war,  the  French  forces  were  to  concentrate  in 
Northern  Bavaria,  where  they  were  to  be  joined  by  the  Austrian  and 
Italian  contingents,  and  this  great  army  was  to  march  on  Berlin  via 
Jena. 


2o8  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

poleon  III,  a  prisoner,  disappeared  from  the  scene.  A 
Provisional  Government  was  formed  which  attempted  to 
continue  the  struggle.  The  enemy  had  invaded  France. 
The  German  Empire  was  proclaimed  at  Versailles  (Jan- 
uary 1 871).  Paris  capitulated  after  a  five  months'  siege. 
Then  came  the  armistice  and  the  establishment  of  the 
Third  French  Republic.  Paris  passed  into  the  hands  of 
the  Commune,  which  held  out  for  six  weeks  (April  2— 
May  21).  Peace  with  Germany  was  signed  at  Frank- 
fort (May  10,  1871).  The  Republican  regime  reestab- 
lished order,  and  the  French  set  to  work  paying  off  their 
war  indemnity. 


CHAPTER  IX 

RealpoUtik 


THE     MOTIVES     OF     PUBLIC     POLICY NEO-MACHIAVELLIANISM- 

MORALITY  AND  POLITICS — THE  PERSONALISED  NATION-STATE 
1\  — DEFINITION  OF  REALISM — PHILOSOPHIC  BACKGROUND — ' 
THE  INFLUENCE  OF  PESSIMISM — SCHOPENHAUER — DE- 
CLINE OF  THE  POLITICO-JURIDIC  THEORY  OF  STATE 

THE   STATE   AS   POWER — VOLITIONAL    FACTORS 


THE  events  of  the  period  which  came  to  a  close  with 
the  Franco-Prussian  War  have  been  reviewed  in 
brief  outline  in  order  to  recall  the  relevant  factors  in  the 
historical  evolution  of  the  Nation-State.  They  will  serve 
to  call  attention  to  the  febrilit^  with  which  plans  of 
aggrandisement  were  pursued;  the  energy  displayed  in 
undertaking  distant  enterprise;  the  speculative  nature  of 
the  risks  assumed;  the  desire  for  compensation,  both  for 
armed  intervention  and  for  friendly  neutrality;  the  secret 
agreements  between  governments,  and  the  rapid  changing 
of  partners  in  an  alliance;  the  making  of  treaties  with 
mental  reservations  that  they  might  be  revised,  abro- 
gated, or  even  violated  if  the  need  should  arise.  An 
atmosphere  of  suspicion  pervaded  the  relations  even 
between  friendly  States.  Nation  building  had  developed 
into  a  routine  policy.  Armed  assistance,  or  neutrality 
as  the  case  might  be,  were  resorted  to  with  a  view  to  the 
advantage  to  be  reaped  from  the  policy  pursued.     War 

and  threats  of  war,  alliances  and  attempts  to  disrupt  the 

[209] 


2IO  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

friendly  Intercourse  between  other  States  had  for  their 
object  the  hope  of  Immediate  gain  rather  than  the  affirma- 
tion of  a  constructive  poHcy.  National  prestige  and  mili- 
tary power  had  come  to  be  looked  upon  as  assets  which 
had  a  market  value.  National  energy  was  devoted  to 
the  task  of  developing  a  clearly  marked  individuality  of 
a  given  people;  in  digging  a  deep  chasm  between  States; 
in  stamping  with  an  indelible  imprint  those  nalioftaLchar- 
acteristics  which  had  become  the  trade-mark  of  the  Na- 
tiori^ate. 

After  i860  Interest  in  internal  affairs,  the  structure 
of  the  State,  questions  of  individual  liberty  and  political 
prerogative,  for  the  time  being  became  of  secondary  Im- 
portance. Foreign  policy,  international  relations,  the  as- 
/sertion  of  the  national  will,  the  extension  of  national  in- 
\fluence  became  the  chief  political  preoccupation. 

Representative  government,  whether  monarchical  or 
republican  in  form,  had  in  principle  been  established,  and 
was  being  gradually  extended  In  practice  to  all  European 
States  with  the  exception  of  Russia.  Men  had  come  to 
believe  that  the  constitutional  system  was  to  be  the  final 
form  of  government,  and  as  It  seemed  the  best  adapted 
to  promote  national  prosperity,  they  accepted  Its  limita- 
tions. A  new  spirit  dominated  political  life.  There  was 
an  absence  of  faith  in  fixed  principles,  a  lack  of  con- 
viction that  rights  are  to  be  regarded  as  inalienable,  a 
growing  distrust  of  reason,  and  an  unb^ealthy  deference 
I    to  "thepjCLffifirs^hat  be"  and  the  fait  accompli. 

The  separation  of  morals  from  politics,^  which 
Machiavelli  had  first  emphasised  in  modern  times  as  es- 

*The  Romans  first  distinguished  law  from  morality  and  gave  it  a 
definite  form.  The  State  was  thereby  limited  in  that  its  legal  character 
was  defined  and  concerned  itself  less  with  the  ethical  ordering  of  the 
world.  No  one  could  resist  the  State  if  it  uttered  its  will.  But  the 
Roman  State  limited  itself;  it  restricted  the  province  of  its  own  power 
and  its  own  action. — Cf.  Biuntschli,  The  Theory  of  the  State,  Book  I,  p.  39. 


REALPOLITIK  211 

sential  to  the  proper  development  of  political  responsi- 
bility and  which  succeeding  generations  had  stigmatised 
as  diabolical,  now  came  to  be  recognised  as  a  greaj^st^p- 
in  advance,  a  factor  of  progress  in  that  it  had  served 
to  free  politics  from  the  trammels^  of  morals,  as  the 
State  had  been  treed  from  the  domination  of  the  Church. 

Nothing  could  better  serve  to  portray  the  new  temper 
of  the  times  than  the  rehabilitation  of  Machiavelli  as 
a  political  philosopher  which  took  place  at  this  time,  and 
the.  efforts  made  to  rank  him  with  Aristotle  as  a  master 
of  political  wisdom.^  The  Machiavellian  doctrine  that 
political  development  cannot  be  made  subservient  to 
moral  law,  that  in  promoting  the  welfare  of  the  State 
the  Prince  cannot  be  held  amenable  to  the  accepted  code 
of  morals,  now  gained  the  support,  not  merely  of  pol- 
iticians, but  also  of  political  theorists  and  public  opinion. 
Politics,  it  was  contended,  is  concerned  solely  with  affairs 
of  State  and  has  in  view  the  advantage  of  the  State,- 
morals  has  to  do  with  private  judgment,  the  good  and 
the  bad,  with  which  politics  has  no  concern.  The  person- 
alised Nation-State  was  developing  a  code  of  conduct  of 
its  own  which  had  nothing  in  common  with  private 
morals.  "Princes  sometimes  commit  shameful  deeds,  but 
we  cannot  blame  them  when  their  acts  are  useful  to 
their  States,  for  shame  is  covered  by  advantage  and  is 
called  wisdom."  ^ 

It  was  not  asserted  that  the  individual  was  of  no  im- 
portance,  but  that  his  importance  and  greatness  could  be 
measured  only  in  terms  of  the  importance  and  greatness 
of  the  State  of  which  he  was  a  member.  The  Nation- 
Sfafg  h a H  become  an  entity,  a  world  in  itself,  which  sought 

*  Cf.  Treitschke,  Politik  {Das  Verhdltniss  des  Staates  zum  Sittengesetz), 
Book  I,  Chap.  Ill,  and  Lord  Acton's  Introduction  to  //  Principe,  edited 
by  L.   A.  Burd. 

"Laurent,  Etudes  sur  I'Histoire  de  I'Humanite,  Vol.  X,  p.  344, 


212  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

to  absorb  all  the  interests,  all  the  talent,  all  the  wealth, 
vigor,  and  intellectual  capacity  of  its  members,  and  to 
claim  from  them  the  fruits  of  their  energy  and  enter- 
prise to  enhance  the  greatness  and  power  of  the  State. 
The  imprint  of  nationality  had  come  to  be  held  the 
proudest  possession  of  the  individual,  and  to  be  a  loyal 
Frenchman,  Englishman,  or  German  almost  more  impor- 
tant than  to  be  an  honest  man.^ 


II 


^   j;.  It  was   during   this   period   that   realism-  became   the 

dominant  motive  not  merely  in  politics,  but  was  reflected 
in  art  and  literature.  Romanticism  which  had  arisen  at 
the  time  of  the  taking  over  of  the  control  of  the  body 
politic  by  the  Middle  Class  about  1830  had  to  all  In- 
tents and  purposes  died  out. 

In  politics,  realism,  Realpolitik,  as  the  Germans  who 
were  the  first  to  introduce  it  in  its  modern  interpretation 
called  it,  bases  policy  solely  on  the  real,  not  on  the 
imagined,  factors  in  a  given  situation.  It  pretends  to 
mean  the  scientific  diagnosis  of  the  component  factors  of 
a  given  political  complex,  the  separation  into  their  pri- 
mary elements  of  these  various  factors,  and  the  weighing 
carefully  the  reaction  of  each  in  a  given  situation  viewed 
purely  objectively,  and  only  thereafter  determining  upon 
a  policy  In  which  the  margin  of  doubtful  and  unforesee- 
able elements  are  reduced  to  a  minimum,  if  not  entirely 
eliminated.  A  realist  policy  is  one  of  scientific  specula- 
tion, where  the  risk  involved  is  far  less  than  It  outwardly 

*  As  Bluntschli,  writing  at  this  time,  declared:  "Der  Staat  ist  ein  gauzes 
ein  Welt  fur  sich.  tVas  im  einzcln  base  ersclieint  ivird  im  Zusammenhang 
gut  gemacht.  Die  mdnnliche  Tugend  des  Patriotismus  ist  nirgends  rein 
'von  Beimischung  Leidenschaften  nutig  jiir  die  Staatspraxis." 


REALPOLITIK  213 

appears.  The  end  which  it  is  sought  to  attain  is  always 
to  be  well  within  reach,  much  under  the  assessed  strength 
of  the  effort  required  to  attain  it.^ 

If  we  examine  the  philosophical  background  upon 
which  this  realist  political  practice  was  etched,  we  will 
find  that  it  reflected  the  negative  pessimistic  outlook  on 
life  which  had  undermined  the  buoyant  faith  of  men 
in  themselves.  Scientific  research  was  revealing  that 
man  was  not,  as  had  hitherto  been  believed,  the  privileged 
image  of  a  Divine  Being,  but  merely  a  member  of  the 
animal  kingdom  linked  in  close  parentage  with  the  low- 
est forms  of  animal  life.  The  belief  that  man  was  spe-> 
cially  created  for  a  definite  purpose  was  thereby  proved 
false. 

Pfrf^rtibilify  and  prngrg,sS)  which  it  had  hitherto  been        ^y/^ ^ 
so  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  concept  of  the  immutable  -  ^ 

nature  of  man,  now  found  in  the  Darwinian  theories  of     ^s^^ 
evolution,  of  natural  selection,  and  the  survival  of  the    ,         ^\ 
fittest  adequate  confirmation.     These  new  doctrines  ap-  \\^^  ^ 
peared  to_canfer  scjentific  sanction  upon  the  competitive 
system.     With   the  progress  of  the  biological  sciences, 
what  we  may  call  the  biologic  interpretation  of  social  life 
arose,  which  transposed  wholesale  to  the  realm  of  politi- 
cal and  economic  life  those  laws  of  evolutionary  develop- 
ment which  had  come  to  be  accepted  as  explaining  sat- 
isfactorily, purpose  in  nature.- 

^"Realpolitik  ist  <welche  von  den  zuirktic/jen,  nicht  den  cingebildeten 
BedUrfnissen  des  Volkes  ausgeht,  ivelche  die  vorhandenen  Krdfte  und 
Mittel  richtig  schdtzt,  die  feindliche  und  freundliche  Mac/it  sorgfdltig 
berechnet  und  nur  erreichbare  Ziele  austrebt.  Nur  mit  dieser  Politik  sind 
Erfolge   moglich." — Bluntschli,  Politik,  p.  322. 

^  It  is  to  be  noted  that  these  doctrines  gained  currency  after  the  first 
enunciation  of  the  communist  principles  of  Marx.  It  has  always  been 
denied  by  the  scientific  socialists  that  a  relevant  analogy  may  be  drawn 
between  the  ruthless  struggle  for  survival  in  nature,  and  the  right  of 
the  stronger  to  appropriate  for  himself  all  the  benefits  of  civilisation,  as 
social  life  is  not  to  be  held  ruled  by  natural  laws,  but  by  economic  laws 
which  historical  materialism  seeks  to  interpret.     {See  p.  163.) 


214  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

The  spread  of  the  doctrines  of  middle  class  liberalism, 
the  extension  of  democratic  ideals  and  of  political  equal- 
ity had  made  men  independent  and  self-reliant,  but  at 
the  same  time  rendered  them  conscious  of  their  weakness 
as  individuals.  They  had  lost  all  sense  of  fixity  in  the 
social  order.  The  motives  of  public  policy,  the  factors 
of  social  development,  even  political  liberty  which  they 
had  struggled  to  acquire,  now  meant  little  to  them  as 
individuals.  PuMic_opinipn  wa.s^jnoiiLd^d-b^.,d.  ^rps  of 
skilled  specialists  who  expressed  the , aims  and  ambitions 
of  a^alSyor  atgpye^  The  in- 

crease of  the  means  of  communication,  the  new  discov- 
eries in  science,  the  rapid  growth  of  large  industrial  cen- 
tres, the  distant  wars  undertaken  for  obscure  motives, 
had  uprooted  men  from  their  old  associations  and  their 
former  modes  of  thought.  An  eclectic  spirit  had  broad- 
ened their  outlook.  It  professed  to  find  something  use- 
ful in  all  the  various  philosophies  of  the  past,  to  recon- 
cile divergences,  to  compromise  conflicting  opinions.  Re- 
ligious prejudice  had  almost  wholly  disappeared.  Politi- 
cal controversy  served  to  absorb  the  polemical  instincts 
which  had  hitherto  found  an  outlet  in  religious  disputes. 
Intellectual  and  moral  speculation  were  left  in  the  hands 
of  men  who  for  one  reason  or  another  were  unable  to 
take  part  in  active  life.  The  Qhurch  remained;  with- 
drawn  from  the  world,  it  was  daily  losing  ground.  In- 
difference in  matters  of  religion  had  become  widespread. 
The  scientific  temper  of  the  age  increased  the  tendency 
towards  agnosticism  and  scepticism,  which  few  religious 
leaders  were  found  able  enough  to  combat.  This  was 
in  a  measure  due  to  the  fact  that  the  clergy  was  largely 
recruited  from  a  mediocre,  uninspired  type  of  man,  unfit 
as  a  rule  for  the  more  exacting  life  of  affairs.  Uncer- 
tainty and  doubt  regarding  the  object  and  end  of  life  had 


REALPOLITIK  215 

taken  deep  root.  What  faith  there  remained  was  no 
longer  implicit,  but  inquisitive  and  critical,  and  found  itself 
daily  assailed  by  the  self-evident  truths  which  science 
laid  bare. 

For  science  had  attracted  men  endowed  with  the  most 
eminent  mental  faculties  who,  by  their  inventions  and  new 
theories,  served  both  philosophy  and  industry.  Men  of 
the  type  who  in  the  past  had  concerned  themselves  with 
questions  of  the  moral  nature  of  man,  and  who  had 
hdped  to  build  up  the  code  of  moral  law  which  had 
made  possible  the  development  of  moral  faculties,  now 
concerned  themselves  with  keen  investigation  of  the 
secrets  of  nature  and  natural  laws.  They  sought  to  dis- 
cover such  new  truths  as  could,  in  the  first  instance,  have  a 
practical,  value  in  everyday  life  and  only  in  a  secondary 
way  explain  the  ordering  and  meaning  of  the  universe. 

This  new  scientific  spirit,  this  rigid  empirical  testing  of 
truth  bred  a  critical  temper  which  made  men  conscious 
of  the  uncertainties  latent  in  all  theories,  suspicious  of 
their  conclusions  unless  confirmed  by  repeated  experi- 
mentation. 

The  dogmatic  spirit  of  positivism  was  making  way  for 
a  new  critjcal_^attij:ude,  which  held  that  in  human  affairs 
probability  is  far  more  often  ascertainable  than  cer- 
tainty. A  finite  intellect  must  be  a  fallible  intellect.  Man 
is  a  conditional  being,  and  cannot  know  absolute  certainty. 
"We  must  resign  ourselves  to  be  guided,  even  in  matters 
of  high  concern,  by  low  probabilities." 

The  pursuit  of  wealth  was  becoming  the  principal  con- 
cern of  men.  Industrial  and  commercial  life  absorbed 
the  best  energies  of  an  ever-increasing  majority.  The 
discoveries  of  science  and  the  intellect  of  men  engaged 
in  scientific  research  were  capitalised  as  part  of  the  new 
industrialism.     Politics,  however,  still  attracted  men  of 


2i6  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

virility  and  foresight,  who  found  in  the  monotony  and 
uniformity  of  democratic  institutions  a  suitable  field  for 
their  energies  as  leaders  of  a  docile  and  increasingly  well- 
disciplined  multitude,  which  was  willing  to  be  cajoled 
or  coerced  in  the  guise  of  patriotism.  Heroism,  a  love  of 
glory,  deeds  of  valour  for  valour's  sake,  a  broad,  disin- 
terested outlook  on  life,  a  contempt  for  rewards,  the  bril- 
liant culture  of  a  select  few,  had  been  definitely  dis- 
credited and  supplanted  by  a  mild-mannered,  self-cen- 
tred, close-calculating,  dull,  respectable,  and  genteel  way 
of  life. 

Men  felt  isolated  in  an  ever-growing,  ever-changing 
world.  They  had  lost  their  social  bearings  and  retained 
a  consciousness  of  their  individuality  chiefly  through  loyal 
allegiance  to  the  personalijedJNation-State. 

The  doctrines  set  forth  by  Schopenhauer,  which  had 
for  more  than  a  generation  been  disregarded,  now  came 
into  vogue  with  the  revival  of  n£itda&sijc_4ieiisiiijism :  ^ 
"The  notion  of  right  as  well  as  that  of  liberty  is  negative. 
Wrong  is  positive.  The  rights  of  man:  'everyone  has 
the  right  to  do  that  which  does  not  harm  another.'  " 

Schopenhauer  had  emphatically  declared  that  the  ex- 
istence of  such  a  body  of  social  coercion  as  the  State 
testifies  to  the  innate  injustice  prevalent  among  men.  The 
State,  according  to  his  view,  is  to  be  looked  upon,  not  so 
much  as  a  common  good,  as  a  protection  against  foreign 
foes  and  domestic  dissensions.  All  rights  are  in  reality 
based  on  the  strength  to  maintain  them.  Courage  is  to 
be  explained  as  a  voluntary  effort  made  to  ward  off  a 
present  danger  in  order  to  avoid  a  greater  danger  in  the 
future.     In  politics  as  in  life  "might  is  right."      "If  you 

*  "Not  to  be  born  is  the  happiest  destiny,  but  after  that  the  greatest 
happiness  is,  after  birth,  to  return  as  soon  as  possible  from  whence  one 
came." — Cf.  Sophocles,  (Edipus  at  Colonus. 


REALPOLITIK  217 

do  not  wish  to  be  enslaved,  enslave  your  neighbor  in 
good  time,  as  soon  as  his  weakness  gives  you  the  op- 
portunity; if  not  he  will  enslave  you."  ^ 

Such  were  some  of  the  tenets  of  the  new  pessimism,  ^<^^\x^'^^ 
so  alien  to  the  spirit  of  initiative  of  Western  civilisa-  ^.-^ 
tion.  This  pessimistic  point  of  view  permeated  deeply 
the  spirit  of  the  times.  It  undermined  the  positive  vigor 
of  middle  class  control  in  the  State,  and  must  be  inter- 
preted as  indicative  of  its  decay.  Schopenhauer's  doc- 
trin*^  of  this  "worst  of  all  possible  worlds"  was  carried 
to  its  extreme  by  Hartmann,  who,  standing  as  he  claimed 
at  the  nexus  of  the  conscious  and  the  unconscious,  de- 
clared that  when  humanity  had  become  intelligent  enough 
to  realise  its  misery  it  would  destroy  itself  "in  a  last 
despairing  act  of  cosmic  suicide."  ^ 

In  politics,  the  older  middle  class  maxims  of  policy, 
which  had  sought  to  assure  a  harmonious  balance  of 
power  in  the  State,  as  well  as  between  States,  had  been 
supplanted  by  a  passionate  partisanship,  a  desire  to  ^ 
affirm  the  power  of  a  particular  party  within  the  State, 
or  of  a  particular  State  In  competition  with  other  States. 
The  control  of  government  was  passing  Into  the  hands 
of  an  extra-legal  grouping  of  men,  a  party,  which  defined  I 
and  carried  out  the  will  of  the  majontyin  home  affairs 
and  Influenced  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs.  Public 
opinion  was  becoming  the  repository  of  public  policy. 
It  was  no  longer  an  opinion  moulded  by  a  free  Inter- 
course of  Ideas,  or  by  a  clear-sighted  referendum  to  an 
educated  Middle  Class,  but  more  and  more  was  being 
made  use  of  as  the  mouthpiece  of  a  small  prrnnp  of  party 
lead©*^,  who  by  their  shrewd  understanding  of  the  needs 
of  the  moment,  by  pandering  to  demands  which  they  had 

*  Cf.  Schopenhauer,  Rec/it  und  Politik. 

'  Cf.  Hartmann,  Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious. 


2i8  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

been  careful  to  create  and  could  thus  satisfy,  had  gained 
the  approval  of  their  followers.  Public  opinion  was  no 
longer  creative;  it  criticised  and  controlled  rather  than 
ruled. 


Ill 

The  politico-juri^ic^heory  of  the  State  was  giving  way 
to  a  fresh  concept.  It  was  coming  to  be  felt  that  the 
personalised  Nation-State  had  a  great  number  of  other 
functions  to  perform,  besides  those  of  enforcing  abstract 
right.  A  purely  juridic  interpretation  of  the  contractual 
obligations  as  binding  the  relations  between  the  governed 
and  the  governing  was  now  held  inadequate.  Legality 
in  politics  in  its  stricter  sense  was  an  abstraction  which 
had  grown  sterile.  The  practical,  cautious,  matter-of- 
fact  mind,  the  scientific  temper  of  the  new  Industrialism 
precluded  the  frank  acceptance  of  the  juridic  concept  of 
the  State  in  Its  positive,  dogmatic  sense.  As  In  the  prac- 
tice of  the  law,  legality  had  made  room  for  equity,  which 
pays  due  regard  to  circumstances,  examines  Into  the 
particular  state  of  affairs,  makes  allowances  for  extenu- 
ating conditions,  and  issues  a  verdict  in  the  light  of  events 
and  the  dictates  of  public  interest,  so,  under  the  influence 
of  the  new  political  ideology  which  was  growing  up,  the 
power  of  the  State  was  to  be  based  on  internal  concord, 
on  toleration  of  divergent  opinion  in  questions  relating  to 
religious,  political,  or  social  matters.  This  was  possible 
only  by  a  more  lax  Interpretation  of  the  law  than  had 
hitherto  prevailed.  Internal  peace  which  political  prac- 
tice sought  to  promote  was  not  held  an  end  in  itself.  It 
served  to  strengthen  the  cohesive  unity  of  the  State,  so 
that  it  might  be  able  to  assert  its  power  or  defend  Its 


REALPOLITIK  219 

policy,  if  need  be  by  armed  force,  in  the  competitive 
struggle  with  other  States. 

The  function  of  representative  government  came  to 
be  to  make  laws,  not  with  any  special  reference  to  their 
ethical  or  moral  value,  but  in  view  of  their  particular 
and  immediate  benefit  to  the  interests  of  those  directly 
concerned.  The  fact  that  these  laws  were  made  by  the 
representatives  of  the  politically  conscious  body,  the  elec- 
torate, who  were  believed  to  be  in  close  touch  with  the 
needs  and  aims  of  the  community,  and  as  such  able  to 
give  expression  to  its  rational  desires,  gained  for  the 
laws  enacted  the  authority  and  immediate  sanction  which 
hitherto  had  required  long-established  tradition  and  cus- 
tom. The  laws  passed  by  these  legislators,  whose  term 
of  office  was  in  many  instances  limited,  had  lost  all  con- 
tact with  any  broader  ethical  values.  They  were  as  a 
rule  enacted  for  the  benefit  of  a  particular  group  of  peo- 
ple, at  a  particular  time,  and  as  they  were  liable  to  re- 
peal, the  sanctity  and  m^jpsty  f)f  th^  law  which  was 
the  basis  of  the  politico-iuridic  theorv  of  State  was  be- 
ing slowly  undermined. 

The  belief  in  the  omnipotence  of  the  will  as  the  dictat- 
ing force  in  human  affairs  which  Rousseau  a  century  be- 
fore had  outlined,^  now  for  the  first  time  received  tenta- 
tive application  and  resulted  in  the  further  transforma- 
tion of  political  practice,  which  was  to  influence  the  con- 
duct of  affairs  of  State. 

A  well-balanced  rationalism,  a  desire  to  limit  and  mod- 
erate the  incoherent  forces  of  nature,  to  dictate  to  them 
the  discipline  of  the  human  mind,  was  giving  way  to  a 
belief  in  the  supremacy  of  the  human  wijl. 

The  direct  relation  of  this  new  interpret'\tion  of  the 
freedom  of  the  will  to  that  of  political  liberty  might 

*Cf.  Contrat  Social,  Book  III,  Chap.  I. 


I 


/ 


220  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

readily  be  traced.  Hitherto  political  liberty  had  been 
interpreted  as  a  limited  freedom,  subject  to  the  dictates 
of  accepted  practice,  ethical  standards,  and  moral  law. 
The  revival  of  the  Machiavellian  doctrine  of  the  com- 
plete separation  of  politics  from  morals  was  accompanied, 
by,  or  rather  in  a  large  measure  the  result  of,  the  newly 
awakened  faith  in  the  omnipotence  of  the  human  wiU. 
The  theory  that  man  if  given  free  rein  could  make  him- 
self what  he  willed  was  speedily  adapted  to  apply  to 
the  Nation-State.  It  had  come  to  be  doubted  that  the 
course  of  human  history,  the  flow  and  sequence  of  events, 
was  either  natural  or  necessary.  Not  only  was  it  sub- 
ject to  change,  to  accidents,  but  especially  to  the  will  of 
man,  the  nature  of  which  was  only  vaguely  understood. 
The  new  science  of  psychology  attracted  able  inquirers 
who  sought  to  investigate  the  motive  of  human  action,  to 
formulate  a  scientific  hypothesis  of  the  will  divested  of 
its  moral  attributes,  and  if  possible  to  arrive  at  a  clearer 
understanding  of  its  nature.  The  will,  independent  of 
moral  direction,  untrammelled  by  moral  law,  was  held  to 
be  best  suited  not  merely  to  guide  the  destiny  but 
to  promote  the  welfare  of  the  State.  It  was  becoming 
the  current  conviction,  proved  by  so  many  examples 
drawn  from  everyday  life,  that  moderate  mental 
faculties,  inferior  capacity,  and  even  limited  opportunity 
could  be  transformed  into  assets  of  great  power  by  a 
firm,  tenacious,  persevering  will.  It  was  coming  to  be 
felt  that  the  will,  steeled  against  vacillation  and  weak- 
ness, could  more  than  offset  other  deficiencies.  The  sur- 
vival of  the  fittest  meant  the  survival  of  the  strongest 
will  to  survive.  It  was  not  lost  sight  of  that  the  in- 
dividual could  often  to  great  advantage  make  use  of 
the  negative  qualities  of  will  such  as  endurance,  stamina, 
fortitude.     But  in  the  affairs  of  State  the  negative  ex- 


REALPOLITIK  221 

pression  of  the  will  was  deemed  inadequate  to  promote 
practical   political    aims,    as    the    State    had    at   its    dis- 
posal the  means  of  coercion  based  on  the  use  of  armed 
force.    In  other  words,  the  State  was  held  an  expression  of  ^ 
a  positive  will;  the  individual  often  of  a  negative  will. 
The  State  must  not  endure;  it  must  act.     Political  power     (^W'Y 
is  to  be  measured  by  the  success  of  the  policy  pursued.  * 
The  State  must  outline  this  policy  with  care,  and  weigh 
carefully  in  the  balance  whether  its  object  can  be  attained 
by' peaceful  methods;  if  not,  whether  it  has  the  strength 
to  secure   the  desired  end;  how  it  can  best  secure  the 
necessary  foreign  assistance,  or  undermine  the  strength 
of  its  opponent,  preparatory  to  attacking  him.     War  ac- 
cording to  these  precepts  is  not  an  evil  for  the  State, 
which   enters   upon   it   in  pursuing   a   carefully   matured 
plan;  it  is  merely  a  manifestation  of  its  will.     A  realist 
perception  of  the  actual  situation,  a  close  union  of  will   // 
and   intelligence,    would   serve   to   render   man   and   the  /' 
personalised  Nation-State  omnipotent. 

Power  was  deemed  the  highest  aim  of  the  State  and 
had  even  in  common  parlance  become  synonymous  with 
the  word  "State."  It  was  no  longer  conceived  that  the 
fmj_nf  fh^  Statg,  the  object  of  political  practice,  was  the 
maintenance  of  peace,  but  rather  the  prc\  cntion  of  un- 
premeditated war.  The  unknown,  untamed  forces  of  the 
human  will  were  to  be  relied  upon  to  impose  a  conscious 
self-restraint  upon  the  policy  of  statesmen,  which  was 
to  be  cast  off  at  a  favorable  opportunity  if  the  aims 
and  need  of  State  required  it.  Virtues  were  coming  to 
be  held  attributes  of  the  will;  of  a  will  which  could  mani- 
fest itself  only  as  force.  Right  knows  no  other  agency 
than  might.  Even  the  will  of  God  rests  solely  on  its 
own  omnipotence;  and  similarly  in  reference  to  the  State 
the  right  of  might  is  the  assertion  of  the  national  will. 


/ 


222  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

Such  in  brief  outline  were  the  underlying  factors  of  the 
new  spirit  of  realism  in  politics,  sharpened  by  the 
competitive  spirit  which  was  increasing  among  States. 
It  marks  the  decline  of  rationalism  and  the  coincident 
rise  of  the  new  volitional  theories  as  yet  only  vaguely 
differentiated. 

Whatever  altruism  remained  in  public  affairs  was  set 
down  as  emotionalism,  a  debilitating  influence  which 
weakened  the  will.  The  discipline  of  patriotism,  the 
fervor  of  a  realist  nationalism,  the  vigorous,  assertive 
vitality  of  the  Nation-State  could,  it  was  thought,  best 
be  heightened  and  strengthened  by  the  close  interplay 
of  political  and  economic  forces. 


i 


CHAPTER  X 

The  Politico-Economic  Theory  of  State 

TERMS    DEFINED THE    END    OF   THE    STATE ROLE    OF    THE    INDI- 
VIDUAL  UNION   OF   THE   STATE  AND   ITS   MEMBERS PHASES 

OF       TRANSITION CLASSIFICATION       OF       STATES NEW 

FUNCTIONS    OF    THE    STATE EDUCATION PUBLIC 

WELFARE ECONOMIC   ENTERPRISE MOTIVES  OF 

i\  PUBLIC   POLICY THE   NEW  ABSOLUTISM 

SURVEY    OF    THE    CONTRIBUTION    OF 
THE     MIDDLE     CLASS     TO     POLIT- 
ICAL   THEORY 


IN  tracing  the  transition  of  the  politico-juridic  concept 
of  the  State  and  the  formulation  of  the  basis  of  the 
politico-economic  ^  theory  which  has  been  developing 
since  1870  a  change  in  the  object  of  the  State  must  first 
be  noted. 

The  individualist  basis  of  the  politico-juridic  theory 
of  State  under  middle  class  control  had  led  to  the  formu- 
lation of  the  thesis  that  the  State  exists  merely  as  a 
means  for  promoting  the  welfare  of  the  individual. 
"Societies  and  laws  exist  only  for  the  object  of  increas- 
ing the  sum  of  private  happiness."  ^  According  to  this 
typically  middle  class  conception,  the  State  was  held  to 

^  By  the  term  "politico-economic,"  I  would  seek  to  define  the  fusion  of 
the  elemental  components  of  the  new  theory  of  State  which  was  to 
evolve  during  the  ensuing  half  century,  as  expressing  most  concisely  the 
close  alliance  between  political  practice  and  economic  motive.  It  is  not 
intended  to  infer  that  economic  motive  had  in  the  past  been  absent,  nor 
that  the  word  "politico-economic"  be  understood  in  the  sense  usually 
attributed  to  political  economy.  It  is  rather  my  purpose  to  discern  that  the 
State  had  abandoned  its  strict  juridic  personality  and  was  no  longer 
to  adhere  so  closely  to  its  rational,  middle  class  individualist  ideal. 

'  Cf.  Macaulay,  Essay  on  Machiavelli,  p.  47. 


1 


224  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

be  a  collection  of  individuals  who  had  adopted  certain 
rules  and  regulations  and  created  an  artificial  institu- 
tion for  furthering  their  personal  wellbeing.  The  State 
was  not  looked  upon  as  an  entity  having  a  specific  object 
and  aim  of  its  own.^  This  view  was  no  longer  tenable 
when  the  personalised  Natioq^-State  came  to  be  endowed 
with  Its  distinctive  natl*6n^  characteristics,  the  develop- 
ment of  which  has  been  outlined.  There  now  seemed  to 
be  a  tendency,  more  especially  in  continental  Europe,  to 
return  to  the  classical  concept  that_the  aini  pf  the  State 
is  not  to  serve  the  individual,  but  that  the  individual  must 
serve  the  State,  and  that  individual  freedom  is  merely  a 
part^^  national  freedom. 

However,  the  classical  theory  of  State  left  too  little 
to  the  initiative  of  the  individual,  and  did  not  make 
proper  use  of  his  energy  and  skill.  While  it  came  to  be 
admitted  that  the  State  has  an  object  of  its  own,  a  mis- 
sion to  fulfil,  a  civilising  function  to  perform  which  at 
times  requires  the  self-sacrifice  of  the  individual  for  the 
common  welfare,  yet  it  was  conceded  that  the  individual 
should  have  a  wide  field  left  to  him  In  which  to  develop 
his  capacities,  and  to  further  his  personal  wellbeing.  It 
was  held  that  It  was  the  duty  of  the  State  not  merely  to 
protect  but  to  assist  him. 

There  thus  arose  a  dualism  of  function,  both  of  the 
State  and  of  the  individual.  The  State  was  concerned 
with  the  assertion  of  national  power — politics — the  posi- 
tive national  will — the   individual  with  the  creation   of 

^  Cf.  Herbert  Spencer,  who  declared  that  since  the  community  has 
no  corporate  consciousness  "this  is  an  everlasting  reason  why  the  wel- 
fare of  citizens  cannot  be  rightly  sacrificed  to  some  supposed  benefit  of 
the  State,  but  why  on  the  other  hand  the  State  is  to  be  maintained 
solely  for  the  benefit  of  citizens,"  and  again  "the  corporate  life  in  society 
must  be  subservient  to  the  lives  of  the  parts,  instead  of  the  lives  of  the 
parts  being  subservient  to  the  corporate  life." — IVestminster  Revienu, 
January  i860. 


THE  POLITICO-ECONOMIC  THEORY        225 

hational  wealth — economics — the  negative  national  will. 
The  function  of  the  State  was  primarily  political;  the  4 
function  of  the  individual  was  primarily  economic.  The 
union  of  the  two  formed  the  complete  Nation-State. 
The  individual  in  his  private  capacity  was  concerned 
chiefly  with  his  economic  wellbeing;  as  a  member  of 
the  State  he  wa^-cnncerned  with  politkiis.  Upon  the 
introduction  of  universal  suffrage  it  came  to  inclizde  the 
greater  majority  of  the  adult  male  population. 
j.'Jn  return  for  the  political  part  played  by  the  in- 
dividual in  public  affairs,  in  return  for  support  of  a 
party  programme  or  a  national  policy,  he  came  to  de- 
mand not  merely  police  protection  and  all  that  it  implies, 
but  economic  assistance  and  benefits  necessary  to  his 
material  wellbeing.  Thus  the  State,  in  addition  to  its  po- 
litical functions  in  affirming  national  power,  no  longer 
content  to  confine  itself  merely  to  the  maintenance  of 
juridic  relations,  w^s  ^^  °p^V  t'^  pr'irn^t-p — economic 
development. 

Here  we  have  the  genesis  of  the  politico-economic  con- 
cept of  the  State.  It  was  a  cooperation  on  the  part  of 
the  individual  and  of  the  State,  conceived  as  separate 
entities,  each  having  separate  fields  of  activity  but  a  com- 
mon aim :  the  increase  of  the  powpr  nf  t\i^  Sfntp  Politics 
was  something  more  than  the  mamtenance  of  right;  it 
was  a  weapon  of  nctfinnal  ppm^r  Economics  was  some- 
thing more  than  the  maintenance  of  wellbeing;  it  was  a 
weapon  of  national  strength.  This  harmonious  union 
between  the  aims  and  capacities  of  the  State  and  its  mem- 
bers, this  specialisation  of  function  and  cooperation  in 
enterprise,  endowed  the  State  with  a  virility  and  energy 
which  it  had  never  possessed. 

The  rise  of  this  new  concept  of  the  State  which  has 
hitherto  not  been  so  precisely  formulated  marks  the  final 


226  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

phase  of  control  of  the  body  politic  by  the  Middle  Class. ^ 
During  the  ensuing  sixty  years  the  Middle  Class  was 
to  enjoy  the  fruition  of  its  long  and  tenacious  struggle 
for  political  ascendancy,  whose  milestones  in  time  can 
be  so  clearly  marked — 1689,  1776,  1789,  1830,  1848, 
1870. 

II 

The  Middle  Class  which  had  developed  the  politico- 
juridic  concept  of  the  State  had  raised  the  individual 
to  a  pinnacle  of  power  to  which  he  had  never  in  the 
past  attained.  It  had  made  possible  a  Cromwell  and 
a  Napoleon,  had  created  the  Nation-State  in  the  image 
of  man,  had  formulated  new  doctrines  qi  liberty  and 
made  jium— believe  that  he  might  command  his-  own 
destijiY.  With  success  in  power  came  the  inevitable 
arrogance  which  accompanies  power.  The  middle  class 
concept  of  the  social  mission  of  man  rapidly  passed 
through  the  phases  of  high  idealism  and  cosmopolitanism, 
and  when  finally  triumphant  adopted  the  more  immediate 
and  tangible  utilitarian  doctrines  of  nationalism  and 
capitalism.  As  a  result  the  State  was  no  longer  believed 
to  be  fashioned  in  the  image  of  man,  but  was  looked 
upon  as  the  wea^oii^ofjnan.  No  longer  content  to  bear 
the  restraints  of  the  juridical  basis  which  had  made 
possible  the  growth  of  the  State,  the  Middle  Class 
sought  for  a  fresh  symbol.  It  had  accepted  progress 
i  and  perfectibility  as  axiomatic  and  rejected  all  belief  in 
^  the  importance  of  regress  or  decay.  The  liberalism 
which  was  its  distinctive  mark  had  evolved  a  phil- 
osophy of  history,  based  upon  the  concept  of  the  gradual 

'^^     ^        ^It  is  to  be  remarked  that  this  new  theory  of  State  was  forced  upon 
^  ^   /■   the  Middle  Class  by  the  rising  Proletariat  and  was  adopted  more  as  an 
accommodation  than  as  a  result  of  inherent  conviction. 


THE  POLITICO-ECONOMIC  THEORY        227 

and  progressive  Improvement  of  mankind.  But  the  only 
proofs  of  validity  that  could  be  adduced  from  this  theory 
were  to  be  found  in  the  material  world,  In  the  realm  of 
the  production  of  the  good  things  of  life,  in  the  stor- 
ing up  of  wealth,  in  the  building  up  of  industry.  In  the 
expansion  of  commerce.  In  brief,  the  metaphysical  ele- 
ments of  the  politlco-juridic  theory  of  State  were  in- 
evitably doomed  to  make  way  for  a  more  materialistic 
interpretation  of  social  life,  which  in  its_jg^ence  was 
allien  to  middle  .class  dogma.  In  the  process,  moral  law 
was  lost  sight  of,  moral  courage  had  become  debilitated, 
material  wellbeing  was  deemed  all  important. 

Those  States  which  rested  upon  politically  conscious, 
economically  vigorous,  numerically  strong  populations 
rose  to  power.  The  development  of  national  power  led 
to  a  further  growth  of  world  power  and  was  accom- 
panied by  a  transformation  of  nationalism  into  imperial- 
ism, which  served  to  mould  the  practice  and  historical  de- 
velopment of  the  politico-economic  theory  of  State. 

States  were  henceforth  to  be  divided  into  distinct  cate- 
gories according  to  the  sphere  of  their  influence.  World 
Powers  were  States  which  played  a  preponderant  part  in 
political  affairs  throughout  the  world,  or  at  least  far 
beyond  their  national  borders  and  continent.  Great 
Powers  were  those  which  had  influence  within  a  more 
restricted  area  and  had  not  the  strength  to  assert  their 
will  in  distant  lands,  either  owing  to  the  absence  of 
a  strong  offensive  weapon  such  as  a  navy,  or  because 
their  interests  were  more  directly  limited  to  their  own 
continent. 

These  two  categories  of  States  were  essentially  aggres- 
sive in  action  and  had  the  power  to  enforce  their  will. 
With  them  the  policing  and  peace  of  the  world  rested. 

Besides  these  there  were  the  smaller  States,   Minor 


228  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

Powers,  which  took  no  part  in  the  broader  policies  or 
plans  of  aggrandisement  and  endeavored  to  maintain 
their  independence  rather  than  to  increase  their  power. 
This  independence  was  in  some  instances  guaranteed  by 
the  Great  Powers.^ 

While  the  World  Powers  were  already  engaged  In 
protecting  their  members  abroad,  and  this  protection  was 
by  degrees  extended  to  their  industrial,  commercial,  and 
even  social  enterprises — and  in  uncivilised  and  semi-civ- 
ilised countries  was  to  have  so  far-reaching  an  influence 
on  colonial  development — all  States  were  engaged  in  pro- 
moting national  prosperity  by  a  zealous  interest  in  car- 
ing for,  and  developing  the  wellbeing  of,  their  citizens 
at  home. 

In  order  to  maintain  Internal  peace,  a  broad-minded 
toleration  no  longer  sufficed.  The  State,  it  was  believed, 
must  assist  in  creating  the  means  of  the  prosperity  of 
Its  members.  It  must  promote  their  industry,  not  merely 
by  insuring  the  maintenance  of  peaceful  conditions,  safe- 
guarding private  property  and  public  order  by  the  faithful 
administration  of  justice  and  general  police  functions, 
but  by  actively  participating  in  the  development  of  all 
resources  afford  every  opportunity  for  increasing  In- 
dividual ability  and  wellbeing.  This  civilising  function 
of  the  State,  it  was  felt,  would  translate  itself  into  eco- 
nomic expansion  and  national  prestige,  which  would  raise 
I  the  status  of  the  State  by  improving  the  condition  of  its 
members. 

The  State  now  earnestly  concerned  itself  with  public 
education  and  no  longer  left  it  to  the  option  of  the  in- 
dividual, but  by  offering  opportunities  for  him  to  acquire 

'Thus  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Russia  were  held  {circa  1875) 
World  Powers;  Austria-Hungary,  Germany,  Italy,  the  United  States, 
Great  Powers.  Annong  the  Minor  Powers  were  Spain,  Holland,  Belgium, 
Switzerland. 


THE  POLITICO-ECONOMIC  THEORY        229 

an  education  at  the  expense  of  the  State,  compelled  at- 
tendance at  school  as  part  of  his  duty  in  preparing  him- 
self to  become  a  useful  member  of  the  community.  In 
some  countries  this  educational  function  was  carried  to 
great  length.^  'The  spirit  of  scientific  research  was 
stimulated  by  State  aid;  the  general  culture  of  the  people 
was  broadened  by  State  subsidies  to  theatres,  museums, 
etc.  The  State  also  contributed  to  the  welfare  of  its 
members  by  affording  practical  assistance  along  other 
linfes.  It  undertook  to  establish  such  new  enterprises  as 
seemed  beyond  the  scope  of  individual  initiative.  The 
telegraph  and  postal  service,  the  construction  and  admin- 
istration of  roads  and  railways,  in  which  the  twofold 
purpose  of  stimulating  economic  development  and  stra- 
tegic requirements  was  kept  in  view,  served  to  place  at 
the  disposal  of  the  individual  additional  means  for  in- 
creasing the  field  of  his  business  activity.  In  this  same 
spirit  the  State  granted  suhsid+es  to  shipping  companies, 
and,  in  certain  instances,  for  the  exploitation  of  natural 
resources,  in  which  immediate  profit  was  not  apparent  and 
private  investors  were  unwilling  to  assume  the  risks. 
Henceforth  the  State  was  to  become  a  principal  promoter 
of  national  prosperity,  either  by  direct  aid  in  those  States 
where  economic  development  had  been  retarded,  or  by 
a  judicious  and  benevolent  policy  to  protect  and  further 
private  initiative.  Free  trade  and  laissez-faire  were 
being  replaced  by  these  newer  methods  of  State  aid  and 
State  supervision.  But  in  every  instance  the  State  was 
careful  to  leave  in  the  hands  of  the  individuaj  the  profit 
which  might  accrue  to  the  most  vigorous  :i^^  enterpnsinp^. 
and  favored  competition  which  would  strengthen  the 
strong  and  crush  the  weak.     This  could  not  fail  to  in- 

'  Denmark,  Prussia,  and  France.     England  was  the  last  Western  State 
to  adopt  national  compulsory  education    (1872). 


i| 


230 


THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 


< 


fluence  public  policy,  which  came  more  and  more  to  be 
concerned  with  furthering  economic  design,  not  merely 
for  the  sake  of  individual  welfare  but  more  especially 
as  the  foundation  of  national  strength. 

In  theory  the  State  remained  the  guardian  of  private 
prerogative  and  assured  to  the  individual  full  liberty.  But 
the  closer  identity  of  the  individual  with  the  State,  the 
fusion  of  the  image  of  the  State  with  that  of  the  in- 
dividual, the  growing  conviction  that  the  State  was  not 
merely  a  country,  but  much  more  an  association  of  in- 
dividuals of  common  national  stock,  or  bound  by  com- 
mon economic  interests,  served  to  gloss  over,  and  later 
even  make  it  appear  very  desirable  for  the  State  grad- 
ually to  take  over  many  of  the  prerogatives  which  had 
hitherto  been  believed  to  belong  exclusively  to  the  in- 
dividual. It  is  not  to  be  overlooked  that  the  system  of 
reciprocity  by  which  the  State  in  a  collective  sense  gave 
assistance  to  the  individual  in  his  private  capacity,  in 
return  for  the  docile  surrender  by  the  latter  oLhis  per- 
sonality,  resulted  in  a  great  increase  in  power  of  the  State 
and  in  the  prosperity  of  the  individual.  The  menace  of 
the  increasing  strength  of  the  State,  which  thus  became 
in  fact  a  world  in  itself,  a  law  unto  itself,  that  recognised 
no  curb  to  its  will  save  that  of  force,  was,  if  ever  con- 
sciously considered,  lost  sight  of. 

The  State  engaged  in  the  pursuit__of_^_ower,  the  in- 
dividual in  the  pursuit  of-^-Qiperity,  had  found  a  com- 
mon ground  of  action,  in  which  the  interests  of  the  in- 
dividual became  identified  with  those  of  the  State.  Thus 
arose  the  new  motive  of  public  policy,  the  protection  and 
promotion  of  interests.  What  were  these  interests? 
Now  that  the  State  had  assumed  for  itself  the  func- 
tion of  advancing  the  economic  wellbeing  of  the  indi- 
vidual, it  was  held  that  political  motive  not  only  must 


THE  POLITICO-ECONOMIC  THEORY         231 

not  pretend  solely  to  govern  public  policy,  but  that  it 
was  the  duty  of  the  State  frankly  and  overtly  to  look 
to  economic  motives  as  well.     It  had  come  to  be  recog- 
nised that  it  was  a  primary  duty  of  the  State  not  merely      -'   .  -> 
to  lend  full  protection  to  its  members  residing  abroad,   'y-i^^j^ 
but  also   to  secure   for  them  the   fullest  advantages   to     ^^ 
trade  in  rivilifiH  as  well  as  in  uncivilised  lands.     This  /P 
protection   was   by   degrees   extended   to   industrial   and  ' 
commercial  enterprise.     The  State  took  it  upon  itself  to 
lodk  out  for  the  interests  of  its  members,  or  nationals, 
as  they  now  come  to  be  called  in  diplomatic  language. 
By  treaties  and  other  agreements  the  various  Western 
Powers  sought  to  secure  the  most  favorable  treatment 
for  the  enterprise  of  their  nationals.     Diplomatic  inter- 
course  was  henceforth  largely  concerned  with  adjustmg 
commercial  conflicts  and  advancing  private  economic  in- 
terests, which  were  in  many  instances  soon  identined  with 
those  of  the  State.     In  extreme  cases  the  State  did  not 
consider  it  beneath  its  dignity  to  make  use  of  its   full 
armed  force  to  back  up  the  claims  of  an  individual,  more 
particularly  in  uncivilised  or  semi-civilised  regions,  or  in 
the  Orient.     It  was  deemed  a  curtailment  of  national    /V,  ^  • 
prestige  not  to  enforce  full  reparation  for  damage  done\ 
to  the  interests  of  citizens  resident  abroad,  and  the  State>^ 
which  could  afford  the  fullest  protection  to  its  members 
was  deemed  entitled  to  the  most  respect.     The  function 
o f  the  StAt-oJaajj-^nadually  evolved  from  the  protection 
of  rights  ^r.  fha^  ^f  the  protection  of  interest-s.     Interest   » 
had  come  to  be  held  the  essential  element  of  right.     In-  | 
terest  created  right.     Interest  required  protection;  right 
required   enforcement,    so   protection   of   interest   often     A 
required  the  use  of  coercive  or  compulsory  measures. 

The  complete  separation  of  morals  from  politics  al- 
ready referred  to  had  resulted  in  the  belief  that  the  State 


232  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

was  concerned  In  the  first  instance  solely  with  increas- 
ing its  own  power  and  with  promoting  the  wellbeing  of 
^  its  members,  and  only  indirectly  with  that  of  humanity 
in  general.  The  question  Qf-.th£  justice  or  m^orality  of 
a  policy  came  more  and  more  to  be  disregarded.^  The 
perversion  of  the  moral  sense,  the  benumbing  of  moral 
consciousness  which  the  new  politico-economic  concept 
of  the  State  had  served  to  increase,  was  only  possible 
without  an  immediate  lapse  into  social  anarchy,  as  a  result 

\of  the  stxicter  social._d.udpline  of  the  industrial  system, 
and  the  tendency  to  entrust  to  the  State  the  power  to 
regulate  ,the  Jife  and  conduct  of  the  InJTvidual. 

There  arose  at  this  time  in  France  a  school  of  thinkers  A^ 


who  sought  to  combat  the  encroachments  of  the  State. 
A  leader  of  this  movement  was  Proudhon  who  has  been 
/^called  the  founder  of  "anarchy."  Though  a  confirmed 
opponent  of  Communism  he  looked  upon  the  State  and 
its  increasing  omnipotence  as  incongruous,  as  enslaving 
the  individual  and  acting  as  potently  as  the  Church  had 
in  fostering  superstition  and  pj:^udice  which  tended,  so 
he  alleged,  to  thwart  the  mor^dd^evdppjjjjgi^^  He 

was  among  the  first  to  declare  himself  in  favor  of  the 
destruction  of  the  State  as  the  social  authority,  and 
showed  himself  to  be  an  avowed  enemy  of  the  principle 
of  nationality.  "The  boundary  of  States  is  to  be  sought 
in  the  consent  of  the  people  and  never  in  the  natural  con- 
figuration of  land  or  sea."  -  Another  ardent  champion 
of  the  anti-nationalist  movement,  though  not  an  anarchist, 
as  he  did  not  seek  to  overthrow  constituted  authority  in 
the  State,  advocated  the  theory  that  the  further  growth 

^A  good  example,  and  by  no  means  an  exception  to  the  general  trend 
of  policy  followed  by  all  World  Powers  in  dealing  with  weaker  States, 
is  to  be  found  in  the  attitude  of  the  British  Government  in  its  dealings 
with  China  concerning  the  suppression  of  the  opium  trade. 

'  Cf.  Proudhon,  Correspondence,  1859-1863, 


fV^^ 


THE  POLITICO-ECONOMIC  THEORY        233 

of  the  Nation-State  should  be  checked  by  splitting  it  up 
into  small  provinces  or  basins.  He  predicted  very 
sanguinely  that  within  a  century  "from  out  of  the  ruins 
of  United  Britain  the  four  kingdoms  which  composed 
it  will  be  resurrected.  .  .  .  Italian  unity  will  scarcely 
have  time  to  establish  itself  firmly  before  it  will  dis- 
appear. .  .  .  Russia — Great  Russia,  Little  Russia,  Red 
and  White  Russia  will  replace  the  Russian  Empire.  .  .  . 
Prussia  will  also  be  split  up,  and  Austria  will  be  crowded 
bacfk  into  the  archdukedom  that  was  its  cradle.  .  .  .  The 
unity  of  France  will  have  to  give  way  to  the  laws  of  his- 
tory, which  show  us  that  great  empires  are  monstrous 
exceptions  to  the  life  of  mankind  .  .  .  the  unity  of 
France  which  dates  from  yesterday,  from  this  morning, 
has  no  firm  roots  in  the  past  and  on  its  ruins  we  will 
see  arising  five  States."  ^ 


III 

The  disciplinary  influence  of  religion,  with  its  code 
of  moral  laws,  was  giving  way  to  the  more  ruthless  eco- 
nomic discipline  with  its  code  of  material  interests.  The 
increasing  pressure  of  competition  requireH'a  new  sense 
of  social  discipline,  which  could,  it  was  believed,  be  en- 
forced by  the  State  if  exclusive  authority  was  conferred 
upon  it.     The  State  was  daily  growing  more  absolute. 

*  Odysse-Barot,  Lettres  sur  la  Philosophie  de  VHistoire,  p.  150  et  seq. 
(Paris,  1864).  The  author  sets  out  to  demonstrate  that  society  is  ruled  by 
force,  and  in  support  of  his  contention  he  surveys  the  thirty-three  cen- 
turies from  the  15th  century  B.C.  to  date  (1861)  and  declares  as  a 
result  of  his  researches:  "From  the  time  when  in  1496  B.C.  the  agree- 
ment was  entered  upon  establishing  between  the  twelve  states  of  Greece 
the  Amphictyonic  League  down  to  the  treaty  of  January  23,  1861,  be- 
tween France  and  England,  I  have  counted  8,397  treaties.  In  spite  of 
these  8,397  solemn  agreements  of  peace,  alliance  and  friendship,  in  the 
long  stretch  of  3,357  years — 1496  B.C.  to  1861  a.d. — there  were  only 
227  years  of  peace  as  against  3,130  years  of  war." — Ibidem,  p.  20. 


234  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

It  arrogated  to  itself  the  right  to  decide  all  questions 
of  whatever  nature,  whether  political,  economic,  or  social. 
It  refused  to  countenance  any  other  authority  within 
Its  boundaries,  any  imperium  in  imperio  such  as  the 
Church  of  Rome  was  inclined  to  set  up,  and  jealously 
guarded  its  prerogative  of  sovereignty.  In  extending  its 
sway  over  the  individual,  by  serving  to  increase  his  ma- 
terial prosperity,  the  State  now  came  to  require  the 
^  implicit  as  well  as  the  explicit  allegiance  of  its  mem- 
bers, and  viewed  with  distrust  any  influence,  even  that  of 
the  Church,  when  not  enlisted  in  promoting  national  in- 
terests. While  technically  the  State  was  concerned  solely 
with  the  external  life  of  the  individual,  and  disclaimed 
any  desire  to  interfere  with  his  convictions  or  beliefs,  to 
control  his  abilities,  or  to  limit  his  capacities — in  brief 
no  rights  over  his  mental  or  spiritual  life — yet  by  tak- 
ing cJiarge  of  his  education,  by  affording  opportunities 
for  self-development,  by  strengthening  his  sense  of  loy- 
alty, the  State  had  come  to  be  looked  upon  by  the  in- 
dividual as  filling  his  whole  horizon.  In  this  way  na- 
tional patriotism  afforded  the  sole  stimulus  to  an  other- 
wise spiritually  barren  life. 

Politics  as  the  dominant  factor  in  social  life  had 
reached  the  high-water  mark  of  its  development.  Lib- 
eralism had  run  its  course.  The  State  was  again  becom- 
ing absolute.  This  new  absolutism  was  not  unlike  that 
fostered  by  the  politico-theistic  concept  of  the  State,  which 
identified  the  sovereigiTwith  the  Qpdhead,  and  led  to  the 
formation  of  national  States  during  the  i6th  century. 
Richelieu  and  Wolsey  were  to  find  their  modern  counter- 
part in  Bismarck  and  Cavour.  For  though  the  politico- 
theistic  concept  was  not  revived,  and  sovereignty  as  the 
personal  attribute  of  the  Prince  had  given  way  to  national 
sovereignty,  the  fundamental  principle  of  arbitrary  power 


THE  POLITICO-ECONOMIC  THEORY        235 

exercised  over  the  life  and  conduct  of  the  in- 
dividual citizen  or  subject  was  strikingly  similar.  The 
modern  State  was,  to  be  sure,  no  longer  identified  with 
the  Godhead.  As  the  theistic  concept  had  been  displaced 
to  make  way  for  the  juridic  concept  of  the  State  created 
in  the  image  of  man,  so  now  the  State  was  coming  to  be 
conceived  of  no  longer  as  the  image  of  man  with  his 
natural  functions  and  articulations,  but  as  an  inyention  of 
man,  a__topl,  ajveapon,  a  machinp,^  ^h^  p|-pHiirt  nf  ^hp 
coMective  will,  man-made,  and  g<"^nd''pg  in  <"^p  c^iy|P  r^)?^-. 
tion  to  man,  as  man  had  stood  in  ages  past  to  his  God. 
The  belief  that  God  had  made  man  for  a  definite  purpose 
had,  as  we  have  seen,  as  a  result  of  scientific  biological 
investigation,  been  proved  false,  and  had  been  replaced 
by  the  conviction  that  the  only  strongly  purposeful 
creative  impulse  rested  with  man.  By  abandoning  any 
analogy  with  natural  law,  by  confining  his  efforts  to  con- 
sidering the  realist  ends  in  view,  man,  it  was  believed, 
would  be  able  to  devise  a  political  order  which  would 
satisfy  the  modern  scientific  temper. 

The  new  politico-economic  theory,  of  State,  which  re- 
vived the  rigid  realism  of  the  older  absolutism,  wasj^orn 
in  an  era  of  pessimism,  and  as  such  was  a  negative,  in- 
adequate  concept,  a  groping  for  a  new  social  formula,  the 
result  of  a  desire  to  formulate  less  dista_steful,  Igg^  w^^te- 
ful  social  arrangements,  rather  than  to  seek  for  a  con- 
sciously better  form.  In  other  words,  no  strong  impulse 
to  growth,  no  strong  incentive  to  development  had  led  to 

^  I  have  made  use  of  the  word  "machine"  merely  to  point  to  the  ten- 
dency already  beginning  to  be  evident  that  the  analogy  of  the  organic 
nature  of  the  State  was  no  longer  rigidly  adhered  to.  The  mutual  de- 
pendence of  parts  distinguishes  an  organism  from  a  machine;  in  the  lat- 
ter the  parts  concur  for  a  common  end,  to  which  each  contributes  in  its 
way,  but  in  which  each  does  not  contribute  to  the  support  of  all  or  any  of 
the  rest.  The  State  retained  outwardly  many  of  its  organic  characteris- 
tics^ but  the  trend  towards  a  mechanical  interpretation  was  increasing. 


i 


236  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

the  formation  of  this  new  theory  of  State.  Viewed  from 
the  standpoint  of  the  Middle  Class  it  must  be  looked 
upon  as  the  completion  and  end,  the  final  stage  of  its 
political  evolution,  which  had  its  beginning  after  the 
Reformation.  As  religion  had  been  displaced  by  politics 
as  the  moulding  force  in  social  life,  as  in  secular  affairs 
the  Church  had  been  definitely  supplanted  by  the  State, 
after  a  period  of  compromise,  so  the  politically  organised 
Nation-State  was  in  due  course  to  be  replaced  by  a  new 
social  ordering.  As  religion  had  after  the  rise  of  national 
States  become  avocational,  so  now  politics  was  to  become 
an  avocation. 

The  eminent  services  rendered  by  the  Middle  Class 
to  Western  civilisation  must  not,  however,  be  overlooked. 
The  Middle  Class  was  the  great  liberalising  force  in 
the  world.  Its  social  function  was  primarily  negative. 
It  was  as  protestants  that  the  Middle  Class  exerted  its 
greatest  influence.  It  was  made  up  of  men  whose  vigor 
was  moral  and  material  rather  than  spiritual  and  physi- 
cal. The  courage  of  the  Crusader  and  the  idealism  of  the 
ascetic  were  incomprehensible  to  them.  The  high-flown 
fantasy  of  chivalry  and  the  pomp  of  Papal  Rome  were 
looked  upon  with  distrust,  principally  because  they  were 
held  useless  and  wasteful.  The  strength  of  the  Middle 
Class  lay  in  its  liberalism  and  utilitarian  viewpoint;  In  its 
moderation  and  moral  courage.  It  stood  for  toleration, 
liberty  of  conscience,  and  individual  freedom;  self-de- 
termination, self-help,  and  self-government.  Its  mission 
In  the  Western  World  was  to  impose  restraints  ^  upon, 
to  curb,  the  untamed  passions  of  man,  freed  from  a 
superstitious  faith  in  a  blind  Providence  and  acting  as  a 
rational  being. 

*  "All  that  makes  existence  valuable  to  any  one  depends  on  the  en- 
forcements of  restraints  upon  the  actions  of  other  people." — J.  S.  Mill, 
On  Liberty,  Introductory. 


THE  POLITICO-ECONOMIC  THEORY         237 

The  Middle  Class  which  had  clothed  the  egotism  of 
individualism  in  a  halo  of  virtue  did  much  to  raise  the 
dignity  of  man.  It  sought  to  individualise  the  State  and 
mark  it  off  as  man's  domain.  It  was  first  empirical,  then 
rational,  then  cosmopolitan,  and  finally  national.  What- 
ever guise  it  assumed,  its  strength  lay  chiefly  in  its 
negating  force.  It  combatted  a  false  creed  or  per- 
nicious policy  with  tenacity;  reformed,  rebuilt,  re- 
modelled, but  lacked  the  boldness  to  strike  out  along  ^  /, 
radically  new  paths,  and  preferred  to  make  use  of  the  ^f^*'^ 
materials  at  hand.  aj^  '\M-  ^^, 

If  we  look  down  the  long  vista  of  centuries  and  re- 
view the  rise  of  the  Middle  Class  to  power  we  cannot 
fail  to  be  impressed  how  far  below  our  expectation  are  /V,' * 
the  positive  results  obtained.  The  Middle  Class  con- 
ferred uporrTHF~w^irIaaninfinite  number  of  small  bene- 
fits: it  restrained  the  rapacity  of  princes  and  placed  the 
services  of  the  practical  man  above  the  inspiration  of 
the  seen  As  long  as  there  were  reforms  to  be  undertaken, 
as  long  as  there  was  work  to  be  done  in  raising  the 
status  of  the  individual,  in  arousing  political  conscious- 
ness, in  awakening  national  solidarity,  in  transforming 
the  religiously  controlled  body  politic  into  a  secular  or- 
ganisation the  Middle  Class  was  equal  to  its  task.  Fur- 
thermore the  Middle  Class  gave  to  the  world  a  belief 
in  liberty,  a  faith  in  toleration,  and  a  hope  in  equality  as 
expressed  in  constitutional  government.  But  if  we  were 
to  compare  the  achievement  of  the  Middle  Class  with 
that  of  the  last  great  prole tajri an  movement,  Christianity, 
or  the  aristocratic  feudal  regime  evolved  under  the 
influence  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  and  the  Church 


238  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

of  Rome,  we  will  find  that  the  Middle  Class  was  never 
able  to  realise  a  positive  growth  of  its  own,  but  was 
compelled  to  adapt  old  formulae  to  new  requirements. 
Even  equalitarian  democracy,  which  has  always  been 
pointed  to  as  the  especial  contribution  of  the  Middle 
Class  to  modern  political  practice,  remained  in  point  of 
fact  little  more  than  a  phrase,  as  it  presupposed  a 
privileged  electoral  body,  beneath  which  there  remained 
a  great  mass  of  unenfranchised  humanity,  by  whom 
the  monotonous  and  tedious  work  of  society  was  to  be 
performed.  The  awakening  of  political  consciousness 
among  this  lower  or  working  class  forced  the  Middle 
Class  into  a  position  of  aggressive  leadership  which  it 
was  unfit  to  assume.  Henceforth  its  leaders  were  com- 
pelled to  undertake  a  policy  of  accommodation.  Politics 
became  a  matter  of  compromise. 

Class  consciousness  was  never  strongly  developed  by 
I  the  Middle  Class.  Of  all  the  elements  which  have  gained 
control  of  the  social  order  the  Middle  Class  was  the 
least  jealous  to  retain  the  distinctive  marks  of  its  solidar- 
ity. This  serves  to  explain  the  readiness  with  which  uni- 
^  versal  suffrage  was  granted,  in  the  hope  of  being  able 
to  assimilate  the  masses  politically  and  substitute  com- 
petition between  States  for  competition  between  classes. 

The  rise  of  the  Middle  Class  to  power  coincided  with 
the  rise  of  the  Nation-State  as  the  social  unit.  The 
State  so  conceived  sought  to  impose  its  authority  upon 
and  to  stamp  as  its  own  all  of  its  members.  This  imprint 
was  made  to  appear  as  emanating  from  the  collective  will 
(  of  the  people  and  not  as  class  rule.  Herein  lay  the 
strength  of  middle  class  policy.  Its  principal  source  of 
weakness  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that,  while  professing 
to  exalt  the  individual,  to  secure  for  him  the  benefits  of 
pohtical  liberty  and  the  prerogatives  of  equality,  to  pro- 


THE  POLITICO-ECONOMIC  THEORY        239 

mote  self-determination,  self-assertion  and  self-develop- 
ment   as  expressed   in   the   term   "self-government,"    the      ^Li/* 
Middle  Class  was  never  able  to  free  itself  from  the  con-        V»^ 
viction  that  it  is  by  imposing  restraints  rather  than  by      >     '"x 
affirming  indefeasible  rights  that  the  body  politic  must     r\\      t 
be  governed.  1) 

John  Stuart  Mill,  who  embodied  more  completely  than 
any  other  political  philosopher  the  mentality  of  the  Mid- 
dle Class  at  the  highest  stage  of  its  evolution,  in  defining 
the  relation  of  the  individual  to  society  in  civilised  com- 
munities,  sets  forth  the  prmciple : 

"That  the  sole  end  for  which  mankind  are  warranted, 
individually  or  collectively,  in  interfering  with  the  lib- 
erty of  action  of  any  of  their  number,  is  self-protection. 
That  the  only  purpose  for  which  power  can  be  rightfully 
exercised  over  any  member  of  a  civilised  community,  ^^^<»Aw 
against  his  will,  is  to  prevent  harm  to  others.  His  own  '^  ' 
good,  either  physical  or  moral,  is  not  a  sufficient  war- 
rant. He  cannot  rightfully  be  compelled  to  do  or  for- 
bear because  it  will  be  better  for  him  to  do  so,  because 
it  will  make  him  happier,  because,  in  the  opinion  of 
others,  to  do  so  would  be  wise  or  even  right.  .  .  .  The 
only  part  of  the  conduct  of  any  one  for  which  he  is  amen- 
able to  society  is  that  which  concerns  others.  In  the  part 
which  merely  concerns  himself,  his  independence  is,  of 
right,  absolute.  Over  himself,  over  his  own  body  and 
mind,  the  individual  is  sovereign."  ^ 

While  it  was  still  admitted  that  social  life,  scientifically 
conceived,  rested  on  purely  utilitarian  foundations,  this 
older  individualist  concept  was  rapidly  dying  out.  Pub- 
lic and  private  morals  were  coming  to  be  systematised  by 
State  supervision,  or  in  those  countries  such  as  England 
or  the  United  States  where  self-help  and  self-determina- 
tion were  strongly  developed,  public  opinion  served  the 

*  Cf.  op.  cit..  Introductory. 


\ 


240  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

same  purpose.  The  State  was  a&.suming  the  function 
of  regulating  and  disciplining  the  moral  as  well  as  the 
phvsicaTlife  of  fhf  i"^i^'''^"^^  in  order  to  make  pos- 
sible a  collective,  cohesive^^discipline,  by  affirming  the 
power  of  the  State,  and  emphasising  the  weakness  of 
the  individual;  in  turn  cajoling  him  by  the  mirage  of 
the  ^greatness  of  the  State  of  which  he  was  a  member, 
if  need  be  arousing  his  patriotisiaa  to  the  sacrifice  even 
of  his  life  for  the  professed  need  of  the  State,  or  j:oe^c- 
Ing  and  compelling  him  If  required.  Whether  these  func- 
tions were  assumed  directly  by  the  government,  as  was 
the  case  in  continental  Europe,  or  by  public  opinion, 
as  was  the  case  in  English-speaking  countries,  the  re- 
sults were  identical.  Wherever  we  look  we  find  an  in- 
creasing debilitation  of  moral  sense,  an  Increasing 
stultification  of  spiritual  motive.  We  find  the  same  under- 
lying tendency  to  consider  sound  credit  above  sound  faith, 
and  an  empirical  test  the  final  arbitrament.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  seek  far  for  the  causes  of  this  change. 
The  State  was  becoming  professedly  non-moral.  That 
interest  creates  right,  that  right  is  weak  and  unreal  un- 
less  backed  by  might,  and  that  the  State  must  be  ready 
to  defend  its  mterests  as  it  must  be  prepared  to  assert 
its  strength,  regardless  of  any  question  of  actual  right, 
had  led  to  the  creation  of  a  group  of  national  States 
whos£_rapacity  was  confined  only  by  policy  or  weakness, 
and  whose  example  remained  the  only  norm  of  social 
life. 

Such  was  the  political  creed  of  the  Middle  Class  on 
the  eve  of  its  dissolution  as  the  sole  controlling  factor  in 
the  State.  We  may  here  trace  the  origins  of  the  new 
politico-economic  theory  of  State  which  was  to  con- 
fer upon  the  State  not  merely  the  right  but  the  duty  to 
intervene    in    what    had    hitherto    been    considered    the 


THE  POLITICO-ECONOMIC  THEORY         241 

domain  of  private  affairs,  and  to  identify  the  interests 
of  the  individual  with  those  of  the  State.  We  may  thus 
discover  that  the  new  politico-economic  theory  of  State 
was  not  the  handiwork  of  the  Middle  Class  alone. 

The  middle  class  theory  had  expressed  itself  in  in- 
dividualism and  nationalism.  The  Nation-State  was  the 
product  of  this  theory.  With  its  rise  and  firm  estab- 
lishment the  cultural  mission  of  the  Middle  Class  had 
been  accomplished. 


II 


BOOK  III 


CHAPTER  I 

The  First  International  Movement 


THE     DECLINE     OF     NATIONALISM QUANTITATIVE     VALUES IM- 
PERIALISM    AND     INTERNATIONALISM THE     PART     OF     ENG- 
LAND  ORGANISATION  OF  INTERNATIONAL  MOVEMENT 

J*      ITS    CHARACTER RAPID    GROWTH THE    CONGRESS 

OF    BASEL THE   PARIS   COMMUNE THE   ATTI- 
TUDE  OF    THE    MIDDLE    CLASS 


THE  rise  of  Prussia  had  upset  the  balance  of  power 
in  Europe.  The  defeat  of  France  had  left  the 
newly-created  German  Empire  in  a  dominant  position 
on  the  Continent.  The  new  Nation-States,  Germany 
and  Italy,  whose  unity  had  been  won  simultaneously,  had 
attained  their  mature  territorial  delimitations.  Austria- 
Hungary  under  the  Dualist  regime  had  secured  for  the 
time  being  internal  peace.  France  though  crippled  had 
not  been  dismembered,  and  was  left  free  to  reorganise 
her  government  on  the  approved  parliamentary  model. 
The  minor  States  had  been  protected  by  international 
guarantees  or  treaties.  The  extension  of  representative 
government  had  led  to  the  strengthening  of  the  hand  of 
constituted  authority  and  insured  its  stability. 

While  the  government  of  Russia  remained  that  of  a 
military  despotism,  it  had  liberated  the  serfs,  which 
seemed  to  portend  an  era  of  more  liberal  rule.  Though 
this  was  not  realised,  the  growth  of  political  conscious- 
ness among  the  Russian  people  made  great  strides,  and 
revolutionary  propaganda  was  carried  on  with  increasing 

1245] 


246  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

zeal  and  activity.  The  situation  of  the  economically  and 
politically  backward  peoples  of  the  Balkans  still  remained 
obscure,  and  this  region  was  to  become  a  fertile  field  for 
intrigue  and  armed  conflict.  The  Danubian  Princi- 
palities, or  Rumania  as  they  were  now  called,  under  a 
German  ruler  assisted  by  foreign  capital,  were  being 
rapidly  developed.  The  other  Balkan  peoples  dreamed 
of  national  independence,  but  the  difficulties  which  beset 
the  path  of  its  realisation  seemed  insurmountable,  more 
particularly  to  the  Southern  Slavs,  a  large  section  of 
whom  would  remain  under  Austrian  rule,  even  if  the 
yoke  of  Turkey  could  be  cast  off.  On  the  American 
continent  the  United  States,  after  the  ordeal  of  the  Civil 
War,  was  entering  upon  an  era  of  unprecedented  growth. 
Their  successful  intervention  in  Mexican  affairs,  their 
forceful  assertion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  protect- 
ing the  continent  against  European  encroachments,  had 
served  to  assist  in  reuniting  the  two  parts  of  the  coun- 
try so  lately  at  war,  and  affirmed  the  ascendancy  of  the 
United  States  in  American  affairs.  In  the  Orient,  Japan 
was  already  beginning  to  look  to  the  West  anxious  to 
enter  into  the  current  of  political  and  economic  progress. 

Looked  at  in  its  broader  aspects,  nationalism  as  an 
aggressive  political  principle  seemed  to  be  dying  out. 
France,  in  establishing  the  Third  Republic,  had  for  the 
time  rid  herself  of  the  incubus  of  the  defence  of  the 
principle  of  nationality  as  a  doctrine  of  political  propa- 
ganda. Nationality  in  its  German  interpretation  of  racial 
supremacy  had  triumphed;  even  a  section  of  French  pub- 
lic opinion  came  to  accept  the  argument  that  race  is  a 
distinctive  mark  of  the  Nation-State,  though  the  French 
were  no  longer  prepared  to  wage  war  in  defending  the 
national  aspirations  of  other  States. 

In  seeking  for  the  causes  of  the  decline  of  nationalism 


THE  FIRST  INTERNATIONAL  MOVEMENT    247 

it  will  be  found  that  it  was  coming  to  be  supplanted  by 
a  new  and  more  all-embracing  motive  of  policy,  con- 
sonant with  the  growth  of  the  power  and  interests  of 
the  State.  Hitherto  the  strong  States  of  Western  Eu- 
rope had  been  principally  engaged  in  extending  their  na- 
tional boundaries,  in  defining  their  national  individuality, 
or  in  asserting  their  national  personality.  The  hope 
which  France  entertained  of  succeeding  to  the  hegemony 
of  continental  Europe  in  return  for  the  assistance  she  had 
rendered  to  the  various  Nation-States  then  in  the  process 
of  formation,  had  been  frustrated  by  the  rise  of  Ger- 
many. France  not  only  was  unable  to  assume  the  leader- 
ship among  a  group  of  relatively  strong  sister  States, 
but  had  been  forced  into  a  position  of  isolation  and  in- 
feripxity  in  the  new  competition  for  power,  which  was 
to  become  the  sole  motive  of  foreign  policy. 


II 

The  new  political  creed  may  be  briefly  summarised  as 
follows.  The  State  is  Power,  and  requires  power,  not 
merely  to  exert  its  authority  at  home,  but  to  assure  the 
respect  of  its  nationals  abroad.  Power  in  its  politico- 
eronomic  sense  is  jpfiost  readily  expressed  by  size  of  na- 
uqx\a]  territory  and  population.  The  tendency  to  form 
great  States;  the  impulse  which  drove  men  to  urban  life 
and  resulted  in  great  cities;  the  energy  in  organising 
great  industrial  enterprises  were  the  result  of  the  implicit 
trust  placed  in  numbers  as  the  principal  element  of  power, 
in  quantity  as~against  quality,  in  aggressive  progressive 
activity  instead  of  cautious  rational  development,  and 
above  all  in  the  conviction  which  had  been  borrowed  from 
the  sphere  of  economics,  that  weakness  is  akin  to  crime. 


248 


THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 


-7 
\ 


This  new  way  of  thinking,  this  dynamic  interpretation 
of  social  phenomena  and  the  transference  of  quantita- 
tive analysis  to  the  realm  of  politico-social  life  was  es- 
se_ntially._alien  to  the  ideals  of  the  Middle  Class,  and  its 
acceptance  must  be  accounted  for  by  acknowledging  that 
the  control  of  the  State  was  passing  out  of  the  hands 
of  this  class.  This  is  clearly  indicated  by  the  fact  that 
the  Middle  Class  now  sought  to  identify  itself  completely 
with  the  State,  and  efface  itself  as  a  class  by  absorbing 
and  uniting  all  classes  in  the  personalised  Nation-State. 

History  affords  adequate  confirmation  of  the  fact  that 
before  a  new  social  order  becomes  ascendant  and  new 
social  arrangements  are  adopted,  the  new  forces  _n}ake 
themselves  felt  on  the  old,  and  produce  a  final  flowering 
or  the  old  order.  In  this  way  we  may  trace  the  rise 
of  the  Middle  Class  at  the  close  of  the  mediaeval  period, 
which  produced  the  Renaissance  and  the  Reformation, 
both  of  which  belong  to  the  older  order.  In  our  own 
times  the  great  economic  expansion  of  the  last  quarter 
of  the  19th  century,  and  the  cultural  progress  which  was 
realised,  were  in  a  large  measure  the  result  of  the  rise 
of  the  Proletariat. 

It  is  in  this  light  that  the  new  motives  of  political 
practice,  imperialism  and  internationalism,  must  be 
looked  upon  as  the  first  reaction  against  middle  class 
ascendancy — the  precursory  manifestations  of  a  more 
complete  change  in  social  organisation. 

Imperialism  and  internationalism  are_dir£Ctl^  related. 
They  first  arose  simultaneously  among  the  people  whose 
political  capacity  had  been  most  fully  developed,  and 
whose  economic  evolution  was  most  advanced.  Both  are 
transition_policies  and  have  therefore  remained  hitherto 
ill-defined  and  even  appeared  as  subversive  factors  of 
politico-social  progress. 


THE  FIRST  INTERNATIONAL  MOVEMENT   249 

Imperialism  jjiay  be  designated  as  the  expression  of 
the  Nation-State  as  Power,  in  the  process  of  over-expan- 
sion ;  Internationalism,  as  a  dissolvent  of  the  NatTon- 
State.  Imperialism  appeared  as  the  logical  sequence  of 
national  growth,  and  few  of  its  middle  class  supporters 
realised  that  in  supporting  imperialism  they  were  serv- 
ing a  political  theory  alien  to  their  continuance  in  con- 
trol, and  perilous  to  the  survival  of  the  Nation-State. 
Internationalism  was  the  first  corporate  expression  of 
thg'' Proletariat,  which  directed  attention  to  the  possibility  / 
of  extra-national  social  organisation.^ 

It  has  already  been  pointed  out  that  England  had  in 
modern  times  assumed  the  part  of  political  tutor  to  the 
Western  World.  Here  political  liberty  and  economic 
independence,  which  led  to  the  establishment  of  con- 
stitutional government  and  the  development  of  the  cap- 
italist system,  were  first  declared  the  imprpsrn'pHhle 
rights  of  man.  It  is  with  no  surprise,  therefore,  that  we 
must  again  turn  to  England  to  discover  the  birthplace  of 
the  new  imperialist  and  internationalist  movements.^ 

^  The  various  international  movements  which  have  arisen,  and  the 
large  number  of  international  agreements  which  have  been  entered  upon 
by  sovereign  States,  from  the  Geneva  Convention  (1864)  to  the  Hague 
Arbitrations  and  the  League  of  Nations  (1919),  must  be  looked  upon  as 
efforts  to  bolster  up  the  old  politico-juridic  thesis  of  State,  and  are  not  to 
be  considered  a  part  of  internationalism,  which  was  more  exclusively  pro- 
letarian. However,  these  movements  are  symptomatic  of  the  striving 
towards  the  breaking  down  of  the  rigid  egoism  of  the  Nation-State,  and 
as  such  will  be  examined  in  the  course  of  the  discussion  of  the  efforts  of 
the  State  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  changing  social  order. 

^Numerous  political  writers  have  sought  to  demonstrate  that  it  was 
in  Germany  that  imperialism  was  first  developed.  Some  even  go  so  far 
as  to  account  for  the  unification  of  Germany  on  imperialist  grounds. 
This  interpretation  would  appear  erroneous,  as  German  and  for  that 
matter  Italian  unity  are  the  products  of  racial  nationalism.  Thus  Boutmy 
in  his  careful  analysis  of  the  psychology  of  political  development  re- 
marks: "L'imperialisme  est  un  etat  psychologique  qui  a  commence  a 
paraitre  en  Europe  vers  i860.  I'Allemagne  I'a  eprouve  la  premiere;  puis 
il  a  gagne  I'Angleterre,  la  France,  et  a  enfin  traverse  I'Atlantique 
pour  s'epanouir  aux  Etats  Unis." — Cf.  Elements  d'une  Psychologie  Poli- 
tique du  Peuple  Americain,  Chap.  VH. 

We  might  adduce  much  evidence  to  prove  that  whereas  the  theoretical 


_? 


250  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

England,  which  had  hitherto  been  in  the  vanguard  of 
political  development,  had  during  the  period  of  nation- 
alist expansion  and  the  growth  of  Nation-States  on  the 
Continent,  fallen  to  a  secondary  position  in  European 
affairs.  She  was  engaged  in  concentrating  her  energy  on 
economic  expansion,  and  had  taken  little  or  no  part  in 
assisting  national  groups  in  their  efforts  to  constitute 
themselves  as  independent  States. 

The  first  organised  expression  of  internationalism  grew 
out  of  a  visit  which  French  workingmen  paid  to  London 
to  the  "International  Exhibition"  held  there  in  1862. 
After  a  number  of  meetings  with  British  workers,  it  was 
decided  to  organise  an  International  Workingmen's  Asso- 
ciation, which  became  known  as  the  FixiL-X^te-Fnation^le, 
with  the  view  of  securing  international  solidarity  among 
workingmen  to  promote  their  economic  betterment. 

By  1864  the  Internationale  was  duly  organised,  and 
Karl  Marx  was  entrusted  with  the  task  of  the  drafting 
of  its  programme,  which  was  adopted  in  1866  by  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Proletariat  of  the  leading  countries  of 
the  Western  World.  It  soon  recruited  stanch  adherents 
from  the  confines  of  Hungary  to  the  coasts  of  California. 
The  Internationale  suddenly  found  itself  in  the  front  rank 
of  the  opposition  to  the  existing  social  order.  Its  avowed 
purpose  was  to  overthrow  the  capitalist  system.  To 
achieve  this  end  it  advocated  the  use  of  the  miist-pewer- 
H  ful  weapon  o£... coercion  yet  devised — the  intern^donal 
1 1  strike. 

basis  of  both  imperialism  and  internationalism  came  from  Germany 
their  first  practical  application  is  to  be  sought  in  England.  It  is  sig- 
nificant that  the  theory  of  imperialism  and  internationalism,  or  as  we 
i  might  call  them  the  doctrines  of  Bismarck  and  Marx,  had  their  first 
tryout  at  the  hands  of  the  English  and  French  and  only  at  a  later  date 
do  we  find  Germany  committed  to  an  imperialist  programme,  while 
the  principles  of  "German  Socialism"  dominated  the  international  move- 
ment. 


THE  FIRST  INTERNATIONAL  MOVEMENT    251 

Such  was  the  basis  of  the  actual  organisation  of  the 
first  international  movement.  In  spite  of  the  energy 
of  its  organisers  and  its  rapid  spread  it  was  not  to  be 
expected  that  the  International  could  have  any  very  great 
immediate  political  influence  on  the  Nation-State.  It  is 
of  importance  more  especially  as  indicating  the  new  trend 
of  social  evolution. 

Though  the  Internationale  was  professedly  communist 
and  accepted  in  principle  communist  theories  as  conso- 
oian^^'with  the  aims  of  the  Proletariat  in  its  struggle  against 
middle  class  individualism,  it  included  no  revolutionary 
programme  to  bring  about  the  breakdown  of  national 
States,  or  even  any  plan  to  establish  closer  political  re- 
lations between  the  members  of  various  States.  It  was 
in  point  of  fact  principally  a  project  for  coordinating 
the  labor  movements  in  various  States,  and  for  securing 
the  support  of  the  stronger  labor  unions,  regardless  of 
national  affiliations.^ 

It  is  significant  of  the  character  of  this  first  interna- 
tional movement  that  in  drawing  up  its  programme 
Marx  abandoned  many  of  his  radical  doctrines  of  1848, 
which  had  made  of  Communism  so  trenchant  a  denuncia- 
tion of  middle  class  political  and  economic  control.  Now 
we  find  written  into  the  body  of  the  declaration  that 
the  members  of  the  Internationale  "will  acknowledge 
truth,  justice,  and  morality  as  the  basis  of  their  con- 
duct towards  one  another  and  towards  all  men,  with- 
out regard  to  color,  creed,  or  nationality,"  which  reads 
much  like  a  favorite  political  platitude  of  the  Middle 
Class.  It  appears  evident  that  national  allegiance  and 
national  patriotism  were  still  uppermost  in  the  minds 
of  the  majority  of  the  Proletariat,  and  that  whatever 

*  The  strike  of  the  bronze  workers  in  Paris  (1S67),  and  of  the  building 
trades  in  Geneva  (1868)  were  successfully  supported  by  funds  contributed 
by  British  labor  unions. 


Jl 


^ 


\\ 


252 


THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 


scope  was  given  to  the  feelings  of  intejTiat^ional  solidarity 
was  secondjj:v:_Jto.  that  of  national  obedience. 

However,  as  an  attempt  to  arouse  class  consciousness 
the  Internationale  is  of  no  little  political  significance.  The 
concept  of  an  international  union  of  the  Proletariat  as 
a  class,  regardless  of  national  affiliations,  cannot  be  said 
to  have  been  clearly  visualised.  Yet  there  was  sown  the 
seed  of  the  conviction  that  the  social  order  might  pos- 
sibly exist  without  the  need  of  national  allegiance,  with- 
out the  adherence  of  the  individual  to  a  national  State, 
as  trade  might  be  carried  on  without  the  intervention  of 
the  middleman. 


i 


III 

The  Nation-State  was  engaged  in  patterning  Its  mem- 
bers on  one  model,  in  eliminating  all  class  distinctions 
and  removing  regional  or  racial  disabilities  in  a  political 
sense,  by  introducing  fullest  political  equality  and  stimu- 
lating racial  unity  and  national  allegiance.  It  promoted 
competition  between  States  for  power  and  between  in- 
dividuals for  economic  advantage.  This  competition  was 
producing  economic  and  social  inequalities  far  more  im- 
mediatc  alid  real  than  the  polilical.^ equality  the  State 
claimed  to  vouchsafe. 

The  international  movement  was  a  first  feeble  attempt 
to  unite  the  Proletariat,  ostensibly  regardless  of  national 
allegiance,  in  its  assault  upon  this  system  of  middle  class, 
anti-social  organisation,  and  by  pointing  out  the  fallacies 
and  injustice  of  the  competitive  system,  it  declared  that, 
"the  emancipation  of  labor  is  neither  a  local  nor  a  na- 
tional but  a  social  problem."  But  nationalism  was  still 
too  strong  a  force,  the  concept  of  the  Nation-State  still 


THE  FIRST  INTERNATIONAL  MOVEMENT     253 

too  recent  a  dogma,  to  permit  of  the  realisation  of  any 
programme  in  which  these  two  factors  were  to  be 
eliminated. 

In  examining  into  the  tenets  of  the  First  Internationale 
with  its  vague  profession  of  "no  rights  without  duties, 
no  duties  without  rights,"  we  will  find  that  it  was  a  co- 
operative rather  than  a  corporate  movement.  It  con- 
ceived of  the  Proletariat  as  having  certain  interests  in 
common  in  its  struggle  against  capitalism,  and  sought  to 
estdblish  a  system  of  international  cooperation  between 
labor  unions,  in  the  first  instance  to  strengthen  labor  so 
as  to  be  able  to  fight  on  something  like  equal  terms 
with  capital,  and  only  as  a  far  remoter  objective,  to 
overthrow  the  capitalistic  system.  None  of  the  leaders  of 
the  Internationale  appear  consciously  to  have  envisaged 
the  corporate  intere&ts  of  the  Proletariat  as  requiring 
a  politico-economic  as  well  as  a  social  organisation  al- 
together different  from  that  which  existed,  or  the  in- 
timate and  inextricable  affiliation  of  the  capitalist  sys- 
tem with  that  of  the  accepted  tenets  of  government  and 
the  democratic  organisation  of  the  Nation-State.  Even 
the  most  advanced  sections  of  the  Internationale  sought 
to  secure  the  control  of  power  in  the  State  by  adopting 
the  political  methods  then  in  vogue,  which  accounts  for 
the  temporising  character  of  the  charter  of  inter- 
nationalism. 

The  growth  of  the  international  movement  had  been 
rapid.  At  the  Fourth  Congress,  held  at  Basel  in  1869, 
the  delegate  from  the  United  States  claimed  to  repre- 
sent 800,000  workers,  while  in  every  European  country 
groups  had  been  established,  journals  founded,  which 
carried  on  an  active  propaganda.  Already  various  Eu- 
ropean governments  had  become  alarmed  at  the  rapid 
spread  of  internationalism.     The  professions  of  middle 


254  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

class  political  philosophers,  demanding  fullest  liberty  of 
thought  and  amplest  toleration  of  all  social  and  political 
views,  which  had  found  widest  acceptance  as  the  founda- 
tion of  political  liberty,  were  for  a  time  overlooked  In 
order  to  stamp  out  the  new  movement.  In  France  and 
Germany  legal  proceedings  were  Instituted  to  dissolve 
the  organisation. 

The  Internationale  had  from  the  beginning  rallied  to 
its  support  all  the  various  types  of  political  malcontents — 
Anarchists,  Nihilists,  Communists — though  their  extrem- 
ist tendencies  were  tempered  by  their  contact  with  the 
more  level-headed  labor  leaders.  However,  the  occasion 
offered  by  the  defeat  of  France  and  the  overthrow  of  the 
Empire  was  deemed  by  some  too  useful  an  opportunity 
to  let  pass,  without  making  an  effort  to  further  the  pro- 
gramme of  social  revolution.  Though  the  Internationale 
as  an  organisation  took  no  part  In  the  Paris  revolution 
(1871),  yet  many  of  Its  members  joined  the  movement 
on  their  own  responsibility,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the 
"Commune"  had  little  In  common  with  internationalist 
aims.^  The  failure  of  the  Commune  led  to  the  disrup- 
tion of  the  First  Internationale.  The  more  moderate 
elements  led  by  Marx  endeavored  to  purge  the  party  of 
its  more  subversive  members,  more  especially  of  the 
Russian  nihilist  group  and  the  Jura  Federation.  This 
led  to  the  secession  of  the  latter  under  Bakunin,  who 

*  Though  Marx  himself  was  led  to  endorse  the  Commune,  it  was  a 
strictly  political  movement,  and  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  Marxian 
principles  of  communism.  The  French  Communal  doctrine  of  1871  was 
that  every  commune,  or  at  least  every  important  city-commune  like 
Paris,  Lyons,  or  Marseilles,  should  be  recognised  as  independent,  and 
France  a  federation  of  such  small  units.  This  doctrine  of  regionalism 
was  a  reaction  against  the  increasing  centralisation  and  the  uniformity 
of  the  Nation-State,  and  as  such  a  recognition  of  the  abuses  arising  out 
of  the  suppression  of  regional  individuality,  but  it  was  neither  a  deeply 
rooted  conviction,  nor  a  carefully  thought-out  system  of  political  organisa- 
tion.    See  p.  232  et  seq. 


THE  FIRST  INTERNATIONAL  MOVEMENT     255 

established  a  rival  Internationale  which  gained  adherents 
chiefly  in  Italy  and  Spain,  while  the  Marxists  set  up 
their  headquarters  in  New  York.  Already  the  Inter- 
nationale had  lost  whatever  political  power  it  had  gained, 
and  within  less  than  a  decade  the  whole  movement  had 
to  all  intents  and  purposes  collapsed. 

The  only  tangible  result  of  this  first  effort  of  the  Pro- 
letariat to  free  itself  from  economic  bondage  and  as- 
sert its  solidarity  as  a  class  against  the  Nation-State 
wa«  the  strengthening  of  the  labor  movements  in  the 
various  States,  their  close  association  with  socialism,  and 
the  laying  of  the  foundation  of  trade-unionism  as  a  po- 
litical factor. 

The  first  assault  on  nationalism  had  been  launched. 
Though  the  progress  of  the  concept  of  internationalism 
was  of  necessity  slow,  It  portended  changes  in  social 
organisation  which  had  never  hitherto  been  contemplated. 


CHAPTER  II 

Imperialism 


RELATION  TO  CAPITALISM — ROLE  OF  THE  PROLETARIAT — MEGALO- 
MANIA  OF   THE    EPOCH PROCESSES   OF    DECAY 

— INFLUENCE  OF  PESSIMISM 


WHILE  the  Proletariat  was  engaged  in  its  struggle 
with  capitalism,  and  sought  economic  advantages 
rather  than  political  privileges,  the  State  was  outgrowing 
its  national  boundaries.  Economic  expansion  was  rais- 
ing new  political  problems  difficult  of  solution,  which 
were  to  involve  the  Nation-State  in  the  pursuit  of  a 
policy  of  foreign  enterprise  fundamentally  hostile  to  its 
concept. 

"Extension  of  the  British  Empire  in  directions  where 
trading  interests  and  investments  require  the  protection 
of  the  flag"  ^  is  the  definition  of  irrrperialism  in  its 
modern  sense,  as  given  by  the  Oxford  Dictionary.  This 
definition  succinctly  sets  forth  the  purely  economic  origin 
of  the  new  political  practice.  With  the  frank  acceptance 
of  imperialism,  a  new  theory  of  State  was  required.  The 
older  politico-juridic  theory  no  longer  sufficed.  The 
way  had  been  prepared  by  the  revival  of  Machiavellian 

^A  Neiv  English  Dictionary  on  Historical  Principles,  edited  by  James 
A.  H.  Murray,  Oxford.  A  note  adds:  "In  the  United  States  imperialism 
is  similarly  applied  to  the  new  policy  of  extending  the  rule  of  the 
American  people  over  foreign  countries  and  of  acquiring  and  holding 
distant  dependencies  in  the  way  in  which  colonies  and  dependencies  are 
held  by  European  States." 

[256] 


IMPERIALISM 


257 


theories  of  the  complete  divorce  of  morality  from 
politics  and  the  rise  of  realism,  both  precursors  of  ab- 
solutism in  a  new  form. 

In  order  to  explain  logically  the  newer  thesis  of 
imperialism  it  would  be  more  consonant  with  a  true 
historical  spirit  to  abandon  the  politico-juridic  concept 
which  arose  with  middle  class  ascendancy  in  the  State, 
and  seek  to  interpret  the  new  policy  by  new  standards 
which  accompanied  the  rise  of  a  new  class  to  power  in 
the, ''State.  Before  proceeding  further  with  a  careful 
inquiry  into  the  historical  evolution  of  imperialism,  as 
illustrated  by  the  imperialist  epoch  (1877-1917)  it  Is 
necessary  to  note  that  the  vigor  of  capitalism,  the  sudden 
superabundant  energy  which  some  of  the  great  States  of 
Western  Europe  displayed  that  made  imperialism  pos- 
sible, rested  upon  the  economic  vigor  of  the  Proletariat. 
It  was  the  ability  of  the  workingmen  to  adapt  themselves 
to  the  new  industrialism,  their  willingness  to  produce 
more  than  they  could  consume,  which  created  not  merely 
the  increased  store  of  wealth  at  home,  but  made  possible 
the  export2Lble__surplus  and  the  consequent  demand  for 
more  raw  materials,  in  the  first  instance  the  causes  of 
imperialist  expansion. 

The  exploitation  of  new  machinery,  the  new  methods 
of  production,  the  new  modes  of  industrial  organisation, 
the  new  channels  of  distribution  as  applied  to  commerce 
and  industry,  had  virtually  eliminated  the  old  Middle 
Class.  A  careful  investigation  and  intelligent  examination 
of  imperialism  reveals  that  the  Middle  Class  as  such  had 
little  or  no  share  therein.  As  long  as  overseas  trade 
was  carried  on  purely  for  profit;  as  long  as  it  retained 
Its  purely  individualist  character,  and  remained  a  priv- 
ilege without  obligations,  having  no  other  aim  than  to 
insure  the  wellbeing  and  increase  the  store  of  wealth  of 


r 


THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 


the  individual,  the  Middle  Class  enthusiastically  entered 
into  it.  But  when  foreign  trade  assumed  something  more 
^  of  a  political  function,  when  it  came  to  entail  obliga- 
tions, the  moderate,  limited,  middle  class  mind  showed 
itself  congenitally  hostile  to  this  new  development  of 
national  power  which  was  to  launch  the  State  into  the 
vortex  of  international  conflict.  Attention  need  only  to 
be  called  to  the  hostility  of  the  Middle  Class  towards  this 
new  type  of  colonial  enterprise.  The  ardor  with  which 
it  was  combatted  by  the  Manchester  school,  so  typically 
middle  class,  is  well  illustrated  by  a  perusal  of  the 
speeches  of  John  Bright  on  Canada,  and  John  Stuart 
Mill's  opposition  to  the  annexation  of  India. 


II 

Though  the  filiatlpji  at  first  seems  obscure,  it  is  sus- 
ceptible of  proof  that  imperialism,  like  internationalism, 
was  in  the  main  a  proletarian  movement;  not  the  positive 
programme  of  its  leaders,  but  the  first  corporate  mani- 
festation of  the  political  consciousness  of  the  masses  on 
their  entrance  into  the  orbit  of  history. 

The  megalomania  of  the  new  era;  the  substitution 
of  quantitative  for  qualitative  standards;  the  expansive 
energy  of  national  power  in  pursuit  of  extra-national 
aims;  the  zeal  displayed  in  acquiring  new  territory,  often 
regardless  of  its  practical  value;  the  desire  of  the  State 
to  assert  itself  as  omnipotent;  the  acceptance  of  the  be- 
lief that  nations  have  a  civilising  mission  to  perform,  and 
that  they  are  the  appointed  instruments  of  God  to  fulfil 
this  destiny;  the  marking  off  of  the  various  nations  in 
their  own  estimation  as  the  anointed  of  the  Deity  for 
this  purpose,   all  indicateamystical   element   alien   to 


IMPERIALISM  259 

the  temper  of  the  Middle  Class,  but  which  is  to  be  found 
at  the  basis  of  all  great  popular  movements. 

Side  by  side  with  the  intense  realism  which  capitalism 
infused  into  imperial  enterprise,  the  strict  enforcement 
of  the  most  ruthless  and  arbitrary  demands  which  were 
made  by  European  Governments  in  behalf  of  their  na-  .♦y 

tionals  in  distant  lands  to  promote  their  private  interests,       q\jV 
we  find  the  sentimental  enthusiasm  with  which  the  Pro-     y  y 
letariat   greeted   the    news    of   the   conquest   of    remote    /^    j^^ 
regions.      The  masses  were   ready  to   support  their  re-,  "i    \j3^ 
spective  governments  in  the  prosecution  of  a  vigorou^  j,(^'  .  -^ 
foreign   policy.      This   committed   the   State    to    a   prc^  (^ 

gramme  of  foreign  expansion  and  served  to  undermine 
the  foundations  of  the  narrow  and  limited  Nation-State, 
and  to  prepare  it  to  assume  a  super-national  character. 

Territorial    expansion,    which   was    the   principal    im- 
perialist phenomenon,  also  had  a  practical  aspect.    It  was 
an  acknowledgment  that  the  territorial  basis  of  the  State, 
as  hitherto  conceived,  was  too  small.     More  elbow  room 
was  needed   for  the   growing  population — altogether   a     ■ 
proletarian  need — an  expression  of  the  desire  to  have  a     1 
share  of  greater  material  wellbeing,  if  not  at  home  at 
least  over-seas.     Thus  arose  the  aim  of  the  State  to  con- 
trol exclusively  for  itself  as  great  a  part  of  the  globe  as     > 
possible;   to   develop   its   colonial   territory,   not   merely 
as  a  source  of  raw  materials.  EuTas  a  place  of  gpttlpmpnf 
for  the  surplus  population. 

Historians  of  the  future,  in  examining  the  political 
evolution  of  the  epoch  under  review,  will  possibly  be 
able  to  discern  with  greater  acuteness  the  particular  fea- 
tures of  proletarian  influence,  and  the  diverse  and  re- 
condite factors  of  proletarian  impulse  to  imperial  ex- 
pansion, which  to  us  are  still  obscured  by  the  outward 
formal  ascendancy  of  the  Middle  Class,  and  the  survival 


26o  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

in  form  of  the  politlco-jurldic  concept  of  the  State. 
But  we  can  already  trace  the  symptoms  of  the  decay  of 
the  older  order,  upon  the  humus  of  which  imperialism 
was  flowering. 

The_prQcess  of  decay  is  one  of  insubordination.  In 
order  that  an  organism  may  function  with  smooth  en- 
ergy and  produce  the  fullest  fruits,  all  the  component 
parts  must  perform  their  allotted  tasks,  not  merely  with 
vigor,  but  also  in  rhythmic  unity.  As  soon  as  one  cell 
or  group  of  cells  ceases  to  maintain  this  rhythmic  re- 
lation— attempts,  figuratively  speaking,  to  assert  its  in- 
dependence— the  organism  becomes  diseased,  and  the 
process  of  decay  sets  in.  Decay  may  thus  be  defined  as 
the  breaking  down  of  the  normal  relation,  the  prede- 
yT\  termined  functioning  of  the  cells  of  an  organism.  Hence 
arise  those  anarchical  relations  which  tend  to  disrupt  and 
ultimately  destroy  it. 

Translated  into  terms  for  use  in  an  historical  analysis 
of  political  theory  such  as  we  are  attempting  to  out- 
line, decadence  may  be  said  to  set  in  when  in  a  social 
system  there  arise  a  preponderant  number  of  individuals 
unfit  to  perform  their  allotted  tasks  as  parts  of  the 
social  order.  Exaggerated  individualism — the  super- 
man— is  in  this  sense  a  symptom  of  decadence.  It  im- 
plies the  tendency  to  decomposition  of  the  complex  social 
fabric  into  its  unorganised,  primary  condition;  the  com- 
petition of  parts  replacing  the  harmony  of  the  whole. 

It  is  in  this  way  that  we  may  interpret  the  development 
of  individualism,  its  gradual  contamination  of  the  body 
politic,  and  the  rise  of  nationalism  as  factors  of  de- 
cadence. It  may  be  averred  that  this  process  is  con- 
tinuous, as  growth  and  decay  succeed  each  other.  It 
is  beyond  our  purpose  to  deal  with  the  imaginative  aspects 
of  such   a  problem.      Nor  is   it   of   immediate   concern 


IMPERIALISM  261 

whether,  as  is  no  doubt  susceptible  of  proof,  a 
civilisation  at  its  highest  point  of  achievement  has  al- 
ready entered  upon  the  period  of  decadence,  and  that 
culture  is  a  corollary  of  decay.  Yet  we  may  note  that 
the  social  unrest  which  has  prevailed  during  the  last 
decade  of  the  19th  century  and  the  first  decades  of  the 
20th,  is  symptomatic  of  the  decay  of  the  older  middle 
class  theory  of  State,  and  that  the  new  order  is  already 
vigorously  thrusting  itself  upward,  so  that  the  events 
pf  these  years  belong  to  the  new  era. 

If  it  were  necessary  to  emphasise  at  greater  length  the 
process  of  social  decay  referred  to,  we  might  recall  again 
the  negative  pessimistic  temper  of  the  period  under  re- 
view. Let  us  listen  to  the  words  of  a  shrewd  French 
analyst,  who  was  a  university  student  at  Paris  soon  after 
1 87 1,  and  who  in  the  early  eighties  interpreted  the  spirit 
of  his  age  with  singular  precision: 

"A  universal  nausea,  due  to  the  inadequacies  of  life, 
fills  the  heart  of  Slavs,  Germans,  and  Latins,  and  shows 
itself  in  the  first  group  as  nihilism,  in  the  second  as  pes- 
simism, and  in  ourselves  by  solitary  and  bizarre  neuroses. 
The  murderous  rage  of  the  conspirators  of  St.  Peters- 
burg, the  writings  of  Schopenhauer,  the  furious  incendi- 
arism of  the  Commune,  the  relentless  misanthropy  of 
realistic  novelists — I  choose  on  purpose  the  most  dispa- 
rate examples — all  reveal  the  same  negation  of  the  value 
of  life,  which  with  every  passing  day  is  enshrouding  West- 
ern civilisation.  We  are,  to  be  sure,  still  far  from 
cosmic  suicide,  the  supreme  desire  of  the  theorists  of 
misfortune,  but  slowly  and  surely  the  belief  in  the  bank- 
ruptcy of  nature  is  being  elaborated,  which  promises  to 
become  the  sinister  faith  of  the  20th  century,  if  science 
or  a  barbarian  invasion  does  not  rescue  mankind  which 
has  thought  too  much,  from  weariness  of  its  own 
thoughts."  1 

*Cf.  Paul  Bourget,  Psychologie  Contemporaine,  Vol.  I,  p.  16. 


262  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

This  passage  admirably  reproduces  the  mood  of  the 
epoch,  and  may  assist  in  the  interpretation  of  the  mean- 
ing of  decadence,  and  throw  light  on  the  duality  of  pur- 
pose in  the  imperialist  movement,  wherein  we  may  chart 
the  ascendant  proletarian,  and  the  descendant  middle 
class  curve* 


CHAPTER  III 
The  Rise  of  the  Proletariat 


DUALISM   IN    POLITICS PRINCIPLES  OF   PUBLIC    POLICY — DISRAELI 

pIIS    PLACE    IN    HISTORY LEADER    OF    IMPERIALIST    MOVE- 
MENT  HIS    AFFINITY    WITH    THE    PROLETARIAT ARIS- 
TOCRACY,   MIDDLE    CLASS,    AND    PROLETARIAT IN- 

^  TERPRETATION      OF      THEIR      POLITICAL      AND 

SOCIAL   THEORIES 


CAPITALISM  was  seeking  profitable  fields  for  invest- 
ment and  exploitation;  the  Proletariat  was  ready- 
to  support  imperial  enterprise  with  a  sentimental,  ill- 
defined  enthusiasm  which  could  not  be  measured  in  terms 
of  profit  and  loss.  Whereas  the  middle  class  capitalist 
could  in  the  early  stages  of  imperial  expansion  perceive 
only  personal  profit  from  foreign  enterprise,  the  Prole-  A, 
tariat,  by  its  support  of  imperial  policy,  by  the  applause  ^ 
^  with  which  it  greeted  the  acquisition  of  new  territory  and 
^  ^  the  raising  of  the  flag  in  distant  lands,  gave  the  encour- 
agement needed  to  the  leaders  of  governments  in  office 
to  pursue  their  programmes  of  foreign  expansion. 

Thus  on  the  one  hand  we  have  capitalism  still  out- 
'f>wardly  under  middle  class  control,  with  its  narrow,  anti- 
5^^  social,  utilitarian  motive  urging  imperial  development  on 
J  purely  realist  grounds,   and  the   Proletariat   supporting    ^^ 
I  the  same  policy  foj;_J_dealist  reasons.     In  other  words, 
^       while  imperialism  appeared  toThelVIiddle  Class  in  power 
'ssN^^as   a  mere   extension  of  nationalism,   a   form  of  super- 

[263] 


1 


,F 


l^ 


^     264  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

V^  nationalism,  it  was  as  supported  by  the  Proletariat  be- 

j>^  ginning  to  be  interpreted  as  a  social  undertaking  which 

engaged  the  State  beyond  its  national  boundaries,  and 
might  ultimately  tend  to  break  down  the  narrower  in- 
dividualist interpretation  of  nationalism,  and  supplant, 
it  by  a  broader  social  understanding. 

It  is  not  to  be  inferred  that  the  leaders  of  imperial 
expansion  were  cognisant  of  this  duality  which  we  can 
now  trace.  On  the  contrary,  they  appear  to  have  been 
confident  that  they  had  succeeded  in  uniting  the  two 
hitherto  antagonistic  elements  in  the  State  in  a  common 
aim,  had  eliminated  class  struggle  and  secured  internal 
harmony  for  the  execution  of  foreign  policy. 

Imperialism  as  the  active  principle  of  public  policy 
is  first  to  be  met  with  in  England,  where  it  was  in- 
augurated by  Disraeli.  Whatever  estimate  may  be  made 
of  the  new  orientation  he  gave  to  political  practice,  it 
*-,  is  necessary  to  note  that  bj^  f^re  apr|  traininp-  he  was 
incapable  of  adopting  the  individualist,  middle  class  view- 
point, and  that  as  the  exponent  of  the  greater  England 
movement  he  led  the  attack  on  middle  class  liberalism. 

It  has  often  been  attempted  to  portray  Disraeli  as  the 
leader  of  an  aristocratic  party,  to  imply  that  imperialism 
was  in  the  nature  of  a  reaction  against  liberalism  in  a 
retrogressive  sense,  a  revival  of  aristocratic  absolutism. 
This  one-sided  interpretation  has  hitherto  obscured  the 
true  character  of  the  latter  stages  of  the  imperial  move- 
ment. At  the  time  that  Disraeli  became  Prime  Minister 
^  (1874)  England,  as  has  already  been  pointed  out,  had 
,  for  nearly  a  decade  been  committed  to  an  inconsequen- 
tial foreign  policy.  She  had  neglected  to  take  an 
active  interest  in  continental  European  affairs,  and  had 
even  abandoned  colonial  expansion,  engrossed  in  further- 
ing the  development  of  individual  enterprise  at  the  ex- 


i 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROLETARIAT  265 

pense  of  political  leadership  and  social  progress.  The 
sudden  development  of  Prussia,  the  growing  strength 
of  the  proletarian  movement,  as  expressed  by  the  First 
Internationale,  brought  to  the  fore  the  defects  of  middle 
class  policy  of  non-intervention  both  at  home  and  abroad. 

It  has  been  argued  that  it  was  merely  a  fortuitous  cir- 
cumstance, a  "mystery,"  that  a  man  of  the  type  of  Disraeli 
should  at  this  juncture  have  been  entrusted  with  the 
government,  and  should  have  launched  England  and  in 
her.train  all  the  other  States  of  the  Western  World  upon 
a  course  of  policy  altogether  different  from  that  which 
had  hitherto  prevailed.  To  accept  such  an  hypothesis 
is  merely  covering  in  deeper  obscurity  the  true  causes 
of  the  trend  of  politico-social  evolution  which  it  is  the  y 
object  of  historical  research  to  uncover,  and  which  a 
fuller  interpretation  of  historical  events  may  assist  in 
revealing. 

There  are  those  who  would  see  in  Disraeli  the  leader 
of  an  aristocratic  party,  the  representative  of  oligarchic 
interests.  They  point  to  the  desperate  struggle  he  en- 
gaged upon  with  the  middle  class  liberals  under  the 
leadership  of  Gladstone — a  typical  representative  of  the 
best  middle  class  mind — the  frequent  reversals  of  his 
policy,  as  confirming  the  reactionary  nature  of  imperial- 
ism. But  this  conception  is  refuted,  if  such  refutation 
be  needed,  by  the  transformation  which  middle  class 
policy  underwent  even  in  England  during  the  last  decade 
of  the  19th  century  in  a  final  desperate  attempt  to  adopt 
the  major  tenets  of  imperialism  as  a  sine  qua  non  of 
political  survival.  There  are  others  who  would  see  in 
Disraeli  merely  a  party  leader,  and  his  struggle  with 
Gladstone  an  example  of  political  competition,  a  personal 
conflict  for  of^ce  and  power. 

It  is  uncontested  that  Disraeli  engaged  England  upon 


266  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

her  course  of  imperial  expansion,  that  he  crowned  Vic- 
toria as  Empress  of  India,  blocked  Russia  in  Central 
Asia,  entered  upon  treaty  arrangements  with  foreign 
powers,  called  Indian  troops  to  Malta  for  purposes  of 
intimidation  in  Europe,  or  if  need  be  for  aggressive 
intervention,  and  was  engaged  upon  other  similar  ac- 
tivities, solely  on  his  own  initiative,  often  without  con- 
sulting Parliament.  But  it  would  be  an  error  of  his- 
torical judgment  to  infer  that  in  acting  in  so  arbitrary 
a  manner,  in  carrying  out  his  strong-handed  policy,  in 
introducing  "jingoism"  into  political  practice,  he  repre- 
sented merely  Tory  England.  We  can  on  the  contrary 
perceive  that  as  a  matter  of  fact  in  inaugurating  im- 
.  perialism,  as  in  promoting  social  reform,  he  was  act- 
I  ing  unconsciously  perhaps,  but  nevertheless  potently, 
^  much  more  in  sympathy  with  the  Proletariat  than  as  the 
^  representative  of  the  Aristocracy.  It  may  even  be  as- 
serted that  in  the  methods,  aims,  and  motives  of  his 
policy  much  which  has  hitherto  been  hall-marked  as 
appertaining  to  aristocratic  impulse,  on  closer  examina- 
tion reveals  its  proletarian  revolutionary  origin. 

It  cannot  be  left  out  of  account  in  an  effort  to  estimate 
the  importance  of  this  new  orientation,  and  incidentally 
to  explain  more  satisfactorily  Disraeli's  place  in  history, 
that  he  was  the  first  political  leader  to  breach  the  old 
order,  if  we  are  to  interpret  imperialism  aright  as  a 
destructive  force  undermining  the  politico-juridic  concept 
of  the  exclusive  Nation-State.  An  examination  of  the 
character  and  temperament  of  the  man  affords  ample  con- 
firmation of  this  thesis.  Disraeli  in  fact  possessed  many 
of  the  salient  class  characteristics  of  the  Proletariat.  For 
if  we  examine  closely  we  will  see  that  Disraeli  embodied 

I  the   eager   intensity   of   the   man  of  the  people,   rather 
than  the  social  self-restraint  of  the  aristocrat.    Imagina- 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROLETARIAT  267 

tlve,  yet  matter  of  fact,  he  combined  passionate  energy 
with  a  mystical  charlatanism.  Arbitrary  without  being 
dogmatic,  vain  without  being  vainglorious,  he  was  en- 
dowed with  a  deep  human  sympathy  and  social  sensibility. 

II 

It  has  been  necessary  to  dwell  upon  the  personal  char- 
acteristics of  Disraeli,  to  analyse  in  a  measure  his  char- 
acter, in  order  to  arrive  at  a  clearer  understanding  of 
the  special  position  which  he  occupied  in  the  history 
of  political  evolution,  and  to  reconcile  the  apparent 
anomalies  of  his  career.  The  party  which  actively  sup- 
ported him  in  Parliament,  the  press,  and  public  opinion 
were  directed  by  men  who  had  come  to  look  askance 
upon  the  unchecked  development  of  individualism,  the 
drifting  trend  of  laissez-faire  policy,  the  subservient  po- 
sition to  which  the  State  had  sunk  under  middle  class 
rule  of  non-intervention.  They  were  men  who  by  char-  x 
acter  and  temperament  placed  national  above  individual  >^ 
interests,  honor  above  profit,  glory  above  scruple  and 
thus  represent  what  has  been  held  to  be  an  aristocratic 
temperament. 

An   examination   of   the   distinctive   marks   of   aristo- 
cratic and  proletarian  motives  of  action  will  reveal  a  close      ^ 
similarity  between  the  two.     Unlike  that  of  the  Middle 
Class,   which  partaking  of  both,   tempering  both,   mod-  1 
crating  both,  includes  neither,  the  proletarian  and  aristo-  \  1 
cratic  temperaments  have  so  many  characteristics  in  com- J 
mon  that,  surprising  though  it  may  appear,  it  is  difficult 
at  the  outset  to  differentiate  between  them. 

Like  the  Aristocracy  the  Proletariat  places  rnight  above 
right.  Both  believe  in  or^ini^ptence ;  both  ^uitmer stand 
obedience.  Both  are  endowed  with  a  capacity  for  spiritual 


268  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

abnegation  and  mystical  exaltation.  The  nicely  balanced 
\.  liberalism,  typical  of  the  middle  class  mind,  its  hyper- 
critical, subjective  mode  of  viewing  life,  are  rejected 
>  alike  by  the  Proletariat  and  the  Aristocracy,  who  look 
upon  life  objectively  as  an  implement  of  social  organisa- 
tion, not  of  egotistical,  self-centred  self-development. 

It  is  this  social  as  opposed  to  individual  outlook,  this 
objective  as  against  subjective  mode  of  viewing  life, 
which  marks  the  closest  identity  between  the  Aristocracy 
and  the  Proletariat,  and  differentiates  them  from  the 
Middle  Class. 

But  if  we  are  able  to  trace  so  marked  a  similarity  be- 
tween certain  salient  characteristics  of  the  Aristocracy 
and  the  Proletariat,  there  are  other  factors  which  dis- 
^  ^  tinguish  the  two  groups  from  each  other  as  clearly  as 
those  which  mark  them  off  from  the  Middle  Class, 

The  basis  of  an  aristocratic  organisation  of  society 
is  the  family.  Its  fixity  is  based  on  hereditary  principles. 
Being  in  theory  the  government  and  administration  by 
thejtt^st,  it  perceives  neither^  the  possibility  of  improve- 
ment nor  the  probability  of  decay  as  long  as  the  estab- 
lished order  is  maintained.  Its  hierarchy,  which  derives 
supreme  authority  from  the  Deity,  and  by  fixed  stages 
descends  the  social  scale  from  lord  to  serf,  bears  a 
theistic  imprint. 

We  have  had  occasion  to  point  out  in  tracing  the  de- 
velopment of  the  middle  class  theory  of  State  how  in 
secular  affairs  the  authority  of  God  came  to  be  replaced 
by  the  authority  of  man;  how  the  individual  came  to  be 
the  important  factor  in  the  State  as  a  human  institution, 
man-made  for  men,  and  the  consequent  rise  of  equalita- 
rian  democracy,  which  strove  to  prove  that  political 
equality  compensated  for  whatever  social  or  economic 
inequality  might  exist. 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROLETARIAT 


269 


The  Middle  Class  had  destroyed  the  fixity  of  the  aris- 
tocratic social  order  and  introduced  the  concept  of  per- 
fectibility and  progress,  which  gave  rise  to  liberalism 
and  toleration,  and  finally  developed  into  social  ir- 
responsibility in  all  cases  where  "positive  harm  is  not 
done  thereby  to  another."  With  it  arose  individualism, 
nationalism,  the  Nation-State,  and  the  capitalist  system, 
which  sought  to  destroy  class  solidarity,  the  last  remain- 
ing vestige  of  the  orders  of  the  aristocratic  regime,  and 
to  ,^ubstitute  therefor  national  unity  or  racial  homo- 
geneity as  the  basis  of  social  organisation.  In  pursuit 
of  these  aims  the  Middle  Class  claimed  to  have  discov- 
ered by  scientific  research  as  racial  or  national  charac- 
teristics, factors  which  had  in  the  past  been  interpreted 
as  class  distinctions.  It  was  apparently  oblivious  of  the 
fact  that  this  same  research  was  revealing  the  funda- 
mental unity  of  mankind,  proving  that  the  Russian  Mir, 
the  Javanese  Dessa,  the  Indian,  Chinese,  Peruvian  village 
organisation,  the  German  Mark,  the  Swiss  Allemend  and 
the  French  communal  system  or  the  Scotch  clan  organisa- 
tion bore  unmistakable  marks  of  identity,  and  that  qcG; 
nomic  development  or  class  consciousness  rather  than  race 
must  be  taken  into  consideration  in  order  to  discover 
distinguishing  social  characteristics  of  real  validity. 

In  place  of  the  fixity  and  immobility  of  the  aristocratic 
social  system  in  Western  Europe,  the  Middle  Class  when 
it  came  to  power  introduced  the  restless  mobility  and 
irresponsibility  of  individualism,  and  the  personalised 
Nation-State.  Rejecting  hierarchic  responsibility,  the 
Middle  Class  at  the  stage  of  its  highest  development 
had  substituted  a  system  of  individual  and  international 
relations,  based  on  politico-juridic  checks,  restraints,  and 
balances  which  isolated  the  individual  in  the  State,  and 
the  State  among  States. 


270  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

The  Middle  Class  in  abolishing  aristocratic  control 
had,  nevertheless,  retained  many  of  the  symbols  of  aris- 
tocracy. While  the  family  no  longer  remained  dominant, 
individual  worth  was  recognised,  individual  initiative 
deemed  preeminent.  The  principle  of  the  hereditary  rights 
of  political  prerogative  was  rejected.  Yet  these  hereditary 
rights  were  retained  as  the  basis  of  the  economic  system 
which  was  built  up  along  individualist,  distinctly  non- 
social  lines.  It  is  at  this  juncture,  when  middle  class 
social   irresponsibility  had  been  carried   to   its   extreme 

•  limits,  that  the  proletarian  movement  arose  with  its  so- 
cial programme,  rejecting  alike  the  political  immunities 
and  privileges  of  the  older  aristocratic  organisation,  and 

\  the  economic  immunities,  privileges,  and  social  irresponsi- 
bility of  the  Middle  Class. 

It  might  be  pointed  out  that  the  influence  of  the  Aris- 
tocracy in  the  State  had  everywhere  declined,  and  no- 
where survived  the  middle  of  the  19th  century.  Yet  the 
aversion  of  modern  times  to  aristocratic  political  doc- 
trines, due  to  the  jealous  ascendancy  of  the  Middle  Class, 
should  not  a  priori  exclude  the  possibility  of  their  revival 
in  a  modified  form  on  a  broader  social  foundation.  It  is 
sufficient  to  note  that  the  middle  class  organisation  of  the 
Nation-State,  on  a  competitive  non-social  basis,  had  be- 
come an  anomaly,  and  the  only  way  out  appeared  to  be 
by  the  disruption  of  the  bonds  of  the  State  so  conceived. 

\  and  the  transformation  of  the  existing  system.     As  the 

I  Middle  Class  had  destroyed  aristocratic  rule,  and  on  the 
Idebris  constructed  the  personalised  Nation-State  as  a 
lliberal  democracy,  so  the  Proletariat  was  bent  upon  the 
destruction  of  this  middle  class,  politico-juridic  structure, 
the  Nation-State,  in  order  to  erect  its  own  particular 
form  of  social  organisation.  As  to  the  Middle  Class 
at  the  close  of  the  mediaeval  period  the  aristocratic  form 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROLETARIAT  271 

of  government  had  appeared  rigid,  isolated,  and  ex- 
clusive, now  in  turn  to  the  rising  Proletariat  the  middle 
class  Nation-State  appeared  rigid,  isolated,  and  exclu- 
sive. Hence  the  aim  of  the  Proletariat  to  replace  it  by 
an  inclusive,  corporate  collective  union,  in  which  the  bar- 
riers of  nations — as  formerly  the  barriers  of  family — 
should  be  eliminated. 

Such  was  the  historical  background  of  proletarian  so- 
cial theory.  Its  principal  object,  at  first  scarcely  realised, 
was 'the  destruction  of  the  middle  class  Nation-State  as 
power.  How  this  object  was  pursued,  how  irrevocably 
the  process  of  disintegration  of  the  middle  class  theory 
of  the  Nation-State  was  carried  on,  the  attempts  made 
to  strengthen  the  existing  concept  of  the  State,  the  illu- 
sion that  the  Middle  Class  was  more  securely  entrenched 
than  ever,  and  that  the  politico-juridic  concept  was  if 
anything  more  vital  than  it  had  hitherto  been,  are  illus- 
trated by  an  examination  of  the  events  of  the  epoch  which 
came  to  a  close  with  the  European  War.  Simultaneously 
we  can  trace  the  rise  and  spread  of  the  influence  of  the 
Proletariat,  and  its  sudden  appearance  in  full  control 
of  the  body  politic  among  a  people,  dwelling  upon  the 
threshold  of  Europe  and  Asia,  where  no  strong  Middle 
Class  existed,  and  where  an  enfeebled  aristocratic  despot- 
ism had  survived,  which  unconsciously  cooperated  with 
the  Proletariat  by  promoting  imperial  enterprise,  and  thus 
opened  the  pathway  of  its  own  destruction. 


CHAPTER   IV 

The  New  Europe 


RELATIVE    POSITION    OF    THE    POWERS — THE    PREDOMINANCE    OF 

GERMANY THE    DREIKAISERBUND THE    RAPID    RECOVERY    OF 

FRANCE THE  CRISIS  OF   I  875 THE  SITUATION  IN  THE  BAL- 
KANS  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY ENGLAND  AND  TURKEY 

PLANS    FOR    THE    PACIFICATION    OF    THE    BALKANS 

THE  SUEZ  CANAL  INCIDENT 


THE  motives  ^  of  historical  evolution  lie  deeply  sub- 
merged in  the  social  consciousness  of  mankind;  the 
motive-force,  the  levers  to  accomplishment  are  placed 
in  the  hands  of  individuals.  Those  who  are  able  to 
fathom  this  consciousness,  to  chart  its  currents  and  prob- 
able course  in  a  measure  procure  a  happy  union  between 
motive  and  action  which  may  serve  to  accelerate  this 
evolution.  The  world  rewards  them  with  plaudits,  hon- 
ors, and  at  certain  epochs  with  hero-worship,  unmindful 
of  the  fact  that  these  so-called  great  men,  the  accelerators 
of  history,  often  do  no  more  than  hasten  maturity  which 
leads  in  turn  to  a  rapid  decay.  Such  a  man  was  Bis- 
marck, the  founder  of  the  new  German  Empire.  The 
history  of  Western  civilisation  during  the  last  quarter 
of  the  19th  century  bears  the  imprint  of  the  impetus  he 
gave  to,  the  quickened  tempo  with  which  he  directed, 
public  affairs.  During  few  periods  in  history  do  we 
find  events  so  closely  coordinated  by  a  single  will. 

''See  pp.   153-154- 

[272] 


THE  NEW  EUROPE  273 

Unlike  Napoleon  I,  who  was  the  servant  of  his  destiny, 
who  summed  up  an  old  epoch,  who  played  a  predomi- 
nantly individualist,  episodic,  and  non-social  part  in  his- 
tory, Bismarck's  role,  in  spite  of  its  outward  anomalies, 
in  spite  of  the  numerous  occasions  in  which  a  naturalist, 
egotistical  individualism  seemed  to  dominate,  was  that 
of  a  man  of  the  new  epoch,  whose  sensibility  and  po- 
litical perception  had  in  them  the  elements  of  a  new 
objectivity  fundamentally  social.  This  social  perception,  / 
this' objective  outlook  on  life,  which  we  have  already  i 
noted  as  a  characteristic  mark  of  the  Proletariat,  as  well 
as  of  the  Aristocracy,  as  opposed  to  the  subjectivity  of 
the  middle  class  viewpoint,  must  be  kept  constantly  in 
mind  not  merely  in  order  to  understand  the  social  evo- 
lution of  the  new  period,  but  to  mark  it  off  from  what 
had  gone  before. 

It  will  be  of  interest  to  review  briefly  certain  salient 
events  of  Bismarck's  later  career — which  entails  a  survey 
in  some  detail  of  the  political  history  of  the  two  decades    1- 
which  followed  the  war  of  1870 — in  order  to  bring  out     ' 
clearly   the   well-defined  nature   of   this   objectivity   and 
social  sensibility. 

II 

The  Franco-Prussian  War  had  done  more  than  deprive 
France  of  Alsace-Lorraine  and  extort  from  the  French 
a  large  indemnity.  It  had  left  the  country  in  the  throes 
of  civil  commotion.  The  Commune  at  Paris  had  been 
repressed  by  the  Middle  Class  with  a  brutality  and  en- 
ergy rarely  to  be  met  with  in  history,  except  at  times 
when  it  is  consciously  realised  by  the  party  in  power 
that  it  is  a  struggle  for  survival  in  which  no  quarter 
will  be  asked  or  given.     A  republican  form  of  govern- 


274  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

ment,  so  long  pressing  for  recognition  in  France,  had 
again  been  organised,  though  it  had  not  as  yet  gained 
sufficient  strength  to  assert  itself  unconditionally.  The 
partisans  of  the  restoration  of  the  monarchical  regime 
were  numerous.  Bonapartists  and  Bourbons  alike  hoped 
for  a  restoration.  But  division  in  their  ranks  gave  the 
young  republic  a  respite,  and  the  Middle  Class,  more 
anxious  to  continue  in  the  control  of  authority,  more 
jealous  of  its  prerogatives  than  interested  in  the  form  of 
government,  placed  increasing  trust  in  the  republic  as 
its  stability  became  more  assured.  "While  France  was 
absent,  the  moment  was  propitious  for  Destiny  to  break 
with  the  past  wherein  she  (France)  had  played  so  grand 
a  part.  It  was  the  end  of  a  Europe — the  one  which  had 
seen  the  wars  of  Greece,  Crimea,  and  Italy — the  begin- 
ning of  a  new  Europe.  The  quarrels  over  nationality 
or  principles  were  appeased;  wars  of  expansion  and 
profit,  of  economic  penetration,  colonial  conquest,  im- 
perialism, world  politics  were  in  preparation  at  the  time 
when  the  internal  struggles  in  France  were  drawing  to  a 
close."  ^  Such  Is  a  usual  French  interpretation  of  the 
consequences  of  the  war  of  1870. 

Historians  are  inclined  to  accept  this  view,  even  if  they 
do  not  pay  such  homage  to  Destiny.  But  it  was  not  so 
much  the  absence  of  France  as  the  presence  of  Germany 
which  was  the  characteristic  feature  of  the  new  era. 
The  centre  of  gravity  of  Europe  had  shifted.  The  new 
German  Empire  had  become  the  preponderant  power  in 
the  West.  Berlin  was  to  replace  Paris  as  the  political 
capital  of  the  Western  World.  England  for  the  time  main- 
tained her  attitude  of  isolation.  Italy  had  profited  by  the 
embarrassment  of  the  Pope,  upon  the  defeat  of  the  eldest 
daughter  of  the  Church,  to  seize  Rome  and  complete  her 

*  Hanotaux,  La  France  Contemporaine,  Vol.  IV,  p.  48. 


THE  NEW  EUROPE  275 

national  unity.  Russia  had  taken  advantage  of  the  situa- 
tion to  force  a  revision  of  the  treaty  of  Paris,  and  rid 
herself  of  its  onerous  clauses  concerning  the  Black  Sea 
(London,  January-March  1871).  Everyone  seemed  sat- 
isfied to  have  profited  by  the  defeat  of  France,  and  the 
tables  were  cleared,  ready  for  a  new  game. 

After  a  war  the  vanquished  remain  for  a  time  under 
the  incubus  of  their  disasters;  the  victor,  on  the  other 
hand,  must  be  prepared  to  exploit  immediately  the  ad- 
van^kges  he  has  gained.  No  one  understood  this  more 
clearly  than  Bismarck.  He  looked  upon  war  as  a  po- 
litical short-cut,  the  advantages  of  which  are  of  a  pro- 
visional and  temporary  nature  that  must  be  supplemented 
by  diplomatic  guarantees.  In  this  sense  the  war  with 
France  was  merely  a  stage  in  the  process  of  historical  de- 
velopment of  Prussia,  concluding  the  series  of  wars  begun 
in  1864,  and  carried  through  successfully  in  1866  and 
1870,  whereby  German  unity  had  been  realised  under 
Prussian  hegemony.  But  there  is  no  halting  in  political 
development.  No  respite  is  given  to  the  growing  State, 
and  during  this  critical  adolescent  period  safeguards  must 
be  found.  To  assure  such  safeguards  is  the  first  duty  of 
the  true  statesman.  Germany  was  surrounded  by  power- 
ful States,  potential  foes.  Already  before  the  end  of  the 
Franco-Prussian  War,  while  Bismarck  was  sojourning  at 
Meaux  a  few  days  after  Sedan,  he  took  advantage  of  the 
great  victories  won  by  German  arms  to  broach  the  sub- 
ject of  an  alliance  with  Russia  and  Austria.  It  was  to  be 
a  revival  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  "an  alliance  of  the  three 
Emperors,  with  the  arriere  pensee  that  Italy  would  join 
them  later."  The  declared  object  of  the  alliance  was  to 
combat  the  revolutionary  republican  movement  which  was 
at  the  time  spreading  in  France. 

The    Vienna    Government,    ready    to    forget    the    In- 


276  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

juries  it  had  suffered  in  1866,  took  pains  to  recall  that 
Bismarck  had  not  pressed  the  advantages  gained  in  the 
field  to  exact  a  humiliating  peace,  and  willingly  entered 
into  the  alliance.  Russia  was  at  first  more  reserved. 
Though  most  intimate  relations  existed  between  the 
courts  of  the  two  countries,  and  Russia  had  given  Prussia 
a  free  hand  in  her  plans  of  aggrandisement,  the  Tsar 
wished  to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity  offered  to 
negotiate  certain  modifications  to  the  treaty  of  Paris. 
In  the  meantime  the  defeat  of  France  had  been  com- 
pleted; the  new  imperial  constitution  had  been  adopted 
by  the  German  States;  the  treaty  of  Frankfort  had 
shackled  France;  Russia  had  gained  her  desired  ends  at 
the  London  Conference,  and  was  ready  to  enter  into  the 
German  scheme.  The  alliance  of  the  three  Emperors, 
the  Dreikaiserbund,  was  agreed  to.  By  the  end  of  1871 
Berlin  had  become  the  political  centre  of  Europe. 

France  had  recovered  from  the  effects  of  the  war  of 
1870  with  unexpected  rapidity.  Though  torn  by  internal 
dissensions,  she  had  been  able  to  pay  off  the  indemnity  to 
Germany  by  1873.  Already  in  1872  she  was  in  a  position 
to  take  in  hand  the  question  of  her  armaments,  and  lay 
down  the  plans  for  the  reorganisation  of  the  army.  By 
1875  she  was  preparing  to  increase  her  military  estab- 
lishment. 

The  Berlin  Government  watched  with  much  concern 
the  sudden  revival  of  French  military  strength.  The  idea 
of  crushing  France  before  she  had  a  chance  to  make  a  full 
recovery  and  entertain  plans  of  revenge  gained  wide  sup- 
port in  official  circles  in  Germany.  Here  was  an  occasion 
to  use  force  to  prevent  possible  future  conflict,  by  striking 
down  a  potential  enemy.  Such  would  have  been  a  logical 
application  of  Bismarckian  realism.  That  it  was  not 
carried  out  was  due  to  various  causes,  among  the  more 


THE  NEW  EUROPE  277 

potent  being  the  intervention  of  Russia,  supported  by 
England,  in  favor  of  peace.  Bismarck,  who  was  not  him- 
self certain  of  the  advantage  of  a  war  at  this  juncture, 
gave  way  under  this  new  pressure.  Hitherto  he  had  had 
a  free  hand  in  European  affairs;  now  he  found  himself 
confronted  by  concerted  action  on  the  part  of  Russia  and 
England  and,  though  he  resented  the  interference,  he  was 
forced  to  acquiesce.  The  Berlin  Government  repudiated 
her  alleged  warlike  intentions,  and  the  incident  was  closed 
.(Mdy  1875).  But  the  maintenance  of  the  peace  of 
Europe  remained  more  precarious  than  ever. 


Ill 

The  year  1875  marks  the  beginning  of  the  struggle  for 
world  power  among  the  European  Nation-States  which  on 
the  surface  appeared  merely  a  continuation  of  the  time- 
honored  struggle  for  ascendancy,  to  which  the  newly 
formulated  doctrine  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest  had  given 
a  fresh  impetus.  "Bismarck  is  really  another  old  Bona- 
parte again,  and  he  must  be  bridled,"  ^  was  the  opinion  of 
Disraeli  during  this  crucial  year,  and  though  England  and 
Germany  were  to  develop  into  the  chief  protagonists  of 
Imperialism,  for  the  time  being  Russia  appeared  the  more 
formidable  foe  of  British  imperial  plans. 

For  a  number  of  years  Russia  had  by  slow  stages  ex- 
tended her  domain  in  Central  Asia,  threatening  British 
rule  in  India,  and  at  the  same  time  was  enlarging  her 
sphere  of  influence  in  the  Balkans,  menacing  Turkish  hold 
on  Constantinople.  The  opening  of  the  Suez  Canal  by 
the  French  (1869),  i^  ^he  construction  of  which  the 
British  had  refused  to  participate,  had  altered  the  course 

*  Cf.  G.  E.  Buckle,  The  Life  of  Benjamin  Disraeli,  Vol.  V,  p.  421. 


278  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

of  the  lines  of  communication  with  the  East,  and  made  of 
the  Mediterranean  the  highway  of  the  British  Empire, 
which  it  became  of  principal  importance  to  England  to 
protect. 

During  the  course  of  the  summer  (1875)  a  revolt  had 
broken  out  in  Herzegovina,  which  was  to  have  so  far- 
reaching  an  effect  on  the  subsequent  course  of  European 
policy,  and  become  the  pretext  of  imperial  expansion  and 
the  mad  scramble  for  world  influence  and  world  power. 
A  careful  survey  is  required  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  clear 
conception  of  the  complex  Near  Eastern  problem,  which 
served  as  the  pretext  for  foreign  intrigue,  and  masked  the 
real  significance  of  imperialism  as  a  new  social,  anti- 
national  current  of  historical  development. 

In  spite  of  the  reverses  suffered  during  the  Crimean 
War,  Russia  had  never  abandoned  her  plans  of  driving 
the  Turks  out  of  Europe  and  planting  the  Russian  cross 
on  St.  Sophia.  The  Pan-Slavic  movement,  which  hitherto 
had  been  carried  on  in  a  desultory  fashion,  had  been  taken 
up  officially,  and  soon  after  i860  the  programme  of 
bringing  all  the  Christian  nationalities  of  the  Balkan  Pen- 
insula under  Russian  influence,  though  never  overtly 
acknowledged,  was  officially  coordinated  and  directed 
from  St.  Petersburg.  The  increasing  weakness  and  mal- 
administration of  the  Porte,  the  chaotic  conditions  which 
prevailed  among  the  various  races  of  the  Peninsula,  who 
had  become  inflamed  by  the  nationalist  propaganda  which 
had  spread  eastward  and  inspired  them  to  demand 
national  independence,  offered  ample  opportunity  for 
judicious  intervention  in  furthering  Russian  designs. 

England,  contrary  to  her  best  political  tradition,  had 
under  Gladstone,  who  was  a  fervent  nationalist,  seen  no 
cause  for  alarm  at  Russian  plans  to  drive  the  Turks  from 
the  Balkan  Peninsula,  and  assist  the  Bulgars,  Serbs,  and 


THE  NEW  EUROPE  279 

Rumanes  in  their  national  aspirations.  France  was  after 
1870  for  some  years  not  in  a  position  to  exert  much  in- 
fluence; Italy,  though  a  signatory  of  the  Paris  Treaty, 
had  lost  interest  in  eastern  Balkan  affairs,  and  was  en- 
gaged with  problems  of  internal  organisation;  Germany 
claimed  to  be  wholy  disinterested  and,  being  bound  by 
alliance  to  Russia  and  the  Dual  Monarchy,  made  it  her 
principal  concern  to  avert  a  struggle  between  her  two 
allies,  as  the  Dual  Monarchy,  being  coterminous  with  the 
Turkish  Empire,  could  not  be  indifferent  to  any  change  of 
the  status  quo  and  was  ready  to  intervene  should  Russia 
show  her  hand  and  force  the  issue. 

Such  was  the  position  of  the  chief  States  when  Disraeli 
came  into  power.  He  reversed  British  policy.  He  was 
no  sympathiser  with  the  tenets  of  nationalism.  He 
could  not  conceive  of  it  as  a  sound  basis  of  England's 
foreign  policy.  It  seemed  to  him  wholly  sentimental 
and  unsound.  The  consolidation  of  the  British  Empire, 
the  safeguarding  of  its  lines  of  communication,  the 
protection  of  its  distant  frontiers,  and  the  acquisition  of 
new  territory  or  fresh  spheres  of  influence  were  far  more 
important  to  British  interests,  according  to  his  concep- 
tion, than  the  championing  of  revolutionary  patriots  in 
their  struggles  for  independence,  which  would  contribute 
nothing  to  British  power.  On  the  contrary,  he  held 
that  British  interests  would  be  menaced  if  Russia  were 
to  gain  a  firm  foothold  in  the  Balkans,  which  might  lead 
to  her  acquiring  the  control  of  Constantinople,  and  this 
must  be  prevented  even  at  the  risk  of  war. 

The  revolt  which  broke  out  in  Herzegovina  in  July 
1875  might  have  readily  been  localised,  yet  the  Porte 
seemed  unable  or  unwilling  to  suppress  it.  Soon  Bosnia 
was  the  centre  of  insurrection.  The  Serbs  were  by  this 
time  up  in  arms,  ready  to  declare  war  on  Turkey.    Eng- 


28o  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

land  was  anxious  that  Turkey  should  be  permitted  to 
deal  with  the  situation  herself,  but  Russia,  Germany,  and 
Austria  had  other  plans.  They  had  taken  upon  them- 
selves to  decide  the  destiny  of  Turkey  without  consulting 
the  rest  of  Europe,  except  to  solicit  its  approval  of  the 
policy  they  might  agree  upon.  Nor  was  agreement  be- 
tween these  partners  easy.  Vienna  was  ready  to  fore- 
stall any  move  that  the  Russians  might  make,  and  Bis- 
marck had  on  more  than  one  occasion  given  proof  that 
if  he  had  to  choose  between  Russia  and  Austria  he  would 
not  hesitate  to  support  the  latter. 

In  the  meantime  the  situation  in  Turkey  had  been  ren- 
dered more  difficult  by  the  default  on  the  payment  of  in- 
terest on  the  public  debt  (October  1875).  The  efforts 
of  the  foreign  consuls  to  bring  about  a  peaceful  settle- 
ment in  the  area  of  revolt  had  failed.  At  St.  Petersburg 
the  question  of  the  partition  of  Turkey  was  raised.  The 
Russian  Chancellor,  Prince  Gortchakov,  outlined  to  the 
French  Charge  d'Affaires  a  plan  for  a  federal  union  of 
the  Christian  States  of  the  Balkans  with  Constantinople, 
a  free  city  on  the  German  model,  as  its  capital.  The  in- 
tervention of  the  European  Powers  appeared  inevitable. 
Russia  took  the  opportunity  to  reaffirm  her  alleged  dis- 
interestedness in  Constantinople,  but  was  firm  in  asserting 
that  neither  England  nor  any  other  Great  Power,  nor 
Greece,  should  be  permitted  to  occupy  the  city  upon  its 
evacuation  by  the  Turks. 

While  the  cabinets  of  St.  Petersburg,  Vienna,  and  Ber- 
lin were  endeavoring  to  reach  an  agreement  concerning 
the  terms  of  the  reforms  to  be  demanded  of  Turkey, 
and  had  not  consulted  England,  Disraeli  by  a  bold  stroke 
showed  that  he  wished  it  to  be  understood  that  no  agree- 
ment respecting  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  could  be  en- 
tered upon  without  the  consent  of  England,  and  that  the 


THE  NEW  EUROPE  281 

British  Government  was  again  to  be  reckoned  with  as  an 
international  factor  of  first  importance. 

Since  its  opening  the  Suez  Canal  had  been  operated  as 
a  private  company,  of  which  the  Khedive  of  Egypt  was 
the  principal  shareholder.  The  financial  position  of  Egypt 
was  precarious.  To  secure  adequate  funds  to  meet  press- 
ing obligations,  the  Khedive  had  proposed  to  arrange  with 
a  group  of  French  financiers  to  mortgage  his  holdings  in 
the  Canal.  While  these  negotiations  were  being  carried 
on,  Disraeli,  learning  of  the  proposal,  promptly  inter- 
vened on  behalf  of  his  Government  and  made  a  more  ad- 
vantageous offer  to  the  Khedive,  which  after  rapid 
negotiations  was  accepted,  and  England  became  owner 
of  the  iatter's  shares,  and  thus  secured  control  of  the 
Canal  (November  20,  1875). 

Europe  was  amazed  at  the  suddenness  with  which  the 
scheme  was  put  through,  which  gained  for  England  as  the 
result  of  a  financial  operation  all  the  advantages  which 
because  of  the  foresight  and  energy  the  French  had  shown 
in  building  the  Canal  they  should  have  reaped.  Russia 
was  not  slow  to  perceive  that  England  was  preparing  to 
contest  the  Russian  advance  to  the  iEgean  and  maintained 
a  significant  silence,  while  Germany  and  Austria  ap- 
plauded the  boldness  of  the  operation.  Bismarck  could 
not  refrain  from  expressing  his  approval  of  an  undertak- 
ing which  so  successfully  put  into  effect  his  own  methods. 

Thus  while  Russia  and  the  Central  Powers  were  talking 
about  the  possible  partition  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  the 
integrity  of  which  England  was  making  ready  to  defend, 
England  herself  was  laying  the  foundation  of  her  plans 
for  detaching  Egypt  from  allegiance  to  the  Porte,  and, 
through  the  successive  stages  of  dual  control  with  France, 
intervention,  and  the  assertion  of  her  sole  ascendancy 
— excluding    France    even    from    the    hinterland — was 


282  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

finally  able  to  include  Egypt  in  the  number  of  her  pro- 
tectorates. 

Disraeli  was  watching  the  international  situation  with 
close  attention.  In  spite  of  the  warning  of  the  Suez 
Canal  incident,  the  three  Emperors  drew  up  an  elaborate 
programme  for  the  reform  of  Turkey,  which  was  to  be 
imposed  by  the  Powers  and  carried  through  under  their 
supervision   (December  30,  1875). 


CHAPTER  V 

The  Eastern  Question 

CONFLICTING    INFLUENCES — REFORMS  A  LA  TURQUE  THE    PRO- 
GRAMME   OF   THE    THREE    EMPERORS THE    BERLIN    MEMORAN- 
DUM  FIRM  ATTITUDE  OF  ENGLAND WAR  IN  THE  BALKANS 

,»r— THE    REICHSTADT    AGREEMENT BULGARIAN    ATROCITIES 

"^    ABDUL    HAMID THE    CONSTANTINOPLE    CONFERENCE 

THE   PORTE    PROCLAIMS  A   CONSTITUTION EFFORTS 

TO  KEEP  THE  PEACE RUSSIA  DECLARES  WAR BRIT- 
ISH THREAT  OF  INTERVENTION  TO  PROTECT  CON- 
STANTINOPLE  AUSTRIA     AND     THE     WESTERN 

BALKANS PLEVNA BISMARCK    AND    GER- 
MAN INTEREST  IN  BALKAN  AFFAIRS RUS- 
SIA  VICTORIOUS — THE   TREATY   OF    SAN 
STEFANO 


THE  question  of  reform  of  the  administration  of  the 
Balkans  by  Turkey  had  been  repeatedly  the  subject 
of  controversy  and  diplomatic  wrangling.  On  the  one 
hand  there  was  the  plan  of  those  who  favored  permitting 
Turkey  to  undertake  the  reforms  urged,  at  her  own  initia- 
tive, without  infringing  upon  her  sovereignty;  on  the 
other,  the  conviction  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  Powers 
to  protect  the  Christian  subjects  of  the  Sultan  and  super- 
vise these  reforms. 

The  traditional  policy  of  England — the  policy  she 
had  pursued  since  the  Battle  of  the  Nile  and  Trafalgar 
had  made  her  a  Mediterranean  Power,  and  her  support 
of  the  Greeks  in  their  struggle  for  independence  had  com- 
mitted her  to  a  more  definite  interest  in  the  Eastern  shores 

[283] 


284  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

of  the  Mediterranean — had  been  to  assert  the  principle 
of  the  maintenance  of  the  territorial  Integrity  of  Turkey. 
England  was  ready  to  support  reforms  a  la  Ttirque, 
pending  such  a  time  as  It  might  be  opportune  to  push  for- 
ward the  claims  of  modern  Greece  as  heir  to  the  ancient 
Eastern  Empire.  Russia,  on  the  other  hand,  since  the 
days  of  Catherine  the  Great  and  the  treaty  of  Kutchuk 
Kainardji  (1774)  considered  herself  the  champion  of  the 
independence  of  the  Slav  peoples  of  the  Balkans,  and  had 
always  pressed  for  active  intervention  and  reforms  under 
European  supervision,  as  the  pretext  for  her  own  pro- 
gressive advance  on  the  Sea  of  Marmora. 

The  joint  note  of  the  three  Emperors,  which  was 
finally  drafted,  outlining  a  programme  of  reform  under 
European  supervision,  met  with  little  success.  England 
at  first  held  aloof,  without  refusing  absolutely  to  par- 
ticipate. In  the  meanwhile  the  Insurgents  extended  their 
incursions.  By  the  spring  of  1876  Bosnia  and  Herzego- 
vina were  in  full  insurrection;  Serbia  and  Montenegro 
were  making  ready  to  declare  war,  and  the  Bulgars,  the 
especial  proteges  of  Russia,  were  being  stirred  to  revolt. 

Turkey  on  her  part  had  now  completed  the  mobilisation 
of  her  forces  and  prepared  for  a  systematic  repression 
of  the  outbreak.  At  this  juncture  the  Tsar,  accompanied 
by  his  Chancellor,  arrived  in  Berlin,  whither  the  Austrian 
Premier  had  been  summoned  by  Bismarck.  A  fresh  mem- 
orandum dealing  with  the  Turkish  situation  was  drafted. 
It  rehearsed  previous  proposals,  added  new  demands,  and 
threatened  that  if  the  objects  set  forth  were  not  attained, 
efficacious  measures  would  be  taken  in  the  interests  of 
peace  to  put  a  stop  to  the  continuation  of  disorders  and 
prevent  their  recurrence. 

The  Berlin  Note  (May  13,  1876)  requested  the  imme- 
diate adherence  of  the  Powers.     It  was  now  England's 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  285 

turn  to  show  her  hand.  She  flatly  refused  to  adhere  to 
the  proposals  outlined  on  the  ground  that  she  did  not  see 
what  they  would  lead  to,  and  could  not  admit  the  right 
of  the  continental  Powers  to  dispose  of  the  Eastern  Ques- 
tion without  first  consulting  her.  To  impress  the  Powers 
with  the  seriousness  with  which  she  regarded  the  situation 
a  British  fleet  was  ordered  to  Besika  Bay,  close  to  the 
Dardanelles,  to  be  ready  for  any  eventuality.  Disraeli, 
in  defending  his  policy,  maintained  that  the  reforms  pro- 
posed were  not  only  Impracticable,  but  inauspicious,  pre- 
luding the  partition  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  England 
had  withdrawn  from  the  concert  of  Powers  and  for  the 
moment  stood  alone.  The  English  Prime  Minister,  how- 
ever, had  no  illusions  about  the  situation.  "Whatever 
happens,"  he  wrote  at  the  end  of  May,  "we  shall  cer- 
tainly not  drift  into  war,  but  go  to  war,  if  we  do,  be- 
cause we  intend  it,  and  have  a  purpose  which  we  mean  to 
accomplish."  ^ 

The  Russian  Chancellor,  bent  on  carrying  through  the 
terms  of  the  Berlin  memorandum,  on  learning  of  the 
refusal  of  England  to  participate,  declared  that  the  Pow- 
ers should  proceed  without  English  concurrence.  With 
England  no  longer  at  hand  to  perform  the  unpleasant 
task  of  checking  Russian  ambitions,  Bismarck  was  unwill- 
ing to  proceed.  He  conceived  it  no  more  to  the  Interest 
of  Germany  than  It  was  to  that  of  Austria  or  England  to 
permit  an  undue  expansion  of  Slav  power  in  the  Balkans, 
which  would  shut  off  the  Austrian  advance  southward 
masking  the  pan-German,  Drang  nach  Osten,  which  was 
now  beginning  to  be  considered. 

At  this  perplexing  moment  a  palace  revolution  at  Con- 
stantinople dethroned  the  Sultan  (May  29,  1876)  and  a 
new  Sultan,  the  puppet  of  the  reform  party,  the  Young 

*  Cf.  G.  E.  Buckle,  The  Life  of  Benjamin  Disraeli,  Vol.  VI,  p.  29. 


286  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

Turks,  believed  to  be  favorable  to  England,  was  placed 
on  the  throne.  It  was  a  good  excuse  for  reconsidering 
the  whole  question  and  was  welcomed  by  Bismarck,  who 
did  not  wish  an  open  break  with  Russia.  His  position  in 
Europe  was  now  unique.  He  was  playing  the  Powers 
off  against  one  another,  friendly  towards  England,^  not 
openly  antagonistic  to  Russia,  while  firmly  supporting 
Austria. 

To  force  the  hand  of  the  Powers,  on  June  30  Serbia 
declared  war  on  Turkey,  followed  the  next  day  by  Mon- 
tenegro, while  Bulgaria  was  already  in  revolt,  urged  on 
by  Russian  assistance  and  volunteers  in  support  of  the 
Pan-Slav  cause. 

In  the  dilemma  caused  by  the  fresh  crisis,  Russia 
sought  a  way  out,  and  in  an  interview  between  the 
Tsar  and  the  Austrian  Emperor,  held  at  Reichstadt  on 
July  8,  1876,  to  which  Germany  was  not  formally  a  party, 
an  understanding  was  reached.  Russia  agreed  to  abandon 
Serbian  pretensions  at  the  request  of  Austria,  who  already 
feared  that  the  Serbs  were  aspiring  to  become  "the  Pied- 
montese  of  the  Southern  Slavs,"  which  would  disrupt  the 
Dual  Monarchy.  Russia  thus  sacrificed  her  interests  in 
the  western  Balkans,  and  countenanced  the  possibility  of 
the  occupation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  by  Austria. 
In  return  the  Vienna  Government  undertook  to  remain 
neutral  in  case  Russia  should  declare  war  on  Turkey. 

The  pourparlers  between  the  Powers,  the  jockeying 
for  position,  had  not  delayed  the  march  of  events.  The 
news  of  the  massacre  of  the  unarmed  Christian  peasants, 
the  famous  "Bulgarian  Atrocities,"  now  began  to  spread 

^"The  great  man  at  Berlin  has  completely  realised  my  expectations.  .  .  . 
He  delights  in  the  whole  affair,  and  particularly  praised  'Disraeli's 
speeches'  to  Odo  Russell,  'and  his  sending  the  fleet  to  the  Dardanelles!'" 
Extract  from  letter  written  by  Disraeli  June  13,  1876.  Op.  cit..  Vol.  VI, 
p.  32. 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  287 

over  Europe.  Public  opinion  was  aroused.  A  large  sec- 
tion of  the  British  public  denounced  the  pro-Turkish 
policy  of  the  Government.  Gladstone  came  out  of  his 
retirement  and  issued  his  passionate  appeal  to  England 
to  assist  "in  driving  the  Turk,  bag  and  baggage,  out  of 
Europe."  In  the  meantime  the  Serbs  had  been  defeated 
and  sought  the  intervention  of  the  Powers,  The  Russian 
policy  of  direct  action  to  avenge  the  sufferings  of  the 
Christian  populations  seemed  fully  justified.  But  Disraeli 
remained  imperturbable.  He  maintained  that  the  reports 
of  the  massacres  spread  through  the  press  were  exag- 
gerated; that  civil  war  prevailed  in  Bulgaria,  which  was 
inevitably  accompanied  by  bloodshed;  but  that,  even  if 
the  worst  reports  were  true,  England  must  first  consider 
her  interests  and  could  not  abandon  a  well-considered 
policy  for  sentimental  reasons. 

At  Constantinople  another  revolt  had  brought  the  "old 
Turks"  back  into  power,  and  they  placed  the  resourceful, 
unscrupulous  Abdul  Hamid  on  the  throne.  The  new 
Sultan  was  held  to  be  pro-Austrian  in  his  sympathies. 

The  menace  of  a  general  European  war  still  subsisted. 
The  policy  of  the  various  governments  betrayed  the  ner- 
vousness and  uncertainty  which  prevailed  as  to  the  prob- 
able alignment  of  the  combatants.  Russia  had  in  July 
signed  the  agreement  with  Austria  at  Reichstadt.  In 
October  we  find  her  (Russia)  sounding  Bismarck  as  to 
what  the  attitude  of  Germany  would  be  in  the  event  that 
Russia  should  declare  war  on  Austria.  Bismarck,  in  at- 
tempting to  make  an  evasive  answer,  let  Russia  under- 
stand that  Germany  could  not  tolerate  any  material  weak- 
ening of  Austria  which  might  imperil  her  position  as  a 
Great  Power.  It  was  now  England's  turn  to  take  the 
initiative,  and  she  proposed  an  armistice  between  Serbia 
and  Montenegro  on  the  one  hand,  and  Turkey  on  the 


288  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

other,  to  be  followed  by  a  peace  which  would  maintain  the 
status  quo  and  permit  of  certain  administrative  reforms. 
To  secure  this  end  it  was  suggested  by  London  that  a  con- 
ference of  the  Powers  be  held  at  Constantinople  to  settle 
the  whole  question.  But  Russia  was  not  in  a  mood  to  per- 
mit England  to  play  a  preponderant  part  in  Balkan  affairs, 
and  added  the  suggestion  that  it  was  to  be  understood  that 
if  the  Porte  did  not  accept  the  peace  proposed,  a  Russian 
army  corps  was  to  occupy  Bulgaria,  an  Austrian  corps, 
Bosnia,  and  a  joint  fleet  of  the  Powers  was  to  enter  the 
Bosporus. 

Early  in  November  the  Russians  were  able  to  compel 
the  Sultan  to  sign  a  two  months'  armistice,  while  the  Tsar 
declared  in  a  speech  at  Moscow  on  November  lO: 

"I  am  very  desirous  that  we  shall  arrive  at  a  general 
understanding,  but  if  such  an  agreement  is  not  arrived  at, 
and  if  it  seems  to  me  that  we  are  not  securing  the  neces- 
sary guarantees  for  the  execution  of  what  we  have  the 
right  to  demand  of  the  Porte,  I  have  the  firm  intention 
to  act  alone." 


The  day  before  Disraeli,  now  Lord  Beaconsfield,  speak- 
ing at  Guildhall,  had  declared: 

"There  is  no  country  so  interested  in  the  maintenance 
of  peace  as  England.  Peace  is  especially  an  English 
policy.  She  is  not  an  aggressive  Power,  for  there  is  noth- 
ing which  she  desires;  she  covets  no  cities,  no  provinces. 
What  she  wishes  is  to  maintain  and  enjoy  the  unexampled 
empire  which  she  has  built  up.  .  .  .  But  although  the 
policy  of  England  is  peace,  there  is  no  country  so  well 
prepared  for  war  as  our  own.  .  .  .  She  is  not  a  country 
that,  when  she  enters  into  a  campaign,  has  to  ask  herself 
whether  she  can  support  a  second  or  a  third  campaign 
which  she  will  not  terminate  till  right  is  done." 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  289 

Russia  took  up  the  challenge,  and  on  November   13,- 
mobilisation  orders  were  Issued,  and  Russia  declared  it       ^   ^ 
her  purpose  not  to  desist  In  her  plans  until  the  "prin- 
ciples of  humanity"  had  been  vindicated. 


II 

The  arrangements  for  the  Constantinople  Conference 
wete,  however,  being  put  through;  though  England  took 
the  necessary  military  precaution.  "We  have  a  force  of 
40,000  men  ready,"  Beaconsfield  wrote  in  his  secret  in- 
structions (December  i )  to  Lord  Salisbury,  who  was  to 
represent  England  at  the  Conference.  "It  Is  a  most 
critical  moment  In  European  politics,"  he  declared.  "If 
Russia  is  not  checked,  the  Holy  Alliance  will  be  revived 
in  aggravated  form  and  force.  Germany  will  have  Hol- 
land; and  France,  Belgium,  and  England  will  be  in  a 
position  I  trust  I  shall  never  live  to  witness."  ^ 

Bismarck,  anxious  to  maintain  his  attitude  of  detach- 
ment In  order  to  be  in  a  position  to  play  the  part  of  arbiter 
when  the  proper  moment  should  arrive,  speaking  in  the 
Reichstag  on  December  7,  1876,  in  reply  to  his  critics  who 
complained  that  the  government  had  taken  no  determined 
stand,  declared:  "The  policy  which  we  pursue  must  be 
dictated  solely  by  our  own  interests,  and  we  will  not  per- 
mit ourselves  to  be  influenced  by  any  proposal  whatsoever 
to  pursue  any  other  policy.  .  .  .  I  do  not  therefore  advise 
any  active  participation  on  the  part  of  Germany,  as  I  do 
not  see  for  Germany  any  interest  which  would  warrant 
our  sacrificing — excuse  the  harshness  of  the  expression — 
the  bones  of  a  single  Pomeranian  grenadier." 

The  Porte,  which  had  remained  a  docile  spectator  dur- 

*  G.  E.  Buckle,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  VI,  p.  104. 


290  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

ing  the  wrangling  among  the  Powers,  now  took  a  step 
which  was  to  upset  all  calculations.  On  the  day  the  Con- 
ference officially  assembled  at  Constantinople,  a  constitu- 
tion on  the  most  approved  European  model  was  promul- 
gated by  the  Sultan,  affording  very  wide  civil  and  political 
liberties  to  all  the  peoples  of  his  Empire,  It  was  evident 
that  the  Porte  desired  to  demonstrate  that  the  Con- 
ference was  unnecessary,  as  all  the  reforms  that  could 
possibly  be  demanded  and  a  great  many  more  were  in- 
cluded in  the  provisions  of  the  new  constitutional  regime 
it  was  proposed  to  set  up. 

Nevertheless,  the  Conference  proceeded  with  Its  labors 
and  presented  a  list  of  demands  which  the  Porte  refused 
to  accept  (January  1877);  whereupon  the  Conference 
broke  up.  War  was  now  inevitable.  Russia  seemed  to 
have  the  sanction  of  the  Powers.  Turkey  was  pushing 
the  mobilisation  of  her  forces  with  unwonted  energy. 

The  Tsar  thereupon  entered  into  a  definite  treaty  with 
Austria  to  insure  the  latter's  neutrality,  and  the  winter 
months  were  employed  in  preparations.  England's  plan 
of  a  conference  had  been  tried  and  failed.  There  was  no 
alternative  left  but  to  let  events  take  their  course.  The 
efforts  to  keep  peace  were  sedulously  pursued,  but  they 
were  all  leading  directly  to  war,  which  on  April  24,  1877, 
was  declared  by  Russia. 

England  maintained  an  expectant  attitude,  while  the 
Russian  forces  steadily  advanced  upon  Constantinople; 
though  meeting  with  stubborn  resistance  In  Armenia,  they 
made  better  headway  in  the  Balkans.  When  the  prospect 
of  a  Russian  entry  into  Constantinople  became  imminent, 
England  warned  Russia  that :  "Anxious,  sincerely  anxious 
to  meet  Russian  views  In  other  matters,  the  occupation 
of  Constantinople,  or  attempt  to  occupy  it,  will  be  looked 
upon  as  an  Incident  which  frees  us  from  all  previous  en- 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  291 

gagements,  and  must  lead  to  serious  consequences."  ^  On 
July  21,  Beaconsfield  telegraphed  to  Queen  Victoria :  "If 
Russia  occupies  Constantinople  and  does  not  arrange  for 
her  immediate  retirement  from  it,  to  advise  Your  Majesty 
to  declare  war  against  that  Power.  Orders  have  been 
given  to  strengthen  the  Mediterranean  garrisons."  ^  A 
breathing  space  was  afforded  to  England  by  the  delay 
suffered  by  Russia  in  reducing  Plevna,  which  held  up  her 
advance  on  Constantinople. 

In  the  meantime  Austria  had  made  it  plain  that  she 
would  not  tolerate  the  extension  of  an  independent  Serbia 
westward,  or  of  Montenegro  northward.  "If  the  Turks 
are  able  to  keep  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  so  much  the 
better;  if  not  we  will  take  them  for  ourselves,"  outlined 
the  Austrian  viewpoint.  Thus  Russia  was  hemmed  in  on 
the  south  and  west  by  the  threats  of  the  Powers,  yet  she 
pushed  military  operations  with  increased  vigor.  On 
December  10,  Plevna  fell.  Kars  had  been  captured  and 
the  Turks  had  fallen  back  on  Erzerum.  The  roads  to 
Constantinople  lay  open.  The  Slavs  of  the  Balkans  all 
took  an  active  part  in  the  campaign,  and  in  January  1878 
even  Greece  joined,  and  marched  into  Thessaly.  On 
January  9  the  Sultan  had  requested  an  armistice.  Russia 
refused,  except  on  the  condition  that  peace  should  be 
discussed.  On  January  20,  Adrianople  fell  into  Russian 
hands.  In  the  meantime  the  Turkish  plenipotentiaries 
had  left  Constantinople  to  discuss  peace.  The  situation 
had  again  become  tense;  the  Russians  were  before  Con- 
stantinople. England  had  committed  herself  to  prevent 
its  occupation.  The  British  fleet  was  ordered  into  the  Sea 
of  Marmora,  and  credits  were  voted  to  increase  the  na- 
tional armaments.     The  Russians  still  hesitated  before 

*G.  E.  Buckle,  op.  cit,  Vol.  VI,  p.  150. 
^Ibidem,  Vol.  VI,  p.   154. 


/ 


292  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

occupying  the  city.  England  now  maintained  that,  no 
matter  what  the  terms  of  the  peace  between  Russia  and 
Turkey  might  be,  they  must  be  subject  to  revision  by  a 
European  Congress.  Austria,  owing  to  her  special  posi- 
tion and  her  previous  agreements  with  Russia,  officially 
proposed  that  a  conference  of  the  six  Powers  be  held  at 
Vienna,  to  agree  upon  the  necessary  modifications  to  the 
terms  of  the  treaty  about  to  be  negotiated  between  Russia 
and  the  Porte. 

The  opportunity  Bismarck  had  long  been  waiting  for 
had  arrived.  Germany  was  making  ready  to  dominate 
the  future  destiny  of  Europe.  "I  am  not  of  the  opinion," 
V  he  declared  in  the  Reichstag  on  February  19,  "that  we 
i*"  should  pursue  a  Napoleonic  policy  and  that  we  should 
wish  to  be,  I  will  not  say  the  arbiter,  or  even  the  school- 
master of  Europe.  Our  role  is  more  modest.  I  conceive 
it  as  that  of  an  honest  broker  who  wishes  to  put  through 
a  good  deal."  Henceforth  it  was  evident  that  Berlin 
would  be  the  scene  of  the  Congress  which  was  to  arrange 
the  affairs  of  Europe,  launch  the  Powers  into  new  paths, 
and  lay  the  foundation  of  new  schemes  of  aggrandisement 
and  of  world  influence. 

On  March  3,  in  spite  of  the  menacing  attitude  of 
England,  the  treaty  of  peace  between  Turkey  and  Russia 
was  signed  at  San  Stefano.  It  provided  for  an  enlarged, 
independent  Montenegro,  with  two  harbors  on  the  Adri- 
atic; an  independent  Serbia,  slightly  enlarged;  an  inde- 
pendent Rumania,  which  received  the  Dobrudja  but  ceded 
Bessarabia  to  Russia;  a  vast  Bulgarian  State  under  the 
high  protection  of  Russia,  extending  from  the  Danube 
to  Thessaly,  from  the  ^-Egean  to  the  Black  Sea.  Russia 
secured  Batum  and  important  tracts  in  Armenia  and, 
among  other  favorable  stipulations,  the  opening  of  the 
Straits  in  peace  and  war  to  all  merchant  vessels  proceed- 


THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  293 

ing  to  Russian  ports.  The  treaty  was  kept  secret  and 
only  communicated  to  the  Powers  three  weeks  later. 

On  the  receipt  of  the  news  of  the  terms  England  lost 
no  time.  The  Slav  menace  had  become  a  reality.  Turkey 
in  Europe  had  to  all  intents  and  purposes  been  wiped  out. 
Though  Constantinople  had  not  been  occupied,  England 
considered  the  terms  of  the  treaty  unacceptable.  The 
reserves  were  called  out;  Indian  troops  were  ordered  to 
Malta,  and  it  was  even  planned  according  to  the  Prime 
Minister  to  "occupy  two  important  posts  in  the  Levant, 
which  will  command  the  Persian  Gulf  and  all  the  country 
around  Bagdad,  and  entirely  neutralise  the  Russian  con- 
quests and  influence  in  Armenia."  On  April  i,  in  a  note 
to  the  Powers,  England  outlined  the  reasons  why  she 
deemed  it  essential  that  the  treaty  of  San  Stefano  should 
be  revised. 

Austria,  whose  interests  in  the  Balkans  had  been  threat- 
ened by  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  was  ready  to  cooperate 
with  England,  while  Bismarck,  maintaining  his  air  of 
aloofness,  pressed  Russia  to  find  out  from  England,  not 
only  what  she  did  not  want,  but  what  she  did.  Accord- 
ingly negotiations  were  entered  upon  in  view  of  a  Euro- 
pean Congress  which  might  be  held.  A  secret  memoran- 
dum, embodying  an  agreement  between  Russia  and  Eng- 
land, was  signed  May  30.  It  included  the  acceptance  in 
the  main  of  the  British  thesis  regarding  the  territorial  dis- 
tribution of  the  Balkans  and  eliminated  the  great  Bulgar 
State,  though  it  left  Russia  a  free  hand  in  Armenia,  and 
confirmed  the  Russian  occupation  of  Batum,  Ardahan, 
and  Kars.  At  the  same  time  a  secret  convention  was 
signed  between  England  and  the  Porte  (June  4)  in  the 
nature  of  an  insurance  treaty,  which  provided  that  if 
Russia  retained  Batum,  Ardahan,  or  Kars,  England  would 
defend  the  integrity  of  Turkish  territory  in  Asia  against 


294  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

any  further  encroachments  by  Russia.  In  return  for  this 
service  England  received  the  right  to  occupy  Cyprus/  and 
a  number  of  British  military  consulates  were  to  be  estab- 
lished in  Asiatic  Turkey,  to  protect  the  special  rights  and 
interests  England  had  secured  by  the  Convention. 

'Disraeli  had  spent  a  day  at  Cyprus  in  1831  and  had  been  much  im- 
pressed by  its  long,  romantic  history.  In  1847  in  one  of  his  novels, 
"Tancred,"  he  had  written:  "The  English  want  Cyprus  and  they  will 
take  it  as  compensation.  They  will  not  take  charge  of  Turkish  affairs 
again  for  nothing.  They  need  new  markets  for  their  cotton  goods. 
England  will  never  be  satisfied  until  the  people  of  Jerusalem  wear 
cotton  turbans." 


CHAPTER  VI 

The  Congress  of  Berlin 


OBJECTS  OF  THE  CONGRESS TREATY  OF  SAN  STEFANO  REVISED — 

DISTRIBUTION    OF    TERRITORY ERECTION     OF     INDEPENDENT 

'.BALKAN    STATES BOSNIA    AND    HERZEGOVINA CYPRUS 

THE     NEW    ORIENTATION     IN     FOREIGN     AFFAIRS 

MATURITY    OF     NATION-STATES PLANS     OF 

EXPANSION — THE    EUROPEAN    VIEWPOINT 


THUS  after  two  years  of  repeated  alarms  England 
was  not  to  go  to  war,  and  instead  there  was  to  be 
a  Congress  of  the  Powers,  wherein  the  two  principal  pro- 
tagonists had  in  advance  secretly  arrived  at  an  under- 
standing, and  the  other  Powers  were  bound  by  interests, 
agreements,  treaties,  and  conventions  to  pursue  a  prede- 
termined policy.  The  intriguing  skill  of  the  negotiator 
alone  could  turn  the  scale;  skill  supported  by  ultimatums 
and  threats  of  war. 

On  opening  the  Congress  at  Berlin  on  June  13,  1878, 
Bismarck,  addressing  the  assembly  which  included  the 
diplomatic  luminaries  of  the  principal  Powers,  stated 
that  the  object  in  calling  together  the  representatives  of 
the  Powers  was  to  submit  the  work  done  at  San  Stefano 
to  the  free  discussion  of  the  governments  signatory  of 
the  treaties  of  1856  and  1871. 

Exactly  one  month  later,  July  13,  the  Congress  finished 
its  labors  and  closed  its  doors.  Lord  Beaconsfield  re- 
turned to  London,  bringing  back  "peace  with   honor," 

[295] 


I 


296  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

which  Included  the  approval  of  the  Powers  of  the  occupa- 
tion of  Cyprus  for  good  measure.  The  dismemberment 
of  Turkey  had  been  prevented.  The  authority  of  the 
Sultan  in  Europe  still  extended  over  60,000  square  miles 
and  a  population  of  6,000,000  inhabitants,  not  including 
Bosnia  and  Bulgaria,  which  remained  tributary  to  the 
Porte,  Turkey  remained  the  gate-keeper  of  the  Straits, 
and  thus  the  status  quo  was  maintained.  Russia,  though 
she  had  to  give  up  her  plans  for  a  great  Bulgar  State 
under  her  suzerainty,  did  not  leave  Berlin  empty-handed. 
Batum,  Kars,  Ardahan,  and  adjoining  territory  were 
definitely  ceded  to  her.  Rumania  was  compelled  to  cede 
Bessarabia  to  Russia,  ajid  in  return  Rumanian  inde- 
pendence was  acknowledged  and  the  Dobrudja  added  to 
the  new  kingdom.  Serbia  and  Montenegro  were  de- 
clared independent,  though  the  former  was  landlocked, 
and  the  latter  only  received  one  port  on  the  Adriatic.  A 
small,  semi-independent  Bulgar  State  was  carved  out  of 
the  territory  in  the  heart  of  the  Balkans;  while  Southern 
Bulgaria  under  the  name  of  Eastern  Roumelia  remained 
under  Turkish  rule,  with  special  administrative  autonomy. 
Greece  received  merely  incidental  consideration.  The 
question  of  Crete  and  the  Greek  Islands  was  not  raised, 
and  only  a  rectification  of  the  frontiers  in  Thessaly  and 
Epirus  was  conceded.  Nor  was  Austria  forgotten.  It 
was  Beaconsfield  who  proposed  officially  that  Austria 
should  occupy  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  Bismarck  at 
once  seconded  the  proposal,  and  thus  it  was  arranged 
without  giving  ear  to  Turkish  protests.  Throughout  the 
proceedings  France  had  played  a  secondary  part,  yet  it 
seemed  only  natural  that  as  favors  were  being  distributed 
wholesale  some  token  should  be  given  to  her  as  a  mark 
of  courteous  or  at  least  condescending  approval  of  her 
self-effacing   attitude.      The   protection   of   the    Roman 


THE  CONGRESS  OF  BERLIN  297 

Catholics  In  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and  a  recognition  of 
France's  especial  interest  in  their  welfare,  principally  In 
the  "important  region  of  Syria,"  was  officially  conceded, 
which  earmarked  that  region  in  the  minds  of  the  French 
as  their  share  when  the  real  partition  of  Turkey  should 
take  place;  while,  as  a  balm  for  French  indignation  at 
the  announcement  made  during  the  closing  days  of  the 
Congress  of  the  permanent  occupation  of  Cyprus  by  Eng- 
land, Lord  Beaconsfield  suggested  to  France  that  she 
could  have  a  free  hand  in  Tunis, 

Bismarck  also  urged  France  to  take  advantage  of  this 
opportunity  to  occupy  Tunis,  anxious  to  divert  French  In- 
terest from  the  Rhine  and  engage  her  reawakened  vigor 
in  colonial  enterprise.  For  Germany  he  requested  no  ma- 
terial compensation.  The  Iron  Chancellor  took  a  broader 
view  of  the  needs  and  aims  of  the  Empire  than  could 
be  measured  by  territorial  compensation.  Though  out- 
wardly disinterested  in  distant  territorial  aggrandisement, 
Germany  had  become  the  deus  ex  machina  in  world  affairs.  J 
Russia  had  been  humiliated,  and  her  advance  checked 
in  the  Balkans.  Her  attention  was  again  directed  to- 
wards Asia.  Austria  henceforth  was  to  look  south,  and 
began  the  march  on  Salonika  under  the  vigilant  eye  of 
Berlin,  leaving  Prussia  the  undisputed  master  in  Germany. 
France  was  about  to  engage  in  an  African  enterprise 
which  was  to  arouse  the  animosity  of  the  Italians,  who 
for  a  long  period  had  been  led  to  believe  that  Tunis  was 
their  special  field  of  expansion.  As  the  Italians  were 
practically  the  only  ones  to  come  away  empty-handed  from 
the  Berlin  Congress,  Bismarck  rightly  judged  that  they 
would  feel  a  lasting  resentment  towards  France,  who  was 
about  to  step  in  and  seize  their  Tunisian  prize.  He 
further  foresaw  that  an  inevitable  misunderstanding 
would  arise  between  France  and  England  over  Egypt, 


298  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

and  he  pressed  England  to  pursue  a  bold  policy  there. 
Though  at  the  time  of  the  Congress  England  refrained,  it 
was  only  a  very  brief  period  before  French  interests  were 
overridden,  and  difficulties  arose  which  served  Germany 
by  enfeebling  and  isolating  France,  and  gave  Bismarck 
the  opportunity  of  again  playing  the  part  of  arbiter  in 
the  dispute  which  he  knew  how  to  exploit  to  good  advan- 
tage. England,  though  feeling  herself  strong  and  aggres- 
sive, looked  to  Berlin  in  a  spirit  of  friendly  cooperation 
and  frankly  acknowledged  that  a  good  understanding  with 
Germany  was  the  soundest  policy  for  her  to  pursue. 

Germany  came  out  of  the  Congress  of  Berlin  the 
ascendant  State  in  Europe;  Austria,  and  in  her  wake  Italy, 
entered  directly  in  her  orbit.  England  was  friendly,  and 
France,  though  isolated,  apparently  not  ungrateful.  Rus- 
sia alone  had  been  alienated,  but  not  only  did  Bismarck 
count  on  England  to  hold  Russia  at  bay,  as  she  had  done 
so  successfully  during  recent  years,  but  he  did  not  re- 
ject friendly  overtures  from  the  St.  Petersburg  Govern- 
ment, in  spite  of  his  avowed  preference  for  an  Austrian 
alliance. 


II 

At  the  time  of  the  Berlin  Congress  the  Nation-States 
of  Europe  had  reached  their  maturity.  Each  of  the 
Powers  had  outlined  for  itself  a  definite  policy  of  expan- 
sion. Here  we  find  the  genesis  of  the  historical  develop- 
ment of  the  ensuing  generation.  Here  the  balance  of 
power  which  had  been  upset  by  the  rise  of  Germany  was 
slowly  coming  into  equilibrium.  Here  the  Triple  Alliance 
germinated.  Here  the  seeds  of  the  Franco-Russian  Alli- 
ance and  the  Triple  Entente  were  sown.    Here  the  future 


THE  CONGRESS  OF  BERLIN  299 

conflict  for  world  supremacy  between  England  and  Ger- 
many may  be  foreshadowed. 

The  European  States  had  found  themselves  discussing 
the  destiny  of  peoples,  the  distribution  of  territory,  no 
longer  with  reference  to  nationality,  but  as  spheres  of 
influence,  as  areas  for  penetration.  The  principle  of  na- 
tionality upon  which  the  Nation-State  had  been  built  was  ^ 
apparently  henceforth  to  be  abandoned,  except  in  so  far  as 
it  served  as  a  rallying  cry  for  the  Powers  to  promote  their 
internal  unity,  to  strengthen  the  cohesive  solidarity  of  the 
State  for  the  purpose  of  expansion.  Racial  and  national 
homogeneity  expressed  in  terms  of  patriotism  was  made 
use  of  to  combat  the  growing  social  objectivity  of  the  ris- 
ing Proletariat,  who  looked  beyond  national  boundaries, 
and  was  breaking  down  the  barriers  which  isolated  the 
various  States.  Furthermore,  the  principle  of  a  Euro- 
pean policy  ^  was  enunciated  and  firmly  established  by 
the  Congress,  which  bound  the  Great  Powers  to  adopt 
a  European  viewpoint,  and  was  to  lead  to  the  formation 
of  two  groups  of  States,  within  one  of  which  at  least  only 
a  relative  freedom  of  action  was  retained  by  the  minor 
partners. 

The  world  had  become  a  field  for  exploitation  and  con- 
quest. England  had  led  the  way,  and  Beaconsfield  had 
given  to  the  European  statesmen  their  first  lessons  in  im- 
perialism, had  outlined  how  imperial  enterprise  may  be  / 
pursued,  how  interests  may  be  made  use  of  and  exploited, 
how  a  bold  policy  of  intimidation  and  threats  of  war 
may  be  taken  advantage  of  without  actually  going  to  war. 
The  Congress  had  brought  the  Powers  into  close  contact, 

'  See  the  reply  made  by  Count  Andrassy,  the  Austrian  representative, 
to  the  Italian  delegate,  who  had  presumed  to  address  an  inquiry  re- 
garding the  policy  of  Austria  in  occupying  Bosnia:  "Monsieur  le  pleni- 
potentiaire  d'ltalie,  dit-il,  I'Aurtiche  en  occupant  la  Bosnie  se  place  au 
point  de  vue  europeen." 


300  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

and  laid  before  them  the  fate  of  the  world  as  clay  for 
their  moulding.  The  vast  African  continent  was  still 
relatively  unoccupied.  Great  areas  of  Asia  and  Austral- 
asia, undefended  by  their  inhabitants,  who  had  not  entered 
upon  the  stage  of  modern  historical  development  or  con- 
ceived of  the  State  as  Power,  still  remained  to  be  oc- 
cupied, or  at  least  dominated.  The  State  had  broken 
through  its  narrow  national  limits.  The  State  as  Power 
was  making  ready  to  strive  for  world  power.  The  Ger- 
man people  were  soon  to  feel  themselves  destined  to  be- 
come the  leaders  of  this  new  imperialism. 


CHAPTER  VII 

The  State  as  Power 

bismarckian  doctrines — relation  to  marxism — the  inter- 
pretation of  treitschke objective  concept  of  power 

church    and    state berlin    and    the    vatican the 

^significance  of  the  kulturkampf social  problems 

— Bismarck's     programme     of     social     welfare — 
Disraeli's  attitude — England  and  Germany 


AT  the  beginning  of  a  new  phase  of  historical  evolu- 
tion, when  a  new  ideology  is  struggling  for  recog- 
nition, an  era  of  adulation  of  power,  a  Gewaltsepoch, 
often  ushers  in  the  new  orientation  of  historical  develop- 
ment. Force  is  relied  upon  during  periods  of  uncertainty. 
Might  is  the  only  accepted  basis  of  right  when  new  ethical 
standards,  new  moral  convictions,  are  in  the  early  forma- 
tive stages.  The  sword  is  held  a  more  real  source  of 
strength  at  a  time  of  spiritual  decadence  than  any  social 
code.^  Man  in  this  confused  state  loses  his  moral  bear- 
ings, and  relies  on  the  weapon  immediately  at  hand,  a 
power  of  his  own  creating  which  it  is  hoped  may  afford 
tangible  protection.  This  was  especially  true  of  the  great 
transition  from  individualist  to  social  standards,  which 
began  to  define  itself  with  much  precision  after  1878. 

It  was  upon  the  foundation  of  middle  class,  subjective 
Individualism  that  national  States  had  arisen.  By  Bis- 
marck  national   spirit  had  been  moulded   Into   a   racial 

*  As  Renan  has  so  well   remarked:  "On  meurt  pour  des  opinions  non 
pour  des  certitudes;  pour  ce  qu'on  croit  et  non  pour  ce  qu'on  sail." 

[301] 


302  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

egotism,  fanatically  cultivated  as  a  source  of  social  power, 
which  had  led  to  Prussian  ascendancy  in  the  new  Ger- 
man Empire,  and  to  German  ascendancy  in  Europe.  He 
had  adopted  the  Hegelian  principle  of  "blood  and  iron" 
and  made  skilful  use  of  the  Hegelian  doctrine  that  his- 
torical development  is  the  result  of  reaction  against  pre- 
vailing practice:  the  identical  doctrine  of  growth  by  an- 
tagonism which  Karl  Marx  had  adopted  in  developing 
his  theory  of  historical  materialism. 

If  we  examine  closely  the  realism  of  Bismarck's  policy, 
the  ruthless  contempt  he  displayed  for  accepted  political 
practice,  whether  in  home  or  foreign  affairs,  the  avowed 
materialism_oX  his  philosophy,  his  distir^pt^opportunism, 
his  adulation  of  violence,  we  will  find  numerous  points  of 
contact  and  analogy  with  that  of  Marx.    Though  a  super- 
ficial reading  of  history  may  apparently  refute  this  thesis, 
yet  a  more  profound  examination  will  reveal  that  Bis- 
marck and  Marx,  standing  as  they  did  at  the  antipodes 
of  the  new  social  movement,  were  endowed  with  the  same 
characteristics  of  social  objectivity  of  viewpoint,  which 
affirms  their  relationship.     Bismarck  having  in  his  posses- 
/"sion  the  weapons  of  power  was  able  to  promote  social 
^^development  by  the  steadier  methods  of  evolution.     Marx 
having  to  forge  his  weapons  could  only  preach  revolution. 
The  Communist  Manifesto  of   1848,  drawn  up  in  a 
spirit  of  violent  class  interest,  based  on  the  dictatorship 
of  the  Proletariat,  is  in  many  respects  identical  with  Bis- 
/  marckian  principles  of  the  national  interest  of  the  State, 
I    enforced  by  the  dictatorial  power  of  government.     Ac- 
cording to  Marx,  the  Proletariat — the  class — could  brook 
no  opposition;  according  to  Bismarck,  the  Nation-State — 
the  government — could  tolerate  no  competition  of  author- 
(  ity  within  its  boundaries.     No  consideration,  no  matter 


THE  STATE  AS  POWER  303 

of  what  nature,  whether  ethically  or  morally  sanctioned, 
could  be  permitted  to  stand  in  the  path  of  the  develop- 
ment of  the  State  as  power,  could  be  allowed  to  divert 
the  individual  from  his  allegiance  to  the  government  of 
the  State. ^  Here  we  may  discern  the  basis  of  Bismarck's 
political  practice,  a  radical  breaking  away  from  the  old 
ideals  of  Statehood,  and  trace  the  influence  of  the  resur- 
rection of  Machiavellian  political  theory,  of  Alaclitpolitik, 
which  Treitschke  openly  glorified  and  proclaimed  Bis- 
,  marckian. 

It  is  to  Treitschke  that  we  must  turn  In  order  to  dis- 
cover the  difference  between  Bismarck's  practice  and 
Machiavellian  theory:  "Not  that  he  (Machiavelli)  Is  al- 
together indifferent  to  the  means  of  power  which  are  re- 
pugnant to  us,  but  that  to  him  everything  depends  upon 
how  the  greatest  power  may  be  acquired  and  retained, 
though  this  power  in  itself  has  no  value;  that  power 
once  acquired  must  justify  itself,  that  it  must  be  used  r 
for  the  greatest  good  to  mankind — of  this  in  his  work 
we  find  no  trace."  ^ 

To  Bismarck  the  State  was  not  an  end  in  Itself.  It 
was  power  as  an  omnipotent  social  force,  concentrated 
in  the  hands  of  Government:  not  Irresponsible  power, 
merely  for  power's  sake,  the  Machiavellian  concept, 
adapted  by  middle  class  practice  purely  subjectively,  but 
rather  unlimited  power  for  the  purpose  of  promoting 
public  welfare.  In  the  acquisition  of  power  the  State  may 
be  unscrupulous,  but  in  its  use  of  power  it  must  promote      ] 

^  In  the  words  of  Disraeli:  "The  divine  right  of  kings  has  been  prop- 
erly discarded,  but  an  intelligent  age  will  never  discard  the  divine 
right  of  government."  And  again,  in  the  general  preface  to  the  edition 
of  his  novels  in  1870:  "The  divine  right  of  kings  may  have  been  a  plea 
of  feeble  tyrants,  but  the  divine  right  of  government  is  the  keystone  of 
human  progress." 

"Treitschke,  Politics,  Book  I,  p.  91. 


( 


/ 


304  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

the  cultural  development  of  its  people.  Thus  Bismarck 
in  his  Memoirs  could  with  a  feeling  of  self-righteousness 
set  down : 

"The  duration  of  all  treaties  between  great  States  is  a 
conditional  one  as  soon  as  the  question  of  the  'struggle  for 
survival'  comes  into  question.  No  great  State  should 
ever  be  compelled  to  sacrifice  its  existence  on  the  altar  of 
faithful  adherence  to  its  treaty  agreements,  when  it  is 
compelled  to  choose  between  the  two."  ^ 

Yet  there  is  a  wide  gap  between  this  distinctly  social 
conception  of  the  disregard  of  treaty  obligations,  and  the 
favorite  individualist  maxim  of  Frederick  the  Great: 
^'S'il  y  a  a  gagner  a  etre  honnete,  nous  le  serons,  s'il  fatit 
duper  soyons  fourhes."  In  Bismarck's  interpretation  we 
can  perceive  the  objective  concept  of  power  which  sacri- 
fices not  merely  all  ethical  and  moral  practice,  but  its  prin- 
ciples as  well  to  a  blind  subservience  to  what  it  believes  to 
be  the  good  of  the  State.  It  never  seems  to  have  occurred 
to  the  advocates  of  the  new  political  practice  that  the  State 
is  a  limited  portion  of  humanity,  or  that  the  policy  of  sole 
reliance  on  power,  on  might,  on  intimidation,  would 
arouse  a  reaction,  and  lead  to  competition  for  power.  The 
subservience  of  public  policy  to  armed  force,  and  the 
measuring  of  the  ascendancy  of  a  State  in  terms  of 
armaments  led  to  the  neglect  of  all  broader  psychological 
and  sociological  considerations. 

To  Bismarck  and  to  the  leading  statesmen  in  all  of  the 
great  States  in  the  West  after  him;  the  State  as  Power 
seemed  its  sole  destiny.  The  materialist  teiTrper'aT'the 
preceding  epoch,  the  emphasis  on  scientific  analysis,  the 
pessimism  which  had  gained  so  wide  an  acceptance,  and 
above  all  the  ruthless  competitive  methods  of  industrial 

'  Gedanken  und  Errinerungen,  Vol.  II,  p.  49. 


THE  STATE  AS  POWER  305 

and  commercial  enterprise,  had  heightened  man's  re- 
liance on  naked  power.  To  the  Individual  engaged  in 
economic  enterprise,  wealth  and  the  power  it  afforded 
were  essentially  non-social  and  as  such  divested  cf  all  so- 
cial obligations.  To  the  State,  power  as  a  politico-eco- 
nomic factor  was  beginning  to  acquire  certain  still  ill- 
defined  social  characteristics.  But  the  State  so  conceived 
remained  exclusive,  and,  flushed  with  the  success  it  had 
achieved  in  moulding  national  consciousness,  refused  to 
tol6rate  any  alien  domination  which  might  by  diverting 
the  individual  from  his  allegiance  to  the  State  stand 
in  the  path  of  the  fullest  development  of  its  power. 
This  was  the  principle  upon  which  Bismarck  acted  in  his 
long  struggle  with  the  Church  of  Rome.^ 


II 

To  understand  the  true  nature  of  the  Kulturkampf  it 
must  be  recalled  that  even  the  Papacy  had  not  remained 
uninfluenced  by  the  cult  of  power  which  had  permeated 
the  spiritual  as  well  as  the  secular  affairs  of  the  epoch. 
Pius  IX  In  his  Encyclical  and  Syllabus  issued  December  8, 
1864,  had  reasserted  in  unequivocal  terms  that  the 
Church  and  the  Pope  are  anointed  by  God  with  supreme 
power,  which  recognises  no  limits  and  no  bounds,  and  is 
above  all  secular  authority.  In  June  1868  he  had  con- 
voked the  Council  which  was  to  pronounce  upon  the  ques- 
tion of  Papal  infallibility.  The  Council  assembled  at  the 
Vatican  in  December  1869.  It  represented  the  entire 
Catholic  world,  and  after  concluding  Its  session  solemnly 

^Bismarck  ivar  der  verkorperie  Geist  der  vom  Sittengesetz  gelosten 
Staatsraison;  er  brae  lite  ihr  ganzes  Wesen  an  den  Tag,  er  nahm 
sich  griindl'tch  Ernst,  ivahrend  die  andern  mit  ihr  nur  spielten. — Fr.  W. 
Foerster,  Politische  Ethik  u.  Politische  Pddagogik,  p.  219. 


\ 


306  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

proclaimed  In  the  name  of  its  400,000,000  followers  the 
infallibility  of  the  Pope  (July  18,  1870).  The  next  day 
Catholic  France  declared  war  on  Protestant  Germany. 
Within  three  months  German  ascendancy  in  Europe  was 
assured,  and  the  temporal  power  of  the  Papacy  came  to 
an  end  (September  20,  1870).^ 

Bismarck  was  no  narrow-minded  evangelical  sectarian. 
It  has  been  said  of  him  that  his  religious  faith  was  at 
the  service  of  his  policy.  At  first  he  maintained  a  neutral 
attitude,  which  he  abandoned  only  when  he  felt  that  the 
Church  was  encroaching  upon  the  domain  of  the  State. 
Throughout  the  struggle  with  Papal  authority  he  kept 
constantly  in  view  the  immediate  phases  of  the  conflict, 

*  It  is  historically  significant  that  at  the  time  when  the  temporal  power 
of  the  Papacy  came  to  an  end  the  Pope  should  have  been  able  to  affirm 
his  ascendancy  over  Catholicism,  and  be  accredited  with  "complete  and 
supreme  jurisdictionary  authority  over  the  whole  Church,  not  simply  in 
matters  of  faith  and  morality,  but  also  in  matters  touching  the  discipline 
and  governance  of  the  Church;  and  this  authority  is  a  regular  and  im- 
mediate authority  extending  over  each  and  every  Church  and  over  each 
and  every  Pastor  and  believer"  and  that  "the  Roman  Pontiff  when  he 
speaks  ex  cathedra  ...  is  endowed  with  that  infallibility  which  accord- 
ing to  the  will  of  the  Redeemer,  is  vouchsafed  to  the  Church  when  she 
desires  to  fix  a  doctrine  of  faith  or  morality;  and  that  consequently  all 
such  decisions  of  the  Roman  Pontiff  are  per  se  immutable  and  independent 
of  the  subsequent  assent  of  the  Church." — Cf.  C.  Mirbt,  Quellen  zur 
Geschichte  des  Papstums,  p.  370  et  seq.  Here  we  have  the  thesis  of  in- 
fallibility as  set  forth  by  the  Vatican  Council,  defining  the  authority  of 
the  Pope  and  extending  his  jurisdiction  over  all  Catholics  to  the  ends  of 
the  earth.  Its  acceptance  meant  that  the  power  was  conceded  to  the 
Pope  at  any  time,  in  any  diocese,  to  exercise  the  functions  of  the  regular 
bishop  and  that  the  clergy  was  shorn  of  its  independent  nationalist  char- 
acter which  it  had  so  long  and  tediously  labored  to  build  up.  It  meant 
that  the  Church  Universal,  according  to  rtie  newly  promulgated  doctrine, 
was  to  supersede  the  older  idea  of  diocesan  independence  which  may  be 
correlated  to  the  idea  of  nationalism.  As  such  the  edicts  of  the  Vatican 
council  may  be  looked  upon  as  one  more  indication  of  the  decay  of  the 
nationalist  principle  and  a  confirmation  of  the  thesis  regarding  the  break- 
down of  the  old  order  and  the  rise  of  the  new  super-national  ideology. 
As  was  to  be  expected,  the  enunciation  of  the  new  doctrine  was  attended 
by  important  political  results,  not  merely  in  Germany:  Austria  imme- 
diately (July  30,  1870)  annulled  the  Concordat  of  1855.  France  later 
revoked  its  Concordat  of  1801,  and  finally  carried  through  the  complete 
separation  of  Church  and  State. 


THE  STATE  AS  POWER  307 

and  their  consequences  on  the  pohtical  influence  of  the 
State. 

A  strong  Catholic  party  had  been  formed  in  Germany, 
which  was  well  represented  in  the  Reichstag  under  the 
most  forceful  Parliamentary  leader  in  the  Empire,  Wind- 
thorst.  Bismarck  was  not  to  be  deterred  by  obstacles.  To 
him  the  Vatican,  armed  with  its  new  dogma  of  infallibility, 
was  in  possession  of  a  weapon  which,  if  it  were  permitted 
to  use  it,  would  endow  the  Church  with  power  infinitely 
greater  than  that  of  the  State. 

By  1872  the  conflict  between  Berlin  and  Rome  was 
openly  declared.  Bismarck  took  the  first  step  and  by  the 
law  of  July  4,  1872,  pronounced  the  dissolution  of  the 
Jesuit  organisations  in  Prussia.  Rome  retaliated  by  re- 
fusing to  receive  a  Prussian  envoy  to  be  accredited  to 
the  Vatican. 

Bismarck  emphasised  the  political  nature  of  the 
struggle.  "It  is,"  he  declared  in  the  Prussian  Herren- 
haus  in  supporting  his  policy  in  a  speech  delivered  on 
March  10,  1873,  "the  old  struggle  for  power,  as  old  as 
the  human  race,  between  priesthood  and  royalty.  A 
struggle  for  power  which  was  old  when  our  Saviour  came 
into  this  world.  It  is  the  struggle  for  power  which  Aga- 
memnon had  to  wage  against  the  prophets  in  Aulis  which 
cost  him  the  life  of  his  daughter,  and  prevented  the 
Greeks  from  setting  sail;  it  is  the  struggle  for  power, 
which  under  the  name  of  the  war  between  the  Popes 
and  the  Emperors,  filled  the  pages  of  German  history 
during  the  Middle  Ages  up  to  the  time  of  the  downfall 
of  the  German  Empire." 

The  struggle  with  the  Vatican  was  now  carried  on  in 
the  open.  The  laws  by  which  Bismarck  proposed  to 
break  the  power  of  the  Roman  Church  in  Prussia  were 


3o8  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

enacted.  They  conferred  upon  the  State  the  right  to  ap- 
point and  instruct  the  clergy;  limited  the  number  of  their 
minlstrants  who,  according  to  the  new  law,  were  to  be  of 
German  nationality,  dependent  in  the  first  instance  di- 
rectly upon  the  State  and  not  upon  Rome ;  and  finally 
the  right  of  all  German  subjects  to  change  their  religion 
at  will  was  recognised. 

Pope  Pius  IX  protested  against  these  rigorous  meas- 
ures, taken,  he  alleged,  to  "discredit  the  religion  of 
Christ."  But  Bismarck  was  not  satisfied.  It  was  a  strug- 
gle for  power,  and  the  State  as  representing  sovereign 
power  could  brook  no  rival.  The  laws  proposed  were 
stringently  enforced.  Recalcitrant  cardinals,  bishops, 
and  other  high  prelates  were  prevented  from  exercising 
their  functions,  and  some  even  suffered  Imprisonment. 
Bismarck  stigmatised  their  conduct  as  revolutionary  and 
justified  his  harsh  measures  by  the  need  of  State.  All 
Germany  was  In  a  turmoil.  The  Kulturkampf  had  en- 
listed its  partisans  and  opponents  among  all  classes. 

The  Pope  in  turn  urged  the  German  bishops  to  stouter 
resistance.  Bismarck  saw  to  it  that  new  laws  were  en- 
acted (1875)  to  control  their  revenues,  in  order  to  sub- 
ject Catholic  sees  to  more  complete  dependence  upon  the 
State.  The  situation  remained  unchanged.  Bishops, 
priests,  and  laymen  were  imprisoned  for  violation  of  the 
new  laws,  but  without  effect.  For  five  years  the  Kultur- 
kampf dominated  the  Internal  policy  of  Prussia  and  the 
Empire.  The  Catholic  sees  of  Prussia  had  been  dis- 
rupted; their  titulars  were  in  exile  or  in  prison.  Four 
hundred  parishes  were  without  priests,  and  still  Rome 
preached  resistance.  Bismarck  seemed  discouraged.  He 
even  appeared  willing  to  temporise.  But  Pius  IX  refused 
to  yield  and  his  death  (February  7,  1878)  alone  afforded 
an  opportunity  for  compromise.     Another  decade  was  to 


THE  STATE  AS  POWER  309 

elapse  before  the  conflict  came  to  an  end.  Long  before 
this  Bismarck  changed  his  attitude.  He  had  feared  the 
rise  of  the  power  of  the  Catholic  Church  in  the  new 
State.  When  he  realised  that  his  policy  towards  it  did 
not  afford  the  desired  results,  but  stiffened  its  resistance 
and  increased  its  prestige,  he  grasped  at  the  first  op- 
portunity offered  by  the  accession  of  a  new  Pope  to  effect 
a  compromise,  which  led  to  a  reconciliation  and  the  repeal 
of  the  laws  of  1874  and  1875.  Bismarck  did  not  enter 
upon  the  struggle  with  Rome  for  any  high  motives  of 
freeing  the  German  people  from  subservience  to  the 
Papacy.  Nor  is  it  to  be  believed  that  he  foresaw  the 
nature  of  the  resistance  which  the  Vatican  would  inspire. 
But  once  committed  to  the  policy  he  persisted  in  it  until 
the  first  favorable  opportunity  for  its  reversal  was  offered. 
It  need  excite  no  surprise  that  we  find  him  soon  thereafter 
compacting  a  close  and  friendly  understanding  with  his 
bitter  foes  of  yesterday. 

Such  was  the  opportunist  nature  of  the  realism  of  Bis-  / 
marck  in  the  throes  of  failure.  It  reveals  that  he  had  no 
far-sighted,  permanent  constructive  policy;  he  contended 
for  no  ideals,  whether  political  or  social,  but  made  their 
formulcE  serve  his  practical  programmes  which  he  dis- 
carded when  they  no  longer  paid  an  immediate  return. 


Ill 

It  Is  more  than  mere  coincidence  that  the  two  initiators 
of   the   imperialist   movement  who    first   definitely  com- 
mitted their  governments  to  the  policy  of  imperial  enter- 
prise should  have  been  the  first  to  give  greatest  consid-i 
eration  to  questions  of  social  reform.     Bismarck,  in  spite 


310  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

of  his  horror  of  socialism  as  an  organism  independent 
of  the  government,  nevertheless  realised  that  his  imperial 
designs  could  only  be  carried  out  in  close  collaboration 
with  the  masses.  As  early  as  1863  we  find  him  organising 
a  commission  to  inquire  into  labor  problems,  to  report 
on  working  conditions  and  the  relations  between  em- 
ployers and  employees.  He  himself  had  been  in  personal 
contact  with  Lasalle  and  other  socialist  leaders  in  an 
effort  to  arrive  at  a  clear  understanding  of  the  exact  needs 
of  the  working  classes.  Though  the  execution  of  his 
plans  was  delayed  for  nearly  two  decades,  he  had  come 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  State  owes  the  same  protection 
to  the  workers  as  it  does  to  the  capitalists.  As  for  the 
benefit  of  the  latter,  the  State  undertakes  to  build  rail- 
ways and  canals,  and  affords  shipping  facilities,  protection 
of  interests  abroad  and  customs  tariff  regulations,  so  the 
former  must  be  protected  by  affording  them  adequate 
wages,  decrease  in  the  burden  of  taxation,  and,  more  im- 
portant still,  a  complete  system  of  State  aid,  insurance 
and  pensions  for  their  aged  and  sick  must  be  arranged  for. 
It  was  the  duty  of  the  State  according  to  Bismarck  to  pre- 
vent the  worker  from  worrying  about  his  old  age  or  from 
falling  into  distress  as  a  result  of  unforeseen  circum- 
stances. Bismarck  asserted  that  it  was  not  only  the  duty, 
but  the  exclusive  right  of  the  State  to  protect  and  promote 
the  welfare  of  its  workers  and  succor  its  indigent.  He 
energetically  repudiated  the  efforts  of  the  Socialists  to 
intervene  in  behalf  of  the  Proletariat.  The  Socialists 
were  to  him  particularly  opprobrious.^  He  seized  every 
opportunity  to  suppress  their  organisation.     For  a  time  he 

^  "They  are  like  the  veiled  prophet  of  Thomas  More,  who  carefully 
hid  his  face,  for  as  soon  as  the  veil  was  lifted  his  face  appeared  to  the 
people  in  all  its  terrible  hideousness.  If  our  laboring  classes  saw  the 
face  of  Mokana  they  would  shriek  in  horror  as  they  would  look  upon 
the  face  of  a  corpse." — Cf.  Bismarck's  speech  in  the  Reichstag  October  9, 
1878. 


THE  STATE  AS  POWER  311 

succeeded  in  driving  them  out  of  Germany,  though  he 
failed  to  check  their  rapid  growth  even  by  his  extensive 
legislation  of  social  reform,  imposed  by  the  Government 
and  not  in  response  to  popular  demand.  Bismarck  had 
embarked  upon  vast  schemes  of  State  Socialism,  the  exe- 
cution of  which  extended  over  many  years,  and  though 
they  were  in  essence  patterned  on  a  paternalistic  sys- 
tem in  which  the  omnipotent  State  conferred  benefits, 
yet  they  afford  further  proof  of  his  social  sensibility, 
which  has  already  been  referred  to. 

Disraeli  undertook  to  attack  the  question  of  social 
reform  in  a  more  opportunist  spirit.  He  believed  that 
social  improvement  was  desired  by  the  people.  The 
first  two  Labor  members  to  be  returned  to  Parliament  in 
England  took  their  seats  in  1874.  Disraeli  had  made  it 
his  especial  care  to  feel  the  pulse  of  the  nation,  to  keep 
a  close  watch  for  any  symptoms  which  might  give  him  a 
cue  for  a  new  policy,  and  then  to  strike  out  boldly,  con- 
fident of  support.  "In  legislation,"  he  wrote  in  the 
autumn  of  1874,  "it  is  not  merely  reason  and  propriety 
which  are  to  be  considered  but  the  temper  of  the  time."  ^ 
He  now  (1875)  entered  energetically  upon  plans  for  im- 
proving the  condition  of  the  people.  Far  less  elaborate 
and  complex  in  his  schemes  than  Bismarck,  Disraeli  in- 
troduced very  practical  proposals  for  social  legislation. 
He  was  ready  to  cooperate  with  labor  representatives 
in  regard  to  housing  problems  and  savings  banks,  and 
above  all  the  regulation  of  the  vexed  question  of  "master 
and  man."  The  two  laws  passed  in  reference  to  this 
latter  question  were  declared  to  be  "the  charter  of  the 
social  and  industrial  liberty  of  the  wage-earning  classes." 
No  branch  of  "social  sanitation"  as  Disraeli  was  wont  to 
call  it  was  left  unimproved,  and  the  foundations  were 

*  Cf.  G.  E.  Buckle,  The  Life  of  Benjamin  Disraeli,  Vol.  V,  p.  359. 


312  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

laid  at  this  time  upon  which  all  subsequent  programmes  of 
social  reform  in  England  were  carried  out. 

In  Disraeli's  attitude  towards  social  problems  we  may 
discover,  though  from  another  viewpoint  than  that  of 
Bismarck,  this  same  new  spint  of  s^o^iaLsensibility  which 
contrasts  so  sharply  with  the  typical  middle  class  in- 
dividualist policy  hitherto  prevalent.  This  serves  to 
explain  the  tenacious  opposition  of  the  Middle  Class  to 
his  programme.  It  marks  off  the  new  departure  in  public 
policy  which  was  to  be  extended  beyond  the  realm  of 
home  affairs.  The  intuitive  insight  into  the  future  role  of 
the  State  which  Disraeli  conceived  in  a  social  sense,  and 
which  he  impressed  on  his  Government  and  the  party 
which  he  led,  has  been  strikingly  summed  up  by  one  of 
his  younger  associates.  Sir  John  Eldon  Gorst: 

"The  principle  of  Tory  democracy  is  that  all  govern- 
ment exists  solely  for  the  good  of  the  governed;  that 
Church  and  King,  Lords  and  Commons,  and  all  other 
public  institutions  are  to  be  maintained  so  far,  and  so  far 
only,  as  they  promote  the  happiness  and  welfare  of  the 
common  people;  that  all  who  are  entrusted  with  any 
public  function  are  trustees,  not  for  their  own  class,  but 
for  the  nation  at  large;  and  that  the  mass  of  the  people 
may  be  trusted  so  to  use  electoral  power,  which  should 
be  freely  conceded  to  them,  as  to  support  those  who  are 
promoting  their  interests.  It  is  democratic  because  the 
welfare  of  the  people  is  its  supreme  end;  it  is  Tory  be- 
cause the  institutions  of  the  country  are  the  means  by 
which  the  end  is  to  be  attained."  ^ 

Disraeli  had  extended  the  basis  of  government  and 
sought  as  Bismarck  was  doing  to  bring  within  the  sphere 
of  its  influence  the  masses  who  had  hitherto  felt  them- 
selves not  merely  exploited  by  the  Middle  Class,  but 
neglected  by  the  State.     He  now  proposed  to  affirm  the 

'  Cf.  G.  E.  Buckle,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  V,  p.  369. 


THE  STATE  AS  POWER  313 

claim  of  England  to  a  major  share  in  the  regulation  of 
world  affairs  which  the  wealth  of  the  country,  its  vast 
colonial  empire,  its  naval  supremacy,  and  its  awaken- 
ing social  solidarity  seemed  to  justify.  Disraeli  has  often 
been  lauded  for  his  imaginative  grasp  of  imperial  policy, 
his  vision  in  appreciating  the  imperial  needs  of  greater 
Britain.  It  would,  however,  appear  useful  in  an  effort  to 
determine  the  more  precise  nature  of  his  historical  signifi- 
cance to  reflect  upon  the  close  parallel  between  his  and 
Bismarckian  methods,  his  use  of  bellicose  tactics  in 
achieving  in  the  international  field,  outside  of  Europe, 
what  Bismarck  had  accomplished  on  the  Continent.  Dis- 
raeli up  to  the  time  of  his  fall  from  power  (1879)  in 
imitating  Bismarck  was  influenced  by  similar  social  mo- 
tives, carrying  out  on  a  much  larger  scale  with  infinitely 
more  varied  resources  a  very  similar  policy.  As  a  process 
of  historical  evolution  in  creating  a  super-national  point 
of  view,  and  hastening  the  destruction  of  the  Nation-State, 
German  hegemony  in  Europe  was  to  be  correlated  by 
English  hegemony  in  other  fields,  until  such  a  time  as  the 
Germans  might  feel  strong  enough  to  seek  to  supplant 
England  and  become  masters  of  the  world.  The  race  for 
world  supremacy  had  begun. 


^« 


CHAPTER  VIII 

International  Politics 


RESULTS  OF  THE   CONGRESS    OF    BERLIN — CRISIS   IN    EGYPT — BRIT- 
ISH     OCCUPATION — A      SCIENTIFIC      FRONTIER — THE     AFGHAN 

WAR RUSSO-GERMAN      TENSION THE      BALKANS      AGAIN 

AUSTRO-GERMAN      ALLIANCE ENGLAND     AND     THE      ALLI- 
ANCE  THE    TEMPER    OF    THE   TIMES; THE    PASSING    OF 

PESSIMISM THE   SUPER-MAN   AND  THE   SUPER-STATE 

TUNIS FRANCO-ITALIAN       RIVALRY AN       IMPE- 
RIALIST   COMEDY — THE    FRENCH    IN    TUNIS 


T 


HE  Congress  of  Berlin  had  during  the  brief  month 
of  its  labors  undertaken  to  settle  all  pending  ques- 
tions which  might  be  the  cause  of  friction,  to  refashion 
the  map  of  the  Near  East,  and  so  put  an  end  to  the 
menace  of  a  general  European  war.  But  in  point  of  fact 
the  settlement  arrived  at  was  unsatisfactory  to  all  imme- 
diately concerned.  None  of  the  newly  created  Balkan 
States  were  satisfied  with  the  treatment  they  had  re- 
ceived. Rumania  was  irritated  at  having  to  cede  Bes- 
)^  sarabia  to  Russia.  Bulgaria  had  been  cut  in  two — "half 
slave  and  half  free."  The  Greeks  were  up  in  arms  at 
the  shabby  treatment  they  had  received  and  were  mak- 
ing ready  to  wage  war  to  vindicate  what  they  believed 
^  to  be  their  rights.  Montenegro  was  vociferously  de- 
manding that  justice  be  done.  In  the  Dual  Monarchy  the 
Hungarians  viewed  with  suspicion  the  annexation  of  Slav 
territory  which  would  increase  the  Slav  element  in  the 
State.     Russia  felt  that  she  had  been  deprived  of  the 

[314] 


INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS  315 

fruits  of  her  victory,  and  grudgingly  carried  out  her  share 
of  the  treaty  clauses;  while  Turkey  refused  to  help  in 
the  settlement  of  minor  matters,  which  would  have  ren- 
dered peaceful  solutions  easier. 

In  Egypt  a  crisis  had  arisen.  The  Anglo-French  sys- 
tem of  dual  control  had  become  irksome  to  the  Khedive, 
and  he  was  anxious  to  be  rid  of  it.  The  situation  was 
difficult,  as  neither  France  nor  England  cared  to  take  the 
initiative  which  might  precipitate  a  conflict.  Bismarck 
seizled  the  opportunity  to  play  the  part  of  pacificator,  and 
suggested  as  a  way  out  that  the  Porte  as  overlord  re- 
move the  Khedive  from  his  throne.  This  measure  was 
taken,  and  so  matters  were  settled  (June  1879).  Here 
Berlin  again  played  a  principal  part  in  the  mediation. 

At  this  time  England  alone  of  the  Powers  seemed 
ready  to  press  her  plans  of  imperial  expansion.  In  order 
to  forestall  Russia,  a  vigorous  aggressive  policy  to  se- 
cure a  "scientific  frontier"  for  northwest  India  was 
brought  to  a  "happy"  conclusion.  Though  it  led  to  a  war 
with  Afghanistan,  in  the  end  British  suzerainty  over  the 
country  was  acknowledged.  In  South  Africa  England 
consolidated  her  hold  over  the  recently  annexed  Trans- 
vaal, and  found  herself  with  a  war  against  the  Zulus  on 
her  hands,  which  after  initial  disasters  led  to  pacification 
and  penetration  which  were  to  become  a  usual  method  of 
imperial  progress. 

By  the  summer  of  1879  the  international  situation  had 
again  become  tense.  During  the  Berlin  Congress  Bis- 
marck had  more  than  once  displayed  his  anti-Russian  sen- 
timents. Nevertheless,  Russia  did  not  give  up  her  at- 
tempts to  bolster  up  the  German  alliance.  While  not 
refusing  these  advances,  the  Berlin  Government  had  made 
It  clear  that  in  case  of  a  conflict  between  her  two  allies, 
Germany   would   unhesitatingly   support   Austria.      The 


3i6  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

unsatisfactory  progress  in  the  settlement  of  pending  ques- 
tions in  the  Balkans,  where  Russia  found  herself  isolated 
by  the  alleged  solidarity  of  the  representatives  of  the 
other  Powers  engaged  in  adjusting  the  various  claims, 
had,  according  to  Bismarck,  led  the  Tsar  in  a  letter  to 
the  German  Emperor  to  threaten  that  "if  Germany  per- 
sists in  the  refusal  to  adopt  (in  the  affairs  in  the  Balkans) 
the  Russian  viewpoint,  peace  cannot  continue  between 
us." 

The  German  Chancellor  deemed  the  moment  oppor- 
tune to  enter  into  a  closer  alliance  with  Austria.  He  also 
sounded  the  British  Government  with  a  view  to  securing 
its  adherence,  in  order  to  be  prepared  for  any  eventuality. 
While  the  Chancellor  was  himself  engaged  in  conducting 
negotiations  with  Austria  and  had  brought  them  to  a 
successful  conclusion  (September  1879),  the  German 
Ambassador  at  London  was  instructed  to  seek  out  Bea-. 
consfield  and  present  to  him  a  survey  of  the  European 
situation,  and  to  emphasise  the  fact  that  the  relations 
between  "Russia  and  Germany  are  in  their  nature  essen- 
tially unsatisfactory.  .  .  .  Russia  is  preparing  to  attack 
Austria;  the  peace  of  the  world  will  be  disturbed;  it  is  in 
the  nature  of  things  that  it  will  not  be  a  localised  war; 
it  will  be  a  great  and  general  war.  Peace  is  necessary  to 
Germany;  no  country  desires  or  requires  peace  more. 
To  secure  it  she  proposes  an  alliance  between  Germany, 
Austria,  and  Great  Britain."  Lord  Beaconsfield  said 
that  he  had  always  been  and  still  was  favorable  in  public 
affairs  to  the  principle  of  an  alliance  or  good  under- 
standing with  Germany.^ 

Ten  days  later,  on  October  7,  the  Austro-German 
alliance  was  signed  at  Vienna.     With  England  the  nego- 

^  See  memorandum  by  Lord  Beaconsfield  to  Queen  Victoria,  September 
27,  1879.— Cf.  G.  E.  Buckle,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  VI,  p.  488. 


INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS  317 

tiations  were  carried  no  further.  But  on  October  27, 
the  Austrian  Ambassador,  under  pledge  of  strictest 
secrecy,  informed  the  British  Foreign  Secretary,  Lord 
Salisbury,  that  a  defensive  alliance,  having  as  its  object 
"the  maintenance  of  the  general  peace  and  of  the  state  of 
things  established  by  the  Berlin  Treaty,"  had  been  entered 
upon  with  Germany.  "The  two  Empires  had  agreed  that 
for  the  minor  matters  which  still  remained  to  be  executed 
by  the  Berlin  Treaty  (chiefly  questions  of  delimitations), 
thj^y  would  observe  a  most  conciliatory  attitude  so  long 
as  Russia  did  the  same,  but  if  for  any  cause  Russia  were 
to  attack  either  Empire,  they  have  agreed  to  treat  it  as 
an  attack  on  both  of  them."  ^  Lord  Salisbury  expressed 
his  approval  of  the  arrangement  and  stated  to  the  Aus- 
trian Ambassador  that  he  hoped  that  "if  in  the  lapse  of 
years  the  Turkish  Empire  should  fall,  the  difficult  ques- 
tions arising  out  of  that  result  would  be  settled  only  after 
an  intimate  consultation  between  the  three  Powers." 

England  had  apparently  committed  herself  to  a  policy 
of  cooperation  with  Austria  and  Germany,  while  retain- 
ing her  liberty  of  action  and  reserving  for  herself  a  share 
of  the  spoils  of  Turkey  in  the  future,  at  the  same  time 
championing  its  integrity  for  the  present. 

But  the  London  Government  had  gone  too  far  ahead 
of  the  public  opinion  of  the  nation.  Beaconsfield's  im- 
perialism had  developed  too  rapidly.  He  had  lost  touch 
with  public  sentiment.  Middle  class  egotism  was  still  too 
strong.  Judged  by  middle  class  standards,  Beaconsfield's 
policy  had  been  morally  wrong.  The  State  as  Power, 
divorced  from  morality,  as  expressed  in  the  new  orienta- 
tion of  foreign  policy  which  had  received  its  sanction  at 
the  Berlin  Congress,  found  no  justification  in  the  eyes  of 

*  Memorandum  by  Lord  Salisbury  to  Queen  Victoria,  October  37,  1879. 
G.  E.  Buckle,  op.   cit.,   Vol.   VI,  p.  491. 


3i8  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

the  strongly  individualist  majority  to  whom  the  breaking 
down  of  the  barriers  of  national  exclusiveness,  even  in 
the  defence  of  national  interests,  seemed  unjustifiable.  In 
spite  of  the  ascendant  position  in  world  affairs  which 
Beaconsfield  had  secured  for  England,  in  spite  of  the  ac- 
quisition of  new  territory  and  the  security  afforded  to  the 
lines  of  communications  by  the  control  of  the  Suez  Canal, 
Cyprus,  and  the  foothold  in  Egypt,  his  Government 
was  badly  defeated  at  the  general  elections  (March 
1880).  The  Liberals  under  Gladstone  were  returned  to 
office.  They  attempted,  though  in  vain,  to  reestablish 
the  old  middle  class  policy  of  exclusiveness  and  disin- 
terestedness in  foreign  affairs. 


II 

The  passing  of  Lord  Beaconsfield  had  no  material  in- 
fluence on  historical  development.  His  picturesque  figure 
disappeared,  leaving  no  void.  For  his  political  philoso- 
phy, in  so  far  as  he  had  any,  rested  on  a  vaguely  realised 
theory  of  State,  arrived  at  with  the  intuitive  vision  of  the 
artist  rather  than  with  the  logic  of  the  politician.  This 
explains  the  part  he  played  in  loosing  England  from  the 
bonds  of  the  personalised  State.  By  initiating  the  policy 
of  imperialism  and  recognising  the  social  obligations  of 
the  State,  the  way  for  the  super-national,  impersonal 
State  was  paved.  "What  wonderful  things  are  events; 
the  least  are  of  greater  importance  than  the  most  sub- 
lime and  comprehensive  speculation."  ^  Here  we  have  in 
Disraeli's  own  words  an  interpretation  of  the  political 
conduct  of  the  epoch.     Detached  from  theory,  oblivious 

*  Cf.  Coningsby. 


\ 


INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS  319 

of  principle,  public  policy  was  coming  to  be  determined 
by  events  and  the  contingencies  arising  therefrom. 

Such  was  the  temper  of  the  times.  Bearing  this  in  mind 
we  may  trace  historically  the  course  of  events,  and  note 
the  rise  of  the  new  politico-economic  theory  of  State, 
veiled  and  incoherent  though  it  appeared  even  to  its  chief 
exponents,  except  as  traceable  as  a  symptomatic,  social 
sensibility  to  which  attention  has  been  called.  Here  we 
may  find  confirmation,  if  such  confirmation  is  needed, 
that  the  old  politico-juridic  theory  of  State  had  definitively 
broken  down,  and  that  the  new  had  not  yet  been  formu- 
lated with  sufficient  precision  to  be  comprehensible.  It  is 
thus  in  the  interpretation  of  events  that  we  must  seek,  to 
discover  the  factors  of  the  new  political  doctrine. 

The  impetus  given  to  imperialism,  the  assaults  upon 
particularism,  the  centralisation  of  authority,  the  mech- 
anisation of  government,  appear  as  destructive  agencies 
of  the  limited,  personalised  Nation-State.  The  era  which 
opened  was  one  of  unconscious  demolition  manifested  as 
conscious  construction.  The  practice  of  the  period  was 
destroying  the  theory  upon  which  the  fabric  of  the  State 
had  been  built.  Whether  we  have  here  the  secret  of 
evolutionary  as  opposed  to  revolutionary  change  is  be- 
yond our  inquiry.  But  it  is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind 
that  the  men  who  directed  public  affairs  had  lost  all 
contact  with  the  philosophic  background  of  politics,  had 
detached  themselves  from  principle,  had  abandoned  ^ 
theory,  and  were  navigating  the  State  by  the  stars  of 
their  destiny  like  a  ship  without  a  compass. 

The  days  of  pessimism  were  passing;  a  new  expansive 
optimism  was  about  to  seize  hold  of  mankind.  The  time 
of  the  Super-Man  and  the  Super-State  had  arrived.  Dur- 
ing the  decade  ( 1 870-1 880)  which  h?d  come  to  a  close  all 
of  the  great  European  States  with  the  exception  of  France 


> 


320  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

had  increased  their  prestige  and  power  and  acquired  new 
territory.  By  1880  even  France  had  recovered  sufficient 
strength  to  be  in  a  position  to  reassert  herself  in  Euro- 
pean affairs.  The  mirage  of  a  colonial  empire  was  grow- 
ing. England  in  more  remote  parts  of  the  earth  was  daily 
increasing  her  holdings,  staking  out  new  claims,  pros- 
pecting new  fields  of  expansion.  It  was  now  the  turn  of 
France  to  put  to  profit  the  lessons  of  the  new  imperialism. 
At  the  Congress  of  Berlin  Bismarck  had  suggested 
Tunis  as  the  field  for  this  exploit.  But  even  now  the 
French  Government  was  loth  to  commit  itself  to  this  un- 
dertaking. A  case  had  to  be  made  out  to  render  the  plan 
feasible.  This  was  not  difficult.  There  was  Italy.  She 
was  known  to  have  plans  of  her  own  in  regard  to  Tunis. 
A  large  and  prosperous  Italian  colony,  the  most  im- 
portant element  in  the  city  of  Tunis,  had  insistently  urged 
the  annexation  of  the  country  to  Italy.  By  the  end  of 
188 1  Italy  seemed  ready  to  take  this  step.  France, 
though  unwilling  or  unable  to  measure  herself  with  Eng- 
land or  Germany,  was  not  averse  to  testing  her  new 
strength  with  some  other  State.  Here  we  have  a  key 
factor  in  imperial  expansion;  the  State  as  Power,  in  com- 
petition for  power.  It  may  be  mentioned  incidentally, 
though  it  had  no  particular  bearing  on  the  plans  of  either 
France  or  Italy,  that  Tunis  was  a  vassal  of  the  Porte, 
ruled  by  its  own  Bey,  and  considered  semi-independent. 

Unfamiliar  with  European  financial  methods,  as  was 
natural  among  a  people  who  had  remained  outside  the 
orbit  of  industrial  expansion,  Tunis  in  close  intercourse 
with  Europe  had  been  compelled  to  accept  foreign  finan- 
cial advisers,  while  the  competition  for  railway  and  other 
concessions  within  the  country  offered  ample  opportunity 
for  political  intrigue,  in  which  the  Italians  and  French 
competed.     First  the  nationals  of  one  and  then  of  the 


INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS  321 

other  State  would  gain  an  advantage,  as  the  Bey  of  Tunis 
endeavored  to  profit  by  the  jealous  competition  of 
the  two  European  States.  Matters  were  brought  to  a 
head,  according  to  French  accounts,  when  the  Italians 
secured  control  of  the  railway  from  La  Goulette  to  Tunis 
(March  1881).  FVance  immediately  protested  and  re- 
ceived concessions  for  her  financiers  to  construct  the  line 
Tunis-Bizerte,  and  port  privileges.  The  French  Govern- 
ment deemed  that  the  opportune  moment  had  arrived  to 
appear  exasperated  at  the  presumption  of  the  Italians. 
Time  for  action  had  come.  Italy  must  be  forestalled; 
she  must  be  confronted  with  a  fait  accompli. 

Some  details  of  the  methods  pursued  are  of  interest  as 
throwing  light  on  the  new  theory  and  practice  of  imperial 
enterprise.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  Italy  was  the 
competitor  and  Tunis  the  spoil.  Yet  historians  of  the 
period  gravely  inform  us  that  on  March  31,  Paris  learned 
that  a  band  of  semi-civilised  Tunisian  mountaineers, 
Krumirs,  had  crossed  the  frontier  into  the  French  province 
of  Constantine  in  the  Algerian  hinterland.  Five  French 
soldiers  were  killed  and  five  wounded.  The  records  of 
history  give  no  details  of  the  fate  of  the  Krumir  raiders, 
and  are  silent  as  to  the  countless  similar  raids  by  tribes- 
men who  had  not  crossed  frontiers.  But  here  was  a  use- 
ful incident.  The  French  Government  immediately  made 
representations  to  the  Bey  of  Tunis,  who  according  to 
French  accounts  declined  to  accept  French  proposals  to 
pacify  the  Krumirs.  On  April  4  the  French  Premier, 
Jules  Ferry,  told  the  Chamber  that  France  would  see  to 
it  that  such  incidents  would  not  be  repeated.  Credits 
were  voted  for  an  expeditionary  force  to  be  despatched 
to  the  scene.  The  Porte  came  to  the  rescue  of  its  vassal 
and  protested.  But  the  stage  was  set.  The  imperialist 
comedy  was  not  to  be  delayed.     The  principal  spectators, 


32i  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

Russia,  Austria,  Germany,  had  given  repeated  assurances 
of  their  approval,  and  promised  not  to  stop  the  perform- 
ance. England  had  likewise  urged  France  to  go  to  Tunis 
and,  in  spite  of  the  change  of  the  government,  was  bound 
by  this  agreement.  London  even  went  so  far  as  to  under- 
take to  "discourage"  the  Sultan  from  any  plan  he  might 
have  formed  to  assist  Tunis.  Italy  stood  alone.  The 
march  of  events  had  been  too  rapid.  She  had  been  dazed 
by  the  meteoric  suddenness  of  the  French  coup.  An  army 
of  23,000  men  was  sent  from  France,  while  native  Alge- 
rian troops  were  concentrated  along  the  Tunis  frontier, 
which  was  crossed  on  April  24.  The  Krumirs  were  at- 
tacked in  their  strongholds,  and  scattered.  But  Tunis 
and  its  Bey,  Sidi  Saddok,  were  not  lost  sight  of.  A 
French  squadron  entered  the  harbor  of  Bizerte,  and  a 
corps  of  8,000  troops  was  landed.  The  Bey  had  no  or- 
ganised army.  He  was  in  no  position  to  resist,  even 
had  he  desired  to  do  so.  Flight  or  surrender  was  the 
alternative.  Flight  was  unnecessary,  surrender  was  easy, 
as  the  terms  of  the  treaty  proposed  by  the  French  left 
the  Bey  on  his  throne,  under  the  zegis  of  France.  So 
at  7  P.M.  on  the  evening  of  May  12,  1881,  "amid  the 
tears  and  lamentations  of  the  women  of  the  seraglio, 
and  the  objurations  of  his  entourage,  who  besought  him 
to  give  in,  Sidi  Saddok,  depressed,  helpless,  beaten  with- 
out a  fight,  placed  the  Bey's  seals  on  two  copies  of  the 
treaty."  ^ 

'  C£.  Hanotaux,  Histoire  de  la  France  Contemporaine,  Vol.  IV,  p.  661. 


CHAPTER  IX 

The  Triple  Alliance 


THE  CIVILISING  MISSION  OF  THE  STATE THE  NEW  BASIS  OF  COM- 
PETITION  TENDENCY     TO     COALITION POSITION     OF     ITALY 

FOUNDATION     OF    THE     ALLIANCE ITS     HISTORICAL     SIGNIF- 
ICANCE  THE     ROLE     OF     AUSTRIA     AND     OF     ITALY ECO- 
NOMIC    FACTORS PEACEFUL     PENETRATION SUPERNA- 

TIONALISM POLITICS     SUBSERVIENT       TO      ECONOMICS 

— SOCIAL  BENEFITS — THE  THEORY  OF  EXPLOITATION 


THUS  France  acquired  Tunis.  In  the  outline  of  its 
policy  issued  by  the  French  Government  it  was  set 
forth  that,  "for  ourselves  we  gain  absolute  security  for 
our  great  African  colony.  .  .  .  Tunis  gains  all  the  bless-  V  ^ 
ings  of  our  civilisation."  Here  is  the  new  note  of  im- 
perialism. The  conquered  peoples,  the  annexed  territory, 
are  to  receive  the  blessings  of  the  "true  civilisation,"  if 
need  be,  at  the  sword's  point. 

The  State  has  a  civilising  mission  to  perform,  no  longer 
merely  within  its  own  boundaries,  in  the  form  of  social 
legislation  and  economic  development  of  its  own  peoples; 
but  these  benefits,  modified,  attenuated,  transformed  to 
suit  particular  circumstances,  are  to  be  thrust  upon  alien 
peoples  whose  cultural  background  and  philosophy  of  life 
might  be  and  usually  were  altogether  different.  Here  we 
find  a  first  tentative  application  of  the  thesis  that  incom- 
petent peoples — that  is,  those  incompetent  in  an  industrial 
and  commercial  sense  when  measured  by  Western  stand- 
ards— have  no  inalienable  right  to  the  possession  of  their 

[323] 


324  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

territory.  Efficient  exploitation  was  to  be  held  a  better 
test  of  right  than  mere  possession.  "The  treasure  of  the 
lazy  belongs  to  the  active  worker,  capable  of  exploiting  it; 
this  is  the  law  which  rules  our  world." 

Henceforth  in  the  course  of  super-national  expansion 
the  State  was  to  arrogate  to  itself  the  right  of  sitting 
in  judgment  upon  the  fitness  of  a  given  alien  people  to  Its 
Independent  existence  and  the  possession  of  its  territory; 
while  in  competition  with  other  great  States  it  was  to 
remain  to  the  strongest  to  assert  for  Itself  the  right 
to  confer  the  Imprint  of  its  own  cultural  development, 
the  benefits  of  Its  own  civilisation,  upon  the  less  com- 
petent peoples. 

France  in  competition  with  Italy  for  Tunis  had  gained 
a  facile  triumph.  The  Italians  had  been  outwitted;  their 
diplomacy  had  been  defective;  their  armed  strength  un- 
ready. The  position  of  Italy  In  Europe  was  far  from 
enviable.  Bismarck  had  gone  so  far  as  to  declare  that 
he  was  delighted  with  the  French  occupation  of  Tunis  and 
hoped  that  France  "would  annex  Morocco."  The  Austro- 
German  alliance  had  strengthened  the  bonds  between 
these  two  countries,  and  the  German  Chancellor  took 
pains  to  let  it  be  known  that  if  Austria  should  see  fit  to 
seek  to  regain  its  lost  Italian  provinces,  Germany  would 
not  oppose  such  a  plan,  "as  Italy  is  not  among  our 
friends." 

The  end  of  the  Kultiirkampf  had  brought  about  a  rec- 
oncilation  between  Berlin  and  the  Papacy,  and  the 
Roman  question  had  again  come  to  the  fore.  Bismarck 
appeared  ready  to  support  Papal  pretensions,  with  the 
view  to  the  reestablishment  of  the  temporal  power,  and 
offered  an  asylum  to  the  Pope  in  Germany  should  His 
Holiness  deem  it  necessary  to  leave  Rome. 


THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  325 

Beaten  by  France,  threatened  by  Austria,  with  Ger- 
many apparently  hostile,  the  Italians  turned  first  to  Eng- 
land, but  received  here  but  scant  consideration.  Glad- 
stone had  no  desire  to  commit  the  country  to  any  foreign 
entanglements,  and  England's  position  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean was  at  the  time  sufficiently  secure  not  to  require  any 
support  that  Italy  might  be  able  to  offer. 

On  examining  more  closely  Bismarck's  policy,  the  Ital- 
ians found  that  In  spite  of  his  outward  harshness  towards 
them,  the  German  Chancellor  was  not  averse  to  includ- 
ing Italy  among  Germany's  allies,  or  as  he  conceived  it, 
her  satellites.  On  the  contrary,  in  point  of  fact,  he  ar- 
dently desired  such  a  union,  but  he  wished  the  request 
therefor  to  come  from  Italy.  To  Italy  this  seemed  her 
only  chance  to  consolidate  her  position  In  Europe.  It 
would  appear  that  the  Italian  Government  had  no  clear 
conception  of  the  ulterior  motives  of  Germany.  Further- 
more, Italy  was  in  no  position  to  be  exacting,  and  ac- 
cepted with  alacrity  the  suggestion  made  by  Bismarck,  that 
any  understanding  with  Germany  must  Include  a  similar 
agreement  with  Austria.  Within  six  months  of  the  Tunis 
fiasco  the  King  and  Queen  of  Italy  paid  a  visit  of  state  to 
Vienna,  and  soon  thereafter  the  representatives  of  Italy 
at  Berlin  and  Vienna  officially  informed  the  Governments 
of  the  two  Empires  that  Italy  was  anxious  to  enter  upon 
a  defensive  alliance  with  them  ( December  1 8 8 1 ) .  These 
proposals  were  not  rejected,  but  the  negotiations  dragged 
on  while  Italy  was  repeatedly  made  to  feel  the  inferiority 
of  her  position,  and  that  her  security  and  Independence 
depended  upon  the  will  of  Germany.  Finally  a  secret 
treaty  was  drawn  up  and  signed  May  20,  1882,  at  Vienna 
between  Germany,  Italy,  and  the  Dual  Monarchy,  which 
came  to  be  known  as  the  Triple  Alliance. 


326  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 


II 

To  Bismarck,  the  founder  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  it 
meant  the  revival  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  which, 
during  its  virile  period  from  the  loth  to  the  14th  cen- 
tury had  made  Germany  not  merely  the  geographical, 
but  the  historico-political  centre  of  Europe.  The  Empire 
had  during  a  long  series  of  decades  maintained  the  gen- 
eral peace  of  Europe,  and  its  decline  marked  the  be- 
ginning of  turmoil  and  chaos  in  the  West.  "The  origins 
of  the  Triple  Alliance  stretch  back  to  mythical  times. 
The  ancient  German  imperial  authority  of  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire  extended  from  the  North  Sea  to  Apulia, 
and  theoretically  included  all  Italy.  It  is  a  peculiar  dis- 
pensation of  destiny  and  of  divine  Providence  that  this 
great  and  powerful  realm  of  Central  Europe,  after  it  had 
been  torn  asunder  by  so  many  wars,  should  In  our  own 
day  again  have  been  reunited."  ^  Nor  is  it  so  great  an 
exaggeration  to  accept  the  view  of  Bismarck  that  the 
Triple  Alliance  under  German  leadership  was  in  reality, 
as  an  historical  factor,  a  restoration  of  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire.  For  it  was  more  than  a  mere  alliance.  The 
great  Central  European  allied  State,  stretching  from  the 
North  Sea  to  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Adriatic,  was  in 
German  eyes  an  extension  of  the  boundaries  of  their  Em- 
pire. For  the  policy  of  the  Alliance,  the  Germans  were 
confident,  would  in  all  cases  be  dictated  by  Berlin.  The 
two  Southern  allies  were  from  the  outset  made  to  feel 
that  they  occupied  subsidiary  positions.  A  broader  and 
more  loosely  knit  control  was  exercised  over  them  by 
Germany  than  exercised  by  Prussia  over  the  States  of 
Germany  proper,  but  their  relation  to  Berlin  was  not  dis- 

^  Cf .  address  delivered  by  Bismarck,  April,   1895. 


THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  327 

similar.  The  Austrian  ally  was  to  be  of  more  service 
than  merely  to  keep  Russia  in  check,  and  the  increase  of 
armaments  and  military  efficiency,  imposed  upon  the  Ital- 
ians as  a  condition  of  alliance,  was  to  mean  more  than  a 
mere  threat  to  France.  For  in  serving  to  strengthen  the 
defensive  unity  of  the  Central  European  group  of  States, 
the  Alliance  gave  breadth,  scope,  and  field  for  German 
economic  expansion. 

As  during  the  Middle  Ages  the  Church  had  in  the 
first  instance  served  as  the  bond  of  union  of  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire,  so  now  the  great  socialising  forces  of 
modern  life,  industry  and  commerce,  were  to  serve  as  the 
unifying  bond  of  Central  Europe.  Here  is  the  basic 
feature  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  which  if  cogently  appre- 
ciated presents  but  one  more  link  in  the  chain  of  evi- 
dence which  we  may  accumulate  in  noting  the  breakdown 
of  the  personalised  Nation-State. 

While  England  and  France,  acting  under  a  similar  im- 
pulse of  economic  expansion,  were  engaged  in  extending 
their  dominions  in  Asia  and  Africa,  Germany  was  pre- 
paring for  a  new  type  of  imperial  expansion  nearer  home. 
By  the  force  of  arms  France  had  acquired  Tunis,  and 
England  had  occupied  Egypt.  These  were  the  first  of  a 
long  series  of  similar  enterprises  undertaken  on  the 
ground  that  the  interest  of  the  world  demands  the  most 
efficient  industrial  and  commercial  exploitation  of  every 
part  of  the  globe,  and  thus  confers  privileges  and  rights 
upon  the  exploiter,  superior  to  those  of  mere  posses- 
sion. Now  Germany,  by  methods  which  came  to  be  desig- 
nated as  "peaceful  penetration,"  was  making  ready  to 
exploit  Italy  and  the  Dual  Monarchy,  and  bind  them  inex- 
tricably to  herself.  Here  was  a  new  weapon  of  economic 
control,  which  was  soon  to  prove  the  most  powerful 
agency  of  political  pressure  which  has  been  devised  in 


328  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

modern  times.  Its  use  in  this  instance  was  deemed  es- 
sential not  only  for  the  consolidation  of  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance— as  history  afforded  so  many  examples  of  the  anti- 
Ghibelline  attitude  of  the  Italians,  who  it  was  anticipated 
might  again  become  restive — but  also  to  give  Germany 
an  opportunity  of  putting  into  effect  the  new  politico- 
economic  thesis  of  the  Super-State. 

The  Triple  Alliance,  the  vigorous  revival,  in  fact  if  not 
in  name,  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  and  the  removal 
of  its  capital  to  Berlin,  brought  to  a  conclusion  the  proc- 
ess of  German  unity  as  Bismarck  had  conceived  it.  At 
the  same  time  it  marked  the  abandonment  of  the  theory 
of  nationalism  as  the  basis  of  State  building.  Not  that 
nationalism  in  the  sense  of  race  patriotism  and  race  supe- 
riority had  as  yet  died  out.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  on 
the  eve  of  bursting  forth  in  a  final  flare  of  unparalleled 
intensity.  But  nationalism  was  no  longer  held  a  sound 
political  theory.  In  this  light  the  Triple  Alliance  as  a 
super-national  grouping  is  more  easily  understood.  And 
though  the  Berlin  Government  never  for  a  moment  for- 
got what  it  held  to  be  the  economic,  cultural,  and  racial 
superiority  of  the  Germans  over  either  of  the  polyglot 
peoples  of  Austria-Hungary  or  of  Italy,  for  purposes  of 
public  policy,  more  especially  in  foreign  affairs,  it  was 
to  become  customary  to  consider  the  Central  Powers  as 
a  politically  compact  group  of  States — a  Super-State. 

In  tracing  the  deeper  currents  of  historical  develop- 
ment we  will  find  that  the  Triple  Alliance  marks  a  distinct 
epoch.  It  has  been  customary  to  interpret  the  Alliance 
as  an  artificial  grouping  of  States,  due  merely  to  the  dip- 
lomatic skill  of  a  Bismarck  in  arraying  Austria  and  Italy 
on  the  side  of  Germany  to  be  prepared  for  an  eventual 
war  with  Russia  or  France  or  both.  This  explanation  is 
in  no   wise   adequate.      The   true   interpretation   of   the 


THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  329 

Triple  Alliance  is  to  be  sought  not  so  much  in  the  realm  \ 
of  higher  politics,  as  in  economics.  The  Triple  Alliance 
was  in  the  first  instance — and  this  fact  cannot  be  too  in- 
sistently dwelt  upon — an  affair  of  "internal  politics"  to 
Germany.  As  the  establishment  of  the  Zollverein  had 
marked  the  first  definite  step  towards  German  unity, 
so  now  the  Triple  Alliance  was  to  afford  a  foundation 
broad  enough  for  the  fuller  development  of  the  eco- 
nomic life  of  the  new  industrialised  Germany,  and  pre- 
pare the  way  for  the  new  imperial  Super-State,  the  out- 
lines of  which  were  at  the  time  only  vaguely  apprehended. 
It  was  a  phenomenon  not  confined  to  Germany  that 
after  1880  politics  had  become  definitely  subservient 
to  economics.  The  middle  class  theory  of  the  Nation- 
State,  with  its  more  strictly  interpreted  politica-juridic 
code,  based  on  compacts  and  contracts,  was  receiving 
blows  under  which  it  was  staggering.  The  accepted 
doctrine  of  legal  right  of  possession,  of  ownership,  was 
being  undermined  by  the  new  economic  theories  of  the 
superior  rights  of  exploitation  which  were  being  advanced 
in  the  form  of  political  doctrine.  The  good  of  the  world 
at  large  was  constantly  being  invoked  as  conferring 
special  privileges.  The  individualist  viewpoint  was 
being  overridden  by  the  appeal  to  general  interest  and 
general  welfare.  The  rapacity  of  the  methods  used  was 
to  be  atoned  for  by  the  social  benefits  gained.  Thus 
England  at  this  time  occupied  Egypt  (July  1882),  and 
the  defenders  of  the  British  policy  were  careful  to  empha- 
sise the  fact  that  this  step  was  motived  by  the  general  in- 
terest of  the  world  at  large,  and  of  Egypt  in  particular, 
whether  the  Egyptians  desired  it  or  not.  Here  was  a 
more  precise  enunciation  of  the  theory  of  exploitation, 
which  Germany  by  her  superior  economic  development 
and  technical  skill  was  making  ready  to  put  into  practice. 


CHAPTER  X 

The  Super-State 


THE  NEW  ECONOMIC  BASIS  OF  THE  STATE — BISMARCK  AS  MINISTER 
OF     COMMERCE     AND     INDUSTRY PROTECTIVE     TARIFFS MAR- 
KETS  COMMUNICATIONS THE     REINSURANCE     TREATY     OF 

1884 ITS  ECONOMIC  MOTIVES ARMED  PEACE COLONIAL 

EXPANSION — FRANCE — ENGLAND ITALY — GERMANY — 

LEOPOLD    II   OF    BELGIUM — THE    CONGO THE    BERLIN 

CONFERENCE — FIRST        PARTICIPATION        OF        THE 

UNITED    STATES    IN    A    EUROPEAN    CONGRESS 

THE  PARTITION  OF  AFRICA — THE  NEW  ERA 


IN  estimating  the  part  played  by  Bismarck  in  the  build- 
ing up  of  the  Central  European  Super-State  by  the  ties 
of  the  Triple  Alliance  it  must  be  recalled  that  the  Chan- 
cellor had  clearly  in  mind  that  economic  factors  were 
essential  to  its  consolidation.  Thus  a  few  months  after 
the  conclusion  of  the  alliance  with  Austria  we  find  him 
taking  over  the  portfolio  of  Minister  of  Commerce  and 
Industry  (1880).  The  man  who  had  forged  united  Ger- 
many on  the  battlefield  was  now  to  forge  upon  the 
economic  anvil  the  unity  of  greater  Germany.  The  mo- 
ment was  propitious.  The  intense  industrial  development 
of  Germany  which  had  followed  upon  the  influx  of  the 
French  indemnity  had  been  succeeded  by  a  period 
of  industrial  depression.  This  depression  w?s  now  be- 
ginning to  abate.     Trade  and  industry  were  reviving. 

Production,  transportation,  markets  are  the  primary 
factors  of  economic  strength.    Production  must  be  stimu- 

[330] 


THE  SUPER-STATE  331 

lated,  transportation  Improved,  new  markets  assured. 
These  were  the  economic  problems  which  Bismarck  set 
himself  to  solve.  These  were  the  interests  which  pre- 
occupied him  during  the  last  years  of  his  control  of  pub- 
lic affairs.  These  were  the  factors  ultimately  associ- 
ated with  the  greatness  and  stability  of  the  new  Super- 
State.  Bismarck  held  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  State 
to  protect  industry  and  stimulate  production;  to  de-  / 
velop  transportation  and"  to  secure  new  markets  and  I 
sources  of  raw  materials.  Though  brought  up  as  a  free  j 
trader,  he  came  to  acknowledge  the  value  of  protective 
tariffs  as  the  only  adequate  protection  for  infant  in- 
dustry, and  saw  to  it  that  laws  providing  for  customs 
duties  were  enacted  to  achieve  his  purpose.  Bismarck 
found  the  railways  in  a  chaotic  condition,  and  as  a  first 
requisite  of  trade  is  to  assure  proper  channels  of  com- 
munication, he  compelled  Prussia  to  buy  and  link  up 
the  various  systems;  supplementing  them  by  canals  and 
waterway  improvements,  and  affording  privileges  to 
shippers.  The  question  of  new  markets  and  sources 
of  raw  materials  was  more  difficult. 

Bismarck  had  on  repeated  occasions  manifested  his 
opposition  to  colonial  enterprise.  He  was  opposed  to 
a  dispersal  of  strength  in  distant  undertakings.  Ger- 
many at  the  time  possessed  no  efficient  navy,  and  would 
inevitably  have  found  herself  in  competition  with  some 
other  strong  naval  Power  which  might  lead  to  a  dis- 
astrous war.  This  must  at  all  costs  be  avoided.  Here 
we  have  the  causes  of  Bismarck's  apparent  opposition 
to  colonial  enterprise.  Industrial  development  requires 
peace.  Though  the  preponderant  strength  of  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  In  European  affairs  and  the  friendly  rela- 
tions with  England  seemed  to  promise  that  peace  would 
not  be   disturbed,   yet  he   knew   that   even   a   threat  of 


332  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

war  might  dislocate  the  plans  which  he  had  matured  for 
the  economic  development  of  Germany. 

The  anti-Russian  policy  which  Bismarck  had  pursued 
and  the  unqualified  support  he  had  given  to  Austria  had 
been  interpreted  by  Russia  as  a  distinct  menace.  He  now 
set  about  to  devise  a  plan  to  allay  this  impression,  and 
taking  his  cue  from  the  example  in  the  business  world, 
he  devised  a  reinsurance  treaty.  On  March  21,  1884, 
at  Berlin,  the  representatives  of  Russia  and  Germany 
signed  a  secret  agreement,  to  be  valid  for  a  period  of 
three  years,  which  bound  the  contracting  parties  to  ob- 
serve an  attitude  of  friendly  neutrality  in  case  one  of 
them  should  be  attacked  by  another  Power.^  Here  was 
an  ideal  arrangement  from  the  German  point  of  view. 
It  did  not  commit  Germany  to  anything  definite,  smoothed 
over  possible  causes  for  hostilities  between  Austria 
and  Russia  which  would  have  compelled  intervention, 
and  at  the  same  time  excluded  the  possibility  of  an  un- 
derstanding between  France  and  Russia  which  would 
have  been  a  direct  threat  to  Germany.  With  peace  as- 
sured along  her  eastern  frontier,  the  western  could  give 
little  cause  for  concern. 

The  Reinsurance  Treaty  of  1884,  viewed  in  proper 
perspective,  thus  appears  to  have  been  entered  upon 
primarily  to  permit  the  most  rapid  and  undisturbed  eco- 
nomic development  of  Germany.  As  such  it  is  of  his- 
torical importance,  as  marking  the  acceptance  by  the 
State  of  the  economic  value  of  peace  as  a  principal  fac- 
tor of  public  policy,  though  not  excluding  the  political 

*This  agreement  was  ratified  in  September  of  the  same  year  at  a 
meeting  of  the  Emperors  of  Austria,  Russia,  and  Germany  held  at 
Skiernevice,  thus  renewing  the  Three  Emperors'  League,  Dreikaiserbund, 
which  was  to  supplement  the  Triple  Alliance.  After  1887  Austria  was 
no  longer  a  party  to  the  agreement,  owing  to  the  unwillingness  of  the 
Tsar  to  continue  in  any  such  arrangement  with  Vienna,  though  he  renewed 

the  treaty  for  another  three  years  with  Berlin. 


THE  SUPER-STATE  333 

value  of  war.  Economics  henreforth  was  to  dictate  to 
politics  the  aims  of  policy.  The  function  of  the  State 
had"^come  avowedly  economic.  Its  principal  and  often 
sole  concern  was  frankly  the  acquisition  of  power  to  pro- 
tect and  promote  industry  and  commerce.  As  the  State 
as  Power  had  acquired  national  unity  and  political  inde- 
pendence, so  now  this  power  was  to  assure  economic  pros- 
perity as  the  stepping-stone  to  super-national  expansion. 
The  long  era  of  European  peace  which  ensued  was 
rendered  possible  by  the  wide  acceptance  of  this  new 
politico-economic  doctrine  that  peace  must  be  safe- 
guarded  by  the  full  power  of  the  State.  It  was  to  be 
an  armed  peace.  The  State  was  to  be  so  well  prepared 
for  war  that  none  would  dare  to  venture  to  declare 
war;  and  thus  peace  would  be  assured.  Such  was  the 
German  thesis  which,  owing  to  Germany's  preponderant 
position  in  Europe,  was  imposed  upon  all  the  great 
States.  Peace  by  combination  of  power,  rather  than  by 
balance  of  power,  was  Bismarck's  doctrine,  which  he 
succeeded  in  enforcing.  The  economic  prosperity  of 
the  country  could  henceforth  be  developed  with  full  en- 
ergy. The  spectre  of  war  had  been  removed,  leaving 
Germany  free  to  expand  overseas.  Nor  could  this  ex- 
pansion be  long  delayed  if  Germany  was  to  have  a 
share  therein. 


II 

The  territorial  expansion  of  the  European  Powers  in 
all  parts  of  the  globe  had  begun  in  earnest.  France  after 
Tunis  had  directed  her  attention  to  Indo-China,  where 
a  foothold  had  been  gained  under  the  Second  Empire; 
she  was  now  engaged  in  occupying  Tonkin,  outlining 
for  herself  a  great  colonial  domain  in  that  region  and 


< 


334  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

at  the  same  time  making  ready  to  seize  Madagascar. 
England,  after  securing  Egypt  and  penetrating  the  Sudan, 
was  about  to  lay  claim  to  Burma.  Russia  was  spread- 
ing out  across  Eastern  Asia  to  the  Pacific.  Italy  had 
blocked  out  for  herself  a  sphere  for  colonisation  along 
the  Red  Sea,  which  at  the  time,  the  Italians  hoped,  might 
include  the  rich  Abyssinian  plateau.  Even  the  minor 
States  such  as  Belgium,  Holland,  and  Portugal  were  em- 
barking on  colonial  enterprise.  It  would  seem  as  though 
the  Germans  would  find  the  world,  or  at  least  its  desirable 
portions,  marked  off  by  other  States. 

In  the  meantime  private  initiative  in  Germany  had  ven- 
tured upon  colonial  expansion.  Hamburg  and  Bremen 
merchants  had  installed  themselves  in  Togoland  and  the 
Cameroon,  in  East  and  Southwest  Africa,  and  in  some 
of  the  Australasian  Islands.  At  home  a  colonial  party 
was  growing  up.  The  German  navy,  though  still  in  its 
infancy,  was  daily  becoming  more  popular.  Bismarck 
felt  that  he  could  no  longer  resist  the  demand  that  the 
State  participate  in  colonial  enterprise.  His  treaty  with 
Russia  gave  him  the  security  needed.  Soon  thereafter 
Germany  entered  into  competition  for  overseas  domains. 
The  methods  he  adopted  showed  that  the  Chancellor 
still  retained  traces  of  his  inherent  opposition  to  such 
enterprise.  Colonies  acquired  by  force  of  arms,  merely 
for  the  sake  of  territorial  expansion,  he  stigmatised  as 
artificial.  For  Bismarck  made  it  plain  that  he  looked 
upon  colonial  undertaking  solely  as  an  adjunct  of  eco- 
nomic expansion,  and  stood  ready  to  protect  and  assist 
German  traders  who  had  established  themselves  overseas. 
His  dominant  aim  was  to  avoid  causes  for  friction  or 
war  with  States  who  had  previously  entered  the  field, 
and  were  better  equipped  than  Germany  to  protect  their 
interests.     This  prudent  policy  did  not  prevent  him  now 


THE  SUPER-STATE  335 

from  actively  supporting  colonial  enterprise.  Central 
Africa  had  up  to  that  time  been  for  the  greater  part  un- 
explored and  was  still  untenanted.  Priority  of  occupa- 
tion by  a  European  State  was  held  the  sole  title  to  sov- 
ereignty. A  number  of  German  merchants  who  were 
engaged  in  trade  in  Southwest  Africa  had  received  con- 
cessions in  the  vicinity  of  the  Bay  of  Angra  Pequena, 
from  a  local  chief.  Here  was  a  foothold  that  was  soon 
to  be  developed  into  the  German  colony  of  Southwest 
Africa.  Simultaneously  Germany  was  acquiring  sov- 
ereign rights  in  Samoa  and  Northern  New  Guinea,  and 
seized  the  Marshall  Islands  in  the  Pacific,  where  Ger- 
man merchants  had  for  some  time  been  established.  Spain 
laid  claim  to  these  islands.  But  Bismarck  desired  no 
disturbance  of  the  peace,  and  he  submitted  the  question 
to  the  arbitration  of  the  Pope,  which  Spain  as  a  Catholic 
country  could  not  refuse  to  agree  to.  By  this  tactful 
act  he  wiped  out  the  last  traces  of  the  hostility  he  had 
aroused  among  the  Catholics  by  the  Kulturkampf,  and 
even  rallied  them  to  his  active  support;^  the  more  so 
that  when  the  Pope  decided  the  question  under  arbitra- 
tion in  favor  of  Spain  the  German  Government  was 
careful  to  observe  very  scrupulously  the  decision  ren- 
dered. The  Germans  were  permitted  to  retain  a  foot- 
hold in  the  Marshall  group,  which  made  it  easier  for 
Germany  to  secure  the  islands  by  purchase  at  a  later 
date  (1899). 

Once   ready  to  commit  himself  to   a  colonial  policy, 
Bismarck  aimed  to  give  to  colonial  affairs  a  breadth  and 

Mt  is  a  significant  example  of  the  opportunism  of  Bismarck's  policy  that 
soon  thereafter  (1887)  he  besought  the  intervention  of  the  Vatican  in 
German  internal  affairs,  and  succeeded  in  inducing  Leo  XIII  to  bring 
pressure  to  bear  on  the  members  of  the  Centre  party  to  support  his 
military  programme,  to  which  they  had  hitherto  been  consistently  op- 
posed. The  Papal  Nuncio  in  a  letter  addressed  to  the  German  Catholic 
leaders  stated  that  "the  Holy  Father  desires  that  the  Centre  shall  support 
in  every  possible  manner  the  project  of  the  military  septennate." 


336  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

scope  suited  to  so  potentially  important  a  branch  of  in- 
ternational politics  by  formulating  a  European  policy 
which,  by  regulating  colonial  enterprise  on  an  interna- 
tional basis,  would  assure  to  Germany,  though  a  late 
comer  in  the  field,  a  prominent  place  consistent  with  her 
dignity  and  power.  Mindful  of  the  success  achieved  at 
the  Congress  of  1878,  the  German  Chancellor  was  now 
anxious  to  find  some  suitable  pretext  for  calling  to- 
gether the  Powers  in  another  congress  to  assemble  at 
Berlin  to  regulate  colonial  undertakings,  to  systematise 
and  if  possible  check  the  rapacious  land-grabbing  of  the 
other  principal  Powers,  and  thus  secure  for  Germany 
what  he  deemed  her  proper  share. 

A  favorable  opportunity  soon  presented  itself.  Leo- 
pold II,  King  of  the  Belgians,  was  a  sovereign  of  a 
new  type.  He  had  absorbed  to  the  full  the  economic  spirit 
of  the  period.  He  seemed  to  realise  that  politics  were 
daily  becoming  more  subservient  to  economics,  and  that 
while  parliamentary  government  had  deprived  the  heads 
of  States  of  much  of  their  political  authority,  sovereigns 
might,  if  they  wished  to  be  something  more  than  mere 
figureheads,  by  a  frank  acceptance  of  the  preeminence  of 
economic  interests  and  by  the  exploitation  of  these  in- 
terests, best  promote  their  own  prosperity  and  that  of 
their  country.  Leopold  II  was  a  typical  capitalist  ^  of 
the  new  school,  who  in  addition  happened  to  be  occupy- 
ing a  throne.  He  was  ready  for  new  enterprise,  eager 
to  open  up  new  fields  for  industrial  and  commercial  ex- 
ploitation. He  was  among  the  very  first  to  perceive 
the    economic    advantages    which    would    accrue    from 

^  Capitalism  was  outgrowing  its  middle  class  interpretation,  and  from 
this  time  we  may  note  a  tendency  of  the  control  of  capital  to  become  con- 
centrated in  the  hands  of  a  relatively  small  group  of  international  finan- 
ciers who  was  ready  to  engage  in  distant  enterprise,  provided  that  the 
State  was  willing  and  able  to  support  its  claims. 


THE  SUPER-STATE  337 

colonial  operations  in  Central  Africa.  With  his  shrewd 
sense  for  business,  Leopold  II  had  as  early  as  1876  called 
together  a  group  of  competent  technical  advisers,  geog- 
raphers and  explorers,  to  formulate  plans  to  carry  on 
explorations  in  equatorial  Africa.  Soon  thereafter  the 
favorable  reports  of  the  English  explorer,  Stanley,  the 
first  white  man  to  descend  the  Congo  River,  stimulated 
Leopold's  plans.  The  African  International  Association 
Was  formed,  composed  of  geographers,  scientists,  ex- 
plorers, and  capitalists  representative  of  all  the  European 
States.  The  Association  outlined  a  plan  to  establish  ex- 
ploring stations  along  the  Congo  River,  and  open  up  the 
great  Congo  Basin  to  European  exploitation  (1878).  By 
1883  considerable  progress  had  been  made.  The  Bel- 
gian King  had  Invested  large  sums  In  the  undertaking. 
Military  and  trading  stations  were  established,  the  navi- 
gation of  the  Congo  was  well  under  way,  and  a  num- 
ber of  steamers  were  regularly  plying  on  the  river; 
while  the  stations  were  garrisoned  by  a  well-disciplined 
police  force.  In  addition  missionaries,  chiefly  English  and 
French,  were  carrying  on  the  fruitful  work  in  spread- 
ing, not  merely  the  Gospel,  but  also  propaganda  In  favor 
of  the  nation  to  which  they  belonged.^ 


Ill 

In  the  meantime  various  States — Portugal,  Holland, 
France — advanced  sovereign  pretensions  over  parts  of 

*It  is  to  be  noted  that  no  attempt  to  colonise  in  the  strict  sense  of 
the  word  was  made  in  Central  Africa.  Though  the  word  "civilise"  has 
been  euphemistically  used  to  give  a  humanitarian  tinge  to  the  work  under- 
taken to  bring  Equatorial  Africa  under  European  control,  colonisation 
aimed  primarily  merely  at  economic  exploitadon.  The  theory  had  gained 
•wide  credence  that  "the  starving  white  man  must  be  satisfied  or  he  will 
become  ugly."  These  words  reflect  the  best  public  opinion  of  the  time, 
which  applauded  land-grabbing  by  the  Powers,  in  Africa  and  elsewhere, 
as  of  the  highest  benefit  to  all  concerned. 


338  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

the  Congo  territory.  Portugal  claimed  priority  as  hav- 
ing sovereign  rights  over  the  Lower  Congo,  based  on 
her  discovery  in  1484.  The  Dutch  laid  claims  based 
on  their  trading  posts,  while  French  explorers  had  been 
active  in  their  explorations  and  in  the  distribution  of  tri- 
color flags  among  the  natives,  as  stakes  of  sovereignty. 
For  her  part  England  found  it  useful  to  recognise  the 
Portuguese  claims,  and  in  February  1884  entered  into 
an  agreement  which  assured  to  Portugal  the  control  of 
the  mouth  of  the  Congo,  while  England  reserved  for 
herself  the  hinterland. 

The  news  of  this  agreement  raised  a  storm  of  pro- 
test among  the  other  European  States.  Here  Bismarck, 
saw  his  opportunity  to  call  a  congress  which,  while  in- 
cidentally settling  the  Congo  question,  might  be  made 
the  occasion  for  formulating  a  European  policy  concern- 
ing the  territorial  partition  of  Africa,  as  well  as  re- 
garding all  questions  relating  to  the  economic  exploita- 
tion of  that  continent. 

From  November  1884  to  the  end  of  February  1885 
the  representatives  of  the  six  Great  European  Powers, 
and  of  Belgium,  Holland,  Denmark,  Turkey,  Norway 
and  Sweden,  Spain,  Portugal,  and — for  the  first  time  in 
a  European  Conference — the  United  States,^  labored  to 
devise  a  suitable  arrangement.  Under  the  presidency 
of  Bismarck  a  policy  was  formulated  which  was  best 
suited  to  assure  to  Germany  a  good  share  of  all  terri- 
tory distributed.  The  Congo  Basin  proper  was  put 
out  of  harm's  way  by  being  reorganised  as  a  Free  State 
with  Leopold  II  as  its  sovereign.  Arrangements  were 
made  to  insure  the  free  navigation  of  the  Congo  and  the 
Niger,  and  rules  were  laid  down  regarding  the  future 
occupation   of   the   coast   of   Africa,   but   the   most   im- 

'  The  United  States  did  not  ratify  the  Act  of  the  Conference. 


THE  SUPER-STATE  339 

portant  clause  of  the  Act  of  the  Berlin  Conference, 
signed  February  26,  1885,  was  that  In  future  any  Power 
which  was  about  to  seize  new  territory  In  Africa  should 
first  notify  the  other  Powers  of  its  Intention  to  do  so, 
in  order  to  avoid  a  conflict.^  Here  was  an  unparalleled 
opportunity  to  assert  the  armed  power  of  the  State  to 
secure  colonial  possessions  by  the  mere  threat  of  war. 
Germany,  as  the  head  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  was 
already  at  this  time  the  strongest  military  power  in  the 
world,  and  she  had  secured  the  right  to  protest  against 
the  colonial  expansion  of  other  States,  which  amounted 
to  the  assertion  of  her  own  preeminence. 

Berlin  suddenly  found  herself  a  central  figure  In  the 
colonial  policy  of  the  world.  Hitherto  England  and  to  a 
less  degree  France  had  been  able  to  increase  their 
colonial  holdings  at  will.  Henceforth  Germany  was  not 
only  to  be  consulted,  but  was  herself  to  become  a  most 
serious  competitor.  Confident  in  the  ascendant  position 
acquired  at  the  Berlin  Conference,  Germany  launched 
headlong  In  the  acquisition  of  colonies.  Within  the  brief 
space  of  three  years  Germany  acquired  a  colonial  do- 
main estimated  at  one  and  a  half  million  square  miles, 
populated  by  over  sixteen  million  inhabitants.^ 

The  attention  of  the  people  of  Europe  was  hence- 
forth to  be  fixed  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  Con- 
tinent. The  world  was  in  fact,  as  well  as  in  speech, 
to  become  the   field   for  their  enterprise.     A  new  gen- 

*It  is  of  importance  to  point  out  that  here  for  the  first  time  in  an  in- 
ternational document  the  matter  of  spheres  of  influence  and  obligations 
attaching  thereto  are  dealt  with. 

'  During  the  ensuing  fifteen  years  the  work  of  the  partition  of  Africa 
was  practically  completed.  France  strove  to  carve  out  for  herself  an 
African  empire  stretching  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Red  Sea,  but  this 
ambitious  scheme  was  blocked  by  England  after  the  Fashoda  Incident 
(1896).  England  herself  planned  a  colonial  empire  which  was  to 
stretch  from  the  Cape  to  Cairo.  This  plan  was  blocked  by  Germany,  who 
gained  for  herself  the  position  of  third  largest  colonial  Power  in  Africa. 


340  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

eration  had  grown  to  manhood  to  whom  the  Crimean 
War  was  but  an  historical  memory,  and  even  the  strug- 
gles of  Germany  and  Italy  for  national  unity  were 
epic  events  of  romantic  rather  than  practical  interest. 
The  gap  left  by  the  defeat  of  France  had  been  filled 
by  her  revival  as  a  World  Power  ready  to  pursue  an 
energetic  programme,  which  at  bottom  was  inspired  by 
dreams  of  a  revanche,  and  the  reacquisition  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine.  The  State  as  Power  had  grown  to  full  stature. 
It  demanded  wider  fields  for  greater  exploits.  A  new 
wave  of  politico-social  enthusiasm,  of  opportunism,  was 
swelling.  The  older  realism  of  Bismarck,  with  its  nar- 
rowed horizon,  its  repressive  limitations,  had  grown  in- 
tolerable to  the  younger  men.  Economic  expansion, 
which  appeared  to  have  been  developed  to  such  a 
prodigious  extent  during  the  past  two  decades,  seemed 
to  the  rising  generation  merely  a  feeble  beginning.  To 
be  sure,  the  maps  of  the  world  had  been  splashed  with 
the  flaming  red  of  British  imperial  expansion;  French 
green  marked  off  vast  areas,  and  now  the  German  yellow 
showed  that  the  German  flag  was  flying  in  the  antipodes. 
But  these  colonies  awaited  organisation  and  exploita- 
tion. Much  had  been  done,  but  infinitely  more  awaited 
doing.  It  was  beginning  to  be  realised  that  the  work 
to  be  done  could  not  be  carried  through  merely  by  con- 
tinuing the  old  policies.  Social  sensibility  was  crystallis- 
ing into  social  consciousness.  Capital,  which  was  eager 
for  new  and  vaster  enterprise,  was  coming  to  realise 
that  its  power  and  potential  expansive  energy  in  in- 
dustry and  commerce  rested  on  the  skill  and  efficient  co- 
operation of  the  working  masses.  Though  Bismarck 
zealously  promoted  his  programmes  of  paternal  State 
social  legislation,  and  carried  through  his  extensive  meas- 
ures  of   social   insurance,    and  protection  to   the  wage- 


THE  SUPER-STATE  341 

earner,  yet  he  repressed  with  unabated  vigor  every  at- 
tempt made  by  the  workers  to  promote  their  own  in- 
terests, or  develop  their  own  class  solidarity. 

During  his  remaining  years  in  office,  Bismarck,  en- 
deavored to  put  the  last  touches  to  his  State.  He  realised 
more  than  ever  that  the  orientation  that  he  had  given 
to  German  development  could  be  maintained  only  by 
armed  force.  To  increase  the  security  and  strength  of 
the  Empire  he  had  founded  he  had  employed  years  of 
skilful  diplomacy,  but  he  realised  that  in  the  last 
analysis  it  depended  on  the  efficiency  of  the  army.  The 
necessity  of  preparing  for  war,  the  conviction  that  the 
armed  strength  of  the  State  was  the  sole  protection  of 
its  cultural  and  economic  life,  of  its  political  liberty  and 
position  in  the  world,  was  dwelt  upon  more  insistently 
than  ever.  The  need  to  increase  this  strength,  to  de- 
velop the  striking  power  of  the  State,  to  render  it 
formidable  above  its  competitors  for  power,  was  de- 
clared the  paramount  interest  of  the  State.  As  a  result 
increased  armaments  were  voted  by  the  German  Reich- 
stag, after  an  arduous  struggle  in  which  the  Chancellor 
had  to  come  forward  in  person  to  defend  his  policy. 
"His  Majesty,  the  Emperor,  cannot  disavow  the  work 
to  which  he  has  devoted  thirty  years  of  his  life :  the 
creation  of  the  German  Army  and  the  creation  of  the 
German  Empire,"  the  Chancellor  declared  in  the  Reich- 
stag on  January  11,  1887,  and  it  is  significant  that  he 
placed  the  army  before  the  Empire. 

Bismarck's  work  was  done.  He  could  go  no  further. 
Though  he  renewed  the  Triple  Alliance  as  well  as  the 
Reinsurance  Treaty  in  this  same  year,  he  added  nothing. 
He  was  engaged  in  holding  together  what  he  had  built; 
for  already  he  saw  fissures  in  the  foundations. 


CHAPTER  XI 

Salus  Populi 


ESTIMATE  OF  BISMARCK  S  HISTORICAL  MISSION THE  NEW  ETHICS 

OF  GOVERNMENT THE  JUSTIFICATION  OF  THE   USE  OF 

FORCE CULTURAL  SUPERIORITY 


THE  deeper  one  examines  into  the  career  of  Bis- 
marck and  the  part  he  played  in  furthering  the 
breakdown  of  the  control  of  the  body  politic  by  the 
Middle  Class,  the  more  distinctly  are  the  limitations  f  mX*^ 
of  his  policy,  where  the  use  of  force  was  of  no  avail,  ^^^v*/*^^ 
revealed.  Though  skilled  in  diplomatic  archit.ectonics,  '^.  ,aAi^ 
unhampered  by  any  scruples  of  moral  responsibility  or  *^^ 
the  accepted  code  of  political  honor  in  so  far  as  affairs 
of  State  were  concerned,  the  Iron  Chancellor  bequeathed 
no  sound  precepts  in  the  art  of  government,  no  prac- 
tice in  the  science  of  politics,  which  might  serve  a  later 
epoch.  He  distorted  the  moral  standards,  and  per- 
verted the  ethical  sense,  not  merely  of  the  German  peo- 
ple, but  of  the  civilised  world.  Yet  who  shall  say  that 
his  dual  historical  mission,  which  was  to  accelerate  the 
destruction  of  the  older  concepts  of  statehood  and  pre- 
pare for  a  new  form  of  social  organisation,  was  not  for 
these  very  reasons  the  more  thoroughly  performed,  that 
he  sowed  a  storm  so  that  the  succeeding  generation 
might  reap  a  whirlwind?  It  cannot  be  maintained  that 
this  was  his  conscious  role,  yet  we  can  perceive  in  his 
conception   of  power   as   objective   the   awakening  of   a 

[342] 


SALUS  POPULI  343 

new  social  consciousness,  the  manifestation  of  social  sen- 
sibility to  which  attention  has  been  called.  His  success 
and  the  ascendancy  of  Germany  were  based  on  a  clear 
insight  into  the  social  nature  of  the  State,  in  contrast 
with  the  middle  class  individualist  theory  which  had 
hitherto  prevailed.  He  was  the  first  to  make  use  of 
the  idea  of  disciplined  cooperation.  But  he  apparently 
failed  to  recognise  that  man  must  not  only  obey,  but  ^ 
he  must  believe;  not  only  /3tos  but  deos  is  necessary  to  i 
a'  complete  development  of^^cial  consciousness.  The 
end  cannot  justify  the  means  when  the  end  has  been 
attained  and  the  means  survive. 

In  asserting  German  claims  to  leadership  in  Europe, 
Bismarck  had  taken  advantage  of  the  nascent  social 
consciousness  of  the  German  people,  and  by  limiting  it 
as  an  exclusively  national  discipline  which  required  of 
the  individual  implicit  as  well  as  explicit  loyalty  to  the 
State,  forbade  the  latter  to  look  beyond  national  bound- 
aries except  as  to  a  field  for  predatory  penetration.  The 
ethics  and  art  of  government  were  directed  to  support 
the  contention  that  the  State  as  Power  can  alone  assure 
survival;  not  power  reinforced  by  moral  considerations, 
implvinp;  in{^ihiti£iLns.-2.nH  etjijral  restraints,  "^uf^'power  ^ 
whose  basis  is  disciplined  violence  which  can  be  unleashed 
at  will.  ~^ 

^"""iFhe  Nation-State  as  Power,  in  the  use  of  force  had        . 
behind  it  psychical  motives  of  a  social  character  which       /T  •* 
had  never  been  hitherto  overtly  accepted.     The  use  of  y  r 
force  was  justified  by  the  end  in  view.     Not  only  do  we  ^ 

find  it  reiterated  with  apparent  finality  that  "the  State    W» 
is  not  physical  power  as  an  end  in  itself,  but  is  the  power 
to  protect  and  promote  the  high  interests  of  mankind. 
The  lesson  of  power   {Machtlehre)  purely  as  an  end  in 
itself  cannot  be  countenanced;  it  is  immoral  because  it 


\ 


344  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

can  not  justify  itself,"  ^  but  the  conviction  had  gained 
credence  that  though  "the  end  of  justice  is  peace,  the 
way  to  attain  it  is  by  war  ...  all  the  justice  that  there 
is  in  the  world  was  attained  after  a  struggle  ...  all 
rights,  the  rights  of  a  nation,  as  the  rights  of  an  in- 
dividual, presuppose  that  he  who  possesses  them  is  al- 
ways ready  to  affirm  them  by  the  use  of  force."  ^  Here 
we  find  power  endowed  with  a  social  sanctity  that  it  had 
never  hitherto  possessed.  The  use  of  force  was  thus 
not  only  necessary  but  a  highly  desirable  attribute  of 
the  State.  War  had  in  the  long  centuries  of  its  eyglu- 
tion  acquired  social  value, ^  The  warrior  instinct  in 
man  had  by  a  slow  process  been  transformed  into  a 
disciplined,  socialised,  combative  sense,  which  found 
expression  in  the  formation  of  armies  organised  to 
protect  the  civilian  community  from  incursion,  until 
at  last  we  find  a  Nation-State  with  its  young  male 
population  conscripted  in  time  of  peace  to  serve  in  the 
ranks,  and  in  time  of  war  the  entire  able-bodied  popu- 
lation pledged  for  national  service.  War  had  become  a 
social  function;  the  State  a  heavily  armed,  disciplined 
weapon  for  war.^ 

The  acceptance  of  the  idea  of  the  State  as  Power — 

'  Cf.  Treitschke,  Politics,  Vol.  II,  p.  543. 

'  Cf.  R.  Ihering,  Der  Kampf  urns  Recht. 

^Cf.   William   James,   "The  Moral  Equivalent  of    JVar." 

*  An  unarmed  State  incapable  of  drawing  the  sword  when  it  sees  fit,  is 
subject  to  one  which  wields  the  power  of  declaring  war.  ...  A  de- 
fenceless State  may  still  be  termed  a  Kingdom  for  convention  or  polite 
reasons,  but  science  whose  first  duty  is  accuracy  must  boldly  declare 
that  in  point  of  fact,  such   a  country  no   longer  takes   rank   as   a   State. 

This,  then,  is  the  only  criterion.  The  right^  of  arms  disting,uishes  the 
State  from  all  other  forms  of_coxpxJxale,Iife,  and  those  who  cannot  take 
up  arms  Tor  themselves  rhay  not  be  regarded  as  States  but  only  as  members 
of  a  federated  constellation  of  States.  .   .    . 

War  is  Politics  (car'  k^oxhv. 

The  grandeur  of  war  lies  in  the  utter  annihilation  of  puny  man  in 
the  great  conception  of  the  State  and  it  brings  out  the  full  splendor  of  the 
sacrifice  of  fellow-countrymen  for  one  another. — Cf.  Treitschke,  op.  cit.. 
Vol.  I,  Chaps.  I  and  II. 


SALUS  POPULI  345 

the  confusion  of  identity  between  what  had  hitherto 
been  considered  a  function  of  government  (the  pro- 
tection of  rights  and  interests)  with  that  of  the  end 
of  the  State  itself — had  promoted  the  rise  of  an  ego-  \\ 
centric,  racial  nationalism,  which  excluded  any  sinci^e  U 
acceptance  of  a  broader  concept  of  humanity.  Yet 
human  mtercourse  was"^  daily  becoming  more   intensive.  ,\^ 

The  communication  between  peoples,  already  accelerated  C^^ 
during  the  preceding  period,  had  increased  an  hundred- 
fold, and  was  increasing  in  geometric  progression.  The 
interpenetration  of  ideas,  the  international  character  of 
trade  ^nd  commerce",  the  first  attempts  to  arrive  at  in- 
ternational solidarity  among  the  working  class,  had  ^ 
built  up  a  fabric  of  social  relations  which  was  hampered 
by  national  boundaries.  Nevertheless  the  technique  of 
government,  the  theory  of  politics  retrenched  itself  more 
strongly  than  ever  behind  the  barriers  of  the  heavily 
armed  Nation-State. 

In  theory,  the  State,  an  organisation  for  peace,  was 
under  the  control  of  its  civilian  administrators;  in  prac- 
tice, the  State  had  in  the  militarised  States  of  continental     - 
Europe  come  under  direct,  elsewhere  under  the  indirect,    \ 
control  of  its  armed  strength  in  order  to  be  prepared  for 
war.    During  the  next  forty  years  the  threat  of  the  drawn 
sword,   the    fear   of   a   levelled   rifle,    their  use    against 
weaker  States — in  brief,  thejactics^of^he  highwayman, 
became  the   practice   of  Stat£S.     The  increase   and  im- 
provement  ot  armaments,  the  building  of  great  navies, 
their  use  in  affirming  world  interests  and  asserting  world 
power   with    a   ruthless   disregard   of   moral   law,    were,  ^j,-tf^  ^ 
justified  by  the  convenient  plea  of  salus  populi.       u>€£.^'^^j4 

The  treaties  and  alliances  entered  into,  the  increase  of       ^^^^.^^^ 
the   potential   offensive    strength   of   the    State,    the    as- 
sertion of  privileges  as  rights,  the  safeguarding  of  in- 


346  THE  TREND  OF  HISTORY 

terests,  became  the  principal  concern  of  politics.  With 
theatric  effect  the  doctrines  of  the  State  as  Power  could 
be  made  to  apply  to  foreign  relations,  and  sincere  men 
accepted  the  view  that  "morals  must  become  more  po- 
litical before  politics  can  become  more  moral."  ^  None 
could  deny  in  surveying  the  spoil  accumulated  by  follow- 
ing the  new  precepts  that  "the  statesman  has  no  right 
to  warm  his  hands  on  the  smoking  ruins  of  his  country, 
and  with  comforting  self-praise  proclaim,  'I  have  never 
lied.'  "  ' 


II 

The  period  of  expansion  which  followed  upon  the 
frank  acceptance  of  the  new  theory  of  the  State  as 
Power  may  be  compared  to  that  of  the  barbarian  in- 
vasions. The  centripetal  physical  factors  which  im- 
pelled the  barbarians  westward  during  the  5th  century, 
and  lured  the  Goths  to  Rome,  the  Huns  to  Chalons,  and 
the  Vandals  to  the  African  shores  of  the  Mediterranean, 
effecting  the  dissolution  of  the  Western  Empire,  were, 
during  the  last  quarter  of  the  19th  century  and  the 
opening  years  of  the  20th,  replaced  by  the  centrifugal 
psychical  factors  which  impelled  the  Western  Powers, 
basing  themselves  on  a  politico-economic  code  wholly 
barbaric,  to  spread  eastward,  and  by  rapid  stages  to  com- 
plete the  conquest  of  Asia,  Australasia,  and  Africa  in 
what  must  appear  in  the  light  of  history  as  an  attempt 
to  subjugate  the  globe.  During  the  5th  century  the  bar- 
barians in  their  march  on  Rome  were  armed  only  with 
their  superior  physical  strength  and  fresh  vigor.     In  the 

'  Treitschke,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  I,  p.  105. 
^Treitschke,  Ibidem,  Vol.  I,  p.   no. 


SALUS  POPULI  347 

19th  century,  the  European  Powers  felt  themselves  en- 
dowed  with  a  rylfiiral  syperiority  which  they  wished  to 
impose  on  the  whole  world. 

This  was  not  the  task  for  an  effete,  worn-out  civilisa- 
tion such  as  we  find  reflected  in  sterile,  middle  class 
pessimism,  with  its  decadent  philosophy  and  its  dilettante 
agnosticism,  or  the  rapacious  yet  puny  greed  of  Nation- 
States  and  the  tortuous  policy  of  the  statesmen  who  di- 
rected the  destiny  of  peoples  prior  to  the  last  quarter 
of  the  19th  century.  But  looking  beneath  the  surface 
we  may  uncover  a  vigorous,  buoyant  energy,  an  eagerness 
for  action,  such  as  the  world  had  not  witnessed.  The 
new  "barbarian"  invasion  by  the  European  peoples, 
frankly  undertaken  after  1890,  rested  on  broader  founda- 
tions than  those  of  the  personalised  Nation-State. 
Though  in  form  it  was  directed  by  the  Middle  Class, 
and  the  methods  of  accomplishment  of  imperial  design, 
the  unmoral  subterfuges  resorted  to  in  an  attempt  to 
reconcile  the  new  policy  with  middle  class  standards  are 
self-evident,  yet  at  every  turn  we  find  traces  of  new 
influences,  new  dements,  garbed  in  the  old  dress.  It 
is  for  this  reason  that  imperialism  and  internationalism 
with  their  attendant  complexities  and  incongruities  have 
hitherto  been  so  diflicult  to  analyse. 

The  State  as  Power  was  at  one  and  the  same  time 
breaking  down  the  old  middle  class  politico-juridic 
theories,  rendering  obsolete  the  older  forms  of  limited 
nationalism,  and  carrying  forward  with  the  old  methods 
the  new  super-nationalism.  The  State  had  become  the 
shell,  it  was  no  longer  the  kernel,  of  social  life. 


> 


INDEX 


Abdul  Hamid  (Sultan  of  Tur- 
key), 287. 

Acton   (Lord),  cited,  211  note. 

Adrianople,   291, 

Afghanistan,  war  of,  with  Eng- 
land, 315-    , 

Africa,  colonial  exploitation  of, 
335  sqq.;  plan  of  partition  of, 
by  European  states,  339  and 
note;  European  policy  regard- 
ing) 339 1  Conference  of  Berlin 
re.  339- 

African  International  Association, 

337- 

Agamemnon,   307. 

Aix-la-Chapelle,  Congress  of 
(1818),  95.      . 

Alexander  II  (Emperor  of  Rus- 
sia), 186;  his  relations  with 
Napoleon  III,  194,  203,  204, 
205 ;  and  Prussia,  195,  196, 
205;  and  France,  195. 

Alexander  VI   (Pope),  23. 

Alexander  the  Great,  38. 

Alexandria,  39. 

Algeria,  incidents  of  French  in- 
tervention in,  108;  French  cam- 
paign in  and  occupation  of, 
108;  annexation  of,  to  France, 
108,  109  and  note. 

Algiers,   108,  109. 

Alsace-Lorraine,    205    and    note, 

273,  340. 

Althusius,  theory  of  State  of,  18; 
his  Politka,  18. 

American  Colonies,  see  United 
States. 

American  Commonwealth  {The), 
see  Bryce. 

American  Constitution,  see  Con- 
stitution  and  United  States. 


Amphictyonic   League,   233   note. 
Analogy,    use   of,   in   politics,   20, 

23,  24,  27. 
Anarchy,  see   Proudhon. 
Andrassy     (Count)     quoted,    299 

note. 
Antwerp,  occupied  by  the  French, 

107. 
Aranda,  33. 
Ardahan,  293,  296. 
Aristocracy,   in   England,   71    and 

note;    characteristics    of,    267; 

compared      with      Proletariat, 

268 ;    fixity    of   social    ordering 

of,  268;  decline  of,  31,  270. 
Aristotle,    38,    49;    his     Treatise 

on      Government      quoted,     49 

note. 
Asia,  Russian  advance  in  Central, 

184,     190,     277,     334;     Russia 

blocked    in,    266;    Turkey    in, 

293. 

Association  of  Ideas,  in  politics, 
55  sqq. 

Austria,  enters  the  Holy  Alli- 
ance, 94  note;  signs  Troppau 
agreement,  95 ;  nationalism  in, 
144,  169;  revolutions  in,  152; 
at  war  with  Italians  (1848), 
152;  defeat  of  Italians  by,  152; 
as  a  Great  Power,  182;  at 
Congress  of  Paris,  188;  in- 
volved in  war  with  Piedmont 
and  France,  194;  the  armistice 
of  Villafranca  and,  194;  at 
war  with  Prussia  and  Italy 
(1866),  200;  defeat  of,  200; 
the  effects  of  the  treaty  of 
Prague  on,  201  ;  exclusion  of, 
from  Germany,  201  ;  Polish 
policy    of,     198;    relations    of. 


349 


350 


INDEX 


with  France,  199;  political  re- 
organisation of,  201  ;  joins  with 
Hungary  in  formation  of  the 
Dual  Monarchy,  202 ;  policy 
of,  during  Franco-Prussian 
war,  207  and  note ;  as  a  Great 
Power,  228  note ;  effects  of 
dualist  regime,  245 ;  plan  of 
Alliance  of  Russia,  Prussia 
and,  275;  Turkish  policy  of, 
279;  Balkan  crisis  and  policy 
of,  281  sqq.;  signs  the  Reich- 
stadt  agreement,  286;  defines 
sphere  of  active  interest  in  the 
Balkans,  289;  neutrality  of, 
during  Russo-Turkish  war, 
290;  at  Congress  of  Berlin, 
296;  re  control  over  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina,  286,  291, 
296;  rapprochement  with  Ger- 
many, 316;  enters  alliance  with 
Germany,  316;  her  relations 
with  Italy,  325;  concludes 
Triple  Alliance,  325  ;  her  part 
in  the  Alliance,  326;  her  ex- 
ploitation by  Germany,  327; 
and  the  Reinsurance  Treaty  of 
(1884),  332. 
Austria-Hungary,  see  Austria. 


Baboeuf  (Noel),  99  note. 

Bacon  (Francis  Lord),  43;  on 
progress,  44. 

Bacon   (Roger),  on  progress,  43. 

Bakunin,  254. 

Balkans,  nation  building  in,  188, 
191 ;  conditions  in,  after  1870, 
246;  national  aspirations  of 
peoples  of,  246;  Russian  inter- 
est in,  277;  policy  of  European 
states  regarding,  278  sqq.; 
the  question  of  reforms  in, 
283  sqq.;  English  policy  re- 
specting reforms  in,  283 ;  Rus- 
sian policy  re,  284,  288 ;  revo- 
lution in,  284;  armistice  of 
1876  in,  288;  Russo-Turkish 
war  and,  299  sqq.;  territorial 
distribution    of,    by    treaty    of 


San    Stefano,    292;    effects    of 
Congress  of  Berlin  in,  314. 

Barbarians,  invasions  of,  2; 
comparison  between,  and  Euro- 
pean economic  expansion  at 
close  of   19th   century,   346. 

Basel,  Congress  of,  international 
(i86g),  253; 

Bastile,  storming  of,   77. 

Batum,  293,  296. 

Beesby,  167  note. 

Belgium,  relations  of,  with 
France,  81,  107  note,  203,  289; 
united  to  Holland,  93;  revolt 
in,  107;  independence  of,  107; 
as  Minor  Power,  228  note; 
colonial  plans  of,  334. 

Benedict  XIV  (Pope),  33. 

Berlin,  67,  156,  203,  207  note; 
274,  276;  Russian  influence  at, 
195,  197;  plans  of,  re  Turkey, 
280;  note  of  (May  13,  1876), 
284;  Congress  of,  to  revise 
treaty  of  San  Stefano,  295 ; 
objects  of  Congress,  295;  terms 
of,  296  sqq.;  effects  of,  298, 
314,  317;  Conference  of,  to 
settle  colonial  questions  (1884), 
338;  act  of  Conference  of,  339. 

Besika   Bay,  285. 

Bessarabia,  187,  292,  296,  314. 

Bismarck  (Prince),  admiration 
of  Marx  for,  171  note;  reor- 
ganisation of  Prussian  army 
by,  199;  declares  war  on  Den- 
mark, 200;  Austrian  policy  of, 
200,  201  ;  and  German  imperi- 
alism, 249  note;  as  founder  of 
the  German  Empire,  272; 
compared  with  Napoleon  I, 
273 ;  character  of,  273 ;  epi- 
sodes in  career  of,  as  history 
of  Europe,  273  ;  his  forging  of 
German  unity,  275 ;  his  plan 
to  revive  the  Holy  Alliance, 
275 ;  supports  Austria,  280, 
287;  his  attitude  in  Balkan 
crisis,  280;  his  approval  of 
Suez  Canal  incident.  281 ; 
Turkish    policy    of,    284    sqq.; 


INDEX 


351 


unique  position  of,  286; 
quoted  re  Balkan  crisis,  289; 
quoted  on  role  of  Germany  in 
European  affairs,  292;  Con- 
gress of  Berlin  called  under 
presidency  of,  295 ;  as  arbiter 
in  Europe,  300;  comparison  of 
his  policy  with  Marxian  doc- 
trines, 302 ;  Machtpolitik  of, 
303 ;  his  idea  of  the  State  as 
Power,  303  sqq.;  on  the  State, 
quoted,  304;  objective  view- 
point of,  304;  attitude  towards 
Papal  doctrine  of  infallibility, 
305;  begins  the  Kulturkampf, 
307 ;  details  of  his  struggle  with 
Rome,  307  sqq.;  motives  of  his 
policy  quoted,  307 ;  end  of 
Kulturkampf,  309 ;  social  pol- 
icy of,  310;  his  opposition  to 
Socialism,  310;  quoted  on  So- 
cialism, 310  note;  plans  of 
State  Socialism  outlined  by, 
310,  311;  intervenes  in  Eg\'pt, 
315;  anti-Russian  sentiments 
of,  316;  he  plans  alliance  with 
Austria,  316;  England  ap- 
proached by,  316;  survey  of 
European  situation  by,  316; 
concludes  alliance  with  Aus- 
tria, 316;  attitude  of,  during 
Tunis  incident,  324 ;  resump- 
tion of  friendly  relations  with 
Papacy,  324;  champions  tem- 
poral claims  of  Papacy,  324; 
Italian  policy  of,  325 ;  forces 
Italy  to  seek  alliance  with 
Austria.  325;  the  creation  of 
the  Triple  Alliance  by,  325 
sqq.;  as  Minister  of  Commerce 
and  Industry,  330;  his  estimate 
of  economic  factors  of  policy, 
331  ;  his  programmes  for 
stimulating  industrial  and  com- 
mercial enterprises,  331  ;  colo- 
nial policy  of,  331,  334;  scope 
and  aims  of  colonial  plans  of, 
331;  his  desire  for  peace,  332; 
economic  value  of  peace  ap- 
praised  by,   332;   his   Reinsur- 


ance Treaty,  332 ;  his  appeal  to 
Papacy,  335  and  note;  his 
plans  for  conference  to  settle 
colonial  question,  336;  policy 
in  Congo  dispute,  338 ;  calls 
conference  to  discuss  the  par- 
tition of  Africa,  338;  last  tasks 
of,  340;  quoted,  341  ;  summary 
of  work  of,  342 ;  German 
hegemony  and  his  part  therein, 
343;  the  Nation-State  as 
Power  and,  343 ;  his  true  his- 
torical mission,  343  sqq. 

Bizerte,   321,   322. 

Black  Sea,  question  of  neutralisa- 
tion of,  187,  193,  275. 

Blackstone,  quoted,  32  and  note. 

Blanc  (Louis),  166. 

Bluntschli,  his  Theory  of  the 
State  quoted,  21,  28,  120,  210; 
his  Politik  quoted,  212,  213 
note. 

Bodm  (Jean),  7,  21  ;  theory  of 
State  of,  17  sqq.;  Les  Six 
Livres  de  la  Republique  of, 
cited,  17;  on  progress,  43,  44. 

Bologna,  57. 

Bona,  108. 

Bonaparte  (House  of),  94,  173; 
intrigues  of,  after   (1870),  274. 

Boniface  VIII  (Pope),  Bull 
Unarn  Sanctam  of,  quoted, 
22. 

Bosanquet,  his  Philosophical  The- 
ory of  the  State,  quoted,  50 
note. 

Bosnia,  revolt  in,  279,  284;  Aus- 
trian control  over,  286,  291, 
296. 

Boulogne,  124. 

Bourbons,  family  system  of,  85, 
86;  restoration  of,  94;  intrigues 
of,  261,  274. 

Bourget  (Paul),  his  Psychologie 
Contemporaine   quoted,   261. 

Boutmy,  his  l^lements  d'urie  Psy- 
chologie  Politique  du  Peuple 
Americain     quoted,    249     note. 

Brahmins,  38. 

Bremen,  334. 


352 


INDEX 


Bright  (John)  on  Canada,  258. 

Brook  Farm,  170, 

Bryce  (Lord),  his  American 
Commonwealth,  quoted,  60 
note. 

Buckle  (G.  E.),  his  Life  of  Ben- 
jamin Disraeli  quoted,  277, 
285,  286,  289,  290,  291. 

Buddhism,  38. 

Bulgaria,  national  aspirations  of, 
278;  relations  of,  with  Russia, 
284,  286,  288;  declares  war  on 
Turkey,  286;  semi-independ- 
ence of,  296,  314. 

Bulgarian  atrocities,  Gladstone 
and,  287;  Disraeli's  view  of, 
287. 

Bull,  Unam  Sanctam,  22. 

Burd,  L.  A.,  211  note. 

Burma,  334- 


Caesar,  87;  the  age  of,  117. 

Cairo,  339  note. 

California,  250. 

Calvin,  4. 

Calvinism,  influence  of,  in 
America,  57. 

Cameroon,  334. 

Campanella  (Tommaso),  his 
Civitas  Solis,  cited,  158. 

Canada,  258. 

Canning,  95. 

Capitalism,  and  nationalism,  107, 
109,  160,  226;  evolution  of, 
127;  spread  of,  128;  in  Eng- 
land, 135,  139;  influence  of,  on 
foreign  affairs,  139;  influence 
on  colonial  policy  of,  139;  ex- 
pansion of,  257;  aims  of,  263; 
struggle  of,  with  Proletariat, 
256;  realism  of,  259;  new  defi- 
nition of,  337  note. 

Carolina  (Constitution  of),  cited, 
61  note. 

Catherine  II  (Empress  of  Rus- 
sia), 33.  34,  284. 

Cavour  (Count),  his  plans  for 
Italian  unity,  191  ;  his  relations 
with  Napoleon  III,   191 ;  con- 


cludes the  Plombieres  agree- 
ment,  194;  234. 

Central  Powers,  see  Germany. 

Charlemagne,  84. 

Charles  Albert  (King),  of  Pied- 
mont,  152. 

Charles  V    (Emperor),  205. 

Charles  X  (King  of  France),  his 
policy  in  Algeria,  108 ;  down- 
fall of,  106. 

Chartism,  nature  of  the  move- 
ment, no;  programme  of,  no; 
results  of,   in,   169. 

Chilperic,  84. 

China,  opening  of,  to  Western 
influence,  191 ;  Franco-British 
policy  towards,  191,  192;  Eng- 
land and  the  opium  trade  in, 
232  note. 

Chinese  Classics,  The,  see  Legge. 

Christianity,  appeal  of,  40;  ideal 
of  brotherly  love  of,  40;  and 
world  unity,  41  ;  viewed  as  a 
proletarian  movement,  237. 

Church  of  Rome,  see  Papacy. 

Cicero,  43. 

Civitas  Solis,  see  Campanella. 

Colonies,  English  policy  re,  139, 
177;  see  also  under  various 
European  States. 

Comte  (Auguste),  political  phi- 
losophy of,  125  sqq.;  influence 
of  positivism  taught  by,  126, 
215;  the  Middle  Class  and, 
127. 

Commune  of  Paris  (1871),  207; 
doctrine  of,  254  note;  incen- 
diarism of,  261  ;  effects  of,  273. 

Communism,  Manifesto  of  1848, 
157;  basis  of,  158;  theory  of, 
158  sqq.;  aims  of,  159  sqq.; 
economic  dependence  of  indi- 
vidual, cited  by,  165;  realism 
of,  165;  principal  purpose  of, 
167;  abolition  of  private  prop- 
erty advocated  by,  167;  de- 
structive programme  of,  167 
sqq.;  and  the  Middle  Class, 
168;  in  action  in  1848,  169; 
historical  survey  of,   170,   171; 


INDEX 


353 


cited,     232,     302;     and     inter- 
nationalism, 251. 

Communist  AlanifestOj  see  Com- 
munism. 

Condorcet,  46,   125. 

Congo,  exploration  of,  337; 
claims  to,  338;  conference  of 
Berlin  re,  338;  Free  State  or- 
ganised, 338. 

Coningsby,  quoted,  318. 

Constantinople,  control  of,  277, 
279,  280,  290,  291  ;  palace 
'^revolutions  at,  285,  287;  con- 
ference of,  288  sqq.;  constitu- 
tion proclaimed  at,  290;  break- 
up of  conference  of,  290;  men- 
aced by  Russia,  291. 

Constitutional  Government,  basis 
of,  27;  in  England,  28,  36,  55. 
63  sqq.;  as  product  of  Middle 
Class  political  theory,  31,  60, 
69,  100;  Puritan  influence  on 
origin  of,  31,  32;  influence  of 
Montesquieu  on  United  States 
theory  of,  53,  63;  Rousseau 
and,  in  France,  52 ;  influence  of 
aristocracy  on,  in  England,  60 
note;  comparison  of  develop- 
ment of,   115- 

Constitution,  of  Carolina,  61 
note;  of  United  States  (1789), 
details  of,  56  sqq.,  62  sqq.; 
quoted,  63  note;  cited,  115; 
influence  of  United  States  on 
French,  of  1791,  78;  French, 
of  1791,  78,  of  1795.  79,  of 
1814,  91.  of  1852,  173;  English 
model  of,  of  Sicily,  1812,  90, 
91;  of  Spain,  go;  of  Minor 
German  States,  92 ;  in  Pied- 
mont, 152;  in  Naples,  152; 
Hungarian  of  (1848),  202; 
Turkey  (1877),  290;  see  also 
under  separate  countries. 

Consulate,   79. 

Contrat  Social,  see  Rousseau. 

Correspondence      de      Proudhon 
( 1 859-1 862),  see   Proudhon. 

Cosmopolitanism,  41  ;  doctrine 
of,  65;   Middle  Class  bias  of, 


67,  226;  and  nationalism,  82, 
118;  influence  on  Napoleon  I 
of,  85,  88;  in  Germany,  131, 
132 ;  decline  of,  132. 

Courland,  205  and  note. 

Crete,   191,  296. 

Crimean  War,  causes  of,  184; 
pretext  for,  185;  negotiations 
to  prevent,  185;  military  opera- 
tions of,  186;  Sebastopol,  186; 
conclusion  of,  187. 

Cromwell  (Oliver),  sought  to 
give  written  constitution  to 
England,  61  ;  226. 

Crusades,  influence  of,  41 ;  and 
England,  89. 

Cyprus,  England  acquires,  294 
and  note,  296. 


Danish  Duchies,  plans  of  Prus- 
sia re,  199;  annexation  of,  by 
Prussia,   201. 

Dardanelles,   285,   286  note. 

Darwinian  theories,  effect  of,  on 
political  affairs,  213. 

Decay,  interpretation  of,  260; 
political  application  of  concept 
of,  261. 

Declaration  and  Bill  of  Right, 
see  Right,  Declaration  and 
Bill  of. 

Declaration  of  Rights  of  Man, 
see  Rights  of  Man. 

Declaration  of  Independence,  of 
United  States  (1776),  53,  62, 
69,  74;  influence  of  Rousseau 
on,  52,  53,  62. 

De  I'Esprit  des  Lois,  see  Mon- 
tesquieu. 

Del  Materialismo  Storico,  see 
Labriola. 

Democracy  in  America,  see  de 
Tocqueville. 

Denmark,  war  with  Prussia 
(1864),  200;  loss  of  Duchies 
by,  200;  education  in,  229 
note. 

Der  Kampf  urns  Recht,  see  Iher- 
ing. 


354 


INDEX 


Descartes,      43;      on      progress, 

44- 

Determinism,  see  Historical  Ma- 
terialism. 

Directory  (French),  organisa- 
tion of,  79,  84. 

Discourse  on  the  Origins  of  Ine- 
quality among  Mankind,  see 
Rousseau. 

Disraeli  (Benjamin),  imperialist 
policy  of,  264;  character  of, 
264,  265;  as  Prime  Minister, 
264;  foreign  policy  of,  265; 
calls  Indian  troops  to  Malta, 
266;  "jingoism"  of,  266;  pro- 
letarian characteristics  of,  266; 
his  estimate  of  Bismarck 
quoted,  277 ;  anti-nationalist 
policy  of,  279;  attitude  of,  to- 
wards Balkan  question,  279; 
purchase  of  Suez  Canal  by, 
281;  Turkish  policy  of,  285; 
quoted  on  war  policy,  285 ; 
during  the  Balkan  Crisis,  286 
sgq.;  his  view  of  Bulgarian 
atrocities,  287 ;  created  Earl  of 
Beaconsfield,  288;  outlines  his 
peace  policy,  288 ;  the  Holy  Al- 
liance cited  by,  289;  his  policy 
during  Russo-Turkish  war 
quoted,  290;  secures  Cyprus 
for  England,  293  and  note;  at 
the  Congress  of  Berlin,  295 ; 
"peace  with  honor"  of,  295 ; 
quoted  re  "divine  right  of  gov- 
ernment," 303  note;  social 
policy  of,  311;  his  schemes  of 
"social  sanitation,"  311;  his 
super-national  viewpoint,  313; 
estimate  of  internal  policy  of, 
by  Gorst  quoted,  312;  his  atti- 
tude towards  Germany,  316; 
and  public  opinion,  317;  fall  of, 
318;  estimate  of  role  of,  318; 
Coningsby  of,   quoted,   318. 

Drang  nach  Osten,  285. 

Dreikaiserbund,  276. 

Dual  Monarchy,  see  Austria. 

Dupont  de  Nemours,  his  Physi- 
ocratie  cited,  68  note. 


Du    Systeme    Industriel,    see    St. 

Simon. 
Dutch  Provinces,  see  Holland. 


Economics,  role  of,  ix ;  rise  of 
science  of,  68  sqq,;  influence  of 
Adam  Smith  on,  69;  theory  of 
freedom  of,  70  sqq.;  effect  of 
doctrine  of  freedom  on,  loi ; 
laws  of,  formulated  by  Middle 
Class,  102,  103;  linked  with 
politics,  105 ;  as  the  dominat- 
ing factor  in  history,  161  sqq.; 
as  a  source  of  power,  177;  as 
principal  factor  in  formation 
of  Triple  Alliance,  329;  as  im- 
pulse urging  formation  of  co- 
lonial domains,  329;  donjinant 
after  1880,  329;  as  controlling 
public  policy,  330;  value  of 
peace  to,  332;  see  also  under 
Politico-Economic  theory  of 
State,    Imperialism. 

Edinburgh,  67. 

Education,  attitude  of  State  to- 
wards, 227 ;  compulsory, 
adopted,  229  and  note;  in  Den- 
mark, France,  Russia,  England, 
229  note. 

Egypt,  the  Suez  Canal  incident 
and,  281 ;  English  policy  in, 
281,  297;  crisis  in,  315;  Bis- 
marck intervenes  in,  315;  oc- 
cupation      of,       by      England, 

329- 

Elba,  90. 

Electorate,  function  of,  148;  re- 
form of,  148;  as  exclusive  pre- 
rogative of  Middle  Class,  149 
sqq. 

Elements  d'une  Psychologie  Po- 
litique du  Peuple  Americain, 
see  Boutmy. 

El  Uffia,  incident  of,  108;  see 
Algeria. 

Empedocles,  on  progress,  43. 

Empire  Liberal,  see  E.  Ollivier. 

Engels,  F.,  joint  author  of  the 
Communist   Manifesto,    157. 


INDEX 


355 


England,   civil   wars   in,   8;   con- 
flict   between    Parliament    and 
the    Crown    in,     lO;    constitu- 
tional monarchy  established  in, 
28;    constitutional    government 
in,  29,  36,  56,  57,  63;  influence 
on  United  States  during  forma- 
tive  period   of,   58    sqq.;   effect 
of    French    revolution     (1789) 
on,  88,  89;  nationalism  in,  89; 
and    constitutional   government 
in  Europe,  90;  Irish  policy  of, 
89;   retrenchment  of,  90;   atti- 
tude   of,    towards    Holy    Alli- 
ance, 94  note;  intervention  of, 
in  Greece,  104;  intervention  of, 
in  Belgium,  107;  utilitarianism 
in,     127,     136;     capitalism     in, 
127,    136,    139,    192;    extension 
of    suffrage    in,    148;    colonial 
enterprise   of,    177;   free   trade 
policy    of,     178;    International 
Industrial    Exhibition     (1851) 
in,    178;    as    a    Great    Power, 
182;  Napoleon  III  and  his  re- 
lations with,    182,    185;   in   the 
Crimean   War,    185    sqq.;    Po- 
lish policy  of,  187,  198;  Chinese 
interests  of,    191  ;   at  the  Con- 
gress    of    Paris     (1856),     187 
sqq.;      joint      intervention      in 
Mexico   by,    197;    as   spectator 
in    European    affairs,    206;    as 
World  Power,  228  note ;  edu- 
cation in,  229  note  ;  public  opin- 
ion  in,   239;   as  political   tutor 
in  the  West,  249;  as  the  birth- 
place of  imperialism  and  inter- 
nationalism, 249,  250  and  note; 
influence  of   Disraeli  on  trend 
of  policy  of,  265  sqq.;  Middle 
Class  policy  and  attitude  of  to- 
wards   the    Balkans,    278;    its 
reversal  by   Disraeli,  279;   ag- 
gressive    foreign    policy,    279; 
acquires  Suez  Canal,  281  ;  and 
the    menace    of    Russia,    281 ; 
aims  in  Eg>^pt,  281 ;  policy  of, 
re    integrity    of    Turkey,    283 ; 
orders    fleet     to     Besika    Bay, 


285;  threatens  Russia  with 
war,  285 ;  effect  of  Bulgarian 
atrocities  in,  287 ;  suggestion 
of  conference  at  Constantino- 
ple made  by,  288;  acute  tension 
in  relations  of,  with  Russia, 
288;  attitude  during  Russo- 
Turkish  war,  290;  orders  mo- 
bilisation, 293 ;  attitude  to- 
wards San  Stefano  treaty,  293 ; 
demands  revision  of  treaty, 
293  sqq.;  urges  calling  of  Eu- 
ropean Congress,  293 ;  defends 
territorial  integrity  of  Turkey, 
293 ;  at  the  Congress  of  Ber- 
lin, 295 ;  secures  Cyprus,  294 
and  note,  296;  secures  special 
privileges  in  Turkey,  293  ;  crisis 
in  Egypt  and,  315;  plans  of,  for 
"scientific  frontier"  for  North- 
west India,  315;  at  war  with 
Afghanistan,  315;  war  with  the 
Zulus,  315;  her  belligerent 
methods  of  imperialist  expan- 
sion, 315;  and  the  general  Eu- 
ropean situation,  316;  notified 
of  Austro-German  treaty  of 
1879,  316;  friendly  attitude 
of,  towards  treaty,  316;  occu- 
pation of  Egypt  by,  329 ;  mo- 
tives to  justify  occupation  al- 
leged by,  329;  theory  of  ex- 
ploitation of,  329;  expansion  in 
the  Sudan  of,  334;  in  Burma, 
334;  and  the  Congo  question, 
338;  partition  of  Africa  and 
her  share  therein,  339  note; 
aim  of  Cape  to  Cairo  domain 
of,  339  note. 

Erasmus,  4. 

Erzerum,  291. 

Essai     sur     le     Despotism,     see 
Mirabeau. 

Essay    on   Machiavelli,    see    Ma- 
caulay. 

t,tudes    sur    I'Histoire    de    VHu- 
manite,  see  Laurent. 

Euripides,  38. 

Europe,    cultural   life    of,    2;    in- 
fluence of  the  Reformation  in, 


356 


INDEX 


17  sqq.;  position  of  clergy  in 
mediasval,  22 ;  influence  of  cru- 
sades on,  41 ;  Napoleon  and, 
86;  spread  of  nationalism  in, 
125j  192;  Western  and  Cen- 
tral, contrasted,  136;  liberal 
movement  in,  152  sqq.;  in  1850, 
175;  Napoleon  III  and,  181; 
Russia  and  Western,  184; 
Prussia  and,  206;  political 
centre  of  gravity  in,  274,  276; 
peace  in,  277;  menace  of  gen- 
eral war  in,  287;  general  pol- 
icy of,  first  advanced  at  Con- 
gress of  Berlin,  299  and  note; 
see  also  under  various  coun- 
tries. 
European  War,  see  World  War. 


Ferdinand  VIII  (King  of  Spain), 
90. 

Ferry  (Jules)  (French  Premier), 
321. 

Fichte,   131,   136. 

Fleury    (General),   205   note. 

Flint  (Robert),  36;  his  History 
of  the  Philosophy  of  History  in 
France  quoted,  36. 

Foerster,  F.  W.,  quoted,  305 
note. 

Fourier,  phalanges  of,  158,  170. 

France,  Dragonnades  in,  8; 
early  national  unity  of,  10;  in- 
fluence of  politics  in,  54;  in- 
fluence of,  on  United  States 
during  formative  period,  59, 
60  and  note;  the  Revolution  of 
1789  in,  75  sqq.;  (for  details 
see  Revolution)  ;  the  Middle 
Class  in,  75 ;  frontiers  of,  reach 
the  Rhine,  81  ;  dominant  in 
Europe,  88;  nationalism  in,  81 
sqq.;  theocratic  school  in,  98; 
rise  of  socialism  in,  99  and 
note;  intervention  of,  in 
Greece,  104;  revolution  of 
1830  in,  106;  the  Middle  Class 
in  power  in,  106;  intervention 
in  Belgium,  107,  108  note;  the 


acquisition  of  Algeria  by,  108; 
in  1840,  125;  liberalism  in, 
143 ;  Louis  Philippe's  policy  in, 
106;  nationalism  in,  139  sqq., 
193;  the  question  of  the  suf- 
frage in,  148;  the  revolution 
of  1848,  152;  the  overthrow  of 
Louis  Philippe,  152;  as  repub- 
lic (1848),  152;  Louis  Napo- 
leon and  {see  under  Napoleon 
III);  as  a  Great  Power,  182; 
and  the  Crimean  war,  185  sqq.; 
foreign  policy  of,  190  sqq.; 
war  of,  with  Austria,  194  sqq.; 
intervention  in  Mexico  of,  197 
sqq.;  intercession  of,  in  behalf 
of  Poland,  198;  tension  in  re- 
lations of,  with  Russia,  198; 
and  the  Luxemburg  affair, 
203,  205;  unrest  in  (1870), 
207 ;  war  of,  with  Germany, 
207;  overthrow  of  Napoleon 
III,  208;  Provisional  govern- 
ment in,  208;  the  Third  Repub- 
lic, 208,  246;  the  Commune, 
208;  peace  with  Germany,  208; 
as  World  Power,  228  note; 
education  in,  229  note ;  organ- 
isation of  parliamentary  gov- 
ernment in,  245 ;  international- 
ism and,  254;  effect  of  Franco- 
Prussian  war  on,  273;  insta- 
bility of  Third  Republic  in, 
274;  loss  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
by,  273 ;  intrigues  of  Bourbons 
and  Bonapartists  in,  274;  re- 
sults of  Commune  in,  273;  and 
the  dawn  of  a  new  Europe,  274 ; 
defeat  of,  profited  by  all,  275 ; 
recovery  of,  276;  and  the  inci- 
dent of  1875,  276;  and  the  Suez 
Canal,  277;  at  the  Congress  of 
Berlin,  296;  earmarks  Syria 
as  her  share  of  spoil,  297;  is 
urged  to  acquire  Tunis,  297; 
condition  of,  in  1880,  320;  im- 
perialist programme  of,  320; 
the  acquisition  of  Tunis  by,  32 1 
sqq.;  motives  of  annexation  al- 
leged   by,    323 ;    acquisition    of 


INDEX 


357 


Tonkin  and  Madagascar  by, 
333.  334;  claims  to  Congo  of, 
337;  African  empire  of,  339 
note;  and  the  Fashoda  incident, 
339  note;  influence  of  a  new 
generation  in,  340;  see  also  un- 
der Africa,  Middle  Class,  Na- 
poleon  III,    Nationalism. 

Francis  II  (King  of  Naples), 
152. 

Frankfort,  Diet  of,  128,  153; 
treaty  of   (1871),  208,  276. 

Franklin,  58. 

Frederick  II  (King  of  Prussia), 
33,  34;  and  Prussia,  130;  pa- 
ternalism of,  131  ;  maxim  of, 
quoted,  304. 

Frederick  William  III  (King  of 
Prussia),    137. 

Frederick  William  IV,  136;  na- 
tionalist policy  of,  137;  atti- 
tude of,  during  revolution  of 
1848,  153- 


Ganganelli,  33. 

Garibaldi,  91  ;  at  Naples,   195. 

Geneva,  67,  251  note;  convention 
of  1864,  249  note. 

George  III  (King  of  England), 
48. 

Germany,  Thirty  Years'  War  in, 
8;  ecclesiastical  lands  in,  22; 
particularist  influences  in,  91 ; 
nationalism  brought  by  Napo- 
leon to,  86;  wars  of  liberation 
in,  91,  136;  the  Congress  of  Vi- 
enna and,  93 ;  absolutism  in, 
128;  ascendancy  of  Prussia  in, 
128;  battle  of  Nations  and 
(1813),  131;  influence  of 
Hegel  on  political  life  of,  133 
sqq.;  position  of  circa  1840, 
136,  141  ;  nationalism  in,  138, 
140,  169,  196;  plans  for  new 
Empire  of,  142,  201  ;  founda- 
tion of  North  German  Confed- 
eration in,  201  ;  intervention  of, 
in  Luxemburg  incident,  204; 
war   with    France   of    (1870), 


207;  Empire  of,  proclaimed, 
208;  peace  of  Frankfort  and, 
208;  as  Great  Power,  228 
note;  dominance  of,  in  Europe, 
245;  imperialism  of,  249  note; 
and  internationalism,  250,  254; 
as  preponderant  state  in  the 
West,  274;  relations  of,  with 
neighboring  states,  275;  in  the 
Dreikaiserbund,  276;  strained 
relations  of,  with  France 
(1875),  277;  disinterestedness 
in  Balkans  claimed  by,  279; 
plans  of,  for  reforms  in  Tur- 
key, 282;  attitude  of  in  Suez 
Canal  incident,  281;  attitude 
of,  during  Balkan  crisis,  284 
sqq.;  at  Congress  of  Berlin, 
297  sqq.;  relations  of,  with  Eu- 
ropean Powers,  298 ;  Prussian 
hegemony  in,  302 ;  alliance  of, 
with  Austria,  316;  negotiations 
of,  re  alliance  with  England, 
316;  and  formation  of  Triple 
Alliance,  325 ;  effect  on,  of 
Alliance,  326;  role  of,  in  alli- 
ance, 326;  policy  of  peaceful 
penetration  of,  327;  the  concept 
of  the  Super-State  in,  328,329; 
superiority  of,  over  other  part- 
ners in  Triple  Alliance,  327, 
328;  economic  development  of, 
330;  industrial  prosperity  of, 
330;  menace  of  Russia  felt  in, 
332 ;  the  Reinsurance  treaty  of 
1884  concluded  by,  332;  effect 
of  treaty  in,  colonial  expansion 
of,  333 ;  in  Togoland,  Cam- 
eroon, East  and  Southwest  Af- 
rica, and  Australasian  islands, 
334;  nav)^  of,  334;  the  Mar- 
shall Islands  incident,  325  ;  the 
Berlin  Conference  and  the  co- 
lonial plans  of,  339;  as  the 
central  figure  in  colonial  com- 
petition, 339;  extent  of  colo- 
nial domain  of,  339;  influence 
of  the  new  generation  in,  340; 
concept  of  the  State  as  Power 
in,    340;    see    also    under    Bis- 


358 


INDEX 


marck,  Nationalism,  and  Im- 
perialism. 

Germans  (The),  political  ca- 
pacity of,  129;  racial  charac- 
teristics of,  130;  Western  in- 
fluence on,  130;  idealism  of, 
130;  as  an  Urvolk,  131;  the- 
ory of  State  of,  133;  influence 
of  Fichte  on,  131,  I35;  national 
unity  of,  136  sqq.;  social  con- 
sciousness of,  340. 

Gladstone,  265;  Turkish  policy 
of,  278 ;  on  Bulgarian  atroci- 
ties, quoted,  287;  return  to 
office     of,      318;      and      Italy, 

325- 

Gneist,  R.,  The  History  of  the 
English  Constitution  by,  cited, 
62  note. 

Gorst,  Sir  John  Eldon,  quoted, 
312. 

Gortchakov,  280. 

Grand  Alliance  (1815),  93  and 
note. 

Greece,  national  unity  in,  38; 
political  maturity  of  ancient, 
117;  struggle  for  independence 
of  modern  (1827),  104;  as  heir 
of  Eastern  Empire,  280,  284; 
England  and,  283,  284;  in 
Russo-Turkish  war,  291 ;  cited 

296,  314- 
Grotius,  18. 
Guildhall,  speech  of  Disraeli  at, 

288. 


Ham,  124. 

Hamburg,  334. 

Harmony  Hall,  170. 

Hague,  204;  Conference  of,  249 

note. 
Hanotaux   (Gabriel),  La  France 

Contemporaine,  cited  274,  321. 
Hapsburg  (House  of),  cited,  128, 

141,    153,    191. 
Hartmann,     Philosophy     of     the 

Unconscious  by,  cited  217. 
Hegel,  cosmopolitanism   of,    131  ; 

political    philosophy    of,     133; 


idea  of  the  state  of,  133  sqq.; 
his  Philosophy  of  Mind  quoted, 
133  sqq.;  his  influence  on 
teachings  of  Marx,  159,  170, 
171  ;  the  triad  of,  159;  Rechts- 
philosophie    of,    cited    159. 

Heidelberg,  University  of,  19. 

Helvetic,  see  Sw^itzerland. 

Herzegovina,  revolt  in  (1875), 
278,  279,  284;  Austrian  con- 
trol over,  286,  291,  296. 

Historical  Materialism,  Marxian 
theory  of,  161  sqq.;  213  note; 
Labriola  quoted  on,   162. 

Histoire  du  Second  Empire,  see 
La  Gorce. 

History,  new^  method  of,  viii; 
truth  of,  14;  nature  of  po- 
litical, 115,  118;  periodicity 
in,  115;  comparative  method 
in,  115  sqq.;  political  matur- 
ity in,  117  sqq.;  objects  of, 
154;  the  will  in,  154  sqq.; 
Marxian  view   of,    161. 

History  of  Contemporary  Europe, 
see  Seignobos. 

History  of  the  English  Constitu- 
tion, see  Gneist. 

History  of  European  Morals, 
see  Lecky. 

History  of  the  Philosophy  of 
History  in  France,  see  Flint. 

History  of  Rome,  see  Mommsen. 

Hobbes,  7,  21;  the  will  in  poli- 
tics, 50  note ;  contrasted  with 
Rousseau,  52. 

HohenzoUern  (House  of),  205. 

Holland,  8;  united  with  Belgium, 
93 ;  French  and  English  inter- 
vention in,  107;  as  Minor 
Power,  228  note;  cited  289; 
colonial  plans  of,  334;  claims 
to  the  Congo  of,  377  sqq. 

Holy  Alliance,  provisions  of,  94 
note;  United  States  and,  96; 
cited  by  Napoleon,  122;  cited 
124,  189;  plan  to  revive,  275; 
cited  by  Disraeli,  289. 

Holy  Roman  Empire,  128,  237; 
significance  of,  327 ;  the  Triple 


INDEX 


359 


Alliance  compared  to,  326,  328; 
Church  and,  327. 

Homer,  38. 

Humanity,  idea  of,  37  sqq. 

Hume,  71. 

Hungary,  151,  153,  169,  183,  250; 
Russian  intervention  in,  184, 
193;  relations  with  Austria  of, 
202;  establishment  of  dualist 
system  in  relations  with  Aus- 
tria, 202,  245. 


Ihtfring,  R.,  Der  Kampf  urns 
Recht  of,  quoted,  344. 

Imperialism,  German  concept  of, 
136;  Middle  Class  definition 
of,  140  and  note,  249,  256  and 
note;  as  a  political  theory,  256 
sqq.;  character  of,  258;  aims 
of,  259;  origin  of,  249  note; 
English  concept  of,  256  and 
note;  economic  nature  of,  256; 
epoch  of,  257;  share  of  Middle 
Class  in,  259,  263 ;  proletarian 
influence  on,  258,  259,  263 ; 
interpretation  of,  266;  Disraeli 
as  leader  of,  266,  299,  318; 
German,  English,  and  Russian, 
277  sqq.;  example  of,  in  Tunis 
incident,  320  sqq.;  Triple  Alli- 
ance and,  327. 

India,  109  note,  258;  Russian 
threat  against,  184,  277;  Queen 
Victoria  crowned  Empress  of, 
266. 

Individualism,  origin  of,  in  poli- 
tics, 20;  the  Middle  Class  view 
of,  61;  liberty  and,  71;  Napo- 
leon and,  85,  123,  227,  and 
nationalism,  98,  105,  241 ;  St. 
Simon  on,  99;  influence  of  the 
Middle  Class  based  on,  lOO, 
102,  237,  241;  decline  of,  125; 
Louis  Philippe  and,  144;  and 
the  suffrage,  149;  existing  so- 
cial order  as  dependent  on 
concept  of,  149;  Communist 
view  of,  167;  the  State  and, 
224   sqq. J   230,    234,   301 ;    eco- 


nomics and,  225 ;  exaggeration 
of,  260;  as  factor  of  decadence, 
260;  decline  of,  239,  267;  cited, 
216,  304. 

Indo-China,   333. 

Industrialism,  vii,  102 ;  in  Eng- 
land,   109;   177,  215,  218,  304. 

International  Industrial  Exhibi- 
tion (London  1851),  first  ex- 
hibition held  to  advertise  indus- 
trial development,   178. 

International  Exhibition  (Lon- 
don 1862),  as  occasion  of 
founding  of  internationalism, 
250. 

International  Workingmen's  As- 
sociation, see  Internationalism. 

Internationale,  the  First,  see  In- 
ternationalism. 

Internationalism,  definition  of, 
248,  249;  and  the  founding  of 
the  First  Internationale,  250; 
Marx  and,  250;  Marx  draws 
up  programme  of,  250;  rapid 
growth  of,  250,  253 ;  Commun- 
ism and,  251  ;  moderation  of, 
251  ;  temporising  character  of, 
253 ;  estimate  of  effects  of,  253 
sqq.;  at  Basel,  253;  disruption 
of,  255 ;  economic  aspects  of, 
255;  and  imperialism,  258;  see 
also  under  Communism  and 
Karl  Marx. 

Intervention,  right  of,  104. 

Ireland,  disturbances  in  (1798), 
89;  abolition  of  Parliament  of 
(1801),  89;  incorporation  of, 
in   England,   89. 

Iron  Chancellor,  see  Bismarck. 

Italy,  conditions  in  i6th  century 
in,  22;  Napoleon  and  national 
unity  of,  86 ;  effect  of  Con- 
gress of  Vienna  on,  93  ;  nation- 
alism in,  128;  demand  for  po- 
litical liberty  in,  151;  aspira- 
tion of  people  of,  for  national 
independence,  152;  revolutions 
in,  152;  engaged  in  war  against 
Austria  (1848),  152;  defeat  of, 
152;  nationalism  in,   153,   169, 


36o 


INDEX 


183,  196;  war  of  1859  and, 
194;  unification  of,  under 
House  of  Savoy,  195  sqq.;  war 
of,  with  Austria  (1866),  200; 
as  Great  Power,  228  note;  in- 
ternationalism in,  254;  unity  in, 
245;  seizure  of  Rome  by,  274; 
at  Congress  of  Berlin,  297 ;  in- 
terests of,  in  Tunis,  320  sqq.; 
isolation  of,  in  Europe,  321; 
Bismarck's  policy  regarding, 
325;  seeks  alliance  with  Ger- 
many and  Austria,  325 ;  details 
of  negotiations  of  alliance,  325 ; 
concludes  alliance  (1882),  325; 
as  a  member  of  Triple  Alli- 
ance, 326;  role  of,  in  alliance, 
327 ;  plans  of  Germany  to  ex- 
ploit, economically,  327 ;  and 
German  policy  of  peaceful 
penetration,  327 ;  colonial  plans 
of,  334- 


James  II  (King  of  England),  31. 

James  (W.),  The  Moral  Equiv- 
alent of  War  by,  cited,  344. 

Japan,  opened  to  Western  inter- 
course, 191 ;  looking  to  West 
as  model,  246. 

Jena,  battle  of,  131 ;  207  note. 

Jesuits,  organisations  of,  in 
Prussia  dissolved,  307. 

Jingoism,  see  Disraeli. 

Johannet  (Rene),  Le  Principe 
des  Nationalites  by,  cited,  84 
note. 

John  Bull,  England  personified 
as,   176. 

Joseph  II  (Emperor  of  Austria), 

33- 
Julius  II  (Pope),  23. 
Jura  Federation,  254. 
Justinian,  code  of,  57;   Pandects 

of,  84. 


Kant,  plan  of  an  universal  State 

of,  65. 
Kars,  capture  of,  291,  293,  296. 


Konigsberg,  67. 

Krumirs,  321. 

Kulturkampf,      see      Bismarck; 

Prussia. 
Kutchuk     Kainardji,     treaty     of 

(1774),  284. 


Labriola  (A.),  Del  Material- 
ismo  Storico  of,  cited,  161; 
quoted,    162. 

Lafayette,  37. 

Lafitte  (Paris  banker),  as  king- 
maker, 106. 

Laibach    (1821),    (Congress   of), 

95,  104. 

Lamartine,  quoted,  86,   138,   174. 

Lasalle,  166,  310. 

Laurent,  Etudes  sur  I'Histoire  de 
I'Humanite  by,  quoted,  211. 

La  France  Contemporaine,  see 
Hanotaux. 

La  Gorce,  Histoire  du  Second 
Empire  by,  quoted  186. 

La  Goulette,  321. 

League  of  Nations  (1919),  249 
note. 

Lecky,  History  of  European 
Morals  by,  quoted   128,  147. 

Legge  (James),  The  Chinese 
Classics,  quoted  38  note. 

Legitimacy,  doctrine  of,  93  sqq.; 
congress  held  to  enforce  policy 
of,  95 ;  England  and  policy  of, 
95;  decline  of,  95,  104. 

Leipzig,   131. 

Leo  XIII   (Pope),  335  note. 

Leopold  (Prince),  as  Hohenzol- 
lern  candidate  for  Spanish 
throne,  205,  206. 

Leopold  II  (King  of  the  Bel- 
gians) new  type  of  sovereign, 
336;  as  a  capitalist,  336;  co- 
lonial plans  of,  337 ;  African 
policy  of,  337;  as  founder  of 
African  International  Associa- 
tion, 337;  chosen  sovereign  of 
Congo  Free  State,  338. 

Le  Nouveau  Christianisme,  see 
St.  Simon, 


I 


INDEX 


361 


Les  Six  Livres  de  la  Republique, 
see  Bodin. 

Lettres  sur  la  Philosophie  de 
I'Histoire,  see  Odysse-Barot. 

Leviathan,  cited,  52. 

Liberty,  nature  of,  41  ;  politics 
and  the  idea  of,  41 ;  economic 
doctrine  of,  70  sqq.;  as  privi- 
lege,  176. 

Life  of  Oliver  Cromwell,  see 
Morley. 

Life  of  Benjamin  Disraeli,  see 
Buckle. 

Locke,  theory  of  state  of,  19, 
iO',  his  Treatise  on  Civil  Gov- 
ernment, cited,  19;  relations 
between  governing  and  gov- 
erned as  outlined  by,  30;  on 
the  will  in  politics,  50  note; 
constitution  of  Carolina  of, 
cited,  61  note. 

Louis  XIV  (King  of  France),  9; 
conception  of  sovereignty  of, 
quoted,  83  and  note. 

Louis  XVI  (King  of  France), 
summons  the  States  General, 
75;  during  the  revolution,  78; 
death  of,  79. 

Louis  XVIII  (King  of  France), 
charter  granted  by,  91. 

Louis  Philippe  (King  of  the 
French),  accession  of,  106;  as 
representative  of  the  Middle 
Class,  106;  his  juste  milieu 
policy,  106,  173;  anti-national- 
ist policy  of,  144;  overthrow 
of,  152,  172. 
London,  7,  67,  178;  Communist 
Manifesto  issued  at,  156;  con- 
ference of  (1871),  275. 
Luther,  4,  9;  political  effects  of 

work  of,  7. 
Luxemburg,     182;    incident,    de- 
tails of,  203  sqq. 


Machiavelli,  7,  21;  political  doc- 
trines of,  17;  theory  of  State 
of,  23;  the  Prince  of,  17;  re- 
vival   of    doctrines    of,    after 


1870,  210,  211,  220;  ranked 
with  Aristotle,  211  ;  theories  of, 
compared  with  those  of  Bis- 
marck, 303 ;  Treitschke  on, 
303. 

Macaulay  (Lord),  quoted,  x; 
Essay  on  Machiavelli  of, 
quoted,  223. 

Madagascar,  334. 

Madrid,  7. 

Magenta,  battle  of,   194. 

Magna  Carta,  30. 

Magyars,  see   Hungary. 

Maistre   (Joseph  de),  quoted,  98. 

Malakoff,  fall  of  the,   186. 

Malta,  British  troops  ordered  to, 
266. 

Manchester  School,  as  repre- 
senting Middle  Class  liberal 
viewpoint,  258. 

Manifesto  of  the  Communist 
Party,  see  under  Marx,  also 
Communism. 

Marianne,   France  as,    176. 

Marmora,  Sea  of,  284,  291. 

Marshall  (Alfred),  Principles  of 
Economics  of,  cited,  68  note. 

Marshall  Islands,  incident  of, 
335 ;  Papal  award  respecting, 
335 ;  purchase  of.  by  Germany, 

335- 
Marx  (Karl),  loo;  joint  author 
of  the  Communist  Manifesto, 
157;  social  theories  of,  158 
sqq.;  influence  of  Hegel  on, 
159,  171  ;  Zur  Kritik  der  politi- 
schen  Oekonomine,  by  quoted, 
159,  160;  theory  of  historical 
materialism  of,  161  sqq.,  213 
note;  view  of  the  Reformation 
of,  162;  realism  of,  165; 
quoted,  167  note;  limitations 
of,  170;  nationalist  bias  of,  171 
and  note;  cited,  213  note;  and 
First  Internationale,  250,  251; 
endorsement  of  Commune  of 
Paris  by  254  note;  theories  of, 
compared  with  those  of  Bis- 
marck, 302 ;  method  of  revolu- 
tion advocated  by,  302. 


362 


INDEX 


Mary   (Queen  of  England),  28, 

Massachusetts,  middle  class  or- 
ganisation of,  61   note. 

Materialism,  see  Historical  Ma- 
terialism. 

Maximilian  (Archduke),  se- 
lected by  Napoleon  III  to  be 
emperor  of  Mexico,  198;  fate 
of,  202. 

Mayence,  203. 

Meaux,  275. 

Mediterranean,  107;  England 
and  the,  278,  283;  the  eastern, 
280. 

Mexico,  condition  of,  in  1861, 
197;  disturbances  in,  197;  Eu- 
ropean intervention  in,  197; 
France  declares  war  on,  197; 
French  in,  198;  Maximilian, 
emperor  of,  199;  intervention 
of  United  States  in  behalf  of, 
200;  recall  of  French  troops 
from,  202;  overthrow  of  Em- 
pire of,  202. 

Middle    Class,    term    defined,    31 
note;      constitutional     govern- 
ment in  England,  as  established 
by,  31  sqq.,  60 ;  puritanical  na- 
ture of,  31,  60;   and  progress, 
42  sqq.;  constitutional  govern- 
ment   in    United    States    estab- 
lished   by,    60;    economic    doc- 
trine of,  70  sqq.;  and  the  aris- 
tocracy in  England,   71;   share 
of,       in       French       Revolution 
(1789),    75    sqq.;    moderation 
of,    77,    100;    as    ruling   power 
in  France,  80,   106;  nationalist 
doctrine     of,     81 ;     effects     of 
French   revolution   on   English, 
89;    and    the    Restoration,    97; 
individualism  of,  61,  100,  102 ; 
theory    of    State    of,    65    sqq.; 
the   politico-juridic  concept  of, 
100;        industrial        movement 
and,  102;  economic  interests  of, 
102 ;   gains   control  of  govern- 
ment  in   France,    106;   concept 
of  the  State  of,   120;  the  tri- 


umph of,  see  Book  I,  Chap.  X; 
influence  of  business  methods 
on  public  policy  of,  107,  109, 
139;  Chartism  and  the  Eng- 
lish, no,  112;  changes  in,  in 
France,  143;  conservatism  of, 
145;  the  suffrage  question  and, 
145  sqq.;  attacked  by  rising 
Proletariat,  156;  proletarian 
view  of,  160;  Marx  and,  162 
sqq.;  social  legislation  of,  167; 
communism  and,  167  sqq.; 
dictatorship  of,  191 ;  mile- 
stones in  history  of,  226;  serv- 
ices rendered  by,  226,  236  sqq.; 
class  consciousness  of,  238 ; 
John  Stuart  Mill  as  repre- 
sentative of,  quoted,  239;  the 
Nation-State  as  product  of  the 
civilisation  of,  226,  238,  241, 
248;  compared  with  Aristoc- 
racy and  Proletariat,  267  sqq.; 
view  of  imperialism,  257  sqq.; 
hostility  of,  towards  colonial 
enterprise,  258;  abolition  of 
aristocratic  control  by,  269; 
historical      position      of,      342, 

347-  ,     , 

Mih-Teih,  doctrine  of  brotherly 
love  of,  38  and  note. 

Milan,  revolt  at,   152. 

Mill  (John  Stuart),  quoted,  33. 
236  note;  utilitarian  doctrines 
of,  127  and  note;  as  t\^pical 
representative  of  Middle  Class, 
quoted  239  and  note ;  opposi- 
tion to  annexation  of  India  of, 
258. 

Mirabeau,  quoted,  78  note. 

Mirbt,  Quellen  zur  Geschichte 
des  Papstums,  quoted,  306 
note. 

Mokana,  310  note. 

Moldavia,   187,  188. 

Moltke,  171  note. 

Mommsen,  History  of  Rome  of, 
quoted,  27  note,  39  note,  87. 

Monroe   Doctrine,   95.    ^98,   246. 

Montenegro,  revolt  in,  284,  286; 
independence  of,  296. 


INDEX 


363 


Montesquieu,  on  origin  of  con- 
stitutional government,  27 ;  De 
I'Esprit  des  Lois  of,  quoted,  27 
and  note,  37,  49  and  note,  50, 
66  note ;  follows  Aristotle,  49 
and  note;  the  politico-juridic 
theory  of  State  summed  up  by, 
52;  influence  of,  on  Constitu- 
tion of  United  States,  53,  63; 
Middle  Class  influence  on,  66 
note. 

Morality,  as  attribute  of  the 
State,  26  sqq.;  separation  of, 
from  politics,  see  Politics. 

More  (Sir  Thomas),  the  Utopia 
of,  cited,  158;  quoted  by  Bis- 
marck, 310  note. 

Morley  (Lord),  Life  of  Oliver 
Cromwell  by,  quoted,  32. 

Morocco,  324. 

Moscow,  288. 

Murray  (James  A.  H.),  256 
note. 


Naples,  152;  Franco-British 
fleet  at,  193. 

Napoleon  I,  79,  82,  128,  226; 
historical  mission  of,  83 ;  atti- 
tude towards  Revolution  of, 
83,  85;  theory  of  State  of,  83 
note;  effect  of  campaigns  in 
Italy  and  Prussia  on,  84;  esti- 
mate of  role  of,  83  and  note, 
84;  and  nationalism,  86,  87,  90, 
93,  123,  124,  138,  185;  prestige 
of  name  of,  123,  173;  quoted, 
85  note,  122,  I76«;  compared 
with   Bismarck,  273. 

Napoleon  III  (Prince  Louis  Na- 
poleon) Napoleonic  Ideas 
written  by,  83  note,  122; 
quoted,  83;  character  of,  123; 
intrigues  of,  123  sqq.;  impris- 
onment of,  124;  as  president 
of  Republic  of  1848,  173; 
coup  d'etat  of,  173;  assump- 
tion of  imperial  dignity  by, 
173;  Emperor  of  the  French, 
173;  nationalist  policy  of,  175, 


181 ;  his  relations  with  Italians 
and  Hungarians,  181 ;  English 
policy  of,  182,  185,  192;  his 
hostility  towards  Austria,  183; 
Russian  policy  of,  185;  his 
share  in  the  Crimean  war,  185; 
triumph  of,  186;  peace  policy 
of,  187;  at  the  Congress  of 
Paris,  188;  Russophile  atti- 
tude of,  190;  plans  of  aggran- 
disement of,  189;  Italian  pol- 
icy of,  193;  diplomacy  of,  193 
sqq.;  his  negotiations  with 
Alexander  II,  194;  and  Ca- 
vour,  194;  and  the  Plombieres 
Agreement,  194;  Italian  cam- 
paign of  1859  of,  194;  pre- 
eminent in  Europe,  196;  his 
views  on  the  Polish  question, 
197  and  note,  198;  interven- 
tion in  Mexico  by,  197,  200; 
his  prestige  in  Europe  shaken, 
198;  his  relations  with  the 
United  States,  200,  202 ;  Prus- 
sian policy  of,  199,  200,  202; 
political  concessions  granted  by, 
203 ;  his  part  in  the  Luxem- 
burg incident,  203  sqq.;  his  re- 
lations with  Alexander  II,  203, 
204;  foresees  Pan-German 
plans,  205  and  note ;  his  at- 
tempt to  form  coalition 
against  Prussia,  207;  plan  of 
military  concentration  against 
Prussia,  207  note ;  declares  war 
on  Prussia,  207 ;  attitude  of 
Russia  towards,  207 ;  defeat 
and  capture  of,  208. 

Napoleon  (Prince  Louis),  see 
Napoleon  III. 

Napoleonic  Ideas,  see  Napoleon 
III. 

Nationalism,  concept  of,  3,  13; 
origins  of,  80  sqq.;  propaganda 
of,  by  France,  81  ;  as  political 
factor  in  France,  81;  abstract, 
82 ;  Napoleon  I  as  missionary 
of,  83,  85;  English  viewpoint 
regarding,  89;  and  individual- 
ism,   98,     105 ;     de     Maistre's 


364 


INDEX 


view  of,  98;  in  1830,  105;  and 
capitalism,  107,  139;  cohesive 
force  of,  120;  dominant  in 
France,  124;  spread  of,  128; 
effect  of,  in  France,  127,  139; 
in  Germany,  132,  138,  140, 
196,  205;  in  Italy,  128,  196; 
racial  theory  of,  138,  140,  196, 
206,  246;  in  Austria,  141; 
transformation  of,  144;  policy 
of  Napoleon  III  re  175,  181, 
205;  in  Russia,  183;  in  public 
life,  176,  180;  dominant  in 
Europe,  192,  211  sqq.;  as  a 
routine  policy  after  1870,  209; 
realism  and,  222 ;  anti-,  232 
sqq.,  254  note;  decline  of  in- 
fluence of,  246,  299;  and  inter- 
nationalism, 252 ;  as  a  factor 
of  decadence,  260;  superna- 
tional  expansion  as  an  out- 
growth of,  318. 
National  Assembly  (French),  76, 

77. 

Nation-State,  120;  formative 
stage  of,  176,  178  sqq.;  Napo- 
leon III  and,  181,  205,  206; 
cohesive  unity  of,  179;  France 
as  a  model,  182;  evolution  of, 
209;  theory  of  the,  218;  influ- 
ence of  volitional  doctrine  on, 
220;  relation  of  the  individual 
to,  179,  216;  as  created  in  the 
image  of  man,  225  ;  as  a  prod- 
uct of  the  Middle  Class,  226, 
238,  241  ;  racial  factors  in  for- 
mation of,  246;  and  imperial- 
ism, 249;  internationalism  and, 
249,  251  sqq.;  new  policy  of, 
259;  transition  of,  259;  aim  of 
Proletariat  to  destroy,  270; 
struggle  for  power  of,  277, 
299;  maturity  of,  298;  Bis- 
marck and  the,  313;  Disraeli 
and  the,  313,  318;  destructive 
agencies  within,  313,  327;  civi- 
lising mission  of,  323 ;  theory  of 
exploitation  of,  323,  329. 

Navarino,  battle  of   (1827),  105. 

Neo-Platonism,   teachings  of,  40. 


New  England,  colonial  life  in,  57; 
type  of  settlers  of,  58. 

New  York,  255. 

Nice,    181,    196. 

Nicholas  I  (Emperor  of  Russia), 
nationalist  policy  of,  183;  and 
Poland,  184;  renders  assist- 
ance to  Austria,  184;  Turkish 
policy  of,  185;  the  Crimean 
war  and,  185;  death  of,  186. 

Niger,  free  navigation  of,  338. 

Nikolsburg,  armistice  of  (1866), 
200. 

Nile,  battle  of,  283. 

North  German  Confederation, 
see  Germany. 

Novara,  defeat  of  Italians  at, 
152. 


Odysse-Barot,  Lettres  sur  la 
Philosophie  de  VHistoire  by, 
quoted,  233  and  note. 

(Edipus  at  Colonus,  see  Sopho- 
cles. 

Ollivier,  E.,  Empire  Liberal  by, 
quoted,  197  note. 

On   Liberty,  see   Mill. 

Opium  Trade,  attitude  of  Eng- 
land in,  232  note. 

Ottoman  Empire,  see  Turkey. 

Owen,  Communist  plans  of,  158, 
170. 

Oxford  Dictionary,  quoted,  256 
and  note. 


Palermo,  157. 

Palestine,  policing  of  Holy  Places 
in,  as  pretext  for  Crimean  war, 
185. 

Pandects,  of  Justinian,  84. 

Pan-Slavic  movement  cited,  183, 
286;  oflScially  taken  up  by  Rus- 
sia, 278;  directed  from  St. 
Petersburg,  278;  objects  of, 
278. 

Papacy,  control  of  social  order 
by,  2,  4;  position  in  Middle 
Ages    of,    3 ;    authority    of,    in 


INDEX 


365 


secular  affairs,  3;  the  Refor- 
mation and,  4;  supremacy 
claimed  by,  21;  absolutism  of, 
21  ;  control  of  secular  and 
spiritual  life  bvj  22;  bull  Unam 
Sanctam  quoted  re,  22  note; 
effects  of  Reformation  on,  8, 
17;  position  of,  in  15th  and 
16th  centuries,  22;  political 
privileges  of,  22;  territorial 
sovereignty  of,  22 ;  struggle  of, 
with  Empire,  40;  insurrection 
'.of   1830,    123;  cited,    162,  238; 

'  question  of  Papal  infallibility 
raised  by,  305,  306  and  note; 
its  relations  with  Germany 
and  Austria,  306  note ;  and 
the  Concordat  with  France  of 
1801,  306  note;  end  of  tem- 
poral power  of,  306  and 
note;  struggle  ofj  with  Prus- 
sia, 307 ;  details  of  attitude  of, 
during  the  Kulturkampf,  308; 
Bismarck  and,  309,  335  note; 
end  of  the  Kulturkampf,  309; 
reconciliation  of,  with  Prussia, 
324;  reestablishment  of  tempo- 
ral power  of  advocated,  329. 

Paris,  7,  157,  206,  207,  274;  fail- 
ure of  revolutionary  outbreaks 
at  (1848),  152;  strike  at,  251 
note;  the  Commune  of  (1871), 
254  and  note. 

Paris,  Congress  of  (1856),  gen- 
eral plan  of,  187;  role  of  Na- 
poleon III  at,  188;  Prussia  ad- 
mitted to,  187;  Russian  policy 
at,  188;  Russo-French  under- 
standing at,  189;  terms  of 
treaty  signed  at,  188;  Italian 
unity  discussed  with  Napoleon 
III  by  Cavour  during,  191 ;  re- 
vision of,  275,  276;  treaty  of, 
cited,  279. 

Parliament,  as  repositary  of  po- 
litical power,  1 1  ;  struggle  of, 
with  the  crown  in  England,  28, 
33 ;  effect  of  revolution  of  1688 
on,  28,  31;  as  supreme  author- 
ity, 28,  29;  arbitrary  powers  of, 


32 ;  Blackstone  quoted  on,  32 
note;  extension  of  authority  of, 
32;  absorption  of  Scotland  by, 
33;  abolition  of  Irish  Parlia- 
ment by,  89;  reform  of  (1832), 
107;  the  Middle  Class  and  the 
electorate  of,    145   and  note. 

Pascal,  on  progress,  46;  Pensees 
sur  la  Morale  by,  quoted,  93. 

Peace,  economic  value  of,  332; 
long  era  of  European  peace, 
333;  economic  factors  of,  333; 
doctrine  of  armed,  333. 

Peking,   192. 

Pennsylvania,  proprietary  colony 
of,  61   note. 

Pensees  sur  la  Morale,  see  Pas- 
cal. 

Peoples'  Charter,  see  Chartism. 

Perfectibility,  as  a  corollary  of 
progress,  see  Progress. 

Persia,  38. 

Pessimism,  doctrine  of,  216;  in- 
fluence on  politics  of,  213; 
Schopenhauer's  teaching  of, 
216;  Hartmann's  theory  of 
cosmic  suicide  and,  217;  effects 
of,  217;  Bourget's  review  of 
quoted,    261 ;    the    passing    of> 

319- 

Peter  Leopold,  33. 

Philosophy  of  Mind,  see  Hegel. 

Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious, 
see  Hartmann. 

Physiocrats,  as  founders  of  eco- 
nomic science,  68;  influence  of, 
on  Adam  Smith,  69. 

Physiocratie  ou  Constitution 
Naturelle  du  Gouvernement  le 
plus  avantageux  du  genre  hu- 
main,  see  Dupont  de  Nemours. 

Piedmont,  constitutional  reforms 
in,  152;  war  of,  against  Aus- 
tria, 152;  at  Congress  of  Paris, 
187;  role  of,  in  Italy,  191. 

Pius  IX  (Pope),  Encyclical  and 
Syllabus  of  (1864),  305  j  sum- 
mons Vatican  Council,  305 ; 
attitude  re  question  of  infalli- 
bility,   306    note;    struggle    of, 


366 


INDEX 


with  Bismarck,  308 ;  death  of, 
308. 

Plato,  38;  Republic  of,  cited,  158. 

Plevna,  siege  of,  291. 

Plombieres,  agreement  of,  194. 

Poland,  93>  169;  Louis  Napoleon 
offered  the  crown  of,  123;  ef- 
fect of  Italian  unity  on,  196; 
nationalism  in,  184;  France 
and,  187,  196;  European  inter- 
vention in  behalf  of,  198;  atti- 
tude of  Napoleon  III  towards, 
197  sqq.  and  note;  revolt  of 
1863  in,  198;  France  fails  to 
give  armed  assistance  to,  198. 

Politica,  see  Althusius. 

Politico-Economic  (Theory  of 
State)  genesis  of,  223  sqq.; 
definition  of  term,  223  note; 
growth  of  authority  of  the 
State  due  to,  228;  effect  of,  on 
individual  welfare,  229-230;  re- 
sults of,  on  diplomacy,  231  ; 
on  public  policy,  231  ;  realism 
of,  235 ;  influence  of  Prole- 
tariat on,  240,  241  ;  the  State 
as  Power  based  on,  247  sqq.; 
extra-national      character      of, 

319- 

Politico-Juridic  (Theory  of 
State),  origins  of,  13,  47  sqq.; 
nature  of,  19,  27;  as  the  State 
fashioned  in  the  image  of  man, 
19  sqq.;  as  the  basis  of  consti- 
tutional government,  lOo;  out- 
line of,  by  Locke,  19,  30;  in- 
fluence of  Rousseau  and  Mon- 
tesquieu on,  52 ;  positivism  and, 
127;  as  adopted  by  Germany, 
130;  rejected  by  Communism, 
164;  individualist  basis  of,  223; 
as  the  contribution  of  the  Mid- 
dle Class,  226  sqq.;  decline  of, 
218,  257,  329. 

Politico-Theistic  (Theory  of 
State),  9,  10,  II  ;  as  represented 
in  monarchical  absolutism,  18, 
23;  supplanted  by  juridic  the- 
ory, 19  sqq.;  abuses  of,  19;  sur- 
vival of  form  of,  13;  the  State 


fashioned  in  the  image  of  God 
as  the  basis  of,  23 ;  Machiavelli, 
as  the  founder  of,  23 ;  new  ab- 
solutism of  the  later  19th  cen- 
tury  compared   with,   234   sqq. 

Politics,  role  of,  ix ;  contrasted 
with  religion,  3,  5,  9;  effect  of 
Reformation,  4,  7;  revival  of 
interest  in,  5  ;  as  principal  pre- 
occupation of  men,  6;  as  sup- 
planting religion  as  the  motive 
force  in  social  life,  5,  8 ;  sub- 
stitution of  the  juridic  for  the 
theistic  basis  of,  13;  defects  of, 
55;  linked  with  economics,  105; 
nature  of,  115,  117;  complexity 
of,  116;  question  of  maturity 
in,  116  sqq.;  and  social  life, 
118;  spread  of,  118,  119;  in 
Germany,  129  sqq.;  historical 
materialism  and,  162;  new  spir- 
it in,  210,  215;  separation  of 
morals  from,  210,  211,  note, 
220,  231  ;  realism  in,  212  sqq. 
222;  pessimism  and,  216  sqq.; 
partisanship  in,  217;  influence 
of  economics  on,  222  sqq.;  and 
power,  224;  zenith  of  develop- 
ment of,  234;  as  a  matter  of 
compromise,  238;  new  creed  of, 
319;  Bismarck  and,  303  sqq., 
342;  international,  315  sqq.; 
subservient  to  economics,  329; 
war  and,  344  note ;  and  the 
nation-state,  345 ;  theories  of, 
see  also  under  Althusius, 
Hobbes,  Machiavelli,  Bodin, 
Locke,  Montesquieu,  Rous- 
seau, Treitschke. 

Politik,  see  Bluntschli. 

Polltik,  see  Treitschke. 

Pombal,   33. 

Porte,  see  Turkey. 

Portugal,  inquisition  in,  8;  con- 
stitutional government  in,  128 
note;  colonial  plans  of,  334; 
claims    to    Congo   of,   337   sqq. 

Positivism,  see  Comte. 

Power,  (The  State  as)  new  doc- 
trine of,  247  sqq.;  Bismarck's 


INDEX 


367 


theory  of,  303 ;  social  aspects  of, 
303,    329,    344;    new    horizons 
opened  by,  317,  339,  345;  appli- 
cation of  doctrine  of,  341  sqq.; 
factor  of  disciplined  violence  in, 
343;  the  war  function  of,  344; 
effect   on   political   practice   of, 
345 ;     historical      function     of, 
347- 
Prague,  treaty  of,  201. 
Prince     {The),    see    Machiavelli. 
Principles      of      Economics,      see 
,  Marshall. 

^Progress,   concept   of,   6;   histori- 
cal review  of  idea  of,  42  sqq.; 
as      contribution      of      Middle 
Class    to    political    theory    and 
social    practice,    45    sqq.,    226; 
positivism   and,    125;    Marxian 
view  of,    162,  213   note;   effect 
of  evolutionary  theory  on,  213. 
Proletariat,    119,    126;    aims    of, 
156;    Marxian    theory   of,    158 
sqq.;  first  participation  in  pub- 
lic affairs  of,  158;  ultimate  des- 
tiny   of,    according    to    Marx, 
160,   166;  domination  of  social 
order   by,   predicted,    159;    dic- 
tatorship of,  162,  164;  revolt  of, 
preached,  163;  as  a  distinct  so- 
cial   unit,    164;    effects    of    rise 
of,    on    the    State,    248;    inter- 
nationalism  and,   248   sqq.;  ef- 
fects   of    First    Internationale 
on,  251  sqq.;  struggle  of,  with 
capitalism,  256;  vigor  of,  257; 
support  of  imperialism  by,  259; 
compared      with       aristocracy, 
268;    class    characteristics    of, 
268,   299;   plan   of,    to   destroy 
Nation-State,  270;   mission  of, 
271;    Bismarck   and,   302,   310. 
Property,  theory  of  private,   167; 
abolition    of    private,    proposed 
by  communists,  167. 
Proudhon,  as  founder  of  Anarchy, 

232;  quoted,  232. 
Providence,  idea  of,  45  and  note, 
94  note ;  influence  of,  on  polit- 
ical affairs,  48,  236. 


Prussia,    in    the    Holy    Alliance, 
94    note;    signs    agreement    of 
Troppau,  95 ;   aims  at   ascend- 
ancy   in     Germany,     128;    the 
Zollverein    and,    128;    influence 
of  Hegel  on,  133  sqq.;  leader- 
ship   of,    136,    140;    revival    of 
prosperity  in,   137;  nationalism 
in,   140;  political  incapacity  of, 
141  ;  revolution  of  1848  in,  153 ; 
attitude  of  Frederick  William 
IV,    in,    153;    at    Congress    of 
Paris,    187;    role    of,    in    Ger- 
many,  191  ;  plans  of  expansion 
of,  199;  Napoleon  III  and,  199, 
200;    relations    of,    with    Rus- 
sia, 196  sqq.,  205;  war  of,  with 
Denmark,   200;    annexation   of 
Danish   Duchies   by,  200;   war 
of,   with  Austria,  200;   results 
of    wars    with    Denmark    and 
Austria  in,  201  ;  as  head  of  the 
North  German  Confederation, 
201;  aggressive  policy  of,  204; 
attitude    of    Europe    towards, 
206;  war  with  France  of,  207; 
education  in,  229  note;  effect  of 
rise  of,  245,  265;  struggle  of, 
with    Papacy,    305    sqq.;    laws 
decreed    by,    dissolving    Jesuit 
organisations,  307;   role  of,   in 
the  Empire  after  formation  of 
Triple  Alliance,  326;  purchase 
of    railways    by,    21  ;    economic 
expansion  of,  331. 
Psychologic    Contemporaine,    see 

Bourget. 
Public  Opinion,  rise  of,  35  sqq.; 
in    France,    36;    cited,    47,    72, 
214,   218,   239;   see  also    Book 
I,   Chapter   III. 
Pufendorf,  19. 

Puritanism,  influence  of,  in  Eng- 
land and  America,  32;  and 
politics  of,  32. 


Quebec,  battle  of,  59. 
Quellen  zttr  Geschichte  des  Pap- 
stums,  see  Mirbt. 


368 


INDEX 


Realism,  rise  of,  212;  in  politics, 
212;  term  defined,  212  sqq.; 
German  definition  of,  212;  ef- 
fect of  science  in  producing 
vogue  of,  213;  capitalism  and, 
259;  Bismarck  and,  340. 

Realpolitik,  see  Realism. 

Recht  und  Politik,  see  Schopen- 
hauer. 

Rechtsphilosophie,  see  Hegel. 

Reform  Act  (1832)  effects  of,  in 
England,   107. 

Reformation,  influence  of,  4,  7, 
8,  17,  19,  23,  135,  236,  248; 
political  and  historical  changes 
due  to,  13  ;  Marxian  interpreta- 
tion of,  162. 

Regency,  in  France,  35. 

Regionalism,  doctrine  of,  254 
note. 

Reichstadt   (Duke  of),  123. 

Reichstadt,  meeting  at,  286; 
agreement  of,  286,  287. 

Reinsurance  Treaty,  between 
Germany  and  Russia,  332 ;  rat- 
ified by  Emperors  of  Austria, 
Russia,  and  Germany  at  Skier- 
nevige,  332  note;  Bismarck's 
object  in  concluding,  332;  re- 
newal of,  332   note,  341. 

Religion,  role  of,  ix ;  contrasted 
with  politics,  3,  9;  supplanted 
by  politics,  5,  8,  236;  decay  of 
ascendancy  of,  7,  8 ;  and  sci- 
ence, 214. 

Renaissance,  41,   130,  248. 

Renan,  quoted,  301   note. 

Restoration,  of  post-Napoleonic 
period,  92;  temper  of,  93;  re- 
pressive policy  of,  95 ;  legiti- 
macy as  policy  of,  93 ;  cited, 
97,  100,  106,  141. 

Revolution : 

{1688)  causes  and  aims  of, 
28,  73 ;  religious  and  political 
factors  of,  28;  supremacy  of 
Parliament  over  Crown  af- 
firmed by,  32. 

{1776)  nature  of,  48; 
French    influence    on,    59;    eco- 


nomic nature  of,  75 ;  causes  of 
success  of,  75 ;  results  on  politi- 
cal practice  due  to,  75. 

{1789)  political  influence 
of,  13;  spirit  of,  36;  ex- 
cesses of,  37 ;  public  opinion 
and,  37,  72;  causes  of,  48,  73; 
influence  of  American  example 
on,  74;  nature  of,  75  sqq.; 
details  of,  78;  role  of  Middle 
Class  in,  78;  results  of,  80,  97; 
question  of  maturity  of  ideol- 
ogy of,  119. 

{1830)  causes  of,  106;  po- 
litical aspects  of,  106;  the 
Middle  Class  and,  106;  effect 
of,  in  Belgium  and  Holland, 
107. 

{1848)  in  France,  152;  in- 
fluence of  economic  factors 
on,  152;  the  suffrage  ques- 
tion in,  152;  results  of,  152; 
in  Italy,  152;  demand  for  con- 
stitutional government  as  cause 
of,  152;  and  nationalist  strug- 
gle for  independence,  152; 
Venetian  and  Roman  Republics 
established  as  result  of,  152; 
collapse  of,  152;  in  Prussia, 
/Austria,  and  Hungary,  153; 
failure  of,  to  achieve  perma- 
nent results,  153;  causes  of 
scant  success  of,  in  general, 
analysed,    155. 

{1870-71)  in  France  as  re- 
sult of  disastrous  war,  207 ; 
the  episode  of  the  Com- 
mune, 208;  permanent  results 
of,  208. 

Richelieu   (Cardinal),  234. 

Right  (Declaration  and  Bill  of) 
(1689),  10.  31;  provisions  of, 
28;  effects  of,  62;  compared 
with  Declaration  of  Rights  of 
Man  and  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  115. 

Rights  of  Man  (Declaration  of) 
(1789),  10;  provisions  of,  77; 
historical    comparison    of,    115. 

Rochambeau,   37. 


INDEX 


369 


Rome,  disruption  of  the  empire, 
2;  political  maturity  of,  117; 
republic  of  1848  at,  152;  the 
Frenchf  garrison  of,  195; 
seized  by  the  Italians,  274; 
cited,  127,  195;  Church  of,  see 
Papacy. 

Romans,  persecutions  by,  8 ;  idea 
of  unity  among,  39;  utilitarian- 
ism of,  39;  political  character 
of,  117;  distinction  made  by, 
between  law  and  morality,  210 
note. 

Rousseau,  10,  50,  66,  78,  84; 
Contrat  Social  of,  quoted,  51, 
52  note;  Discourse  on  the  In- 
equality among  Mankind  of, 
quoted,  51;  theory  of,  re  will 
of  all  and  general  will,  50  note, 
150  and  note,  219  and  note, 
147;  volitional  doctrine  of, 
contrasted  with  that  of  Locke 
and  Hobbes,  50  note,  52;  and 
the  politico-juridic  theory,  52; 
and  Declaration  of  Indepen- 
dence, 53. 

Rumania,  creation  of,  246;  na- 
tional aspirations  of,  278;  ef- 
fects of  Congress  of  Berlin  on 
territory  of,  314. 

Russia,  forms  the  Holy  Alliance, 
94  and  note ;  frames  the  agree- 
ment of  Troppau,  95 ;  inter- 
venes in  Greece,  104;  Polish 
insurrection  against,  123;  as  a 
Great  Power,  182;  Wars  of 
Nicholas  I,  of,  183;  Pan-Slavic 
Movement  of,  183;  Asiatic  in- 
terests of,  184,  190;  Polish 
policy  of,  183,  196;  and  the 
Crimean  War,  184  sqq.;  at  the 
Congress  of  Paris,  187  sqq.;  in 
the  vortex  of  Western  affairs, 
190;  Italian  policy  of,  193;  ten- 
sion with  France  over  Poland, 
198;  and  the  Luxemburg  inci- 
dent, 203 ;  relations  of,  with 
Prussia,  196  sqq.,  205  ;  attitude 
of,  towards  France,  207 ;  as 
World       Power,      228      note; 


growth  of  political  conscious- 
ness in,  245 ;  forces  revision  of 
treaty  of  Paris,  275  ;  Bismarck's 
plan  of  alliance  with,  275 ;  ad- 
vance in  Central  Asia  of,  266 ; 
influence  in  the  Balkans  of, 
277 ;  threat  of,  against  Con- 
stantinople, 277 ;  Turkish 
policy  of,  278;  partition  of 
Turkey  advocated  by,  280;  as 
champion  of  the  independence 
of  Balkan  peoples,  284;  ad- 
vance on  Sea  of  Marmora  by, 
284;  Balkan  crisis  and  plans 
of,  285 ;  the  Reichstadt  agree- 
ment of,  286;  attitude  of,  to- 
wards England,  288;  mobilisa- 
tion of,  289 ;  treaty  of,  with 
Austria  re  Balkans,  290;  de- 
clares war  on  Turkey,  290; 
campaign  of,  291  ;  victories  of, 
291 ;  the  treaty  of  San  Stef- 
ano  of,  with  Turkey,  292 ;  at 
the  Congress  of  Berlin,  296, 
314;  and  the  Austro-German 
Alliance,  316;  the  Reinsurance 
Treaty  of,  (1884),  332  and 
note ;  renewal  of  Dreikaiser- 
bund,  332  note ;  paramount  in- 
terest in  Asia  of,  334. 
Russell  (Lord  Odo),  286  note. 


Sadowa,    battle    of,   200;    results 

of,  202. 
Samoa,  335. 
Salisbury    (Lord),    289;    quoted, 

317; 

Salonika,    Austrian    advance    on, 

297. 
San  Stefano,  treaty  of,  terms  of, 

292  sqq.;  revision  of,  293,  295. 
Savoy,  81,    181,   196. 
Savoy  (House  of),  191. 
Schleswig-Holstein,     see     Danish 

Duchies. 
Schopenliauer,  teachings  of,  216; 

pessimistic    doctrine    of,    217; 

Recht    und   Politik    of,    quoted, 

217;  cited,  261. 


370 


INDEX 


Science,  effect  of  development  of, 
on  history  and  politics  after 
1870,  215  sqq. 

Scotland,      Act      of      Union      of 

(1707),  33- 

Sebastopol,  siege  of,  186,  187. 

Sedan,  battle  of,  cited,  127;  re- 
sults of,   207. 

Seignobos,  quoted,  95  note. 

Seneca,  cited  on  progress,  43. 

Serbia,  national  aspirations  of, 
278;  revolt  in,  284;  declares 
war  on  Turkey,  286;  indepen- 
dence of,  296. 

Sicily,  constitution  of  (1812),  90; 
revolution  in,  152. 

Sidi  Saddok  (Bey  of  Tunis),  322. 

Skierneviqe,  332  note. 

Smith  (Adam),  Inquiry  into  the 
Nature  and  Causes  of  the 
IFealth  of  Nations,  by,  69 ; 
character  of,  69;  influence  of 
Physiocrats  on,  69 ;  economic 
theories  of,  70;  contribution  to 
economics  of,  71;  influence  of, 
on  politics,  71. 

Socialism,  first  forecast  of,  99 
and  note;  St.  Simon  as  foun- 
der of,  99;  origins  of  modern, 
99  and  note;  scientific,  see 
Communism;  State,  166;  Com- 
munist view  of,  167;  Bismarck 
and,  310  and  note. 

Solferino,  battle  of,  194. 

Sophocles,  (Edipus  at  Colonus, 
of,  quoted,  216. 

South  America,  constitutional 
government  in,  64  note. 

Spain,  inquisition  in,  8;  taxation 
in,  10;  as  a  national  State,  86; 
constitution  of  1812,  90;  Holy 
Alliance  and,  96;  constitutional 
government  in,  128  note;  in- 
tervention in  Mexico  by,  197; 
withdrawal  from  Mexico  by, 
197;  HohenzoUern  candidate 
to  throne  of,  205,  206;  as 
Minor  Power,  228  note;  inter- 
nationalism in,  255;  Marshall 
Islands  and,  335. 


Spencer  (Herbert),  quoted,  224 
note. 

Stanley,  African  explorer,  337. 

State,  see  Nation-State,  State  as 
Power,  Theory  of  State,  Super- 
State,   etc. 

States  General  (1789),  75. 

Stewart,  71. 

Stoics,  39. 

Strassburg,   124. 

St.   Helena,  85,   124. 

St.   Peter,   Patrimony  of,  22. 

St.  Petersburg,  cited,  197,  261, 
278. 

St.  Simon,  socialist  doctrine  of, 
99;  Du  Systetne  Industrie!  and 
Le  Nouveau  Christianisrtie,  of, 
99  note;  cited,  100,  158;  rela- 
tion to  Positivism  of,  125. 

St.  Sophia,  278. 

Sudan,  334. 

Suez  Canal,  construction  and 
opening  of,  277 ;  diversion  of 
trade  routes  through,  278;  con- 
trol of,  acquired  by  England, 
281. 

Suffrage,  struggle  for  extension 
of,  148,  sqq.;  in  England,  148; 
in  France,  148;  value  of,  150 
and  note;  universal,  238. 

Super-Man,  260,  319. 

Super  -  State,  politico  -  economic 
thesis  of,  319  sqq.;  Triple  Al- 
liance regarded  as  forming  a, 
328,  329,  330;  imperialism  and, 
327;  Bismarck  and  the,  330  sqq. 

Switzerland,  64  note,  169;  as 
Minor  Power,  228  note. 

Syria,  French  interest  in,  297. 


Tacitus,  27. 

Talleyrand,  92. 

Tancred,    cited    re    Cyprus,    294 

note. 
Terror   (Reign  of),  79. 
The  Moral  Equivalent  of  War, 

see  James. 
Thibaudeau,    Histoire    des   £tats 

Generaux  by,  quoted,  81   note. 


INDEX 


371 


Tiers  £tat,  75,  76. 

Tocqueville,  de,  Democracy  in 
America  by,  quoted,  60,  144, 
176. 

Togoland,  334. 

Tonkin,  333. 

Trade-Unions,  first  legally  sanc- 
tioned in  England,  iio;  inter- 
national movement  and,  250, 
255;  strikes  supported  by,  251. 

Trafalgar,  283. 

Transvaal,  315. 

Treitschke  (H.  von),  Politik  of, 
cited,  211;  as  the  interpreter 
of  Bismarck's  policy,  303;  Poli- 
tik of,  quoted,  303,  344,  and 
note,  346;  the  Machtlehre  of, 

343- 

Triple  Alliance,  genesis  of,  at 
Congress  of  Berlin,  298;  for- 
mation of,  by  Bismarck,  325 
sqq.;  role  of  Italy  and  Austria 
in,  326  sqq.;  significance  of,  to 
Bismarck,  328;  viewed  as  re- 
vival of  Holy  Roman  Empire, 
326,  328;  Bismarck  quoted  re- 
garding, 326;  scope  of,  328; 
economic  aspects  of,  329 ;  as  the 
Super-State,  329;  viewed  as 
conclusion  of  process  of  Ger- 
man unity,  328 ;  true  signifi- 
cance of,  329,  330. 

Triple  Entente,  298. 

Troppau  (Congress  of),  95. 

Tunis,  France  urged  to  annex, 
297;  condition  of,  320;  Italian 
interests  in,  321  ;  the  Bey  of, 
321;  Franco-Italian  rivalry  in, 
321 ;  as  scene  of  first  imperial- 
ist comedy,  322 ;  details  of 
French  expedition  to,  322 ;  ac- 
quisition of,  by  France,  322; 
Bismarck  and,  324. 

Turgot,  on  progress,  46. 

Turin,  194. 

Turkey,  war  of  Greek  indepen- 
dence and,  127;  share  of,  in 
the  Crimean  War,  184  sqq.; 
and  the  Balkans,  246;  policy 
of  England  towards,  278  sqq.; 


Russian,  German,  and  Austrian 
plans  re,  279  sqq.;  default  on 
interest  on  public  debt  by,  280; 
plan  to  partition,  280  sqq.,  285; 
proposed  European  interven- 
tion in,  284;  plans  of,  for  re- 
forms in  the  Balkans,  284; 
mobilisation  of  armies  of,  284; 
palace  revolutions  in,  285,  287 ; 
insurrection  in  European  prov- 
inces of,  286;  Abdul  Hamid, 
Sultan  of,  287 ;  conference  of 
Constantinople  re  288;  consti- 
tution granted  by,  290;  war  of, 
with  Russia,  290;  invasion  of, 
by  Russians,  291  ;  details  of 
Russian  campaign  in,  291 ;  ar- 
mistice with  Russia,  291  ;  the 
peace  of  San  Stefano  and,  292; 
assistance  rendered  by  England 
to  prevent  partition  of,  292; 
cedes  Cyprus  to  England,  293 ; 
at  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  296, 
314;  future  partition  of,  dis- 
cussed, 317;  attitude  of,  in 
Tunis,  322. 


Umbria,   195. 

Unam  Sanctam  (Papal  bull) 
quoted,  22  note. 

United  States,  constitution  of,  53, 
115;  quoted,  63  note,  78;  con- 
stitutional democracy  in,  56; 
colonial  origin  of,  57,  58;  Puri- 
tan influence  in,  58;  character 
of  founders  of,  58;  influence  of 
French  theories  in,  59;  strug- 
gle for  independence  of,  59; 
contribution  of  English  polit- 
ical practice  to,  60;  definition 
of  sovereignty  by,  63  ;  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  and,  95,  198,  246; 
confronts  the  Holy  Alliance, 
95;  opening  of  Japan  by,  191; 
the  slavery  question  in,  192; 
civil  war  in,  198;  and  Mexico, 
198,  202,  246;  as  a  Great  Pow- 
er, 228  note;  public  opinion  in, 
239;     rapid     development     of, 


372 


INDEX 


after  1875,  246;  international 
movement  in,  253 ;  imperial- 
ism in,  256  note;  at  conference 
of  Berlin,  338  and  note. 

Vatican,  see  Papacy. 

Vauban,  68. 

Venice    (Republic  of)    1848,   152. 

Venetia,  195;  annexed  to  Italy, 
201. 

Vera  Cruz,  199. 

Verona  (Congress  of),  95. 

Versailles,  208. 

Victoria  (Queen  of  England), 
178,  291,  316  note,  317  note; 
crowned  Empress  of  India, 
266. 

Vienna  (Congress  of),  92,  93; 
work  of,   128. 

Vienna,  revolution  in,  157;  nego- 
tiations at  (1855),  187;  cited, 
183,  187,  191,  194,  201,  275, 
280,  292,  316. 

Villafranca,    194. 

Virginia,  61  note. 

Wallace  (William),  Hegel's 
Philosophy  of  Mind,  transla- 
tion of,  133. 

Wallachia,  188. 

War,  as  expression  of  national 
will,  221;  years  of,  233  note; 
political  value  of,  341  ;  peace 
attained  through,  344;  value  of, 
344;  the  State  as  a  weapon  for, 
344;  Treitschke  on,  quoted,  344 
note. 


War  of  Liberation,  in  Germany, 
91,  136. 

Washington,  202. 

Waterloo,   122. 

Wealth  of  Nations,  see  Adam 
Smith. 

Wellington  (Duke  of),  107. 

Westminster,  33. 

Westminster  Review,  cited,  224 
note. 

Westphalia  (Treaty  of),  144. 

Will,  Locke  on  the,  50;  law  as 
expression  of  the  general,  77, 
78;  Hegel's  view  of,  133,  134; 
Rousseau  on  the  nature  of  the, 
in  politics,  147,  150  and  note, 
219;  in  history,  116,  154,  155 
and  note;  cited,  148;  of  the 
people,  173;  national,  176,  221, 
224;  new  political  theory  of, 
220,  221;  as  power,  221. 

William  (King  of  England),  28, 
29. 

Windthorst,  307. 

Wittenberg,  8. 

Wolsey  (Cardinal),  234. 

World  War,  imperialist  epoch 
closed  during,  257;  271. 


Young  Turks,  see  Turkey. 


Zollverein,  129,  137,  329. 

Zulus,    War    of,    with    England, 

315- 
Zur  Kritik  der  politischen  Oeko- 
nomine,  see  Marx. 


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